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TMI Blog1885 (2) TMI 1X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f 1871? This question presents itself to my mind in two aspects. The first is, whether Section 24 of the Bengal Civil Courts Act renders it imperative on this Court and the Courts subordinate to it to administer the Muhammadan Law in cases of this nature? The second is, what is Muhammadan Law of pre-emption in regard to the point before us? 2. The first of these questions depends upon the construction to be placed on Section 24 of the Bengal Civil Courts Act (VI of 1871). In discussing this, I shall be within the recognized rules of interpretation in reviewing shortly the history of the particular section in question. It is not a new provision of the law. The principle which it embodies was recognized by the British rule at the outset of its authority in this country. The history of the recognition of this principle has been accurately traced by a learned Judge of the Indian Bench, Mr. Justice Field, at pages 169--171 of his valuable work on the Regulations of the Bengal Code. The legislation there described began with the Regulation of the 21st August 1772, which laid down the exact scope of the application of the Hindu and Muhammadan Laws, and the omission to provide for case ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ons at the time of the application of the law of the case, and were designed for the protection of the rights of such persons--not for the deprivation of the rights of others. Whenever, therefore, in any civil suit, the parties to such suit may be of different persuasions, when one party shall be of the Hindu and the other of the Muhammadan persuasion; or where one or more of the parties to the suit shall not be either of the Muhammadan or the Hindu persuasion, the laws of those religions shall not be permitted to operate to deprive such party or parties of any property to which, but for the operation of those laws, they would have been entitled. In all such cases, the decision shall be governed by the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, it being clearly understood, however, that this provision shall not be considered as justifying the introduction of the English or any foreign law, or the application to such cases of any rules not sanctioned by those principles. 3. Such was the law at the time when the celebrated case of Sheikh Kudratulla v. Mahini Mohan Shaha 4 B.L.R. 134 was decided by the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court. Since that time, however, the pro ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... table in such suits to apply that law. Here again Spankie, J., adhering to the opinion formerly expressed by him, dissented from the opinion of the majority of this Court. 5. Now, as to the two Full Bench cases, the opinion of the majority of this Court in regard to gift and pre-emption was that, although the Court was, as a matter of fact, bound to apply the rules of Muhammadan Law, it was so bound not by the strict terms of the first part of Section 24, but by the rule of justice, equity, and conscience, referred to in the second part. Spankie, J., on the other hand, held that the law of pre-emption, as of gift, must be applied under the first part of the section, being included under the head of religious usage or institution. In other words, the majority thought that they might properly let their notions of justice, equity, and good conscience prevail over those of the Muhammadan Law, while Spankie, J., held that the Court was absolutely bound to follow that law. With all due respect to the majority in that case, I cannot help observing that the view expressed by Spankie, J., is the only one which could be accepted by a Muhammadan lawyer sitting here as a Judge. That lear ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... -emption, etc., if not governed by Muhammadan Law as expressed clearly in the text of the Kuran, are controlled by religious usages founded on, or institutions enjoined by the oral law or sayings of the Prophet. And in conclusion: I am of opinion that the proper answer to the reference is, that the suit giving rise to it should be determined by that law (i.e., the Muhammadan Law), and without reference to the principles of justice, equity, and good conscience. 6. Now, although the decision of the majority in that case is binding upon me, I regard the question as virtually reopened by this case, and I must therefore confess that I am unable to agree with it, and my reasons are these: In the first place the Muhammadan Law of gift or pre-emption either is or is not law in the proper sense, by which I mean a rule of conduct binding upon the subjects of the State, and upon the Courts which the State has established. No doubt the opinion of the learned Judges leads to the same result, They also apply the Muhammadan Law, not as a law, but only as a rule enjoined by equity. In my view, equity cannot, so to speak, invent rules by which rights are to be determined: it must follow and b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is heirs, and a bequest to a stranger is allowed only to the extent of one-third of the property. Under these circumstances, to allow the Muhammadan Law of inheritance, and to disallow the Muhammadan Law of pre-emption, would be to carry-out the law in an imperfect manner; for the latter is in reality the proper complement of the former, and one department of the law cannot be administered without taking cognizance of the other. Among Aryan systems, which favour the notion of the inchoate rights of heirs, the rule of primogeniture, the jus representations, and the exclusion of females from inheritance, except in special cases, the property is not so completely split up on the owner's death; but, under the Muhammadan system, upon a man's death, not only his children are entitled to succeed to his property, but also his wife, mother, father, and other heirs, according to well-defined rules; and I myself know of a case in which, after a Muhammadan's death, his property was divided into twenty-three shares, each heir having a separate share in every parcel. If such a law of inheritance were not mitigated by the law of pre-emption, the result would be serious inconvenienc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the persons arrayed as parties to the suit belongs to a different race and religion. In such a case, it would be impossible to administer any particular law if the word parties in the section meant parties to the suit, This is obviously the only interpretation which can apply to the administration of Muhammadan Law of inheritance and succession by our Courts. Indeed, cases are readily conceivable in which none of the parties to the suit are Muhammadans, but in which their right, having been derived by transfer or otherwise from Muhammadans, the Muhammadan Law would be the sole rule of decision, because the inception of the rights to be adjudicated upon took place under that law. This can be best illustrated by supposing the case of a Muhammadan who dies leaving a widow, a son, and a daughter, each one of whom conveys his or her share, by gift or sale in the estate of the deceased, to a Hindu, a Christian, and a Parsi, respectively. It is to my mind obvious that in a suit between these various transferees, involving the ascertainment of the extent of the right of each person, the Muhammadan Law would, under the former part of Section 24 of the Bengal Civil Courts Act, be the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r discussing the question whether pre-emption prevailed originally among the Hindus, he goes on to say: I have found in the Maha Nirvana Tantra, a work which chiefly treats of mythology, a passage which would seem to imply that preemption is recognized as a legal provision according to the notions of the Hindus. But it remains yet to be decided whether this shall be held to be practical law or not. 10. I hope, before ending this judgment, to contribute something to a settlement of the question which Sir W. Macnaghten regarded as undecided, having long taken an interest in the subject of pre-emption, and having considered it my duty to investigate the much-vexed question whether the right existed under the old Hindu Law, and whether the Muhammadans found it existing when they came into India. I may here quote from a very distinguished Sanskrit scholar, Dr. Rajendralal Mitra. After stating that the Smritis, from which the Hindu Law is derived, contain no reference to the right of pre-emption, the learned scholar goes on to say: The word samanta is everywhere defined to mean owner of an adjoining property, and not the right which such an owner has to claim precedence in purchasi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in law. In so far, the claim to pre-emption in oases where it is most urgently demanded is entirely abandoned. Had there been any authentio law in existence, it would have for certain been cited in some case or other, but there is no record of any such citation. These remarks are certainly not in keeping with the positive rules laid down in the Maha Nirvana Tantra, and quoted in the preface to Macnaghten's Muhammadan Law; but those rules, not having been recognized by any of our current law-books, cannot be held binding or authentic. It has been Dowhere recognized as an authority on law. Nor has it been anywhere quoted in a law digest. Moreover, the Tantra is not by any means an ancient work. The belief is, that the most authentio Tantras number sixty-four, but the name of the Maha Nirvana does not occur among them, and it must therefore be accepted to be of secondary importance, even as a Tantra. My idea is, that the administration of law by Kazis during the Muhammadan period gave wide currency to haq-i-shufa, and its advantage became so apparent to the Hindus that they attempted to naturalize it by working on its principles in the Tantra in question, where an interpolation c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e author of the Mitakshara. Nor is there any other trace of pre-emption in the Hindu law-books. The Tantras, generally speaking, have never been recognized as authoritative law-books I any sense of the word.' 12. Adopting the authority of these eminent Sanskritists, there is no doubt in my mind that the question which Sir William Macnaghten regarded as open to doubt is in reality not so, and that there has never been such a right as that of pre-emption recognized by the Hindu Law, though I cannot forget that the rule of that law which prohibits any member of a joint undivided family from selling his share in the joint property without the consent of his co-parceners, aims at a result not dissimilar to that which the Muhammadan Law of pre-emption is intended to achieve. The fact that some of the parties concerned in the present cases are Hindus, need not therefore in itself complicate the question as to the applicability of the Muhammadan Law, nor create any such difficulty as would otherwise have arisen with regard to the question how the rule of preemption is to be administered according to justice, equity, and good conscience, in a case where, some parties being Hindus and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e on an equal footing in all cases regarding the privilege of shafa. (Hamilton's Hedaya, vol. III, p. 592). What was the effect of this? In course of time, pre-emption became adopted by the Hindus as a custom. I may here refer to an official paper printed in the Revenue Reporter, vol. V, at p. 150, in which it is said that the rule of preemption has been adopted as a custom almost universally throughout these Provinces, even by villages which are purely Hindu. I have already in Zamir Husain v. Daulat Ham I.L.R. All. 110 and in the recent case of Sheoratan Kuar v. Mahipal Koer Ante p. 258 explained my views as to the manner in which this custom has been adopted by the Hindu community. 15. Now, there can be no question that the Muhammadan Law of pre-emption must be administered in cases in which all the parties concerned are Muhammadans, The question is, whether it should be administered in cases in which only the vendee is a Hindu. Before expressing my own view of the matter, I think it will be useful to review the case-law on the subject, and to ascertain how it stands at present. The most important of the cases is that of Sheikh Kudratulia v. Mahini Mohan Shaha 4 B.L.R. 13 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the vendor should be subject to that rule of law. 16. I have read these cases carefully, and it appears to me impossible to reconcile them. The most important of them are Sheikh Kudratalla v. Mahini Mohan Shaha 4 B.L.R. 134 and Dwarka Das v. Husain Bakhsh I.L.R. All. 564 in which a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court and a Full Bench of this Court respectively laid down two propositions, one being, so to say, the converse of the other. Bearing in mind the rules of the Muhammadan Law of pre-emption, it seems to me impossible to hold that both of these decisions can be right. I know that, as a matter of pure logic, it does not follow because a proposition is true, that its converse must be true also; and it is obvious that, as a matter of pure reasoning, if a Muhammadan pre-emptor, cannot enforce pre-emption against a Hindu purchaser, the vendor being a Muhammadan, it does not necessarily follow that a Muhammadan can enforce pre-emption where the vendor is a Hindu and the purchaser a Muhammadan. But the exigencies of the definite rules of the Muhammadan Law of preemption happen to be such as to render it essential that the various propositions relating to the subject should be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 4 of the Civil Courts Act. But because a Hindu is not under that section subject to the Muhammadan Law of pre-emption, he cannot avail himself of any pre-emptive right which that law creates only in favour of those who are subject to its behests. And the reason is simple. The rights and obligations created by that law, as indeed by every other system with which I am acquainted, must necessarily be reciprocal. Then, if a Hindu cannot as a pre-emptor avail himself of the Muhammadan Law of pre-emption in a case where the vendor is a Muhammadan and the purchaser is a Hindu, what reason is there for holding that a Muhammadan pre-emptor can enforce the pre-emptive right where the vendor is a Hindu and the purchaser a Muhammadan? The question was discussed by this Court in the Full Bench case of Chundo v. Hakeem Alim-ood-deen N.W.P.H.C. Rep. 1874 p. 28 and the majority of the Court gave an affirmative answer upon a reasoning which must necessarily lead to the conclusion that an affirmative answer should also be given to the proposition which, as I have just stated, can only be answered in the negative. Indeed, the untenability of the proposition, as already pointed out, was not long after ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... become his by the laws of his country. He bought it subject to the rules which governed it in the hands of his vendor, from whom he has derived his title, and the circumstance that he is not a Hindu will not save him from the incidents of the Hindu Law. Indeed, in the case supposed, as the law stands, the Muhammadan purchaser would no doubt be free from a pre-emptive claim at the instance of his Hindu vendor's co-parceners. But he would be free only because the Hindu Law provides no pre-emptive right. He would, however, be liable to something worse, by reason of that law which governed the property in the hands of his vendor. The sale might be avoided at the instance of the Hindu co-parcener, if the subject of the sale was a share in joint property. And if it can be shown that property in the hands of a Muhammadan is in principle as much subject to the pre-emptive claim of his Muhammadan co-parcener or neighbour as the marital estate in the hands of a Hindu widow, or the share of a member of a Hindu joint family, is subject to its own restrictions or qualifications as to sale, it seems to me that the enforcement of the Muhammadan rule of pre-emption against the Hindu purchas ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... spect from me, as from every one else connected with the administration of justice in British India, I feel myself bound, in differing with them, to explain my reasons fully by reference to original texts of the Muhammadan Law of pre-emtion, which I cannot help feeling would have led those eminent Judges to a different conclusion had the texts been accessible in the English language. I make this observation because Sir Barnes Peacock at the beginning of his judgment in the celebrated case of Sheikh Kudratulla v. Mahini Mohan Shaha 4 B.L.R. 134 used expressions which leave no doubt that, even after the case had been argued before him in the Full Bench, His Lordship was inclined to form an opinion similar to that which I have formed in this case, and that he adopted the opposite view in consequence of the opinion which had been so forcibly and clearly expressed by Mr. Justice Mitter. And because the judgment of that learned Judge in the most exhaustive and powerful manner presents the opposite view to that which I hold in this case, the best way in which I can justify my own opinion is to examine the reasoning leading to the conclusions which he and the majority of the Court adopte ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ourts in the administration of the Muhammadan Law. Mitter, J. says that he is satisfied by certain passages in this work, that the conclusions at which he arrived were consistent with the Muhammadan Law of pre-emption. I need not quote any more passages from the learned judgment, as I purpose to analyse all the main arguments adopted by the majority--Peacock, C.J., Kemp and Mitter, JJ. The first proposition which those learned Judges laid down was, that the right of preemption under the Muhammadan Law does not exist, before actual sale, because, on the one hand, the pre-emptor has no right of prohibiting the sale, and, on the other hand, the vendor is not bound to offer the property for purchase to the pre-emptor before selling it to the stranger; and they held their view to be supported by the circumstance that the pre-emptor cannot before such sale relinquish his pre-emptive right, nor could the absence of his consent vitiate the sale. Upon this reasoning they held that a Muhammadan owner of property was subject to no legal disability arising out of pre-emption, but was free to sell it regardless of that right. They then proceeded to lay down the second main proposition that a sa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ry word of this definition by original Arabic texts of the Muhammadan Law itself, but I will confine myself only to such texts as bear immediately upon the main propositions involved in this case. I may, however, observe that the nature of the right, as appears from the definition which I have given, partakes strongly of the nature of an easement--the dominant tenement and the servant tenement of the law of easement being terms extremely analogous to what I may respectively call the pre-emptive tenement and pre-emptional tenement of the Muhammadan Law of pre-emption. Indeed, the analogy goes further, for I shall presently show that the right of pre-emption, like an easement, exists before the injury to that right can give birth to a cause of action for a suit--sale in the one case corresponding to the invasion of the easement in the other. In short, I maintain that, under the Muhammadan Law, the rule of pre-emption, proceeding upon a principle analogous to the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, creates what I may call a legal servitude running with the land; and the fact that that law has ceased to become the general law of the land cannot alter the nature of the se ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... se conclusions, and I shall therefore pass on to other books as high in authority as the Hedaya itself. Here is a short text from the Durrul-Mukhtar: The cause of pre-emption is the contiguousness of the pre-emptor's property with the purchased property, whether by co-parcenership or vicinage. (1) Again, a more explicit passage is to be found in Ami, a commentary upon the Kanz: The author (of the Kanz) says 'by sale,' which must be referred to his expression, ' pre-emption becomes obligatory.' This would indicate that the cause of the obligator ness of pre-emption is sale, that is the sale of the pre-emptional house, and some have held this very opinion. The correct opinion, however, is that the cause of pre-emption is the conjunction of the properties in a necessary manner, and sale is a condition (of pre-emption). From this it follows that pre-emption becomes enforceable by sale, that is, after its coming into existence. (2) All the different views on the subject entertained by Muhammadan jurists, who were only too fond of the mediaeval schoolmen's method of arguing such questions, are to be found in Birjandi, a well-known commentary on the Muhammadan ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ne of principle, but of detail, arising from the difference in the nature of the occasion demanding the exercise of the right. In the one case, that occasion is sale; in the other, it is building. Now, it is true that in the one case the pre-emptor cannot prevent his co-parcener from selling his property to a stranger, whilst in the case supposed, A could prevent B from building, on his land. But the reason of the distinction is not that the right of the one did not exist before the sale, and the right of the other did exist before the building. The reason is this. The object of the non-apparent easement possessed by A is the beneficial enjoyment of his own property, and definite infringement of that right is ascertained when B takes any definite action to build upon his land,--a state of things which would be sufficient to afford a cause of action in favour of A, seeking preventive relief or other assertion of his right of easement. But in the case of pre-emption, the object of the right is to prevent the intrusion, not of all purchasers in general, but only of such as are objectionable from the pre-emptor's point of view. Again, the right (unlike the right of veto possessed b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d to say that that which is only possible should, by a retrospective effect, vitiate that which is certain, namely the sale. This is the manner in which the jurists of the Muhammadan Law have dealt with this point of the rule of preemption, and it is upon very similar grounds that they hold the pre-emptor incapable of relinquishing his pre-emptive right in respect of a sale which has not yet taken place. They would say (and there is ample authority for this statement) that the identity of the purchaser, the amount of the price, and other terms of the sale, the certainty of which is essential, not to the existence, but to the exercise of the pre-emptive right, being still undefined by a legal relation between the vendor and the vendee, the pre-emptor had no means of knowing for certain whether he should or should not give up an ascertained legal right, and therefore the relinquishment of pre-emption before sale is void. Whatever the merits of this reasoning from a jurisprudential point of view may be, I confess I fail to see how it supports the view that the right of pre-emption does not exist as a restriction or qualification of the right of sale possessed by the owner of property ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... by Mushini, Abu David, and Aukissai. (1) Two other traditions to the same effect are also to be found in Muslim, which is one of the books of acknowledged authority on Hadis or traditions. I will, however, quote only one of them, as it brings into prominence the difficulty with which I am now dealing: It is related by Jahir that the Prophet said:--'Pre-emption exists in all joint properties, whether land, or house, or grove. It is not proper for him (the owner) to sell till he has offered it to his co-parcener, who may take or reject it; and if the vendor fails to do this, his co-parcener has the preferential right to it until he is informed. (2) Both these traditions have much the same effect, but in the first of them the Arabic word la yahillo occurs, which I have rendered by not lawful; whilst in the second the phrase employed is la yasliho, which I have translated as meaning not proper. The importance which the Muhammadan jurists, in laying down legal principles, attached to the exact words in the sayings of the Prophet, at once gave rise to the question whether the injunction as to the vendor's giving notice to the pre-emptor and offering to him the property f ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... it vitiate a sale executed without his permission. I am not at liberty to interpret the sayings of the Prophet in a sense other than that adopted by the recognized authorities on Muhmmadan jurisprudence. But it is perfectly clear from these traditions that the very conception of pre-emption in Muhammadan Law necessarily involves the existence of the right before the sale in respect of which it may be exercised. All that the interpretation of the Muhammadan jurists' goes to show is, that the sale is not vitiated by the absence of the pre-emptor's consent--an interpretation which, whilst it is perfectly consistent with the rest of their method of reasoning in dealing with pre-emption, again falls short of establishing the proposition that the right is not antecedent in existence to the sale complained of by the pre-emptors. 25. I have now to deal with the argument that the right of pre-emption under the Muhammadan Law is a mere right of re-purchase, not from the vendor, but from the vendee. I trust what I have already said goes far to show that this conclusion cannot be right. If by the expression re-purchase is meant the institution of a new contract of sale other th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lf was subject, to stand in the shoes of the vendee in respect of all the rights and obligations arising from the sale under which he has derived his title. It is, in effect, as if in a sale-deed the vendee's name were rubbed out and the pre-emptor's name inserted in its place. Otherwise, because every sale of a pre-emptional tenement renders the right of pre-emption enforceable in respect thereto, every successful pre-emptor obtaining possession of the property, by the so-called re-purchase from the vendee, would be subject to another pre-emptive claim, dating, not from the original sale, but from such re-purchase --a state of things most easily conceivable where the new claimant is a pre-emptor of a higher degree than the pre-emptor who has already succeeded. The result would be that pre-emptive litigation could never end. 26. I could go on at much greater length to show that the hypothesis that preemption is only a right of re-purchase from the vendee, would involve even greater anomalies inconsistent with the fundamental rules of the right of preemption. But I need not pursue the argument any further, because it seems tome that the general principles of jurispru ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nnecessary to repeat the arguments which those learned Judges have already expressed with such force and lucidity. It, however, remains for me to deal with the reasoning adopted by Mitter J., as to pre-emption being a right feeble and defective, because, on the one hand, it is lost if not immediately asserted, and, on the other hand, it can be defeated by tricks and artifices. If feeble and defective only means that the right of pre-emptor is transitory in the sense of requiring immediate assertion, I can understand the phrase. But I do not understand how the transitory character of the right can affect the question whether or not it should be enforced against a Muhammadan vendee and not against a non-Muhammadan. So far as this particular point is concerned, it seems enough to say that, if the right is legally enforceable against the one, it should be enforceable against the other. On the other hand, in one sense, full ownership itself may be called transitory, because if A, being the owner of X, allows B to sell it to C, A being present at the time of the sale, his mission to assert his title to X would, in effect, by the doctrine of estoppel, defeat his right in X. Pre-empti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... kinds of devices for the purpose of frustrating its own law. If there is a bond fide sale between a Muhammadan vendor and a Hindu purchaser, and they come forward and declare that which is not true, and say that it was not a sale intended to operate, but was a fictitious device, their words must be accepted according to the Muhammadan Law, and the truth of the assertion cannot be disputed. They would be bound by the untruth which the vendor and the purchaser declare for the purpose of evading the right of pre-emption. Can we say that if they will state an untruth, the Hindu shall remain in possession of the property which he has purchased; but if they will not declare that which is untrue, there is an equity to take the property away from the purchaser. The argument is consistent with certain passages in the text-books, which His Lordship went on to cite. But without attempting to explain the real reasons upon which those passages proceed, the argument may be fully answered by saying that in the case supposed, the question whether there has been a bond fide sale or not is not a question of substantive law, but a mere question of fact, to be ascertained by the rules of that departm ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y the Muhammadan Law, than there would be for saying that when a decree is passed under the Muhammadan Law for dower or inheritance, the process for executing that decree is to be regulated by the rules of procedure provided by that law. And, speaking generally, I may say that if it is once conceded that the technicalities of the Muhammadan Law of contract, procedure or evidence, are not binding upon us, it will be found that no tricks and artifices can defeat the pre-emptive right in our Courts. Such devices are held to be abominable even where the technicalities of Muhammadan adjective law might give them some plausible effect; and this is the prevalent doctrine, notwithstanding the opinion of Kazi Abu Yusuf, to be found in the passage from the Bedaya, to which Kemp, J., has referred. The opinion of Imam Muhammad, given in that same passage, condemns all devices; but there being no such questions in this case, I need not discuss the matter any further. But I wish to add that I have considered it my duty to deal with this reference at such elaborate length, not only out of respect for the eminent authorities with whom I have ventured to differ in arriving at my conclusions, b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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