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TMI Blog2019 (2) TMI 467X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... second proviso to Section 18(1) shall be that if a person other than borrower / guarantor files an appeal before the Arbitral Tribunal then the stipulation of the pre-deposit of 50% (or 25%) of the amount of debt due from him as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the DRT shall not be insisted upon. This is the only interpretation, which can be given to second proviso to Section 18(1) read with Section 2(f) of the SARFAESI Act. It is a well settled law of interpretation that “when the words of the statute are clear, plain or unambiguous, ie., they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences - there is no ambiguity in the provisions of Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act. The provisions of Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, are determinative of the fact that the legislature intended that it is only the borrower and the guarantor, who should be under obligation to make the pre-deposit. The same is clear on a literal and grammatical meaning of the words “borrower” and “any person aggrieved” as found mentioned in Section 18 and 2 (f) of the Act. There is no inconsistency within the provision ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d Ors. v. Indiabulls Housing Finance Ltd. bearing No. 244/2017 was filed before the DRT by respondent Nos.1 to 5. It is the case of the petitioner that the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 are neither the owners of the property nor do they have any interest in the said property. On October 30, 2017, the DRT-1 rejected the interim relief application and directed that the auction sale shall remain subject to the final outcome of the SA. On December 05, 2017, an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC was filed by the petitioner seeking dismissal of the SA on the grounds that the respondent Nos.1 to 5 have no locus to prefer a securitization application challenging the SARFAESI action of the petitioner against the said property. The secured asset was auctioned on October 30, 2017 and sale was confirmed. A sale certificate was issued on January 03, 2018 in favour of the auction purchaser against the payment of entire sale consideration of ₹ 25,04,10,000/-. 5. On February 17, 2018, the learned DRT, New Delhi allowed the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC of the petitioner and dismissed the SA. On February 27, 2018, respondent Nos. 1 to 5 preferred an appeal before the DRAT impugning the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... espondents was dismissed while deciding the application filed by the petitioner Under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC. 9. He submitted, the Supreme Court of India has categorically interpreted Section-18 of SARFAESI Act along with its proviso in the case titled Axis Bank v. SBS Organics Private Ltd. and Anr. (2016) 12 SCC 18. According to him, the aforementioned judgment of the Supreme Court clearly interprets the provision of pre-deposit and provides that any aggrieved person which includes borrowers, guarantors and any third party, against an order passed by the DRT under Section 17 is entitled to prefer an appeal. For the purpose of preferring an appeal, a fee is prescribed for the Tribunal, however, to entertain to said appeal the aggrieved person has to make a deposit of 50% of the amount. 10. According to him a similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in the case titled as Narayan Chandra Ghosh v. UCO Bank Ors. Civil Appeal No. 2681 of 2011. Similarly, in a decision of this Court in Sanjeev Sikka and Anr. vs. Reserve Bank of India and Ors. W.P.(C) No. 312/2018, this Court has held that the Appellate Tribunal can hear appeals against an order of DRT only upon com ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... order passed by the learned Appellate Tribunal by stating that the same is in conformity with the provisions of Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. 16. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, the issue falls in a very narrow compass, whether respondent Nos.1 to 5, who were neither the borrowers nor the guarantors are liable to make pre-deposit of half of the amount of the debt, which has been claimed by the petitioner herein under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act. To answer this issue, it is necessary to reproduce Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, as under:- 18. Appeal to Appellate Tribunal.- (1) Any person aggrieved, by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under section 17, may prefer an appeal along with such fee, as may be prescribed to an Appellate Tribunal within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order of Debts Recovery Tribunal.-(1) Any person aggrieved, by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under section 17, may prefer an appeal along with such fee, as may be prescribed to an Appellate Tribunal within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order of Debts Recovery Tribunal. Provided that different fees may be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... unt of debt due from him as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the DRT shall not be insisted upon. This is the only interpretation, which can be given to second proviso to Section 18(1) read with Section 2(f) of the SARFAESI Act. 19. It is a settled position of law, in the process of interpreting a statute or a provision, it should also be kept in mind that it is the duty of the Court to conceive and perceive the true intention of the Legislature and in the words of Hon'ble Justice G.P. Singh, in his Book, Interpretation of Statutes , how far and to what extent each component / part of the statute influences the meaning of the other part, would be different in each given case . Justice G.P. Singh states in Principles of Statutory Interpretation (Eighth Edition, 2001), It may look somewhat paradoxical that plain meaning rule is not plain and requires some explanation. The rule, that plain words require no construction, starts with the premise that the words are plain, which is itself a conclusion reached after construing the words. It is not possible to decide whether certain words are plain or ambiguous unless they are studied in their context and const ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... le, the Court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation. In the present case, the literal construction leads to no apparent absurdity and therefore, there can be no compelling reason for departing from that golden rule of construction. 22. In Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan reported in AIR 1957 SC 907, the Supreme Court held that, it must always be borne in mind that the first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislature must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself. If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. The words used in the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimately arise. When the material words are capable of two constructions, one of which is likely to defeat or impair the policy of the Act wh ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... utory provision is plain and unambiguous, the court shall not interpret the same in a different manner, only because of harsh consequences arising therefrom.... 37. The court's jurisdiction to interpret a statute can be invoked when the same is ambiguous. It is well known that in a given case the court can iron out the fabric but it cannot change the texture of the fabric. It cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. It cannot add or subtract words to a statute or read something into it which is not there. It cannot rewrite or recast legislation. It is also necessary to determine that there exists a presumption that the legislature has not used any superfluous words. It is well settled that the real intention of the legislation must be gathered from the language used. . ..... But the intention of the legislature must be found out from the scheme of the Act. 30. In Vemareddy Kumaraswamy Reddy v. State of A.P., reported in (2006) 2 SCC 670, the Supreme Court held that, 12. It is said that a statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting or construing a statut ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 179. Even otherwise, it is a well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. The language employed in a statute is a determinative factor of the legislative intent. If the language of the enactment is clear and unambiguous, it would not be proper for the courts to add any words thereto and evolve some legislative intent, not found in the statute. Reference in this regard may be made to a recent decision of this Court in Ansal Properties Industries Ltd. v. State of Haryana [MANU/SC/0113/2009 : 2009 (3) SCC 553] 180. Further, it is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that the legislature is specially precise and careful in its choice of language. Thus, if a statutory provision is enacted by the legislature, which prescribes a condition at one place but not at some other place in the same provision, the only reasonable interpretation which can be resorted to by the courts is that such was the intention of the legislature and that the provision was consciously enacted in that manner. In such cases, it will be wrong to presume that such omission was inadvertent or that by incorpora ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... osit on an appeal filed by him / her against the order of the DRT. The DRAT has rightly rejected the contention made on behalf of the petitioner for the pre-deposit to be made by the respondent. 38. Mr. Mata had relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Axis Bank (supra). In the said judgment, the question arose as to what shall be the fate of pre-deposit on the disposal of the appeal. It was in that context, the Supreme Court made observations as relied upon by Mr. Mata that an appeal can be entertained only if the borrower deposits 50% of the amount determined by the DRT. Suffice it to state, the observations of the Supreme Court made have to be read in that context in which the issue has arisen in the said case. The said judgment has no applicability in the facts of this case. 39. Even the judgment in the case of Narayan Chandra Ghosh (supra) shall not be applicable as the issue was whether the pre-deposit is a mandatory provision. The Supreme Court held in the affirmative. 40. Insofar as the reliance placed by Mr. Mata on the judgment of the Madras High Court in the case of K. Kalpana (supra) is concerned, there the petitioner was the owner of the pr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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