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TMI Blog1965 (8) TMI 102X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ors of the Estate of the deceased, with one Jayanta Kumar Banerjee, long before the vesting of the estates under the provisions of the Act. 3. In April, 1963, the appellants received a notice from the respondent No. 3 under Section 57 of the Act directing them to file relevant records in connection with the settlement recorded in Khatian No. 140, as in the opinion of the respondent No. 3, the settlement was invalid. The case number given in the notice was 124 and in the notice it was specified that the case was under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4. This notice is dated March 27, 1963. The particulars of the case as set out at the top of the notice are as follows: -- Case No. 124 under section 151, Civil Procedure Code Notice Under Section 57 of Act I of 1954. West Bengal Act for Acquisition of Zamindari rights and rights of the intermediaries. 5. It is the validity of this notice, and the threatened proceedings under the same, that were challenged by the appellants in the writ petition. The grounds on which the validity of the notice have been challenged are; (1) Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be invoked for correction or revision ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... limited to grounds I, II and III set out under paragraph 7 of the petition. This rule nisi was discharged by Laik, J. by his judgment dated December 23, 1964, and this appeal is directed against this judgment. 7. The first contention of Mr. B. Chowdhury, learned counsel for the appellants, was that the respondent No. 3 was not a civil Court, and for that reason could not exercise the inherent powers of a Civil Court. It was argued that Section 57A of the Act, conferred upon the State Government, the power of investing any authority specified in Section 53 of the Act with all or any of the powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure. The inherent power of a Civil Court Mr. Chowdhury argued, was not a power created by the Code of Civil Procedure, which had merely recognised and preserved the inherent powers of the Court. Mr. Chowdhury further argued that the term 'inherent power' itself indicated that this was a power which could be exercised by a Civil Court and by no other authority. It was not a power conferred or created by statute. It was further argued that the inherent power of a civil Court was not a power under the Civil Procedure Code. That being th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , was justified in commencing proceedings to rectify the mistake or error arising from the alleged interpolation or tampering with the original record of rights. Mr. Chakravarty relied upon the statements in the affidavit-in-opposition affirmed by the respondent No. 3 on September 10, 1963, in support of his contention. He argued that nothing had been done yet, except that a notice had been issued to the appellants to file necessary papers for preparation of a list of compensation, payable with regard to acquisition of Zamindaries, and the rights of the intermediaries under the Act. The issue of this notice could not be challenged as Section 57 of the Act clearly empowered the respondent No. 3 to issue a notice for production of papers and documents. This was all that was done by the respondent No. 3 so far. It was argued that the issue of the notice under Section 57 of the Act had not been challenged by the appellants in the writ petition. In issuing the notice the respondent No. 3 exercised the statutory powers conferred upon him, and as he suspected that interpolation had taken place, and illegal and unauthorised entries had been made in the Khatians mentioned above, he was enti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n preserved and recognised by Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure? There is no doubt that the respondent No. 3 seeks to rectify the record of rights in exercise of the inherent powers of a Civil Court. Indeed the respondent No. 3 appears to have gone very much further, as he states in the affidavit-in-opposition affirmed by him on September 10, 1963, that in the matter of the alleged interpolation in the original record of rights he even started an enquiry under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is clear, therefore, that the respondent No. 3 not only proposed to rectify the records in exercise of the inherent powers of a Civil Court, but as an administrative officer he started an enquiry into the alleged interpolation in exercise of the inherent powers of a Civil Court. 12. Mr. Chowdhury's contention, however, that the respondent No. 3 cannot in any circumstances exercise the inherent powers of a Civil Court by virtue of Section 57A of the Act cannot be accepted by us, in the form in which it has been advanced. If a statute confers upon an authority the power of a civil Court, it cannot be said that the authority invested with such powers, should exercise ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e of inherent powers of a civil Court by the Respdt. No. 3 was justified. In our opinion, this view of the trial Court cannot be upheld. A quasi Judicial tribunal cannot claim or exercise the inherent powers of a civil Court, unless a statute has conferred all the powers of a civil Court on such a tribunal. Such a tribunal cannot be equated to a civil Court except on authority of law. Unless, therefore, the statute confers upon such quasi judicial tribunal all the powers of a civil Court either expressly or by implication, the inherent powers of a civil Court cannot be exercised by such a tribunal. 15. It was next contended by Mr. Chowdhury that the powers of a statutory authority or corporation are limited and circumscribed by the statute by which such authority or tribunal is created. In support of this contention Mr. Chowdhury relied upon Halsbury, 3rd Ed. Vol. 9, p. 62, Art. 129 and a decision of this Court reported in ILR (1944) 2 Cal 101: (AIR 1946 Cat 23) and a decision of the Patna High Court reported in AIR 1959 Pat 369 (?). In my opinion the principle that statutory corporations and authorities can exercise only such powers as had been conferred upon them, is of no ass ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... invoked, nor exercised in this case, as the statute had made specific provision for revision of the record of rights even after final publication. It was argued that the exercise of inherent powers by a Civil Court would be wholly without jurisdiction if there was statutory provision for making the order, which was sought to be made in exercise of the inherent powers of the Court. The inherent powers of the Court, Mr. Chowdhury argued, could be exercised only for the ends of justice, and if the ends of justice could be met by exercise of statutory powers, the resort to inherent powers of a Civil Court would be entirely without jurisdiction. 18. The respondent No. 3 is seeking to rectify certain entries in the record of rights alleged to have been made by tampering with the records and by making interpolations therein. It was argued by Mr. Chowdhury that assuming that the allegations of interpolation and tampering with the records were true, a revision of the records could be made by the respondent No. 3, in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by Section 44(2-a). This subsection expressly confers upon an officer empowered by the State Government to revise an entry in the re ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ce demand that the respondent No. 3 should rectify the record of rights by invoking the inherent powers of a Civil Court in complete disregard to the provisions of Section 44(2-a) of the Act? The statute clearly contemplates that there may be occasion and necessity for revising the record of rights even after final publication, and has accordingly made provision to enable the appropriate authority to revise the record of rights. But in this case instead of taking recourse to the clear statutory provisions for the purpose of revising the record of rights, the inherent powers of a Civil Court are sought to be invoked by the respondent No. 3 for revising the record of rights. 21. Mr. Chakravarty sought to repel this contention of Mr. Chowdhury by relying upon a Bench decision of this Court in Baul Chand Sen v. Surish Chandra Sen, 19 Cal LJ 251: (AIR 1914 Cal 170). In that case an application was made for amendment of the record of rights prepared under Chapter 10 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The applicant's contention was that there had been interpolation in the record of rights and that the initials of the Settlement Officer in the record of rights were forged. An enquiry was ma ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s Section 115-B, by the Bengal Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1928. But this Section dealt with the question of correcting an entry in the record or rights made by a bona fide mistake only, The exercise of inherent power by the Settlement Officer was upheld, because there was no provision in the Bengal Tenancy Act corresponding to Section 44(2-a) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1954. Section 44(2)(a) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act creates very wide powers to revise the finally published record of rights for any reason whatsoever. It is not confined or restricted to the correction of entries made by bona fide mistake, as was the case under Section 108-A, (later 115-B) of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 23. The decision in Baul Chand Sen's case, 19 Cal LJ 251 : (AIR 1914 Cal 170) (supra) has therefore no application to the facts in this appeal. There was no provision in the Bengal Tenancy Aft whereby the revenue officer could correct an entry in the record of rights, except in cases where an entry had been made through a bona fide mistake. It was in these circumstances, and because there was no provision in the statute to rectify a mistake caused by fraud, that the e ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion of the record of rights, on the ground that there had been interpolations. But Jayanta, Mr. Chakravarty argued, had not come forward to agitate his grievances. There is hardly any force in this contention of Mr. Chakravarty, Jayanta undoubtedly is a person who is likely to be affected by a revision of the record of rights with regard to Khatian No. 140. But the settlement in favour of Jayanta was made by the appellants as executors of the estate of Rajendra Chandra Banerjee, since deceased. The appellants as executors of the estate of the said Rajendra Chandra Banerjee are interested in maintaining the settlement made by them and it cannot, therefore, be said that no rights of the appellants have been infringed so as to enable them to move an application under Article 226 of the Constitution. 27. It was next contended by Mr. Chakravarty that the issue of the impugned notice under Section 57 of the Act cannot be challenged nor can the notice be quashed by a writ of certiorari and therefore no order can be made with regard to the notice dated March 27, 1963, which has been validly issued by the respondent No. 3. There is no merit in this contention. The notice undoubtedly has ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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