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TMI Blog1965 (2) TMI 124X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... A of the said Act. In other words, the earlier notification which brought the temple of Sri Thiyagarajaswami at Tiruvarur under the purview of the earlier Madras Act has been extended by the notification issued on 4th August, 1956, for a further period of five years. By a writ petition filed by the appellant, Sri-la-Sri Subramania Desika Gnana Sambanda Pandarasannadhi, Hereditary Trustee of the Rajan Kattalai of the temple in question, in the High Court of Madras the validity of this latter notification was challenged. The High Court has rejected the pleas raised by the appellant in support of his case that the impugned notification is invalid, and has dismissed the writ petition filed by him. It is against this order that the appellant has come to this Court with a certificate granted by the High Court. The controversy between the parties as it has been presented before us in appeal, really lies within a very narrow compass, but in order to appreciate the points raised for our decision, it is necessary to set out very briefly the background of the present litigation. 2. In the town of Tiruvarur in Thanjavur Dist. there is an ancient temple. The Presiding Deity is Sri Thyagaraja ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y different category by the Madras High Court in Vythilinga Pandara Sannadhi v. Somasundara Mudaliar I.L.R [1894] 17 Mad. 199 but with that aspect of the matter, we are not concerned in the present appeal. In practice, a scheme appears to have been evolved that in regard to the various services in the temple in respect of which Kattalais had been endowed, the management of the allotted properties vested in separate trustees and in that sense, all the trustees administering separate Kattalais could be said to constitute a kind of corporation in which the management of the temple properties vested, each one of its members being in charge of particular items of properties the proceeds of which would be utilised for the performance of a specific Kattalai. 4. In course, of time, however, this practice did not work harmoniously and coordination between the duties of the various trustees worked unsatisfactorily, because more emphasis came to be placed on the individuality of the Kattalais and that led to anomalies in the actual administration of the said Kattalais. As a result in 1910, a suit was filed under s. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the settlement of a scheme to manage ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ple or endowment would go under the control of the Board notwithstanding the scheme which might have been framed already. On taking management of a notified temple or endowment, the Board was authorised to appoint an Executive Officer and define his duties. In consequence, such Executive Officer would virtually displace the trustee and would function under the control of the Endowment Board. The result of the notification in substance would be that the previously existing scheme would be suspended, and the management would vest in the Board. 8. Soon after this Act was passed, proceedings were commenced by the Board for the purpose of notifying the temple with which we are concerned in the present appeal, and the Kattalais attached thereto. The Trustees of the various Kattalais naturally opposed this step, but their objections were over-ruled, and on May 25, 1937, a notification was issued. To this notification we have already referred. In pursuance of this notification, an Executive Officer was appointed by the Board on July 12, 1937. On July 30, 1937, the Board defined the powers of the Executive Officer and directed him to take charge and be in possession of the temple and the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... application made to them cancel the notification. This section had made provision for the notification of religious institutions after this new Act came into force. Section 103(c) dealt with cases where notifications had been made under the previous enactment. That section provided that the notification published under s. 65A, sub-s. (3) or sub-s. (5) of the said Act and in force immediately before the commencement of the new Act would be deemed to be a notification published under s. 64 and would be in force for five years from the date of the commencement of the new Act (No. XIX of 1951). 11. In 1956, another Amending Act (No. IX of 1956) was passed. Section 2 of this Amending Act substituted a new sub-section in the place of s. 64(4). Under that provision, every notification published or deemed to be published under that section shall remain in force for a period of five years, but it may by notification be cancelled at any time or continued from time to time for a further period or periods not exceeding five years at a time as the Government may by notification in each case think fit to direct. As a consequence, s. 103(c) was also amended, and the words and shall be in forc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cation would soon expire on September 30, 1961 and the Government would then have to consider whether it should be renewed or not, and the High Court thought that on that occasion, the Government would certainly hear the appellant before making up its mind on that issue. The judgment of the High Court was delivered on August 11, 1961, and since the High Court thought that the impugned order can last only for a short period thereafter, it would serve no purpose to issue a writ quashing the said order on the ground that the principles of natural justice had not been complied with before passing it. Mr. Viswanatha Sastri for the appellant contends that both the grounds given by the High Court in support of its refusal to issue a writ are plainly erroneous, and we are satisfied that Mr. Sastri is right. 13. Before dealing with these grounds, however, it is necessary to consider the argument urged by Mr. Raganathan Chetty on behalf of the respondent State that the High Court was in error in holding that the Order which has been passed under s. 64(4) is a quasi-judicial order and can be legitimately passed only after complying with the principles of natural justice. He argues that tho ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tinued from time to time, is a purely administrative decision. The Government is already in possession of the material relevant for the purpose of deciding the question. This material has been placed before the Government at time of the enquiry which is held by the Commissioner under s. 64(2) before the initial notification is issued, and all that the Government has to do on subsequent occasions is to consider whether the said notification should be cancelled or continued. Such a decision needs no further enquiry and cannot be characterised as quasi-judicial. That is how Mr. Chetty supports the validity of the impugned notification, though it has been issued without giving to the appellant. 16. In support of this contention, he has relied upon the decision of this Court in Shri Radeshyam Khare Anr. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Others [[1959] S.C.R. 1440]. In that case, it was held that Sections 53A and 57 of the C.P. and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922, differed materially in their scope and effect, and that the nature of the orders which can be passed under the two respective sections was not the same. That is why this Court found that whereas in taking action under s. 53A ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... oubt, technically right in the sense that this plea was not mentioned in the first affidavit filed by the appellant in support of his petition; but in the affidavit-in-rejoinder filed by the appellant this plea has been expressly taken. This is not disputed by Mr. Chetty, and so, when the matter was argued before the High Court, the respondents had full notice of the fact that one of the grounds on which the appellant challenged the validity of the impugned Order was that he had not been given a chance to show cause why the said notification should not be issued. We are, therefore, satisfied that the High Court was in error in assuming that the ground in question had not been taken at any stage by the appellant before the matter was argued before the High Court. 18. The second reason given by the High Court appears to be plainly erroneous. In assuming that the impugned Order would come to an end on September 30, 1961, the High Court appears to have ignored the fact that before it delivered its judgment, a new Act had come into force (Madras Act XXII of 1959). This Act came into operation on January 1, 1960. Section 72(7) of this Act provides that any notification published under ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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