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TMI Blog2017 (12) TMI 1448X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nt is an a department of the Central Government. 2. The first respondent was charging licence fee to the petitioners. The reason for filing the writ petition is that the first respondent threatened to terminate the licences granted to the petitioners and entry permits to the airport on the ground of failure of the petitioners to supply information demanded from them and for non payment of licence fee which was claimed with retrospective effect from 1979. The demand was made by the first respondent by a letter dated 6th December 1996 addressed to the third petitioner. By the said letter, the petitioners were called upon to pay the licence fee at the rate of 2% from the year 1979 to January 1985 and at the rate of 10% from February 1985 till March 1991. For the period commencing from 1st April 1991, the licence fee was demanded at the rate of 11%. The percentage specified was of gross turnover every year. According to the case of the petitioners, the demand for payment of licence fee was without authority of law as there is no power to impose licence fee save and except upon instructions of the Central Government as is clear from Section 22(ii) of the said Act of 1994. The contentio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nt held on 3rd September 1984, it is noted that earlier Regulations of 1982 have been superseded by the said Regulations of 1984. The resolution records that the Board approved charging of licence fee at the rate of 10% of gross turnover from agencies providing ground handling services to airlines at the airport. 5. By a letter dated 4th October 1995 issued by the first respondent, the third petitioner was informed by the first respondent that it has been decided to charge licence fee at the rate of 11% on the gross turnover of the petitioners for providing ground handling services at Mumbai Airport from the date on which the third petitioner has been rendering ground handling services to the concerned airlines. The petitioners by addressing a letter dated 28th October 1996 informed the Airport Director of the first respondent that the petitioners were ready and willing to pay licence fee at the rate of 2% of the gross turnover with effect from 4th October 1995. Accordingly, a cheque in the sum of Rs. 1,99,594.60 was forwarded with the said letter. By the said letter, it was pointed out that various flight kitchen operators rendering services at Mumbai Airport have not been subjec ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed the charging of licence fee at the rate of 10% on gross turnover from the agencies providing ground handling services. By a letter dated 2nd July 1986, the advocate for the first respondent informed the advocate for the petitioners that the petitioners should make payment of licence fee on whatever basis as an ad hoc payment until final amount is determined in consultation with the first respondent. By a letter dated 29th September/4th October 1995, the first respondent informed the petitioners that it has been decided to charge to the third petitioner licence fee at the rate of 11% of the gross turnover for providing ground handling services at Bombay Airport. By a letter dated 3rd October 1996, the petitioner requested the Airport Director of the Mumbai Airport to look into the matter and issue necessary directions for complying with the judgment and order dated 13th April 1994 in Writ Petition No.2277 of 1984. 9. This writ petition was originally filed for challenging the demand of licence fee made by the letter dated 6th December 1986 (Exhibit A to the petition). 10. In this writ petition, on 23rd December 1996, this Court granted interim relief in terms of prayer clauses ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... orders. The petitioners were directed to pay licence fee at the rate of 15% of the gross turnover directly to the second respondent instead of first respondent. The said notice of motion taken out by the petitioners was disposed in terms of the minutes of the order dated 9th April 2009 by which the petitioners were directed to pay charges/ licence fees to the second respondent as per the policies of the second respondent. The second respondent was directed to give NOC in favour of the petitioners and their employees to the Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (the third respondent) for renewal of entry passes. 12. In supersession of the said Regulations of 2000, on 18th October 2007 the first respondent brought into force the Airports Authority of India (General Management, Entry for Ground Handling Services) Regulations of 2007 (for short "the Regulations of 2007"). The said Regulations were brought into force from 1st October 2007. 13. In this petition, it is pointed out that during the pendency of the petition, the second respondent continued to demand and recover from the petitioners licence fee by terming it as "royalty/ revenue share/ damage charges" from time to time. Accord ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... filing of the petition. It is contended that though resolution was passed by the Board of Directors of the first respondent on 26th December 2001 by which it was resolved to charge licence fee at the rate of 11% of gross turnover, a demand was made from the petitioners for the said amount with effect from 1st April 1991. It is contended that even initial rate of 2% is not sanctioned by the Board Resolution. It is contended that the amount paid at the rate of 2% of gross turnover was without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the petitioners. 17. There is reply filed by Shri Raghava M. on behalf of the second respondent. Shri Raghava M. is the General ManagerLegal and authorized representative of the second respondent. The first contention raised is that the first respondent is a private entity and, therefore, a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be issued against the second respondent. It was further contended that with a view to enable the second respondent to discharge its functions under OMDA, a registered leasedeed dated 26th April 2006 has been entered into by and between the first respondent and the second respondent. Reliance is al ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... owered to charge any fees or rent without previous approval of the Central Government and in the present case, there is nothing placed on record to show that the rate of fees was fixed at 2%, 10%, 11% and 15% respectively with previous approval of the Central Government. She invited our attention to the said Regulations of 1984 and the said Regulations of 2000. She invited our attention to the definition of "ground handling" in both the said Regulations. She also pointed out the guidelines issued for grant of permit to provide ground handling services at airports other than those belonging to the Airport Authority of India. She submitted that the levy attempted to be made by the first and second respondents is in the nature of tax. She also pointed out the pleadings regarding discrimination between certain other private agencies and the present petitioners. She tendered across the bar a statement showing the amounts so far paid by the petitioners to the first respondent which are also set out in the petition and in the rejoinder filed by the petitioners. She relied upon the decision of Calcutta High Court in the case of Netram Agarwalla and others v. Chairman, Raigunj Municipality ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ervices as it concerns the facility for carrying on any trade or business at airport, heliport or airstrip. He submitted that for charging fees or rent for such services, prior approval of the Central Government is not necessary. He submitted that as clause (ii) covers ground handling services, the first respondent and the second respondent have power to levy ground handling charges. He also pointed out that the petitioners have discontinued their operation at the Mumbai Airport from 31st March 2015 as set out in the affidavitinreply. He relied upon the said Regulations of 2000 and guidelines bearing No.AIC 07/2007. He relied upon the minutes of order dated 9th April 2009. 20. The learned counsel appearing for the first respondent supported the impugned action. One of the submissions of the first respondent and the second respondent, without prejudice to their rights and contentions, is that in any event, the petitioners are not entitled to refund as the same would amount to unjust enrichment. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, relying upon the interim orders, submitted that there is no question of unjust enrichment. The learned counsel appearing for the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dent No.2. The airport was already in existence and various functions were performed thereat in terms of this statute of 1994. That the amendment permits leasing and for the purpose of preserving and protecting public interest or better management of airports, then, it would not be proper to agree with Mr. Tulzapurkar that a writ petition cannot be filed and raising the above challenge. 85. Mr. Tulzapurkar's reliance on Article 12 of the Constitution of India is not proper for Article 226 of the Constitution of India empowers this Court to issue a writ in terms thereof to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. Part III of the Constitution of India contains Articles 12 to 35. The right to equality guaranteed by Articles 14 to 18, the right to freedom guaranteed by Articles 19 to 22, the right against exploitation, the right to freedom of religion, constitutional and educational rights and right to constitutional remedies. Therefore, for enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose, a writ can be issued. Once a petition ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... comes from several ancillary and connected documents and deeds. However, the foundation for all this is the AAI Act, 1994, and the functions discharged in pursuance thereof. It is in these circumstances that we hold that the management and administration of an airport meant for passengers and cargo carried by airline companies is the function discharged and duty performed. That is not under any private arrangement. It is futile to urge that everything in relation to the administration, management and operation of the airport is in the realm of a contract or private law. That extreme contention has not been canvassed. The only argument is that the larger issue about maintainability of the writ petition against MIAL is pending and we should observe nothing by which the stand of the MIAL in such proceedings is affected or jeopardized. We hasten to add that we have no such intent nor as a blanket proposition are we suggesting that the MIAL in all times and under all circumstances is amenable to writ jurisdiction. Just as Mr. Tulzapurkar relies upon paragraph 102 of the judgment in the case of Life Insurance Corporation of India vs. Escorts Limited & Ors. (1986) 1 SCC 264, we are mindfu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed, namely, its provisions do not empower collection of such levy which we are considering and, therefore, to determine the question of maintainability de hors or contrary to the statute would be impermissible. Therefore, we do not think that the writ petition can be dismissed on the grounds of maintainability." (underlines supplied) Therefore, the preliminary issue raised by the second respondent is already concluded against the said respondent. 22. Even otherwise, the said decision which binds this Court is material and relevant. We must note that in the said case before the Division Bench, the challenge was to the payment demanded from various airlines of levy of 13% of gross turnover of food items/articles which are uplifted from Chhatrapati Shivaji International Airport, Mumbai and sold onboard for domestic and international airlines. The Division Bench considered Sections 12 and 12A of the said Act of 1994, which reads thus: "12. Functions of the Authority. (1) Subject to the rules, if any, made by the Central Government in this behalf, it shall be the function of the Authority to manage the airports, the civil enclaves and the aeronautical communication s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... es to further the efficient discharge of the functions imposed on it by this Act; (o) take all such steps as may be necessary or convenient for, or may be incidental to, the exercise of any power or the discharge of any function conferred or imposed on it by this Act; (p) perform any other function considered necessary or desirable by the Central Government for ensuring the safe and efficient operation of aircraft to, from and across the air space of India; (q) establish training institutes and workshops; (r) any other activity at the airports and the civil enclaves in the best commercial interests of the Authority including cargo handling, setting up of joint ventures for the discharge of any function assigned to the Authority. (4) In the discharge of its functions under this section, the Authority shall have due regard to the development of air transport service and to the efficiency, economy and safety of such service. (5) Nothing contained in this section shall be construed as (a) authorising the disregard by the Authority of any law for the time being in force; or (b) authorising any person to institute any proceeding in respect of duty or liability t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... i) and (ii) of Section 22 of the said Act 1994. In paragraph 118, the Division Bench held thus: "118. After this comes clause (ii) which once again must be seen as the power of the authority. The authority with due regard to the instructions that the Central Government may give to it from time to time, charge fees or rent from persons who are given by the authority any facility for carrying on any trade or business at any airport, heliport or airstrip. Thus, these fees or rent is charged from persons who are given by the authority any facility for carrying on a trade or business at any airport. This provision once again must be read not in isolation but harmoniously with all other provisions of the Act falling in separate chapters and particularly those functions which the authorities may discharge in terms of section 12(1) and (2). The authority thus manages the airports, civil enclaves and aeronautical communication stations and it is expected to do all this efficiently. It is its duty to provide air traffic service and air transport service at any airport and civil enclave. It, in its discretion may carry out various activities and take such steps and measures as would en ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... at any airport. This facility given by the AAI to such persons and that function in turn being taken over by the second respondent would not take within its import the services rendered by the airline operators to the passengers and the flying public. The persons contemplated by clause (ii) of section 22 are those who are carrying on trade or business at the airport. To enable them to carry on any trade or business, facilities are given by the AAI and which power, in turn, is now vesting in a limited sense with the second respondent. It is for that the fees or rent can be charged. The question raised is whether the petitioners before us are such persons as are contemplated and covered by this clause. We think not. We hasten to clarify that this would not be so in all cases and in all circumstances for the authority may charge fee or rent from persons who are given any facility for carrying on any trade or business at any airport, heliport or airstrip and such persons may include the airline companies. It is common ground that the airline companies set up their ticketing centres, information kiosks, booth for assisting passengers, particularly in medical emergencies and would use e ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... said power is not derived by the second respondent under OMDA. Thus, the act of the first and second respondents of imposing or levying licence fee must be supported by the said statutory provisions. 24. In the earlier part of the judgment, we have referred to the decision of this Court in Writ Petition No.2277/1984 filed by the petitioners. In the said writ petition, it was noted that the third petitioner commenced its business in the year 1979, initially of baggage handling of Gulf Air passengers. Later on, the third petitioner started handling of Saudi Airlines crew baggage. Thereafter, the third petitioner entered into agreements with various airlines for ground handling services including the services of providing wheel chairs and stretchers. In the said writ petition, it is held by this Court that the petitioners' business will be governed by the Regulations of 1984. As far as business carried out of ground handling services is concerned, the Government of India has issued an order on 18th January 1972 in exercise of powers under rule 72A of the Aircraft Rules, 1971 directing that no person shall enter into or remain in the movement area for operating any vehicle or oth ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e time employees or any of the designated agency under Regulation 3 authorised by it for handling its own aircrafts; (b) any other Operator or Agency who or which has been specially permitted in writing by the Authority to undertake ground handling activities through their bonafide whole time employees; (c) the bonafide whole time employees of National Carriers or any of the designated agencies under Regulation 3 authorised by them; (d) the bonafide whole time employees of Airports Authority of India or a designated agency authorized by it. 5. The Board of AAI will lay down terms and conditions (including financial consideration), eligibility criteria for ground handling agency (both financial and technical) and number of such agencies to be appointed at each airport keeping in view the safety, security demand, available infrastructure, land and other relevant consideration." We must note here that AnnexureB to the said Regulations include services to the passengers and baggage handling at the airport terminus. 25. A circular was issued by the Director General of Civil Aviation on 28th September 2007 for guidance under the title "Grant of Permission for Providing Gro ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... vious approval of the Central Government, charge fees or rent (a) for the landing, housing or parking of aircraft or for any other service or facility offered in connection with aircraft operations at any airport, heliport or airstrip; Explanation.In this subclause "aircraft" does not include an aircraft belonging to any armed force of the Union and "aircraft operations" does not include operations of any aircraft belonging to the said force; (b) for providing air traffic services, ground safety services, aeronautical communications and navigational aids and meteorological services at any airports and at any aeronautical communication station; (c) for the amenities given to the passengers and visitors at any airport, civil enclave, heliport or airstrip; (d) for the use and employment by persons of facilities and other services provided by the Authority at any airport, civil enclave, heliport or airstrip; (ii) with due regard to the instructions that the Central Government may give to the Authority, from time to time, charge fees for rent from persons who are given by the Authority any facility for carrying on any trade or business at any airport ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e power to collect licence fee or rent from the petitioners will be under clause (ii) of section 22 and not under clause (i). The business carried on by the ground handling services agencies on the basis of their agreements with the airlines will be covered by clause (ii). The second respondent on the basis of the lease executed under Section 12A can exercise power to levy fees only under the said Act of 1994 and not otherwise. As far as the demands subject matter of this petition are concerned, it is not shown that the same are either contrary or inconsistent with any instructions of the Central Government. There is no requirement of clause (ii) of Section 22 of the said Act of 1994 or clause (ii) of Section 17 of the said Act of 1971 to seek prior instructions of the Central Government before charging licence fee by exercising the power under clause (ii). The affidavit dated 11th May 2017 of Shri S.V.Ramana filed on behalf of the Central Government in SLP(C) No.33063 of 2016 takes the same stand. This affidavit shows that till that day, the Central Government had not issued instructions to the contrary. 28. The issue is dealt with in paragraph 118 of the decision of th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e Board Resolution of the first respondent fixing licence fee at the rate of 2% is not placed on record. The petitioners addressed a letter dated 28th October 1996 to the Airport Director of Mumbai Airport in which they have specifically stated that they are ready and willing to pay licence fee at the rate of 2% of gross turnover with effect from 4th October 1995 when for the first time demand for licence fee was made. In fact, a cheque representing the said amount was forwarded along with the said letter dated 28th October 1996. Even in the letter dated 6th December 1996, the petitioners again expressed their willingness to pay the amount at the rate of 2% and, in fact, an amount of Rs. 23,993.70 was forwarded along with the said letter. The resolution of the Board of the first respondent fixing the licence fee at 2% is not placed on record. In fact no such resolution is referred in the affidavit filed by Shri Ashok Arora on behalf of the first respondent. But the tenor of the letters dated 28th October 1996 and 6th December 1996 shows that the petitioners unconditionally accepted to pay fee at the rate of 2% from 4th October 1995. Hence, no relief can be granted as regards the pa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... etition filed in the year 1996. Thus, there is no merit in the challenge to the levy at the rate of 10% . 32. Exh.E is the letter dated 29th September/ 4th October 1995 by which the third petitioner was informed by the Deputy General Manager that it was decided to charge licence fee at the rate of 11% of gross turnover for providing ground handling services at Mumbai Airport. In fact, by the said letter, a demand was made for payment of licence fee at the rate of 11% of gross turnover from the date of commencement of the business. The first respondent in its reply has not relied upon any such resolution passed prior to 26th December 2001. There was no Board decision taken as on 4th October 1995 to charge fee at the rate of 11%. There is no reference in the said letter to any resolution passed by the Board of the first respondent authorizing or fixing the said rate. In absence of any such resolution, levy at the rate of 11% could not have been made. A meeting of the Board of the first respondent was held on 26th December 2001. Exh.O18 is a letter dated 1st April 2002 addressed by the General Manager (Commercial) to the Airport Director of the Indira Gandhi International Airpor ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is a tax or a fee. Paragraphs 31 and 32 of the said decision read thus: "31. The traditional view that there must be actual quid pro quo for a fee has under gone a sea change in the subsequent decisions. The distinction between a tax and a fee lies primarily in the fact that a tax is levied as part of a common burden, while a fee is for payment of a specific benefit or privilege although the special advantage is secondary to the primary motive of regulation in public interest. If the element of revenue for general purpose of the State predominates, the levy becomes a tax. In regard to fees there is, and must always be, correlation between the fee collected and the service intended to be rendered. In determining whether a levy is a fee, the true test must be whether its primary and essential purpose is to render specific services to a specified area or class; it may be of no consequence that the State may ultimately and indirectly be benefited by it. The power of any legislature to levy a fee is conditioned by the fact that it must be 'by and large", a quid pro quo for the services rendered. However, corelationship between the levy and the services rendered (sic or) expec ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is needless to stress that the element of quid pro quo is not necessarily absent in every tax : Constitutional Law of India by H. M. Seervai, Vol. 2, Second Edn., p. 1252, paras 22, 39." (underline supplied) 36. The Apex Court observed that a tax is levied as a part of a common burden, while a fee is a payment for a specific benefit or privilege. However, corelation between levy and service rendered or expected should be of the general character and not of mathematical exactitude. In the present case, initially the first respondent and thereafter, the second respondent allowed the third petitioner to conduct its business in the premises of the airport and earn income. The members of the staff of the third petitioner were allowed entry inside the airport. Therefore, there is quid pro quo between levy of licence fee and the facility provided by the first and the second respondents. Hence, the demand under challenge is not by way of a tax. 37. We have already referred to interim orders passed from time to time. On the basis of the interim orders, the petitioners have deposited the amount demanded at the rate of 10%, 11% and 15% respectively. Deposit of the amounts on the bas ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ndia and hence, any tax collected, retained or not refunded in accordance with the said provisions must be held to be collected, retained or not refunded, as the case may be, under the authority of law. Both the enactments are self contained enactments providing for levy, assessment, recovery and refund of duties imposed thereunder. Section 11B of the Central Excises and Salt Act and Section 27 of the Customs Act, both before and after the 1991 (Amendment) Act are constitutionally valid and have to be followed and give effect to. Section 72 of the Contract Act has no application to such a claim of refund and cannot form a basis for maintaining a suit or a writ petition. All refund claims except those mentioned under Proposition (ii) below have to be and must be filed and adjudicated under the provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act or the Customs Act, as the case may be. It is necessary to emphasize in this behalf that Act provides a complete mechanism for correcting any errors whether of fact or law and that not only an appeal is provided to a Tribunal which is not a departmental organ but to this Court, which is a civil court. (ii) Where, however, a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the judgment. Where the burden of the duty has been passed on, the claimant cannot say that he has suffered any real loss or prejudice. The real loss or prejudice is suffered in such a case by the person who has ultimately borne the burden and it is only that person who can legitimately claim its refund. But where such person does not come forward or where it is not possible to refund the amount to him for one or the other reason, it is just and appropriate that that amount is retained by the State, i.e., by the people. There is no immorality or impropriety involved in such a proposition. The doctrine of unjust enrichment is a just and salutary doctrine. No person can seek to collect the duty from both ends. In other words, he cannot collect the duty from his purchaser at one end and also collect the same duty from the State on the ground that it has been collected from him contrary to law. The power of the Court is not meant to be exercised for unjustly enriching a person. The doctrine of unjust enrichment is, however, inapplicable to the State. State represents the people of the country. No one can speak of the people being unjustly enriched. (iv) It is not open to any per ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... i) The decision of this Court in STO v. Kanhaiya Lal Mukundlal Saraf 1959 SCR 1350 AIR 1959 SC 135 (1958 9 STC 747 must be held to have been wrongly decided insofar as it lays down or is understood to have laid down propositions contrary to the propositions enunciated in (i) to (vii) above. It must equally be held that the subsequent decisions of this Court following and applying the said propositions in Kanhaiyalal have also been wrongly decided to the above extent. This declaration or the law laid down in Propositions (i) to (vii) above shall not however entitle the State to recover to taxes/duties already refunded and in respect whereof no proceedings are pending before any authority/Tribunal or Court as on this date. All pending matters shall, however, be governed by the law declared herein notwithstanding that the tax or duty has been refunded pending those proceedings, whether under the orders of an authority, Tribunal or Court or otherwise. (ix) The amendments made and the provisions inserted by the Central Excises and Customs Law (Amendment) Act, 1991 in the Central Excises and Salt Act and Customs Act are constitutionally valid and are unexceptionable. (x) ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... for refund provided he is able to establish that he has not passed on the burden to another person. It, therefore, cannot be said that Section 11B is a device to retain the illegally collected taxes by the State. This is equally true of Section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962." (underlines supplied) What is held by the Apex Court is in the context of illegal collection of tax. By order dated 23rd December 1996, the learned single Judge of this Court granted interim relief subject to condition of petitioners regularly paying licence fee at 11% of gross turnover. By further order dated 11th February 2009 in Notice of Motion No.73/2009, the petitioners were granted time of four weeks to pay licence fee at the enhanced rate from 1st July 2007. Thus, on the basis of interim orders passed by this Court, the petitioners have paid fees at the rate of 11% and 15%. 38. Now the question is whether the petitioners are entitled to refund. We have held that the demand for levy of licence fee at the rate of 2% of annual turnover is illegal. However, the petitioners paid the amount at the rate of 2% without any demur from 4th October 1995. Moreover, there is no challenge to the demand made a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 1st July 2007. The first respondent was not competent to demand licence fee at the rate of 2% for the period prior to 4th October 1995. The first respondent was entitled to recover licence fee at the rate of 10% of the annual turnover from 3rd September 1984 till 26th December 2001. From 26th December 2001, the recovery at the rate of 11% was lawful. From 1st July 2007, the levy at the rate of 15% is justified. (II) We direct the Director of Civil Aviation to appoint a competent officer of the appropriate rank to make an adjudication on the question of quantum of amounts paid by the petitioners which were not payable by them as per the findings recorded above. He will ascertain whether any amount in excess of what is payable in terms of what is held in clause (I) above was paid by the petitioners. The officer so appointed will decide whether the petitioners have recovered the said excess amount, if any, from the companies or airlines which employed them. Only if the petitioners satisfy the competent officer that the excess amount has not been recovered by the petitioners from third parties, to that extent, the petitioners will be entitled to refund. Even, the computation of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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