9911796707
TMI Blog2011 (4) TMI 1488X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... fusing to grant four reliefs sought, namely, (1) to grant mandatory temporary injunction directing the Respondent No. 1 herein to act under Clause 32(ii) of Memorandum and Rules and Regulations ( Regulations for short) of the Respondent No. 1 by appointing a Commissioner to make preliminary inquiry against the Respondent No. 2 pending disposal of Civil Suit No. 930 of 2008, (2) to suspend the amendment to Clause 6.2.4 in the Regulations for players, team officials, managers, umpires and administrators and Board of Control for Cricket in India (for short BCCI ) Code 2008, which permits an administrator to have directly or indirectly commercial interest in the matches or events like Indian Premier League ( IPL for short) or Champions League Twenty 20, (3) to grant temporary injunction restraining the Respondent No. 2 from functioning as Secretary of BCCI and (4) to grant mandatory temporary injunction directing BCCI not to permit the Respondent No. 2 to contest any of the posts of office bearers in future for a reasonable number of years as the Court thinks fit, is upheld. 3. In order to understand the controversy raised in the instant cases it will be relevant to notice the es ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t No. 2 had thereby acquired commercial interest and violated the terms of Clause 6.2.4 of the Regulations. The Appellant wrote another letter on September 19, 2008 to the President of BCCI reiterating his grievance against the Respondent No. 2 and urged the then President of BCCI to take action against the Respondent No. 2. Since no action was taken by the President of the BCCI on the complaints submitted by the Appellant, the Appellant has filed Civil Suit No. 930 of 2008 in the High Court of Madras at Chennai seeking a permanent injunction to restrain BCCI from permitting the Respondent No. 2 to participate in the General Body Meeting scheduled in Mumbai on September 27, 2008 or on any other subsequent date, which would be convened in relation to election of new office bearers. The Appellant has also sought permanent mandatory injunction directing BCCI to initiate inquiry under Clause 32(ii) of the Regulations, by appointing a Commissioner to make a preliminary inquiry against the Respondent No. 2. Another relief claimed by the Appellant in the said suit is for mandatory injunction directing the Respondent No. 1 to exercise his powers as per Clause 8(6) of the Regulations by sus ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the amendment carried out in the Regulations of the Respondent No. 1, the Appellant has filed another suit in the High Court, i.e., Civil Suit No. 1167 of 2008 alleging that the amendment in Clause 6.2.4 of the Regulations was made to protect the interest of the Respondent No. 2. The main prayer made in the said suit is to: (1) declare that Clause 6.2.4 of the Regulations insofar as it excludes the IPL and Champions League Twenty 20 is illegal and opposed to public policy (2) For permanent injunction restraining the Respondent No. 2 from functioning as Secretary of BCCI and (3) For mandatory injunction directing BCCI not to permit the Respondent No. 2 from contesting any of the posts of the office bearers. 7. The Appellant also filed three other interim applications for reliefs pending the above numbered suits. The Appellant filed OA No. 1299 of 2008 in Civil Suit No. 1167 of 2008 with a prayer to suspend operation of the amendment made in Clause 6.2.4 of the Regulations. OA No. 1300 of 2008 was also filed in the said suit claiming temporary injunction to restrain the Respondent No. 2 from functioning as Secretary of BCCI. Further OA No. 5740 of 2008 was filed in the later suit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... deration was required. Thus, considering the matter prima facie, the High Court found that neither in the two complaints made by the Appellant nor in the para relating to cause of action in the plaint of Civil Suit No. 930 of 2008, the Appellant had stated that he was filing the suit in the capacity of an administrator and, therefore, both the suits were filed by the Appellant in his individual capacity and not in the capacity of an administrator. The High Court noticed that the application by the Appellant, i.e., O.A. No. 1041 of 2008, praying for an injunction to restrain BCCI from permitting the Respondent No. 2, to participate in the General Body Meeting etc, was rejected by the High Court vide order dated September 26, 2008, the said order was not challenged by the Appellant. The High Court was also of the view that on mere allegations, an injunction could not be ordered against the Respondent No. 2 from participating in the General Body Meeting convened, to elect the office bearers, as those allegations were yet to be substantiated at the time of the trial. The contention of the Appellant that the provisions of Clause 6.2.4 should be read with MOA and Regulations of BCCI was ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dated 12.92008 by which jurisdiction of BCCI was invoked by the Appellant in the capacity of former President of BCCI but is contrary to what is averred in para 4 of the plaint and the same deserves to be set aside. According to the learned Counsel for the Appellant, the power of a Civil Court under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure is plenary, unrestricted and extremely wide, subject only to specific statutory curtailment thereof and, therefore, implied circumscribing of the power of Civil Courts should not have been readily assumed or casually inferred as was done by the High Court in the impugned judgment. The learned Counsel emphasized that in the present case there is no statutory curtailment of the power of Civil Court to grant interim or injunctive relief and those who feel aggrieved are not intended to be rendered remedy less by the Rules and Regulations of BCCI. 12. As against this Mr. G.E. Vahanvati, learned Attorney General for the Respondent No. 1 and Mr. R.F. Nariman, learned Senior counsel for the Respondent No. 2 argued that the contention of the Appellant based on the definition of Administrator is not consistent with the plaint in the civil suit filed ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nterest element and thus even if he would not have disclosed as was not done in the present proceedings also, the Respondent would have pointed out relevant facts to the Court. Another reason which had weighed with the Appellant in not filing the writ petition as public interest litigation was that in all probability the petition would have been summarily dismissed on the ground that it involved determination of highly disputed question of facts. The learned Counsel asserted that good grounds have been recorded by the High Court for coming to the conclusion that civil suits of the nature filed by the Appellant were not maintainable and, therefore, the judgment impugned should be upheld by this Court. 13. This Court has heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length and in great detail. This Court has also considered the documents forming part of the appeals and the relevant Regulations framed by the BCCI. 14. In view of the rival contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the parties, this Court will have to consider the question whether the Appellant can be regarded as administrator within the meaning of the Rules and Regulations of the BCCI. Admittedly, the Appellan ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ll for all particulars and unless it decides, that there is no prima facie case and be accordingly dropped, commence hearing the subject case and complete the same as expeditiously as possible and decide the subject issues by providing reasonable opportunity to the parties of being heard. None of the parties shall be entitled to be represented by any lawyer. If, despite due notice, any party fails to submit any cause or submits insufficient cause, the Committee shall after providing reasonable opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned, take appropriate action. In the event any party refuses and or fails to appear despite notice, the Committee shall be at liberty to proceed ex-parte on the basis of the available records and evidence. The Place of hearing shall be decided by the Committee from time to time. The Committee shall have the power to impose penalties as provided in the Regulations for players, Team officials managers and Umpires of the Board. (b) The decision of the Committee shall be final and binding and shall come into force forthwith on being pronounced and delivered. (iv) If any Member or Associate Member or any Administrator of the Board commits any act o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on being nominated to any of the subcommittees of the BCCI. A past president may be nominated on any of the sub-committees of BCCI and only then he would be deemed to be an administrator and not otherwise. Having regard to the well settled principles of interpretation, this Court is of the opinion that purposive interpretation of the term Administrator will have to be adopted and only such an interpretation would lead to a harmonious construction of various clauses of the Regulations. In terms of Clause 32(v), any administrator found guilty can be expelled by the Board and in future such an administrator would not be entitled to hold any position or office or be entitled to be admitted in any committee or would be entitled to be a member or an associate member or affiliate member of the Board. A bare reading of Clause 32(v) of the Regulations makes it more than clear that it includes only those past office bearers who are included in any committees or sub-committees of the Board. Regulation 6.2.1 provides for debarring a guilty administrator for a period of one year but such debarment would be possible only if the administrator is holding any office or is part of any sub-committe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the rejoinder do not make the provisions of the Specific Relief Act applicable to the facts pleaded by Appellant in the two suits. 17. An attempt was made to argue that the Appellant is entitled to maintain the two suits because what is claimed by the Appellant is that he is the past president of BCCI and, therefore, both the suits instituted to declare that the Respondent No. 2, i.e., Mr. Srinivasan has no right to hold any position in BCCI due to conflict of interest relates to right to property. However, on going through the averments made in the plaints, this Court finds that no right is claimed under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. The record does not indicate that any personal right of the Appellant is infringed. Prima facie the Appellant, who is claiming declaratory decrees against the Respondents, would not be entitled to the same because no personal right of the Appellant is infringed. 18. The averments made in the two plaints would show that the Appellant is not claiming any legal character in the BCCI nor is he claiming any right to any of the properties of the BCCI. Therefore, it is clear that the Appellant has not instituted the two suits under Section 34 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... that the Appellant had filed any application seeking permission of the court under Order I Rule 8 Sub-rule (1) Code of Civil Procedure nor the averments made in the plaints of two suits indicate that the suits are purportedly filed in a representative capacity. A careful scrutiny of the averments made in the plaints of the two suits prima facie indicates that the Appellant has filed the suits in his individual capacity. All that the Appellant has stated in the plaints is that he is the past President of BCCI and, therefore, he is interested in the promotion of the game of cricket in India and in maintaining the purity of administration of BCCI. The paragraph which deals with cause of action inter alia mentions that the Appellant has filed the suits in the capacity of an Administrator. The averments made in the plaints prima facie indicate that what is asserted by the Appellant is that that he had questioned the conduct of Mr. N. Srinivasan by sending two complaints dated September 5, 2008 and September 19, 2008 to BCCI and that no action was taken by BCCI against Mr. N. Srinivasan. The two complaints have been produced on the record of the appeals. A glance at those two complaints ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... re, can be stated only by him but it is not in dispute that such a writ petition was not filed by the Appellant. 22. The result of above discussion may be summarized as follows: The Appellant is not a member of the Respondent No. 1 society. It is not his case that he is either full member of associate member or an affiliate member of the Respondent No. 1 society. His claim that he is an administrator of the BCCI and has filed two suits in that capacity is rightly not accepted by the High Court. The suits claiming declarations are neither filed under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act nor the suits are filed in a representative capacity under Order I Rule 8 nor the Appellant has filed public interest suits as contemplated by Section 91 of Code of Civil Procedure. 23. In the light of above discussion, the question arises as to whether the two suits filed by the Appellant, who is not a member of the Respondent No. 1 Society, are maintainable. There is no manner of doubt that BCCI is a private autonomous Society registered under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975. Therefore, its actions have to be judged only like any other similar society or body and cannot be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... de the Parsi community was not against the public policy as it did not militate against the provisions or the Act or rules made there under. What was held by the Court in paragraph 22 of the reported decision while judging validity of a bye-law, the interest of the society is paramount and that interest would prevail so long as there is nothing in the Act or the rules prohibiting the promotion of such interest. This Court further observed that going by Chheoki Employees' Cooperative Society Ltd. case, neither the member, Respondent No. 2, nor the aspirant to membership, Respondent No. 3, had the competence to challenge the validity of the bye-laws of the society or to claim a right to membership in the society. The reference to the case of Chheoki Employees' Cooperative Society Ltd. made by this Court in the above mentioned paragraph refers to the decision of this Court in State of U.P. and Anr. v. Chheoki Employees' Cooperative Society Ltd. (1997) 3 SCC 681. In the said case what is laid down is that a member of a society has no independent right qua the society and he cannot assail constitutionality of the Act, rules and bye-laws. This Court has further explained in t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... exemption etc, while exercising enormous public functions and, therefore, it must be judged on a higher pedestal like an instrumentality of State. 26. In support of above mentioned plea the Appellant has relied on the decision in the case of BCCI v. Netaji Cricket Club (2005) 4 SCC 741. Placing reliance on the observations made in para 80 at page 762 of the reported decision, it was argued that as BCCI's control over the sport of cricket is deep, pervasive and complete, the suits would be maintainable. According to the Appellant, as a member of ICC, the BCCI represents the country in the international fora and it has the authority to select players, umpires and officials to represent the country in the international fora, it is an instrumentality of the State and the suits are maintainable against it. Paras 80 and 81 of Netaji Cricket Club case (supra) are as under: 80. The Board is a society registered under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act. It enjoys a monopoly status as regards regulation of the sport of cricket in terms of its Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association. It controls the sport of cricket and lays down the law therefore. It inter alia ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... es but categorically held that the exercise of such functions are in a very limited area of the activities of the Respondent No. 1 BCCI. In para 29 of the said judgment this Court proceeded on an assumption that some functions of the Respondent No. 1 like the selection of a team to represent India in international matches, may amount to public duties but in the end held that this is not sufficient to hold that the Respondent No. 1 is a State for the purposes of Article 12 of the Constitution. The categorical findings in paragraphs 23, 24, 25, 28, 29, 31, 33 and 34 of the Zee Telefilm Ltd. Case are as under: 23. The facts established in this case show the following: 1. The Board is not created by a statute. 2. No part of the share capital of the Board is held by the Government. 3. Practically no financial assistance is given by the Government to meet the whole or entire expenditure of the Board. 4. The Board does enjoy a monopoly status in the field of cricket but such status is not State-conferred or State-protected. 5. There is no existence of a deep and pervasive State control. The control if any is only regulatory in nature as applicable to other similar bodies ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... yee works would also have to be treated as State. The pre-requisite for invoking the enforcement of a fundamental right under Article 32 is that the violator of that right should be a State first. Therefore, if the argument of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is to be accepted then the Petitioner will have to first establish that the Board is a State under Article 12 and it is violating the fundamental rights of the Petitioner. Unless this is done the Petitioner cannot allege that the Board violates fundamental rights and is therefore State within Article 12. In this petition under Article 32 we have already held that the Petitioner has failed to establish that the Board is State within the meaning of Article 12. Therefore assuming there is violation of any fundamental right by the Board that will not make the Board a State for the purpose of Article 12. 29. It was then argued that the Board discharges public duties which are in the nature of State functions. Elaborating on this argument it was pointed out that the Board selects a team to represent India in international matches. The Board makes rules that govern the activities of the cricket players, umpires and other p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t or he is not a State. Under the Indian jurisprudence there is always a just remedy for violation of a right of a citizen. Though the remedy under Article 32 is not available, an aggrieved party can always seek a remedy under the ordinary course of law or by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution which is much wider than Article 32. 33. Thus, it is clear that when a private body exercises its public functions even if it is not a State, the aggrieved person has a remedy not only under the ordinary law but also under the Constitution, by way of a writ petition under Article 226. Therefore, merely because a nongovernmental body exercises some public duty that by itself would not suffice to make such body a State for the purpose of Article 12. In the instant case the activities of the Board do not come under the guidelines laid down by this Court in Pradeep Kumar Biswas case (supra), hence there is force in the contention of Mr. Venugopal that this petition under Article 32 of the Constitution is not maintainable. 34. At this stage, it is relevant to note another contention of Mr. Venugopal that the effect of treating the Board as State will have far reachi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... h of this Court, about three weeks after the judgment was delivered by two Judge Bench in Netaji Cricket Club case. The judgment delivered by the Constitution Bench makes it clear that the judgment of the two Judge Bench, delivered in case of Netaji Cricket Club, was specifically cited before the Constitution Bench and was considered by the Constitution Bench. Further, the judgment in Zee Telefilms case was first prepared by the learned Judges, who had written the judgment in Netaji Cricket Club case and this is evident from the fact that the learned Judges, who had delivered majority judgment in Zee Telefilms case, have recorded that they had read the opinion of the learned Judge but did not agree with the conclusions recorded therein. In view of the healthy traditions established by the legendary Judges of this Court, the learned Judges, who constituted majority in Zee Telefilms case, have refrained from using the expression that law laid down in Netaji Cricket Club case is not a good law or that the decision in Netaji Cricket Club case stands overruled because the learned Judge, who had written judgment in Netaji Cricket Club case, was also one of the learned members of the Cons ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dent No. 2 it was contended that no specific allegations against Members of the BCCI or directors of the India Cement Limited have been leveled against the Respondent No. 2 and, therefore, the plea based on conflict of interest was rightly negatived by the High Court. It was maintained before this Court that India Cement Limited is a Company, which is managed through a Board of Directors of which Respondent No. 2 is the Vice Chairman and Managing Director, but his holding of shares is only 0.05% and, therefore, it is wrong to say that the Respondent No. 2 takes decision without approval of the Board of Directors of the Company. What was pleaded was that India Cement Limited has thousands of share holders and the Company has an independent legal existence from its share holders whereas all the decisions regarding management and administration of BCCI are taken by its Managing Committee consisting of nine members of whom the Respondent No. 2 is only one of the members and, therefore, there is no conflict of interest as is claimed by the Appellant. It was further argued that all the decisions of the Managing Committee of the BCCI have to be approved by its General Body and as there ar ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Players Regulations would include events like ODI Match, Twenty 20, etc. is to ignore the hard ground realities and completely brush aside the definitions of those terms mentioned earlier. 35. The expression matches or events in the unamended Clause 6.2.4 of the Rules and Regulations cannot be construed to include the events like T20 cricket as those events were introduced after the year 2000. Therefore, the contention of the Appellant that the Respondent No. 2 violated the unamended Players Regulations and injunctions as prayed for should have been granted, cannot be accepted and is hereby rejected. 36. The next question which falls for consideration is whether the Players Regulations were properly amended or the amendments made are illegal as pleaded by the Appellant. 37. The argument that Clause 6.2.4 of the Players' Regulations was not properly amended and, therefore, the same should be regarded as illegal is devoid of substance. All the rules relating to agenda of notice were properly followed. The amendment in Clause 6.2.4 can be traced back to the working committee meeting, which took place on June 22, 2008. The record would show that in the said meeting it was ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ems which would be taken up by the members under the heading any other business . It is implicit in the concept of special business to be taken up for discussion at the behest of the Chairman that no particular mention is required of other business which is to be conducted at the meeting. When a member gets his notice, he is deemed to have knowledge of the Regulations of the body concerned and, therefore, of the agenda items. In any event only members could have objected to the process for amending the Players' Regulations. The record shows that not a single member objected to the proposed amendment. On the contrary the record unerringly shows that the resolution relating to the impugned amendment was passed unanimously by the members. The Rules and Regulations, which are the organic and constitutional documents of the association, are framed under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975. A plain reading of Section 12 of the said Act makes it very clear that it is only if a bye-law or the objects of association mentioned in the Memorandum is intended to be amended that such amendment is required to be registered. This provision has no application to amendments of the P ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... which was not conducted on lines of international cricket, but was conducted purely on commercial lines. If maximum boost was to be given to the cricket, it was through organizing T20 matches on a commercial basis. Thus it stands to reason that any person who is interested in the game should be able to participate in the commercial aspect of T20. For this purpose, a tender process had to be used. The attempt was to maximize interest and participation in T20 by way of acquisition and funding of teams. This could be done if there was a widest possible participation both by franchisees and stakeholders including the spectators. The process of bidding by the franchisees for the various participating teams establishes the commercial nature of IPL and Champions League T20 cricket. Therefore, it is difficult to uphold the contention of the Appellant regarding conflict of interest in an IPL since the purpose of this new model of cricket was to maximize outreach of the game and exploit its commercial potential as well. The record does not indicate that any franchisee or any other member of the Respondent No. 1 BCCI has complained of any alleged conflict of interest. It is nobody's case ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ppears that in the absence of any specific allegation of mala fides in the plaints of both the suits, the Appellant, who is Plaintiff in the suits, would not be entitled to any of the main reliefs claimed in the two suits and reliefs claimed in interlocutory applications. The assertion made by the Appellant that the amendment in Clause 6.2.4 of the Rules and Regulations was carried out at the behest of the Respondent No. 2 would in turn suggest that the Respondent No. 2 exercised undue influence over the other members of the Managing Committee and General Body of BCCI and the various other persons constituting various committees. When such allegations of undue influence are pleaded by any party to a suit, it is the requirement under Order VI Rule 4 Code of Civil Procedure that particulars must be given in detail. However, the pleadings do not even remotely satisfy the requirements of Order VI Rule 4 Code of Civil Procedure. There are no specific allegations in the plaints of both the suits. A reading of the plaint in CS No. 1167 of 2008 discloses that there are no particulars or specific allegations of mala fides against the sub-committee, Managing Committee or General Body of BCCI ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... et Association. Moreover, the two suits were filed in the year 2008 and no interim relief/reliefs has/have been granted by the learned Single Judge of the High Court as well as by the Division Bench of the High Court. This Court is of the opinion that after passage of over two years, it would not be in the fitness of things to grant mandatory temporary injunction as prayed for. What is relevant to notice is that if the injunctions as prayed for are granted the suits would stand decreed without adjudicating the claims raised by the Respondents, on merits. Such a relief is not called for in the facts of the case. Therefore, the Appellant is not entitled to the injunctions claimed by him in different interlocutory applications which were filed before the High Court. 45. The Appellant has filed an application seeking permission of the Court to permit him to produce additional documents in the present appeals. It is an admitted position that the additional documents sought to be produced before this Court were not part of the records before the learned Single Judge or the Division Bench of the High Court. As such no reasons are stated as to why these two documents, though in existenc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ught to be relied upon is Minutes of Meeting of the Governing Council of the IPL dated August 11, 2009. This document reflects the deliberations between the various members of the Governing Council on the issue of transfer of players from one IPL franchise to the other at the end of three years. Nine members including eminent cricketers who are members of the Governing Council participated in the meeting and the Respondent No. 2 had also expressed his views on the issue of transfer of players. The record shows that ultimately, the views expressed by the Respondent No. 2 were not accepted. This document proves that the Governing Council is not influenced by the views of one person and the Respondent No. 2 is not in a position to exercise undue influence over the other members of the Governing Council, as alleged. 48. As noticed earlier the learned Single Judge of the High Court before whom the suits were instituted as well as the Division Bench of the High Court have refused to grant equitable relief of injunction claimed by the Appellant. This Court is of the opinion that grant of interim relief as prayed for can amount to decreeing the suit without adjudicating the claims raise ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... utely vague and not in terms of Order XVI Rule 4(1)(d)(ii) of the Supreme Court Rules because it does not give particulars of (a) how the Appellant came to be in possession of those documents, (b) at what point of time he acquired possession of documents, (c) the source from which the documents were secured and (d) what prevented the Appellant from placing the documents on record of the trial court. Though the Appellant has filed quite lengthy rejoinder, these questions have not been addressed by him in the rejoinder. The contention that the Respondents have failed to respond to the merits of the Interlocutory Application and, therefore, those documents should be considered, cannot be accepted, more particularly, when no ground is made out for granting permission to the Appellant to produce the documents sought to be produced along with the said Interlocutory Application. 50. The upshot of the above discussion is that the learned Single Judge and Division Bench of the High Court were justified in not granting the temporary injunction claimed by the Appellant. It is difficult to hold that either the learned Single Judge or the learned Judges of the Division Bench of the High Cour ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d against which these appeals 85 arise wherein extensive arguments have been advanced by learned Counsel for the contesting parties in support of their respective pleas. 52. Having deliberated and meticulously considered the same in the light of the background, facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals as also having the benefit of the views expressed in the judgment and order of my learned Brother Panchal, J., I find it hard to subscribe to the view expressed therein and hence record reasons respectfully dissenting from the view on the issues raised in these appeals. For this purpose as also to test the relative strength and weaknesses of the arguments advanced and to have an overall view of the controversy involved, I deem it essential to relate the genesis and background of the matter under which these appeals arise. 53. The 1st Respondent in these appeals which is the Board of Control for Cricket in India (for short 'BCCI') is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act which has its own Memorandum of Association, Rules and Regulations. Apart from these, BCCI also has regulations for Players, Team Officials, Managers, Umpires and Administr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s owned Chennai Super King. The Complainant/Appellant therefore sought action against him as he brought to the notice of the BCCI-President that the second Respondent - Sri N. Srinivasan being an office bearer of the BCCI who is also heading a company named 'India Cements' had commercial interest giving rise to a conflict of interest with the Indian Premier League (for short 'IPL') Tournament for which an auction was conducted by the BCCI, in so far as he was in substantial control of the India Cements Ltd. which became the successful franchisee of the Chennai Super King and at the same time is also in the governing council of the IPL Tournament which disqualified him to participate in the bid for owning Chennai Super King. 56. The Appellant's complaint did not meet with any response whatsoever from the BCCI which prompted him to file a suit in the Madras High Court on 24.9.2008 bearing C.S. No. No. 930/2008 wherein the Plaintiff Appellant herein sought to enforce Clause 6.2.4 against the second Respondent - Sri N. Srinivasan as in the year 2008, Respondent No. 2 - Sri N. Srinivasan who is the Managing Director of India Cements Ltd. became the successful bi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the case of Appellant, could not have been permitted in view of Clause 6.2.4 as it stood prior to the amendment. But in order to obviate the bar imposed by Clause 6.2.4 which came in the way of Respondent No. 2 from participating in the auction for IPL, an amendment was hurriedly and most expeditiously introduced in Clause 6.2.4 in order to permit second Respondent-Sri N. Srinivasan to participate in the bid in which he was a successful bidder and consequently owned Chennai Super King in spite of the bar of Clause 6.2.4 which was operating against him prior to its amendment and was introduced subsequent to the auction which was held for owning Chennai Super King, in absence of which he would have been ineligible to participate in the bid and hence disqualified. The Appellant, therefore, filed two applications for injunction and in the first application bearing No. 1041/2008 he had sought a temporary injunction restraining the BCCI from permitting Respondent No. 2 - Sri N. Srinivasan to participate in the General Body Meeting but in the second application he sought injunction against the amendment introduced by pleading to put it under suspension. 59. However, the main thrust of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... llant can be held to be having the competence or locus to file a suit against the BCCI, then whether the suit can be held to be maintainable at his instance so as to enter into further question whether the alleged amendment introduced in Clause 6.2.4 can be held to be having any conflict of interest with the interest of BCCI as in that event it would permit Respondent No. 2 to hold the field by functioning as office bearer of the BCCI and thus participate in all its policy decisions as well as deliberations, while continuing also as Vice Chairman/ Managing Director of his firm India Cements Ltd. and simultaneously also own Chennai Super King as successful bidder in the IPL auction. 61. The preliminary question on which the entire edifice of the case rests which will have the effect of making the entire case stand or crumble down, is the question as to whether the Plaintiff/Appellant has the locus standi to file a civil suit in the High Court of Madras so as to challenge the amendment introduced by the BCCI under Clause 6.2.4. In this context, it is extremely relevant to record the definition of the term 'Administrator' in the BCCI Regulations. Clause 1(n) defines the ter ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e would not include an Administrator unless he is a member of the sub committee of the disciplinary committee which is constituted for dealing with the misconduct of any office bearer including all its constituents as envisaged under Clause 32, would be a far fetched interpretation so as to hold that unless an Administrator is appointed on a sub committee for the purpose of constituting a disciplinary committee under Clause 32 of the Regulation, he cannot be treated as an 'Administrator' within the meaning of Clause 1(n) of the Regulation and that it would not clothe him with any legal right to maintain an action in law against the BCCI even for challenging the arbitrary amendment, is difficult to agree and accept. 63. On the contrary, I find sufficient force and substance in the contention of the counsel for the Appellant that the suits were filed by the Appellant in the capacity of past president of the BCCI since he was an Administrator within the meaning of the said definition enumerated in Clause 1(n) of the Regulation. As such, he was competent to institute a suit in his individual capacity since Clause 1(n) of the Regulation cannot be allowed to result into a prov ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t from dealing with cases of misconduct against players, umpires or administrator. 65. A plain and literal interpretation of the Rule clearly indicates that the past presidents also have been unequivocally included within the meaning of 'Administrator' and while an Administrator can also be included as a Member of the Sub-Committee for the Disciplinary Committee, it cannot be interpreted so as to infer that former president stands excluded from the definition of Administrator until and unless he is a member of the Sub-Committee for disciplinary proceedings. It is difficult to accept that this would be so in order to give it a purposive interpretation as no purpose in my opinion can possibly be inferred from this, on the contrary, the purpose is writ large that it amounts to grant exemption to Respondent No. 2 from getting trapped into the bar imposed by Clause 6.2.4 of the Regulation of the BCCI which laid down that Administrator shall have no direct or indirect commercial interest in any event of the BCCI. With utmost respect, to hold it to be a purposive interpretation would amount to overlooking the express provision of the definition of Administrator given out in C ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... emind ourselves the well-settled principle of interpretation that when the language in a statute is plain and admits of one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise, as in the instant matter, where the definition of 'Administrator' has been clearly given out in the Regulation of the BCCI. But in order to oust the past President and his competence to challenge the action of BCCI from questioning the speedy and hurried amendment introduced by the BCCI in order to assist Respondent No. 2 from participating in the bidding process for owning Chennai Super King and then to interpret the definition of 'Administrator' so as to hold that he was not competent to file a suit, can hardly be held to be giving effect to a purposive and meaningful interpretation to the expression 'Administrator' as the purpose or object to serve some just cause is totally missing. 70. If we were to dig at the labyrinth of the archives of judicial precedents, we may take note of the case of The Attorney General v. The Mutual Tontine West Minster Chambers Association, Limited (1876) 1 Ex.D. 469 as also Charles Bradlaugh v. Henry Lewis Clarke, (1883) VIII A.C. 354, w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise. What is not included by the Legislature (law maker), the same cannot be undone by the court by principle of purposive interpretation. This was the view expressed by this Court also in the matter of Dental Council of India and Anr. v. Hari Parkash and Ors. (2001) 8 SCC 61 wherein it was held that it cannot ignore the obvious (provision) and object and the intention of the Legislature apparent from the context and so interpret and construe it, so as to enlarge the scope of its application by imparting into it, meaning by implication, which do not necessarily arise. 72. Taking into consideration the aforesaid salutary principles of interpretation, I am clearly of the view that the definition of the term 'Administrator' does not exclude the past president from the meaning of Administrator so as to hold that the action taken by the Administrator by filing a civil suit and questioning the amendment introduced by the BCCI in Clause 6.2.4 was not fit to be entertained on the ground that the Appellant had no locus standi to challenge the amendment on the ground of his competence or locus standi. I, therefore, find it hard to su ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... by taking recourse to the civil remedy of filing civil suits in the capacity as former president of the BCCI merely to ensure suspension of the amendment by way of seeking injunction which was introduced as the same was not in the interest of the BCCI, since it gave rise to direct or indirect commercial interest of Respondent No. 2 with the events of BCCI and is barred under Regulation 6.2.4 which is sought to be diluted by introducing the amendment in the same. 75. It may be reiterated that this appeal by special leave is not a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution but is an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution arising out of an order passed in a civil suit refusing to grant injunction which was filed in two regular civil suits. I, therefore, find it difficult to accept the contention of the counsel for the Respondents and accepted by brother Panchal, J. that merely because the BCCI cannot be regarded as an instrumentality of the State, it will have to be held that the two suits filed by the Appellant are not maintainable. In order to decide whether the Plaintiff has a right to file a civil suit or not, locus standi or competence of the Plaintiff alone is to be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t the elected honorary office bearers of the Kerala Cricket Association and others like players, coaches, managers, members of various committees etc. are public servants within the meaning of Section 2(C) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and the High Court of Kerala had reversed the judgment of the Special Court at Kerala which had held that they are not public servants. To elaborate it slightly, it may be stated that Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 10107/2010 titled T.C. Mathew v. K. Balaji Iyengar and Ors. was filed challenging the judgment of the Kerala High Court wherein the substantial question of law which was raised before the Supreme Court in the aforesaid special leave petition was whether the elected office bearers of Kerala Cricket Association could be prosecuted under the Prevention of Corruption Act alleging offences under Section 13(1)(c) and (d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and whether Section 409, 420, 468, 471, 427(a) and 201 of the Indian Penal Code was rightly initiated against elected honorary office bearers of the Kerala Cricket Association viz. honorary members of various committees, players, coaches, manager, boys te ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ause 6.2.4 of the Regulation of the BCCI in abeyance specially when the Appellant succeeded in making out a prima facie case to the effect that participation of Respondent No. 2 in the bid held for IPL matches and thus own Chennai Super King directly or indirectly came in conflict with the interest of BCCI as Respondent No. 2 during and after bidding process for the IPL Team admittedly held positions in four capacities which are as follows: (c) Treasurer of BCCI; (d) Vice-Chairman and Managing Director of India Cements Ltd. (e) Chairman, Managing Committee, Chennai Super King; and (f) Ex-officio Member of the Governing Council of IPL. Additionally, with effect from September 2008, Respondent No. 2 became the Secretary of BCCI and, therefore, the Ex-officio Chief Executive of BCCI and also Convener of the Meetings of the Committees of BCCI including IPL and Champions League. In this context, I find substance in the plea of learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant that conflict of interest does not require actual proof of any actual pecuniary gain or pecuniary loss as the principle of 'conflict of interest' is a much wider, equitable, legal and moral prin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he bid to own IPL tournament and at the same time holding the position of an office bearer of the BCCI, is clearly bound to result into conflict of interest of the BCCI. It is altogether a different matter that the Appellant has also tried to cite example that the Respondent No. 2 as franchise holder for Chennai Super King was compensated approximately for ₹ 47 crores by Respondent No. 2 on account of cancellation of a match. However, this is not the stage to rely on this part of the allegation even if it is by way of an example as the suit is still pending before the High Court, but the fact remains that the Respondent No. 2 by virtue of his position as Vice-Chairman and Managing Director of India Cements Ltd. and ex-officio Member of the Governing Council of IPL clearly came in his way to participate in the auction held by the BCCI for IPL matches and it is for this very purpose that the amendment was hurriedly introduced so that the Respondent No. 2 may not be held disqualified from owning IPL Chennai Super King. 78. In fact, the concept of 'conflict of interest management' has increasingly drawn the attention of governments and citizens alike in all advanced co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... CI in so far as the power of amendment was introduced not to promote the game of cricket but to promote the interest of the 2nd Respondent as it is more than clear that without the amendment, Respondent No. 2 would not have been entitled to participate in the bid as he was a Treasurer of the BCCI and hence without the amendment he was not eligible even to participate in the bid and enjoy dual status of that of an office bearer of the BCCI as Treasurer and also own Chennai Super King. 80. The Plaintiff/Appellant in my view and perception based on consideration of the concept of conflict of interest and its implication surely succeeded in making out a prima facie case that this resulted in serving commercial interest of Respondent No. 2 which gave rise to conflict of interest with the activities of the BCCI since Respondent No. 2 as Administrator/office bearer was able to influence the decision of the BCCI by being a treasurer and simultaneously also participated in the IPL auction, clearly giving rise to commercial interest which is barred if the amendment had not been introduced. Even at the risk of repetition, it is essential to highlight that the BCCI regulation itself acknowl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rectitude by divesting himself from commercial interest which directly or indirectly results in conflict of interest with the activities of the BCCI which was clearly barred under Regulation 6.2.4 but has been diluted by introducing an amendment after the IPL auction had already been held when Respondent No. 2 was ineligible even to participate in the auction. Hence, the impugned amendment dated 27.9.2008 was fit to be suspended by granting injunction against the same. This is clearly so as it would be difficult to overlook that multiple loyalties can create commercial interest with the activities of BCCI thus resulting in conflict of interest since the financial or personal interest of the Board would clearly be inconsistent with the commercial and personal interest of the Administrator of the Board. In addition, the rule of equity and fairness provides that no one who stands in a position of trust towards another can in matters affected by that position, advance his own interests for example, by trading and making a profit at that other's expense as the rule of legal prudence mandates that once a fiduciary is shown to be in breach of his duty of loyalty, he must disgorge any ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
