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TMI Blog2019 (3) TMI 1411X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on (12) may lead to further follow up actions. Under sub-Section (13) a copy of the investigation report could be obtained by any concerned person by making an application in that behalf to the Court while under sub-Section (14) on receipt of said investigation report the Central Government may direct SFIO to initiate prosecution against the Company. The investigation report under sub-Section (12) is to be submitted on completion of the investigation whereas report under sub-Section (11) is in the nature of an interim report and is to be submitted if the Central Government so directs. In the backdrop of these provisions we must now consider whether the period within which a report is contemplated to be submitted to the Central Government under sub-Section (3) is mandatory and what is the scope and extent of such stipulation. It must also be stated here that the provisions of Section 43(2) of 2008 Act do not postulate any such period and the assignment in the present case to SFIO was under the concerned provisions of 2013 Act as well as under 2008 Act. Section 212(3) of 2013 Act by itself does not lay down any fixed period within which the report has to be submitted. Eve ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... g on that premise and in passing the order under appeal. Appeal allowed - writ petitioners namely Rahul Modi and Mukesh Modi are directed to surrender and remain present on 01.04.2019 at 11.00 a.m. before the Special Court, Gurugram. The Special Court may then consider the matter on merits and whether the accused are required to be remanded to custody. - Criminal Appeal Nos. 538-539 of 2019 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) Nos.94-95 of 2019), Transfer Petition (CRL.) No. 35 of 2019 - - - Dated:- 27-3-2019 - Abhay Manohar Sapre And Uday Umesh Lalit,JJ. JUDGMENT Uday Umesh Lalit, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. These Appeals challenge the correctness of the common interim order dated 20.12.2018 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Writ Petition (Crl.) Nos.3842 and 3843 of 2018. 3. In exercise of powers conferred by Section 212(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013 ( 2013 Act , for short) and under Section 43(2) and (3)(c)(i) of the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008 ( 2008 Act , for short), the Central Government vide order No.07/115/2018/CL-II (NWR), directed investigation into the affairs of Adarsh Group of Companies and LLPs ( The Gro ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... neficiaries thereof: (ii) To identify instances of mismanagement, negligence or fraud; (iii) To ascertain the role of auditors, KMPs or independent directors or any other person in the alleged fraud: (iv) To examine role of any other entity used as conduit in the alleged fraud; (v) To identify non-compliance of the statutory provisions of the Act and its impact on Corporate Governance. 6. That the Inspector(s) so appointed shall exercise all powers available to them under Section 217 of the Companies Act, 2013 and Chapter IX of LLP Act, 2008. The inspector(s) shall complete their investigation and submit their report to the Central Government within a period of 03 (Three) months from the date of issue of this order. 7. This order is issued for and on behalf of the Central Government. Sd/- (Santosh Kumar) Joint Director 4. On the same date, i.e. on 20.06.2018 an Order was passed by the Director, SFIO. The relevant portion of said order was as under:- 3. Now, therefore, in exercise of powers conferred under Section 212(1) of the Companies Act 2013, the following Officers are designated as Inspectors to carry out the investigation into the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... trate First Class, Gurugram by order dated 11.12.2018 granted remand till 14.12.2018 and directed they be produced before the Special Court (Companies Act), Gurugram on 14.12.2018. The application seeking remand had sought to make out a case for custody of the accused. The matter was dealt with by the Judicial Magistrate as under:- 5. Counsel for accused Nos.1 and 2 argued that these persons have already been co-operated with the investigation since 20th June and their office have been sealed. Despite this, now remand has been sought without any reason, therefore, kindly it be declined. 6. Perusal of documents on record shows that there are serious allegations and as per order dated 20.06.2018, investigation was ordered to be initiated and now accused has been produced before this court under Section 167 Cr.P.C. seeking SFIO remand. This court is to exercise the power of Magistrate in terms of Section 436(1)(B). At this stage, remand has been sought. The offence alleged is definitely serious in nature and the arrest orders are placed on record. Consequential to these documents, accused were arrested and produced. Undoubtedly, they have been appearing on notices issued by ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he Order dated 14.12.2018 passed by the Special Court was:- 6. Admittedly as per the provisions of Section 212(3) of the Companies Act, the investigations ordered are required to be completed within the specified time. But the issue is even if it not so done, what should be consequences and whether further proceedings or investigations shall be unlawful. The answer to the mind of this court is simply no because the time frame mentioned is to complete the investigations in a time bound manner but the said time can be extended from time to time by the same authority. And in this case all, after investigations when the team submitted report to competent authority, which is the Director of SFIO, he permitted the team to arrest the accused and go for further investigations, which in the given facts and circumstances amount to extension. Then the purpose of section 212(3) is just to grant sanction to investigate as per the procedure provided under Chapter XIV of the Companies Act, 2013 and as per sub-Section 6, the offence alleged is cognizable and non-bailable and thus power has been granted to the SFIO to arrest the persons involved and see their remand and then to file a final re ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lowing order was passed: At request of Ms. Maninder Acharya, learned ASG appearing on behalf of the Union of India, in order to enable her to obtain instructions qua the extension of time for the submission of report by the SFIO, the hearing of the petitions is adjourned. On the same day the accused were produced before the Special Court and after being satisfied that further custody was required in order to complete investigation, the accused were remanded to police custody till 21.12.2018. The relevant part of the Order of the Special Court was:- 2. The SFIO has placed before the undersigned complete noting proceedings showing the investigations carried out by it from the last date till today. As submitted by the counsel for the complainant and after going through the case diary in the form of noting sheets from the day the accused were handed to the custody of the complainant till today, it comes out that admittedly some more disclosures about the entire scam has been disclosed by the accused persons relating to some new issues leading to disclosure about undisclosed wealth and thus the request for further custody of accused persons is required to trail and confro ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... il, during the pendency of the writ petitions, on their furnishing personal bond in the sum of ₹ 5 lakhs each with 2 local sureties in the like amount subject to conditions stipulated in the order. During the course of its order following observations were made by the High Court in paragraphs 22 to 30:- 22. On a conspectus of the above decisions and in the light of the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties, what we are called upon to determine at this stage is whether the arrest of the applicants was illegal and without the authority of law; and whether the subsequent remand orders, which are cited to sanctify the arrest, are beyond the pale of examination by this Court in the present applications. 23. There is no denying the fact that, the Competent Authority vide its order dated 20.06.2018 directed the SFIO to conduct an investigation into the affairs of the subject entities, in public interest. There is also no quarrel with the circumstance that, the period specified by the Competent Authority in the said order dated 20.06.2018 lapsed on 19.09.2018. There is also no dispute with regard to the fact that, the SFIO sought an extension of time, from the Compete ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... as follows:- 6. ..And in this case all, after investigations when the team submitted report to competent authority, which is the Director of SFIO, he permitted the team to arrest the accused and go for further investigations, which in the given facts and circumstances amount to extension. is wrong, incorrect and patently contrary to law and the official record. 30. This is quite apart from the circumstance that, the applicants were arrested at the SFIO office at New Delhi on 10.12.2018, thereby rendering the remand orders passed by the concerned Magistrate in Gurugram, wholly without jurisdiction. 13. The original writ petitioners Rahul Modi and Mukesh Modi were, therefore, released on bail. The aforesaid order dated 20.12.2018 passed by the High Court is presently under challenge. Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General appeared for the appellant SFIO in both criminal appeals while the original writ petitioners were represented by Mr. Kapil Sibal, Mr. Mukul Rohatgi and Mr. Sidhharth Luthra, Senior Advocates. Both sides also filed their written submissions. 14. The learned Solicitor General submitted inter alia: (a) In terms of the provisions of 2013 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... consequences. It is precisely for this reason that certain time limit is contemplated within which investigation must be completed and the investigation cannot be allowed to be an endless matter. The period prescribed under the 1st Order, therefore, had to be scrupulously observed and the mandate came to an end on the expiry of said period. (b) SFIO being a special entity which otherwise has no jurisdiction to investigate into the matter, must therefore act within the parameters of the mandate and no arrest after the expiry of the period could have been effected. (c) Any arrest made beyond the period would be without jurisdiction and the High Court was, therefore, justified in granting the relief in the present matter. (d) The Writ Petitions principally challenged the orders of arrest being without jurisdiction and it was only the 4th prayer in the Writ Petitions which pertained to issuance of a writ of Habeas Corpus. (e) The order entrusting investigation to SFIO was passed in New Delhi, SFIO is located in New Delhi, the order of arrest was passed in New Delhi, the writ petitioners were arrested in New Delhi and were kept in custody in SFIO office in New Delhi and as s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ppeal? 17. For considering whether the writ petitioners were entitled to any interim relief, two questions were framed by the High Court in paragraph 15 of its Order. Before considering the matter from the perspective of said two questions, an issue which was stressed by the learned Solicitor General may be addressed first. It was submitted by him that the date with reference to which the legality of detention can be challenged in a Habeas Corpus proceeding is the date on which the return is filed in such proceedings and not with reference to the initiation of the proceedings. He relied upon the decision of the Federal Court in Basanta Chandra Ghose vs. King Emperor (1945) 7 FCR 81, which had concluded: If at any time before the Court directs the release of the detenue, a valid order directing his detention is produced, the Court cannot direct his release merely on the ground that at some prior stage there was no valid cause for detention . Similar questions arose for consideration in Naranjan Singh Nathawan vs. State of Punjab (1952) SCR 395, Ram Narayan Singh vs. State of Delhi (1953) SCR 652, A.K. Gopalan vs. Govt. of India (1966) 2 SCR 427, Pranab Chatterjee v ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tion for habeas corpus would be quite relevant, for the simple reason that if on that date the detention is legal, the Court cannot order release of the person detained by issuing a writ of habeas corpus. But, for the purpose of the present case, it is immaterial which of these three views is accepted as correct, for it is clear that, whichever be the correct view, the earliest date with reference to which the legality of detention may be examined is the date of filing of the application for habeas corpus and the Court is not, to quote the words of Mr Justice Dua in B.R. Rao v. State of Orissa7, concerned with a date prior to the initiation of the proceedings for a writ of habeas corpus . Now the writ petition in the present case was filed on January 6, 1973 and on that date the petitioner was in detention in the Central Jail, Vizakhapatnam. The initial detention of the petitioner in the District Jail, Darjeeling had come to an end long before the date of the filing of the writ petition. It is, therefore, unnecessary to examine the legality or otherwise of the detention of the petitioner in the District Jail, Darjeeling. The only question that calls for consideration is whether th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Visakhapatnam, could not, therefore, be said to be illegal and his subsequent detention in the Central Jail, Visakhapatnam, pursuant to the orders made by the Special Judge, Visakhapatnam, pending trial must be held to be valid. This Court pointed out in Col. B. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Orissa7 (SCC p. 258, para 5) that a writ of habeas corpus cannot be granted where a person is committed to jail custody by a competent court by an order which prima facie does not appear to be without jurisdiction or wholly illegal . 21. The principle laid down in Kanu Sanyal8, thus, is that any infirmity in the detention of the petitioner at the initial stage cannot invalidate the subsequent detention and the same has to be judged on its own merits. 22. At this juncture, we may profitably refer to the Constitution Bench decision in Sanjay Dutt v. State through CBI, Bombay (II) (1994) 5 SCC 410 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1433 wherein it has been opined thus: (SCC p. 442, para 48) 48. It is settled by Constitution Bench decisions that a petition seeking the writ of habeas corpus on the ground of absence of a valid order of remand or detention of the accused, has to be dismissed, if on ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... well as before this Court is that once there is stay of investigation, the order of remand is sensitively susceptible and, therefore, as a logical corollary, the detention is unsustainable. It is worthy to note that the investigation had already commenced and as a resultant consequence, the accused was arrested. Thus, we are disposed to think that the order of remand cannot be regarded as untenable in law. It is well-accepted principle that a writ of habeas corpus is not to be entertained when a person is committed to judicial custody or police custody by the competent court by an order which prima facie does not appear to be without jurisdiction or passed in an absolutely mechanical manner or wholly illegal. As has been stated in B. Ramachandra Rao3 and Kanu Sanyal9, the court is required to scrutinise the legality or otherwise of the order of detention which has been passed. Unless the court is satisfied that a person has been committed to jail custody by virtue of an order that suffers from the vice of lack of jurisdiction or absolute illegality, a writ of habeas corpus cannot be granted. It is apposite to note that the investigation, as has been dealt with in various authoriti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ail which prayer could be allowed by the court below, having regard to the nature of the offences allegedly committed by the petitioner and the attendant circumstances. The petitioner has for whatever reasons chosen not to do so. He, instead, has been advised to file the present petition in this Court which is no substitute for his enlargement from custody. C) A Bench of three learned Judges of this Court in State of Maharashtra and Others vs. Tasneem Rizwan Siddiquee (2018) 9 SCC 745 concluded as under:- 10. The question as to whether a writ of habeas corpus could be maintained in respect of a person who is in police custody pursuant to a remand order passed by the jurisdictional Magistrate in connection with the offence under investigation, this issue has been considered in Saurabh Kumar v. Jailor, Koneila Jail11 and Manubhai Ratilal Patel9 v. State of Gujarat. It is no more res integra. In the present case, admittedly, when the writ petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus was filed by the respondent on 18-3-2018/19-3-2018 and decided by the High Court on 21-3-2018 her husband Rizwan Alam Siddiquee was in police custody pursuant to an order passed by the Magist ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... passed by the Magistrate granting police custody till 23-3-2018 and more particularly for reasons mentioned in that order of the Magistrate. In a somewhat similar situation, this Court in State represented by Inspector of Police and others v. N.M.T. Joy Immaculate (2004) 5 SCC 729 deprecated passing of disparaging and strong remarks by the High Court against the investigating officer and about the investigation done by them. Accordingly, we have no hesitation in expunging the observations made in paras 4 to 6 of the impugned judgment against the police officials concerned in the facts of the present case. 19. The act of directing remand of an accused is thus held to be a judicial function and the challenge to the order of remand is not to be entertained in a habeas corpus petition. The first question posed by the High Court, thus, stands answered. In the present case, as on the date when the matter was considered by the High Court and the Order was passed by it, not only were there orders of remand passed by the Judicial Magistrate as well as the Special Court, Gurugram but there was also an order of extension passed by the Central Government on 14.12.2018. The legality, val ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ourt was justified in entertaining the petition. We may deal with this issue after considering the second question posed by the High Court in said paragraph 15. 21. The first Order dated 20.06.2018 itself indicated that the Registered Office of the Principal Company was in Gurugram, Haryana. Section 435 of 2013 Act contemplates establishment of Special Courts for the purpose of providing speedy trial of offences under said Act. Section 436 then provides that offences specified under sub-section (1) of Section 435 shall be triable only by Special Court established or designated for the area in which the Registered Office of the Company, in relation to which the offence is committed . Soon after the arrest, the accused were produced before the Judicial Magistrate, Gurugram on 11.12.2018, who remanded them to custody till 14.12.2018 and directed that they be produced before the Special Court, Gurugram on 14.12.2018. Accordingly the accused were produced before the Special Court, Gurugram, who thereafter remanded them to custody first till 18.12.2018 and later till 21.12.2018. The Special Court, Gurugram would be competent to deal with the matter in terms of Section 436. Learned ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Court was called upon to consider the questions regarding territorial jurisdiction of Courts with regard to criminal complaints under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and para 13 of the decision noted the earlier decision in Navinchandra N. Majithia14 and observed as under: 13. We are alive to the possible incongruities that are fraught in extrapolating decisions relating to civil law onto criminal law, which includes importing the civil law concept of cause of action to criminal law which essentially envisages the place where a crime has been committed empowers the court at that place with jurisdiction. In Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra14 this Court had to consider the powers of High Courts under Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India. Noting the presence of the phrase cause of action therein it was clarified that since some events central to the investigation of the alleged crime asseverated in the complaint had taken place in Mumbai and especially because the fundamental grievance was the falsity of the complaint filed in Shillong, the writ jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court was unquestionably available. The infusion of the concept of cau ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... al Government shall, by notification, establish an office to be called the Serious Fraud Investigation Office to investigate frauds relating to a company: Provided that until the Serious Fraud Investigation Office is established under sub-section (1), the Serious Fraud Investigation Office set-up by the Central Government in terms of the Government of India Resolution No.45011/16/2003-Adm-I, dated the 2nd July, 2003 shall be deemed to be the Serious Fraud Investigation Office for the purpose of this section. (2) The Serious Fraud Investigation Office shall be headed by a Director and consist of such number of experts from the following fields to be appointed by the Central Government from amongst persons of ability, integrity and experience in, - (i) banking; (ii) corporate affairs; (iii) taxation; (iv) forensic audit; (v) capital market; (vi) information technology; (vii)law; or (viii) such other fields as may be prescribed. (3) The Central Government shall, by notification, appoint a Director in the Serious Fraud Investigation Office, who shall be an officer not below the rank of a Joint Secretary to the Government of India having ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ted by an Investigating Officer who shall have the power of the inspector under section 217. (5) The company and its officers and employees, who are or have been in employment of the company shall be responsible to provide all information, explanation, documents and assistance to the Investigating Officer as he may require for conduct of the investigation. (6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), 17 Subs. by Act 21 of 2015, sec. 17, for the offences covered under sub- sections (5) and (6) of section 7, section 34, section 36, sub-section (1) of section 38, sub-sections (5) of section 46, sub-section (7) of section 56, sub-section (10) of section 66, sub-section (5) of section 140, sub-section (4) of section 206, section 213, section 229, sub-section (1) of section 251, sub-section (3) of section 339 and section 448 which attract the punishment for fraud provided in section 447 . [offence covered under section 447] of this Act shall be recognizable and no person accused of any offence under those sections shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless- (i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ral Government if so directs, the Serious Fraud Investigation Office shall submit an interim report to the Central Government. (12) On completion of the investigation, the Serious Fraud Investigation Office shall submit the investigation report to the Central Government. (13) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, a copy of the investigation report may be obtained by any person concerned by making an application in this regard to the court. (14) On receipt of the investigation report, the Central Government may, after examination of the report (and after taking such legal advice, as it may think fit), direct the Serious Fraud investigation Office to initiate prosecution against the company and its officers or employees, who are or have been in employment of the company or any other person directly or indirectly connected with the affairs of the company. (15) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, the investigation report filed with the Special Court for framing of charges shall be deemed to be a report filed by a police officer under section 173 of t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f the limited liability partnership ought to be investigated; or (c) if, in the opinion of the Central Government, there are circumstances suggesting (i) that the business of the limited partnership is being or has been conducted with an intent to defraud its creditor, partners or any other person, or otherwise for a fraudulent or unlawful purpose, or in a manner oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to some or any of its partners, or that the limited liability partnership was formed for any fraudulent or unlawful purpose; or (ii) that the affairs of the limited liability partnership are not being conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Act, or (iii) That, on receipt of a report of the Registrar or any other investigating or regulatory agency, there are sufficient reasons that the affairs of the limited liability partnership ought to be investigated. 26. Reading of the provisions of 2013 Act shows that certain Sections in Chapter XXIX prescribe punishment for offences such as fraud, false statement, false evidence and withholding of property under Sections 447, 448, 449 and 452 respectively. The punishment for fraud involving an amount of at leas ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he Central Government. This report under sub-Section (12) may lead to further follow up actions. Under sub-Section (13) a copy of the investigation report could be obtained by any concerned person by making an application in that behalf to the Court while under sub-Section (14) on receipt of said investigation report the Central Government may direct SFIO to initiate prosecution against the Company. The investigation report under sub-Section (12) is to be submitted on completion of the investigation whereas report under sub-Section (11) is in the nature of an interim report and is to be submitted if the Central Government so directs. In the backdrop of these provisions we must now consider whether the period within which a report is contemplated to be submitted to the Central Government under sub-Section (3) is mandatory and what is the scope and extent of such stipulation. It must also be stated here that the provisions of Section 43(2) of 2008 Act do not postulate any such period and the assignment in the present case to SFIO was under the concerned provisions of 2013 Act as well as under 2008 Act. 28. Section 212(3) of 2013 Act by itself does not lay down any fixed p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... me limit is not adhered to. The Statute must also have contemplated a situation that a valid investigation undertaken by any Investigating Agency of Central Government or State Government which was transferred to SFIO, must then be re-transferred to said Investigating Agencies. But the Statute does not contemplate that. The transfer is irrevocable and cannot be recalled in any manner. Once assigned, SFIO continues to have the power to conduct and complete investigation ( The decision of this Court in Kazi Lhendup Dorji vs. State of Sikkim Ors reported in (1994) Supp. 2 SCC 116 (para 16), though in a different situation, laid down that consent once given by State Government under which investigation was handed over to CBI, could not be recalled or rescinded by the State Government and it is the CBI which would be competent to complete investigation. ) . If that be so, can such power stand curtailed or diminished if the investigation is not completed within a particular period. The Statute has not prescribed any period for completion of investigation. The prescription in the instant case came in the order of 20.06.2018. Whether such prescription in the Order could be taken as c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r sub-Section (1) would not come to an end. The only logical end as contemplated is after completion of investigation when a final report or investigation report is submitted in terms of sub-Section (12) of Section 212. It cannot therefore be said that in the instant case the mandate came to an end on 19.09.2018 and the arrest effected on 10.12.2018 under the orders passed by Director, SFIO was in any way illegal or unauthorised by law. In any case, extension was granted in the present case by the Central Government on 14.12.2018. But that is completely besides the point since the original arrest itself was not in any way illegal. In our considered view, the High Court completely erred in proceeding on that premise and in passing the order under appeal. 31. These appeals therefore deserve to be allowed and the Order under appeal must be set aside. Since the writ petitioners were directed to be released on bail, by way of interim relief, we direct as under:- (a) The Order dated 20.12.2018 passed by the High Court in W.P. (Crl.) No.3842 of 2018 and in W.P. (Crl.) No.3843 of 2018 is set aside. (b) The writ petitioners namely Rahul Modi and Mukesh Modi are directed to surren ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... has drawn, which are based on remarkably articulate process of reasoning. However, having regard to the nature of the controversy, I wish to add a few words of mine. 3. One of the questions which fell for consideration in these appeals and was ably argued at length by the learned senior counsel for both the parties was in relation to the scope, extent and the purpose of Section 212 of the Companies Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ) and, in particular, whether the compliance of sub-section (3) of Section 212 of the Act is mandatory or directory and, if so, why. 4. As rightly reasoned out by my learned brother Lalit, J., having regard to the scheme of the Act underlined in Chapter XIV (Sections 206 to 229 of the Act) dealing with the matters relating to inspection, inquiry and investigation of the companies in juxtaposition with Chapter XXIX which prescribes the punishment/penalties for commission of various offences specified under the Act, the compliance of sub-section (3) of Section 212 of the Act is essentially directory. 5. If the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents (writ petitioners) that the compliance of sub-section (3) of Section 21 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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