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TMI Blog2018 (11) TMI 495X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... GNOU and PTU are constituted in exercise of the legislative power the accreditation by them in favour of the appellant is very much covered under the terms “recognized by law” - demand set aside. Demand on hiring charges recovered from IGNOU - scope of SCN - Held that:- The demand for the charges received as hiring of computer, stationery, etc. charges under commercial tanning and coaching service is not sustainable. Such kind service may be classified as supply of tangible goods. But the impugned Show Cause Notice has not proposed the demand under the head of supply of tangible goods - The law is settled that the adjudicating authorities are not allowed to go beyond the scope of show cause notice - demand set aside. Demand on Income from IIHT - Held that:- From the clause of the agreement between appellant and IIHT and in view of the admitted fact that the appellant is the service tax provider whereas IIHT is the recipient thereof Section 68 of the Finance Act, 1944 acquires relevance according to which the liability to pay service tax in such manner and within such period as may be prescribed, rests upon such person who is providing taxable services to any other person. Thu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... K Batra (CA) Mr. Vibha Narang (Adv.) Present for the Respondent: Mr. G.R. Singh, (AR). ORDER PER: RACHNA GUPTA The present appeal is directed against the Order of Commissioner Appeals bearing No. (188) dated 10.01.2014. 2. The relevant facts for the adjudication are that the appellants are engaged in providing Commercial Training and Coaching Services (CTCS in short) and are accordingly registered since 10.04.2008. Department on an intelligence gathered by their anti-evasion branch came to know that the appellants have not discharged their liability for providing CTCS services for the period w.e.f. April 2004 to 30 September 2009. Resultantly, a show cause notice dated 22.04.2010 was served upon them raising the total demand of ₹ 32,40,478 under the following heads: Particulars Taxable Value Total Taxable Value Service Tax Total Service Tax 01.04.04 01.04.09 to 30.09.09 01.04.04 to 31.03.08 01.04.09 to 30.09.09 Demand on income fro ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... detailed above), but for providing CTCS. Hence, foremost it is relevant to know the definition of CTCS: Commercial Training or Coaching Centre means any institute or establishment providing commercial training or coaching for imparting skill or knowledge or lessons on any subject or field other than the sports, with or without issuance of a certificate and includes coaching or tutorial classes but does not include preschool coaching and training centre or any institute or establishment which issues any certificate or diploma or degree or any educational qualification recognised by law for the time being in force; The category wise arguments, observations and decisions are as follows: Demand on income from insurance Co.: On this account it is submitted on behalf of the appellant that there has been several decisions vide which the income from insurance Co. for rendering CTCS to their agents is held to be out of tax. The Bombay Flying Club Vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai-II 2012-TIOL-841-CESTAT-MUM, Academy of Maritime Education And Training Trust Vs. The Commissioner of Service Tax, Chennai, 2014-TIOL-1327-HC-MAD-ST M/s. National Institute Of Cons ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s which are recognized by law. As such they fall under the exclusion clause of the taxable entry of Commercial Training or Coaching Services. The accreditation certificates as enclosed are impressed upon. With respect to income from PTU it is submitted, in addition, that the appellants were not receiving any amount from the students who rather were paying the amount directly to the university. Above all the demand is not sustainable in view of the notification No. 10/2003 NT dated 26.06.2003. Ld. CA has relied upon the authorities below: Trichy Inst. Of Management Studies (P) Ltd. Vs. CCE Trichy 2011(22) STR 533 (Tri. Chennai) Commr. Vs. Trichy Inst. Of Management Studies Vs. CCE, Trichy 2016(44) STR J162 (Mad.) CCE, Trivandrum Vs. Tandem Integrated Services 2010(20) STR 469 (Tri. Bang.) Union of India Vs. Kasara District Parallel College Association 2014(9) TMI 385 Kerala High Court Chanakya Mandal Pariwar Vs. Commissioner of CE, Pune-III, 2018(4) TMI 846 7. Ld. DR while justifying the findings of the authorities below on this issue has mentioned that the appellants have failed to produce any documentary evidence to seek the benefit of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... iding education for obtaining the degree of a recognizing university and as such these are also exempted. Findings below are therefore prayed to be set aside. 10. Ld. DR has justified the confirmation of the demand. To our opinion, as per the definition of CTCS under Section 65(26) of the Act (as mentioned above) what is taxable is training or coaching which is commercial in nature. Under the present head, the demand has been raised qua hiring of computer charges recovered from IGNOU. From no stretch of imagination the said hiring charges can be called as an amount recovered from IGNOU with respect to training/ coaching irrespective it is meant for imparting education and training to the students by a center recognized by law. Thus the demand for the charges received as hiring of computer, stationery, etc. charges under commercial tanning and coaching service is not sustainable. Such kind service may be classified as supply of tangible goods. But the impugned Show Cause Notice has not proposed the demand under the head of supply of tangible goods. The law is settled that the adjudicating authorities are not allowed to go beyond the scope of show cause notice. We therefore opin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s and conditions specifically under para 1.7.1 of the said agreement makes it is clear that the appellant was permitted to use any other new trademark, trademill or service mark in relation to its business of education and training in information technology however on being advised by the franchiser in writing. This particular observation makes it clear that except the nomenclature, the agreement is actually for franchisee services. Further perusal of the agreement, specifically para 2.1.1 thereof, makes it clear that royalty of 15% of total gross collections of every month received by the appellant was agreed to be the share of IIHT and the remaining 85% thereof was agreed to be that of the appellant. From the above said clause of the agreement between appellant and IIHT and in view of the admitted fact that the appellant is the service tax provider whereas IIHT is the recipient thereof Section 68 of the Finance Act, 1944 acquires relevance according to which the liability to pay service tax in such manner and within such period as may be prescribed, rests upon such person who is providing taxable services to any other person. Thus the statue itself prohibits any agreement of serv ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ill to enable the trainee to seek employment or undertakes an employment directly after such training or coaching. Since the nature of training in the present case is about latest information technology programs such as networking, cloud computing net java etc., we are of the opinion that the training is a job specific talent devolvement. As a result, the appellant is opined to be a vocational training institute entitled for the exemption of above notification dated 10.09.2004. The demand of ₹ 63,786/- as confirmed by the adjudicating authorities below is therefore hereby set aside. Demand as raised for miscellaneous income: Now coming to demand of ₹ 6,542/- service tax against the miscellaneous income and of ₹ 28,748/- service tax against the income not forming the part of P L account, it is submitted by the appellant that miscellaneous income is out of the sale of the scrap library charges etc. However, we observe that there is no evidence on record to this effect the original adjudicating authority has clearly recorded that despite a ledger account was asked from the appellant they have failed to provide same. In absence thereof the miscellaneous inc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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