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2018 (5) TMI 1552

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..... l on behalf of the respondent/assessee. 4. The case of the appellant is that the appellant in this case, namely, the Director of Income Tax (International Taxation) Delhi-II, New Delhi, has filed the Appeal on 13.7.2011. As the copy of the impugned order was received in the office of the appellant only on 16.3.2011. An Appeal under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") is to be filed within a period of 120 days from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. Therefore, learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the Appeal has been filed within time. In fact, he points out that even the Office has not raised any objection that the Appeal is barred by limitation and it is the respondent/assessee, which has raised this contention. 5. The appellant, in fact, has also filed an Application seeking condonation of delay of 653 days by way of abundant caution so that, in case if the court finds that there is delay in filing the appeal, an order may be passed condoning the delay. 6. Section 260A of the Act provides for an Appeal to the High Court from an order of the Appellate Tribunal on substantial question of law. The actual provision .....

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..... ide as a mistake by the respondent/assessee. 8. The respondent/assessee would also contend that much water has flown under the bridge after the passing of the order in terms of various litigations and other developments, which have taken place. He enlists the filing of Writ Petition No. 2070 of 2009 by the respondent/assessee on 07.12.2009. It related to a challenge to proceedings under Section 147 of the Act in relation to Assessment Year 2002-03. This is after the impugned order was passed on 29.5.2009. He would submit that a counter affidavit was filed by the Director of Income Tax (the appellant in the present case) on 23.12.2009. Mr. P.R. Mullick would seek to impute knowledge of the impugned order by the contents of the counter affidavit filed. Still later, there is reference to another Writ Petition filed in respect of Assessment Year 2004-05. Therein also, it is stated that a counter affidavit was filed on 19.02.2010, wherein also, the appellant has referred to the impugned order in this case. There is also reference to proceedings before the Dispute Resolution Panel for the Assessment Years 2005-06 and 2006-07, where also there is reference to the impugned order and, in t .....

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..... the Commissioner. It may also be apposite that we refer to the definition of the word 'Commissioner'. The word 'Commissioner' is defined under Section 2(16) as follows: "2(16) "Commissioner" means a person appointed to be a Commissioner of Income-tax or a Director of Income-tax or a Principal Commissioner of Income-tax or a Principal Director of Income-tax under sub-section (1) of section 117;" 13. "Chief Commissioner" is defined under Section 2(15A) as follows: "2(15A) "Chief Commissioner" means a person appointed to be a Chief Commissioner of Income-tax or a Principal Chief Commissioner of Income-tax under sub-section (1) of section 117;" 14. "Commissioner (Appeals)" is separately defined under Section 2(16A) as follows: "2(16A) "Commissioner (Appeals)" means a person appointed to be a Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) under sub-section (1) of section 117;" 15. Section 116 of the Act deals with Income Tax Authorities. Section 117 of the Act deals with appointment of Income Tax Authorities. Sub-section (2) of Section 117 reads as follows: "117. Appointment of income- tax authorities. - (2) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub- section (1), and subject to the .....

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..... nk that we may not be justified in rejecting the case of the appellant that the impugned order was not received, as claimed by the respondent/assessee. 18. As regards the knowledge of the order, which is attributed to the appellant by virtue of various proceedings, which we have made reference to, we would think it may be beside the point, as Section 254(3) contemplates a duty with the Tribunal to communicate the order. Section 260A creates a right of appeal and provides that appeal is to be preferred within a period of 120 days. The appeal is to be lodged within 120 days of the receipt of the order. Reading these provisions together, it is clear that what is contemplated by the law giver is that an appeal must be lodged within a period of 120 days from the date of receipt of the order and receipt is to be understood as meaning that there is a duty also on the Tribunal to communicate the order to the person, who is entitled to lodge the appeal. In this case, the person, who is to file the appeal, is the Director and it is the definite case of the appellant that the order was communicated and received by the office only on 16.3.2011. The appeal is filed within 120 days from the dat .....

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..... are inclined to take the view that the order dated 29.5.2009, namely, the impugned order of the Tribunal was received on 16.3.2011 by the appellant and the appeal is lodged within 120 days, the appeal cannot be treated as barred by limitation. 22. It is also relevant to bear in mind, in the context of the framework of the Act in question, that unlike other law, the law giver does not contemplate the aggrieved party making an application and obtaining the certified copy as a condition for preferring an appeal. The order is to be mandatorily communicated by the Tribunal to the persons entitled. Since there is a specific mode, which is provided under the Act, we would think that the appellant may not be unjustified in contending that the appeal is within time from the date of receipt of the order by the appellant. 23. In such circumstances, we repel the contentions of the respondent/assessee and hold that the appeal is within time. In view of this conclusion of ours, we close the Application for condonation of delay as unnecessary. 24. At the request of Mr. H.M. Bhatia, learned counsel for the appellant, list the appeal on 22.5.2018 in the Supplementary Cause List along with conne .....

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