9911796707
TMI Blog2000 (11) TMI 1249X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Sy. No. 40 7.04 Bhuvanahalli 52A.23G 2. According to petitioner, the said lands along with the surrounding land were declared as an industrial area under Section 3(1) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 ('KIAD Act' for short). Thereafter, the State Government issued a preliminary notification dated 7-7-1994 (gazetted on 7-7-1994) under Section 28(1) of the KIAD Act giving notice of its intention to acquire such lands, as they were required for the purpose of an industrial establishment by the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board ('Board' for short). In pursuance of it, a show-cause notice dated 6-1-1995 was issued to the petitioner under Section 28(2) of the KIAD Act fixing the hearing on 23-2-1995 and calling upon him to show cause why the said lands should not be acquired. The petitioner filed objections dated 21-2-1995. After enquiry and appropriate orders under Section 28(3), a final declaration dated 8-8-1996 (gazetted on 8-8-1996) was made under Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act stating that the State Government was satisf ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cision that the lands are required for establishing an industrial layout by the Board. (ii) Whether Section 11-A of LA Act applies to acquisition under KIAD Act. (in) If Section 11-A of LA Act is not applicable, whether the petitioner is entitled to any other relief. Re: Point (i).- 6. The petitioner does not dispute that after publication of the preliminary notification dated 7-7-1994, a show-cause notice dated 6-1-1995, as required under Section 28(2) of the KIAD Act was served on him. The said notice fixed the date of hearing as 23-2-1995 at 11 a.m. and called upon the petitioner to show cause why the lands should not be acquired. In response to the said notice, the petitioner filed his detailed objections on 21-2-1995 itself. The original file relating to the acquisition proceedings made available by the learned Counsel for the Board shows that the case was called before the Special Land Acquisition Officer on 23-2-1995; that, on that date the petitioner was absent and as he had already made a request for time, the matter was adjourned to 17-3-1995; that however, the matter was subsequently advanced to 6-3-1995 at the request of the petitioner; that on 6-3-1995, t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s Act and not KIAD Act. While House Sites Act is in pari materia with Land Acquisition Act insofar as it did not deal with any subject other than land acquisition, KIAD Act was not an enactment in pari materia, as it deals not only with acquisition of land but several other subjects. Therefore a decision rendered with reference to House Sites Act cannot be applied to KIAD Act. (b) In Mariyappa's case, supra, the effect of the provision for vesting of absolute title on publication of final declaration (even before taking possession) was not considered. While the decision in Mariyappa's case, supra, is a binding law insofar as it lays down that LA Act with subsequent amendments should be read into the provisions of House Sites Act, the further decision that Section 11-A of LA Act should be read into House Sites Act is contrary to earlier decisions of the Supreme Court which hold that Section 11-A will not apply where the land has already vested in the Government. The decision in Mariyappa's case, supra, was rendered by two Judges of the Supreme Court; and it is contrary to two earlier decisions of the Supreme Court rendered by larger Benches in Satendra Prasad Jain and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Section 11-A does not apply to cases where the land was vested in the State. The decision in Satendra Prasad's case, supra, and the three other decisions examined the applicability of Section 11-A with reference to Section 17 of LA Act which provides for vesting of the land in the Government on taking possession, even before award is made. 11. The decision in Pratap's case, supra, related to Section 52 of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959. Section 52(1) of the Rajasthan Act corresponds to Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act and Section 52(4), (5) and (6) of the Rajasthan Act corresponds to Section 28(5), (6) and (7) of KIAD Act. What is relevant to note is that Section 52(4) of the Rajasthan Act provided that where a final notice under Section 52(1) is published in the Official Gazette the land shall, on or from the date of publication absolutely vest in the State Government free from all encumbrances and sub-sections (5) and (6) provide for the State Government taking possession subsequent to such vesting. The same is the position under Section 28(5), (6) and (7) of the KIAD Act. Dealing with Section 52(4) of the Rajasthan Act, the Supreme Court held as follows.- ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Government. In Pratap's case, supra, the Supreme Court held that Section 11-A of LA Act will not apply once the land vests in the State Government, absolutely, free from encumbrances, even if award is not passed or possession is not taken, and by applying the principle laid down in Satendra Prasad Jain's case, supra, which dealt with Section 17 of the LA Act, it held that Section 11-A will not apply to cases where the land vested on publication of declaration, even before possession was taken. Section 28(5) of KIAD Act being similar or identical to Section 52(4) of the Rajasthan Act, it has to be held that insofar as KIAD Act is concerned, the provisions of Section 11-A will be inapplicable, as the land vests in the State Government on publication of Final Declaration under Section 28(4) of the Act. 13. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the decision in Mariyappa's case, supra, being a later decision, it should be followed. It is pointed out that even Section 3(5) of the House Sites Act provided for absolute vesting of the land in the State Government free from encumbrances on publication of the declaration under Section 3(4), even before taking po ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e two Acts, found that there is no detailed machinery whatsoever in the House Sites Act and therefore the said Act cannot be treated as a self-contained or complete Code; the House Sites Act and LA Act are supplemental to each other, as unless the LA Act supplements the House Sites Act, the House Sites Act cannot function; and the two Acts are in pari materia because the House Sites Act does not deal with any other subject but deals with the same subject of land acquisition, which otherwise would have fallen under the ambit of LA Act. Consequently, following the principles laid down in State of Madhya Pradesh v M.V. Narasimhan, the Supreme Court held that the provisions of LA Act as amended from time to time (including the 1984 amendment inserting Section 11-A) will have to be read into the House Sites Act. As Section 5 of House Sites Act makes LA Act applicable mutatis mutandis in respect of enquiry and award, reference to Court, appointment and payment in respect of lands acquired it was held that Section 11-A should also be read into the House Sites Act. But Mariyappa's case, supra, did not consider the point that was specifically considered in the earlier decisions (in Sate ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... A would apply, where the land had already vested in the State Government under Section 3(5) of House Sites Act, but held that provision (Section 11-A of LA Act) would apply as the provisions of LA Act are made applicable by virtue of Section 5 of the House Sites Act. When the same question, that is, whether Section 11-A applied to acquisitions under KIAD Act (or any other Act which provides for absolute vesting before passing of the award, without containing any provision for reversion to the land-owner), it is necessary to follow the earlier decisions in Satendra Prasad Jain's case, supra and Pratap's case, supra and hold that Section 11-A does not apply. But as for as the acquisition under House Sites Act is concerned, until otherwise held by the Supreme Court or the House Sites Act is modified, it has to be held that Section 11-A is applicable in view of the decision in Mariyappa's case. 17. In view of the above discussion, it is held that Section 11-A of the LA Act does not apply to acquisitions under KIAD Act. Re. Point (iii).- 18. Even if Section 11-A of LA Act is not applicable, it does not follow that the passing of the award can be unduly delayed. In ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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