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TMI Blog1956 (2) TMI 70X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... not clear), and in the witness box he swore that he had paid the money and was given the receipt. Mr. Barlow held that the receipt did not appear to be a genuine document and that the appellant's evidence was not true. Accordingly he passed a preliminary decree against the appellant for the full amount of the claim on 15-3-1950 and a final decree followed on 15-7-1950. There was an appeal to the High Court but that was dismissed on 9-5-1951. The High Court also held that the receipt was a very suspicious document and that the appellant's evidence was not reliable. The plaintiff then made an application in the Court of Mr. W. Augustine, who is said to have succeeded Mr. Barlow as a Subordinate Judge of the first class, asking that a complaint be filed against the appellant under sections 193 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code. But before it could be heard Mr. Augustine was transferred and it seems that no Subordinate Judge of the first class was appointed in his place; instead, Mr. K. K. Gujral, a Subordinate Judge of the fourth class, was sent to this area and he seems to have been asked to decide the matter. But as he was only a Subordinate Judge of the fourth class he made ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , he neither made the complaint nor rejected the application. He declined to do either because he said he had no jurisdiction; so also neither Mr. Barlow nor Mr. Augustine made a complaint or rejected the application. That carries us on to section 476-A of the Criminal Procedure Code. Section 476-A states that when the Court in which the offence is said to have been committed neither makes a complaint nor rejects an application for the making of a complaint, "the Court to which such former Court is subordinate within the meaning of section 195, sub-section (3) " may take action under section 476. Section 476 authorises the appropriate Court, after recording a finding that it is expedient in the interests of justice, etc., to, among other things, make a complaint in writing and forward it to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction. That was done by Mr. Pitam Singh. So the only question we have to decide on this part of the case is whether the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge over which Mr. Pitam Singh presided was the Court to which the Court of Mr. Barlow was subordinate within the meaning of section 195(3). Now it is to be noticed that subordinatio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ascertain which of two Courts entertains the majority of appeals over a given period of time, as well as to determine what is the appropriate period of time. Another view considers that the word means that the higher Court is the one to which there is an unrestricted right of appeal and so cannot apply when any restriction intervenes such as when the right of appeal is limited to a particular class of cases or is hedged in by conditions. This was the view taken in M. S. Sheriff v. Govindan: AIR1951Mad1060 . Other views are also possible but we do not intend to explore them. In our opinion, the matter is to be viewed thus. The first question to be asked is whether any decrees, orders or sentences of the original Court are appealable at all. If they are not, and the Court is a Civil Court, then, under section 195(3), the appeal against the order making or refusing to make a complaint will be to the principal Court of ordinary original civil jurisdiction. If, however, appeals from its various decrees and orders lie to different Courts, than we have to see to which of them they "ordinarily" lie and select the one of lowest grade from among them. In determining the Court or ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... inate Judge in two classes of case which are specified. "shall be preferred to the Senior Subordinate Judge of the first class exercising jurisdiction within such Civil District". There are thus three forums of appeal from the Court of the Subordinate Judge depending on the nature of the suit and its value. The question is whether in each of these three classes of case the appeal can be said to lie "ordinarily" to one or other of these appellate tribunals. Applying the rule we have set out above, the appeal to the Senior Subordinate Judge cannot be termed "ordinary" because the special appellate jurisdiction conferred by the Notification is not the ordinary jurisdiction of the Senior Subordinate Judge but an additional power which can only be exercised in a certain limited class of case. It is not a power common to all Subordinate Judges nor even to all Senior Subordinate Judges. Therefore, it cannot be said that appeals from the Courts of the various Subordinate Judges "ordinarily" lie to the Senior Subordinate Judge. Consequently, that Court is not one of the appellate tribunals contemplated by section 195(3) of the Criminal Procedure C ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he Punjab may not hold good elsewhere. We say this because rulings were cited before us from other parts of India which take differing views. We do not intend to refer to them because it would not be right to examine the language of Acts that are not directly before us. Accordingly, we confine ourselves to the Punjab Act (Act VI of 1918). Section 18 of the Punjab Courts Act states that there shall be the following classes of Courts, namely " ...................................... (3) the Court of the Subordinate Judge". Section 22 provides that "the State Government may.... fix the number of Subordinate Judges to be appointed". Section 26, which has already been quoted, fixes the pecuniary limits of their jurisdiction. Then comes section 27 defining the local limits of their jurisdiction : " (1) The local limits of the jurisdiction of a Subordinate Judge shall be such as the High Court may define. (2) When the High Court posts a Subordinate Judge to a district, the local limits of the district shall, in the absence of any direction to the contrary, be deemed to be the local limits of his jurisdiction". From there we go to the Notification ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... with one inherent and territorial jurisdiction despite the distribution. The third view is that each Subordinate Judge is a separate and independent Court in himself and it is pointed out that section 27 invests each Judge personally with a territorial jurisdiction and not the Court, and so also section 26. Under section 33 the power of control (apart from the High Court) over all civil Courts within the local limits of a District Judge's jurisdiction is with him, and section 34 empowers the District Judge to distribute any civil business. "cognizable by... the Courts under his control... among such Courts in such manner as he thinks fit". The Senior Subordinate Judge does not therefore appear to be vested with either administrative or judicial control over any other Subordinate Judge except in so far as he is a Court of appeal in certain specified classes of case. In our opinion, the Senior Subordinate Judge who made the complaint had no jurisdiction to make it, either as the original Court which tried the suit, or as the appellate authority under section 476-B of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is not enough that he also had first class powers because he was ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... udge shall be preferred to such other Subordinate Judge as may be mentioned in the notification, and the appeals shall thereupon be preferred accordingly, and the Court of such other Subordinate Judge shall be deemed to be a District Court, etc." Now this permits an appeal from one Subordinate Judge to another and the words the "Court of such other Subordinate Judge" indicate that the Subordinate Judge to whom the appeal is preferred is a separate and distinct Court. The position thus reduces itself to this. The original Court made no complaint; section 476-A of the Criminal Procedure Code was therefore attracted and the jurisdiction to make the complaint was transferred to the Court to which Mr. Barlow's Court was subordinate within the meaning of section 195. That Court, as we have seen, was the Court of the District Judge. Now, when the matter was reported to the District Judge by Mr. K. K. Gujral, the District Judge dealt with it. He had authority under section 476-A either to make the complaint himself or to reject the application. He did neither. Instead, he sent it to Mr. Pitam Singh who had no jurisdiction. Of course, the District Judge could have sen ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... with the District Judge. Section 21(1) states that - "When the business pending before any District Judge requires the aid of an Additional Judge or Judges for its speedy disposal, the State Government may appoint such Additional Judges as may be necessary". But these Judges cannot discharge all the judicial functions of the District Judge. Their jurisdiction is a limited one and is limited to the discharge of such functions as may be entrusted to them by the District Judge. Section 21(2) states that "An Additional Judge so appointed shall discharge any of the functions of a District Judge which the District Judge may assign to him". It is true that sub-section (2) goes on to say that "in the discharge of those functions he shall exercise the same powers as the District Judge" but these powers are limited to the cases with which he is entitled to deal. Thus, if his functions are confined to the hearing of appeals he cannot exercise original jurisdiction and vice versa. But if he is invested with the functions of an appellate tribunal at the District Court level, then he can exercise all the powers of the District Judge in dealing with appea ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... or has acted as a Court of appeal under section 476-B. As we have shown, the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge Mr. Pitam Singh had no jurisdiction to entertain this matter either as a Court of appeal under section 476-B or of its own authority under section 476-A. The Additional Judge Mr. J. N. Kapur, who has called himself an Additional District Judge, also had no jurisdiction under either section. But he seized himself of the case and has rejected the application for the making of a complaint. He therefore assumed a jurisdiction which he did not possess and that at once attracted the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. Now it does no matter in this case whether that jurisdiction lies under section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code or under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code because under either of these two sections the High Court is entitled to set aside an order of a Court subordinate to it which has assumed a jurisdiction that it does not possess. Therefore, in so far as the High Court as aside the order of Mr. J. N. Kapur it was right. But where it went wrong was in upholding the complaint made by the Senior Subordinate Judge. As we have shown, that Court ha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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