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TMI Blog1997 (7) TMI 686X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ers was in violation of the above Rules and the said Act and hence the sales are voidable. When the case had come up before this Court, this Court while upholding the constitutionality of the Act directed the authorities to go into the question of adverse possession raised by the petitioners. The learned single Judge has extracted the pleadings on adverse possession of the petitioners. Therein, the High Court had pointed out that there is no express plea of adverse possession except stating that after the purchase of the lands made by them, they remained in possession and enjoyment of the lands. What requires to be pleaded and proved is that the purchaser disclaimed his title under which he came into possession, set up adverse possession with necessary animus of asserting open and hostile title to the knowledge of the true owner and the later allowed the former, without any let or hindrance, to remain in possession and enjoyment of the properly adverse to the interest of the true owner until the expiry of the prescribed period. The classical requirement of adverse possession is that it should be nec vi, nec clam, nec precario. After considering the entire case law in that behalf, t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lment and it is not necessary that the possession must be so effective so as to bring it to the specific knowledge of the owner concerned, I am of the view that the said observation must be understood with reference to the observations made in Paragraph-7 of the judgment. At paragraph-7 of the judgment, the Supreme Court has observed thus: 7...For instance, one of the most important facts which clearly proved adverse possession was that the plaintiff had let out the land for cultivatory purposes and used it himself from time to time without any protest from the defendant. During the period of 45 years, no serious attempt was made by the municipality to evict the plaintiff knowing full well that he was asserting hostile title against the municipality in respect of the land. Further, this Court, in the case of Danappa Revappa Kolli v. Gurupadappa Kallappa Pattana Shetti ILR1990KAR610 , while referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Kshitish Chandra's case (supra), relied upon by Sri Narayana Rao in support of the plea of adverse possession, has observed that apart from the actual and continuous possession which are among other ingredients of adverse possession, the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ereon within the prescribed period. Thereby, the appellant's possession would become adverse. No such stand was taken nor evidence has been adduced in this behalf. The counsel in fairness, despite his research, is unable to bring to our notice any such plea having been taken by the appellant. Therefore, in the absence of crucial pleadings, which constitute adverse possession and evidence to show that the petitioners have been in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the lands in question claiming right, title and interest in the lands in question hostile to the right, title and interest of the original grantees, the petitioners cannot claim that they have perfected their title by adverse possession and therefore, the Act does not apply as laid down by the Supreme Court in Manchegowda's case (supra). The law laid down by the Supreme Court in Chandevarappa's case (supra) fully applies to the facts of the present case. In the said case, while considering the claim of adverse possession the purchaser of a granted land from the original grantee, the Supreme Court has observed that the person, who comes into possession under colour of title from the original grantee i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nted to them and enjoy the same in perpetuity subject to the conditions that they do not violate the conditions of the grant. This view of mine is supported by the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Rudrappa v. Special Deputy Commissioner (Writ Appeal No. 1210/1987 decided on 17-6-1996), wherein in Paragraph 3 of the judgment, the Division Bench of this Court, while considering similar grants, has taken the view that the grantee was not given absolute title in respect of the land granted. The relevant portion of the judgment at Paragraph 8. reads as follows: 8...It is clear from the terms of the grant that the appellant's predecessor in title, the grantee could not alienate the land for certain period and if the land was alienated, it was open to the Government to cancel the grant and resume the land in question. If the grant was hedged in with several conditions of this nature, the same cannot be said to be absolute moreover, it must be noticed that the grant was made at an upset price. In the circumstances, proceedings initiated by the respondents cannot be slated to be barred by limitation or is it possible to sustain the plea of adverse possession raise ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... son. 5. The learned Counsel, submitted that in view of the decision in ILR (1994) Kan 1839 AIR 1975 SCW 100 K. T. Hutchegowda v. Dy. Commr. for the purpose of determining whether the period of limitation is 12 years or 30 years, each case has to be examined on its merits and if the grant had been made in absolute terms, the land would vest in the transferee and he would have perfected his title by principles of adverse possession. But, subsequently, the Supreme Court in a later decision in R. Chandeveerappa v. State of Karnataka (1995)6SCC309 - have explained that in claiming adverse possession certain pleas have to be made such as when there is a derivative title as in the present case, if the appellants intend to plead adverse possession as against the State, they must disclaim their title and plead this hostile claim to the knowledge of the State and that the State had not taken any action within the prescribed period, it is only in those circumstances the appellants possession would become adverse. There is no material to that effect in the present case. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no substance in any of the contentions advanced on behalf of the appellants. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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