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2018 (1) TMI 1137

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..... ifferent aspects of the matters to be determined. A preliminary issue affecting the whole claim would expressly be the subject matter of an interim award under the English Act. The English Act advisedly does not use the expression interim or partial , so as to make it clear that the award covered by Section 47 of the English Act would be a final determination of the particular issue that the arbitral tribunal has decided. The award dated 23rd July, 2015 is an interim award, which being an arbitral award, can be challenged separately and independently under Section 34 of the Act. Such an award, which does not relate to the arbitral tribunal s own jurisdiction under Section 16, does not have to follow the drill of Section 16(5) and (6) of the Act. Appeal allowed. - Mr. R.F. Nariman And Navin Sinha JJ. JUDGMENT R.F. Nariman, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. An interesting question arises as to whether an award delivered by an Arbitrator, which decides the issue of limitation, can be said to be an interim award, and whether such interim award can then be set aside under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). The brief facts necessary to .....

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..... , the judgment of National Thermal Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Siemens Atkeingesellschaft, (2007) 4 SCC 451. He also referred us to various judgments on what constitutes an interim award and argued that, according to him, the point of limitation being one of the issues raised by the parties, was finally decided by the aforesaid award and would, therefore, be amenable to challenge. 5. Shri Ajit Kumar Sinha, learned senior advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent, also placed reliance on various sections of the Act, in particular Sections 16 and 37 thereof. According to the learned senior advocate, a ruling on the point of limitation is a ruling on jurisdiction and any finding thereon goes to the root of the case. This being the case, the drill of Section 16 has to be followed, and as the plea of limitation has been rejected by the learned Arbitrator, the arbitral proceedings have to continue further and the challenge has to be postponed only after all other issues have been decided. According to the learned senior advocate, the scheme of Section 37, in particular Section 37(2)(a), also makes it clear that appeals lie only from an order under Section 16 accepting the plea but not reje .....

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..... an interim arbitral award on any matter with respect to which it may make a final arbitral award. xxx xxx xxx 32. Termination of proceedings. -(1) The arbitral proceedings shall be terminated by the final arbitral award or by an order of the arbitral tribunal under sub-section (2). xxx xxx xxx 37. Appealable orders .-(1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders (and from no others) to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order, namely:- (a) refusing to refer the parties to arbitration under section 8; (b) granting or refusing to grant any measure under section 9; (c) setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under section 34. (2) Appeal shall also lie to a court from an order of the arbitral tribunal- (a) accepting the plea referred to in sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of section 16; or (b) granting or refusing to grant an interim measure under section 17. (3) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court. 7. The point at issue is a narrow one: whether an award on the issue of li .....

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..... parties. 11. The English Arbitration Act, 1996, throws some light on what is regarded as an interim award under English Law. Section 47 thereof states: 47 Awards on different issues, c. (1) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the tribunal may make more than one award at different times on different aspects of the matters to be determined. (2) The tribunal may, in particular, make an award relating- (a) to an issue affecting the whole claim, or (b) to a part only of the claims or cross-claims submitted to it for decision. (3) If the tribunal does so, it shall specify in its award the issue, or the claim or part of a claim, which is the subject matter of the award. 12. By reading this section, it becomes clear that more than one award finally determining any particular issue before the arbitral tribunal can be made on different aspects of the matters to be determined. A preliminary issue affecting the whole claim would expressly be the subject matter of an interim award under the English Act. The English Act advisedly does not use the expression interim or partial , so as to make it clear that the award covered by Section 47 of the English Act would be a final determination of t .....

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..... taken by the trial court that the earlier award made and written though signed was not pronounced but nevertheless had become complete and final, therefore, should be made the rule of the court appears to us to be correct with regard to Item 1 inasmuch as the claim in relation to Item 1 could not have been adjudicated by the arbitrator again and it has been rightly excluded from the second award made by the arbitrator on 28-1-1994. Thus the view taken by the trial court on this aspect also appears to us to be correct. Therefore, the trial court has rightly ordered the award dated 28-1-1994 to be the rule of the court except for Item 1 and in respect of which the award dated 26-11-1992 was ordered to be the rule of the court. It is, thus, clear that the first award that was made that finally determined one issue between the parties, with respect to Item no.1 of the claim, was held to be an interim award inasmuch as it finally determined claim 1 between the parties and, therefore, could not be re-adjudicated all over again. 15. In McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. (2006) 11 SCC 181 at page 211-212, under the heading validity of the partial award , this Court hel .....

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..... e may state that both the partial award and the final award are subject-matter of challenge under Section 34 of the Act. The aforesaid judgment makes it clear that an interim award or partial award is a final award on matters covered therein made at an intermediate stage of the arbitral proceedings. 16. Tested in the light of the statutory provisions and the case law cited above, it is clear that as the learned Arbitrator has disposed of one matter between the parties i.e. the issue of limitation finally, the award dated 23rd July, 2015 is an interim award within the meaning of Section 2(1)(c) of the Act and being subsumed within the expression arbitral award could, therefore, have been challenged under Section 34 of the Act. 17. However, Shri Sinha has argued before us that the award dated 23rd July, 2015 being a ruling on the arbitral tribunal s jurisdiction would fall within Section 16 of the Act, and inasmuch as the decision taken on the point of limitation was rejected, the drill of Section 16 must be followed in which case all other issues have to be decided first, and it is only after such issues are decided that such an award can be challenged under Section 34 of the Act. S .....

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..... rbitration and conciliation, they could, with appropriate modifications, serve as a model for legislation on domestic arbitration and conciliation. The present Bill seeks to consolidate and amend the law relating to domestic arbitration, international commercial arbitration, enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and to define the law relating to conciliation, taking into account the said UNCITRAL Model Law and Rules. 19. It may be noticed that Section 16(1) to (4) are based on Article 16 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. The Kompetenz principle deals with the arbitral tribunal s jurisdiction in the narrow sense of ruling on objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. What is important to notice in the language of Section 16(1) is the fact that the arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, which makes it clear that it refers to whether the arbitral tribunal may embark upon an inquiry into the issues raised by parties to the dispute. 20. Here again, the English Arbitration Act of 1996 throws some light on the problem before us. Sections 30 and 31 of the said Act read as under: 30 Competence of tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction. - (1) .....

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..... d that the said word displays a certain colour depending upon the context in which it is mentioned, is well-settled. In the classic sense, in Official Trustee v. Sachindra Nath Chatterjee , (1969) 3 SCR 92 at 99, jurisdiction is stated to be: In the order of Reference to a Full Bench in the case of Sukhlal v. Tara Chand [(1905) ILR 33 Cal 68] it was stated that jurisdiction may be defined to be the power of a Court to hear and determine a cause, to adjudicate and exercise any judicial power in relation to it: in other words, by jurisdiction is meant the authority which a Court has to decide matters that are litigated before it or to take cognizance of matters presented in a formal way for its decision . An examination of the cases in the books discloses numerous attempts to define the term jurisdiction , which has been stated to be the power to hear and determine issues of law and fact , the authority by which the judicial officer take cognizance of and decide causes ; the authority to hear and decide a legal controversy , the power to hear and determine the subject-matter in controversy between parties to a suit and to adjudicate or exercise any judicial power over them; the power .....

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..... ion 3 of the Limitation Act to ascertain for itself whether the suit before it was within time, it would act without jurisdiction if it fails to do so. All that the decision relied upon says is that Section 3 of the Limitation Act is peremptory and that it is the duty of the court to take notice of this provision and give effect to it even though the point of limitation is not referred to in the pleadings. The Privy Council has not said that where the court fails to perform its duty, it acts without jurisdiction. If it fails to do its duty, it merely makes an error of law and an error of law can be corrected only in the manner laid down in the Civil Procedure Code. If the party aggrieved does not take appropriate steps to have that error corrected, the erroneous decree will hold good and will not be open to challenge on the basis of being a nullity. 23. It is in this sense of the term that jurisdiction has been used in Section 16 of the Act. Indeed, in NTPC (supra) at 460-461, a Division Bench of this Court, after setting out Sections 16 and 37 held: 10. Now, the only question that remains to be decided in the present case is whether against the order of partial award an appeal is .....

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..... he claim. In Pandurang Dhoni Chougule v. Maruti Hari Jadhav [AIR 1996 SC 153 : (1996) 1 SCR 102] this Court observed that: (AIR p. 155, para 10) It is well settled that a plea of limitation or a plea of res judicata is a plea of law which concerns the jurisdiction of the court which tries the proceedings. A finding on these pleas in favour of the party raising them would oust the jurisdiction of the court, and so, an erroneous decision on these pleas can be said to be concerned with questions of jurisdiction which fall within the purview of Section 115 of the Code. In a particular sense, therefore, any declining to go into the merits of a claim could be said to be a case of refusal to exercise jurisdiction. 18. The expression jurisdiction is a word of many hues. Its colour is to be discerned from the setting in which it is used. When we look at Section 16 of the Act, we find that the said provision is one, which deals with the competence of the Arbitral Tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction. SBP Co. v. Patel Engg. Ltd. [(2005) 8 SCC 618] in a sense confined the operation of Section 16 to cases where the Arbitral Tribunal was constituted at the instance of the parties to the cont .....

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..... nd the refusal to proceed further either wholly or partly. 19. In a case where a counterclaim is referred to and dealt with and a plea that the counterclaim does not survive in view of the settlement of disputes between the parties earlier arrived at is accepted, it could not be held to be a case of refusal to exercise jurisdiction by the Arbitral Tribunal. Same is the position when an Arbitral Tribunal finds that a claim was dead and was not available to be made at the relevant time or that the claim was not maintainable for other valid reasons or that the claim was barred by limitation. They are all adjudications by the Tribunal on the merits of the claim and in such a case the aggrieved party can have recourse only to Section 34 of the Act and will have to succeed on establishing any of the grounds available under that provision. It would not be open to that party to take up the position that by refusing to go into the merits of his claim, the Arbitral Tribunal had upheld a plea that it does not have jurisdiction to entertain the claim and hence the award or order made by it, comes within the purview of Section 16(2) of the Act and consequently is appealable under Section 37(2) .....

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..... ith in revision? It is a bit difficult to understand how an erroneous decision on a question of limitation or res judicata would oust the jurisdiction of the court in the primitive sense of the term and render the decision or a decree embodying the decision a nullity liable to collateral attack. The reason can only be that the error of law was considered as vital by the court. And there is no yardstick to determine the magnitude of the error other than the opinion of the Court 26. Likewise, in Hari Prasad Mulshanker Trivedi v. V.B. Raju (1974) 3 SCC 415 at 423-424, a Constitution Bench of this Court again referred to the blurring of lines between errors of law and errors of jurisdiction found in Anisminic (supra) as follows: Though the dividing line between lack of jurisdiction or power and erroneous exercise of it has become thin with the decision of the House of Lords in the Anisminic case , [(1967) 3 WLR 382] we do not think that the distinction between the two has been completely wiped out. We are aware of the difficulty in formulating an exhaustive rule to tell when there is lack of power and when there is an erroneous exercise of it. The difficulty has arisen because the word .....

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..... ed to the expression jurisdiction occurring in Section 9A and held an earlier judgment of this Court to be per incuriam. Though the Constitution Bench judgment in Ittavira (supra) was mentioned by the Bench, referring to the argument of one of the counsel for the parties, in the concluding portion, this judgment is not referred to at all. In any case, the reasoning of the Court in that case was in the context of Section 9A which, when contrasted with Order XIV of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, made the Court accept the wider concept of jurisdiction as laid down in Pandurang (supra). 29. In our view, therefore, it is clear that the award dated 23rd July, 2015 is an interim award, which being an arbitral award, can be challenged separately and independently under Section 34 of the Act. We are of the view that such an award, which does not relate to the arbitral tribunal s own jurisdiction under Section 16, does not have to follow the drill of Section 16(5) and (6) of the Act. Having said this, we are of the view that Parliament may consider amending Section 34 of the Act so as to consolidate all interim awards together with the final arbitral award, so that one challenge under Se .....

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