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TMI Blog1987 (12) TMI 330X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ment of those sites. Several persons submitted applications. The appellants in Appeal No. 97 of 1981 were some of them. They applied with deposit of earnest money of ₹ 1000 each. That would be ten per cent of the premium payable for the site. All the applications were processed for final allotment. In the meantime, it is said that the appellants were called upon to deposit 25 per cent of the premium calculated at the rate of ₹ 15 per square yard. The appellants appear to have complied with that demand also. Since there were more applicants than the sites available, the authorities decided to draw the lots. In October 1977, the lots were drawn and the lady luck smiled at the appellants. But the authorities did not issue letters of allotment. The reason was obvious. The authorities had a second look at the scheme of allotment of sites for printing industries. The authorities wanted to accommodate as many applicants as possible. But they could not accommodate all those applicants for want of adequate number of sites in the industrial area phase II. The authorities were also of the view that for setting up the printing industry, larger sites such as those earmarked earlier, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eurs who were allotted sites from industrial area phase II paid the premium only at the rate of ₹ 15 per square yard. Why then there should be a higher rate payable by these persons. They did not ask for sites in the Industrial area phase I. Their applications for sites in the industrial area phase II were not rejected. The same applications appear to have been considered for sites in the industrial area phase I. Secondly, the applicants were not responsible for the delay in the allotment of sites. The delay was entirely due to the change of policy adopted by the Chandigarh administration. Thirdly, there is no evidence that the Chandigarh administration had to incur more expenditure for forming new sites in phase I. It is, therefore, not proper that these applicants should be asked to pay the premium at a higher rate. The High Court, in our opinion, was justified in directing the authorities to recover only at rate of ₹ 15 per square yard. Before considering the contentions urged in the appeal of printing press owners, we may briefly refer to the relevant provisions of the enactment bearing on the contentions. The disposal of building sites in Chandigarh has been reg ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the premium and the remaining 75 per cent of the premium shall be paid as provided under Rule. 12. Relying on these provisions, it was urged that the appellants had a right to obtain transfer of sites in respect of which the lots were first drawn in their favour. We are unable to accept this contention. Admittedly, at that stage, there was no intimation of allotment of sites to the appellants. There was no official communication to them as required under sub-rule (3) of Rule 8. Such intimation alone confers right on the appellants to obtain possession of the sites. The intimation must be sent by a registered letter giving particulars of the sites allotted and the premium payable in respect thereof. In the absence of any such communication, the appellants cannot be held to have the right to get transfer of sites in their favour. The next step in the argument was that the Estate officer ought to have allotted the sites upon the receipt of applications of the appellants. The reliance was placed and emphasis was put on the word shall used in sub-rule (3) of Rule 8. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 8 provides that when 10 per cent of the premium has been tendered, the Estate officer shall, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ger plots. It was stated that the appellants upon the assurance of getting bigger plots had placed orders for heavy machinaries for their printing presses. These averments were also made in the writ petition before the High Court. The High Court rejected the plea of estoppel on the ground that there was no evidence of heavy investment on machinaries. Mr. V.M. Tarkunde, learned counsel for the appellants urged that there is no need to produce any such evidence to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel. The counsel is right in this aspect. The party invoking the doctrine of estoppel need not prove any detriment as such. It may be sufficient if he has relied upon the assurance made to him. This court in the Delhi Cloth General Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (Civil Appeal No. 223 of 1974 disposed of on October 8, 1987) to which one of us was a member, said: It is true, that in the formative period, it was generally said that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked by the promisee unless he has suffered 'detriment' or 'prejudice'. It was often said simply, that the party asserting the estoppel must have been induced to act to his detriment. But ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he next contention urged for the appellants related to the revised policy adopted by the Chandigarh administration for allotment of smaller sites. It was said that the sites in phase II ought to have been allotted when there were enough to go round the appellants. It was also said that the other entrepreneurs who had filed applications along with the appellants had been allotted sites in phase II and there was no good reason to exclude the appellants for being considered for smaller sites in phase I. The procedure followed by the authorities has been assailed as arbitrary and contrary to Art. 14 of the Constitution. Of course, if there were enough plots to accommodate all the applicants in the industrial area phase II, it would not be proper for the authorities to revise the policy and allot smaller sites in phase I. But no material has been placed before us to come to the conclusion that there were enough industrial plots to accommodate as far as possible all those applicants. It appears from the record that the authorities for want of plots in phase II formed another lay out in phrase I. The action of the authorities appears to be bona fide and we have no reason to doubt it. T ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... command to the State to afford equal protection of its law sets a goal not attainable by the invention and application of a precise formula. Therefore, classification need not be constituted by an exact or scientific exclusion or inclusion of persons or things. The Courts should not insist on delusive exactness or apply doctrinaire tests for determining the validity of classification in any given case. Classification is justified if it is not palpably arbitrary. (ii) The law can make and set apart the classes according to the needs and exigencies of the society and as suggested by experience. It can recognise even a degree of evil, but the classification should never be arbitrary, artificial or evasive. (iii) The classification must not be arbitrary but must be rational, that is to say, it must not only be based on some qualities or characteristics which are to be found in all the persons grouped together and not in others who are left out but those qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object of the legislation. There is yet another facet of Art. 14. This Court speaking through Bhagwati, J. in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, [197 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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