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TMI Blog2019 (4) TMI 983X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to the de jure inability of an arbitrator to act as such. Under this provision, any prior agreement to the contrary is wiped out by the nonobstante clause in Section 12(5) the moment any person whose relationship with the parties or the counsel or the subject matter of the dispute falls under the Seventh Schedule. The sub-section then declares that such person shall be ineligible to be appointed as arbitrator. The only way in which this ineligibility can be removed is by the proviso, which again is a special provision which states that parties may, subsequent to disputes having arisen between them, waive the applicability of Section 12(5) by an express agreement in writing. What is clear, therefore, is that where, under any agreement between the parties, a person falls within any of the categories set out in the Seventh Schedule, he is, as a matter of law, ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator. Thus, the Managing Director of the appellant could not have acted as an arbitrator himself, being rendered ineligible to act as arbitrator under Item 5 of the Seventh Schedule. Appeal allowed. - CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3972 OF 2019 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he said officer shall appoint another person to act as an arbitrator in accordance with terms of the agreement and the person so appointed shall be entitled to proceed from the stage at which it was left out by his predecessors. 4. Since disputes and differences arose between the parties, the respondent, by its letter dated 03.01.2017, invoked the aforesaid arbitration clause and called upon the appellant s Chairman and Managing Director to appoint an independent and impartial arbitrator for adjudication of disputes which arose out of the aforesaid APO dated 30.09.2014. By a letter dated 17.01.2017, the Chairman and Managing Director of the appellant, in terms of the arbitration clause contained in the GCC, nominated one Shri K.H. Khan as sole arbitrator to adjudicate and determine disputes that had arisen between the parties. He also made it clear that the parties would be at liberty to file claims and counter-claims before the aforesaid sole arbitrator. 5. On 03.07.2017, this Court, by its judgment in TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engineering Projects Ltd., (2017) 8 SCC 377 [ TRF Ltd. ], held that since a Managing Director of a company which was one of the parties to the arbitratio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e. 8. Shri Sharad Yadav, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent, has supported the reasoning of the impugned judgment and has added that Section 12(4) makes it clear that a party may challenge the appointment of an arbitrator appointed by it only for reasons of which it became aware after the appointment has been made. In the facts of the present case, since Section 12(5) and the Seventh Schedule were on the statute book since 23.10.2015, the appellant was fully aware that the Managing Director of the appellant would be hit by Item 5 of the Seventh Schedule, and consequently, any appointment made by him would be null and void. This being so, Section 12(4) acts as a bar to the petition filed under Sections 14 and 15 by the appellant. Further, Section 13(2) makes it clear that a party who intends to challenge the appointment of the arbitrator, shall, within 15 days after becoming aware of circumstances referred to in Section 12(3), send a written statement of reasons for the challenge to the arbitrator. Admittedly, this has not been done within the time frame stipulated by the said Section, as a result of which, the aforesaid petition filed by the appellant ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... relationship with or interest in any of the parties or in relation to the subject-matter in dispute, whether financial, business, professional or other kind, which is likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his independence or impartiality; and (b) which are likely to affect his ability to devote sufficient time to the arbitration and in particular his ability to complete the entire arbitration within a period of twelve months. Explanation 1.-The grounds stated in the Fifth Schedule shall guide in determining whether circumstances exist which give rise to justifiable doubts as to the independence or impartiality of an arbitrator. Explanation 2.-The disclosure shall be made by such person in the form specified in the Sixth Schedule. (2) An arbitrator, from the time of his appointment and throughout the arbitral proceedings, shall, without delay, disclose to the parties in writing any circumstances referred to in sub-section (1) unless they have already been informed of them by him. (3) An arbitrator may be challenged only if- (a) circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to his independence or impartiality, or (b) ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a controversy remains concerning any of the grounds referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (1), a party may, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, apply to the Court to decide on the termination of the mandate. (3) If, under this section or sub-section (3) of Section 13, an arbitrator withdraws from his office or a party agrees to the termination of the mandate of an arbitrator, it shall not imply acceptance of the validity of any ground referred to in this Section or sub-section (3) of Section 12. 11. Section 12(5) has been earlier dealt with in three Supreme Court judgments. In Voestalpine Schienen GmbH v. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., (2017) 4 SCC 665, this Court went into the recommendations of the aforesaid Law Commission Report, and referred in great detail to the law before the amendment made in Section 12 and then held: 23. It also cannot be denied that the Seventh Schedule is based on IBA guidelines which are clearly regarded as a representation of international based practices and are based on statutes, case law and juristic opinion from a cross-section on jurisdiction. It is so mentioned in the guidelines itself. xxx xxx xxx 25. S ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... etermine whether an arbitrator is de jure unable to perform his functions, it is not necessary to go to the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 13. Since such a person would lack inherent jurisdiction to proceed any further, an application may be filed under Section 14(2) to the Court to decide on the termination of his/her mandate on this ground. As opposed to this, in a challenge where grounds stated in the Fifth Schedule are disclosed, which give rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator s independence or impartiality, such doubts as to independence or impartiality have to be determined as a matter of fact in the facts of the particular challenge by the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 13. If a challenge is not successful, and the Arbitral Tribunal decides that there are no justifiable doubts as to the independence or impartiality of the arbitrator/arbitrators, the Tribunal must then continue the arbitral proceedings under Section 13(4) and make an award. It is only after such award is made, that the party challenging the arbitrator s appointment on grounds contained in the Fifth Schedule may make an application for setting aside the arbitral award in accordance with Section 34 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... igible to act as arbitrator under the Seventh Schedule. This Court held: 50. First, we shall deal with Clause (d). There is no quarrel that by virtue of Section 12(5) of the Act, if any person who falls under any of the categories specified in the Seventh Schedule shall be ineligible to be appointed as the arbitrator. There is no doubt and cannot be, for the language employed in the Seventh Schedule, the Managing Director of the Corporation has become ineligible by operation of law. It is the stand of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that once the Managing Director becomes ineligible, he also becomes ineligible to nominate. Refuting the said stand, it is canvassed by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent that the ineligibility cannot extend to a nominee if he is not from the Corporation and more so when there is apposite and requisite disclosure. We think it appropriate to make it clear that in the case at hand we are neither concerned with the disclosure nor objectivity nor impartiality nor any such other circumstance. We are singularly concerned with the issue, whether the Managing Director, after becoming ineligible by operation of law, is he still eligi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... de in the form specified in the Sixth Schedule, and the grounds stated in the Fifth Schedule are to serve as a guide in determining whether circumstances exist which give rise to justifiable doubts as to the independence or impartiality of an arbitrator. Once this is done, the appointment of the arbitrator may be challenged on the ground that justifiable doubts have arisen under sub-section (3) of Section 12 subject to the caveat entered by subsection (4) of Section 12. The challenge procedure is then set out in Section 13, together with the time limit laid down in Section 13(2). What is important to note is that the arbitral tribunal must first decide on the said challenge, and if it is not successful, the tribunal shall continue the proceedings and make an award. It is only post award that the party challenging the appointment of an arbitrator may make an application for setting aside such an award in accordance with Section 34 of the Act. 15. Section 12(5), on the other hand, is a new provision which relates to the de jure inability of an arbitrator to act as such. Under this provision, any prior agreement to the contrary is wiped out by the nonobstante clause in Section 12(5 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... itrator shall be ineligible to be so appointed, notwithstanding any prior agreement to the contrary. In the event such an ineligible person is purported to be appointed as an arbitrator, he shall be de jure deemed to be unable to perform his functions, in terms of the proposed explanation to section 14. Therefore, while the disclosure is required with respect to a broader list of categories (as set out in the Fourth Schedule, and as based on the Red and Orange lists of the IBA Guidelines), the ineligibility to be appointed as an arbitrator (and the consequent de jure inability to so act) follows from a smaller and more serious sub-set of situations (as set out in the Fifth Schedule, and as based on the Red list of the IBA Guidelines). 60. The Commission, however, feels that real and genuine party autonomy must be respected, and, in certain situations, parties should be allowed to waive even the categories of ineligibility as set in the proposed Fifth Schedule. This could be in situations of family arbitrations or other arbitrations where a person commands the blind faith and trust of the parties to the dispute, despite the existence of objective justifiable doubts regarding ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y of the categories mentioned in Section 12(5), read with the Seventh Schedule, a party may apply to the Court, which will then decide on whether his mandate has terminated. Questions which may typically arise under Section 14 may be as to whether such person falls within any of the categories mentioned in the Seventh Schedule, or whether there is a waiver as provided in the proviso to Section 12(5) of the Act. As a matter of law, it is important to note that the proviso to Section 12(5) must be contrasted with Section 4 of the Act. Section 4 deals with cases of deemed waiver by conduct; whereas the proviso to Section 12(5) deals with waiver by express agreement in writing between the parties only if made subsequent to disputes having arisen between them. 18. On the facts of the present case, it is clear that the Managing Director of the appellant could not have acted as an arbitrator himself, being rendered ineligible to act as arbitrator under Item 5 of the Seventh Schedule, which reads as under: Arbitrator s relationship with the parties or counsel xxx xxx xxx 5. The arbitrator is a manager, director or part of the management, or has a similar controlling inf ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mine whether the mandate of an arbitrator has terminated as he has, in law, become unable to perform his functions because he is ineligible to be appointed as such under Section 12(5) of the Act. 20. This then brings us to the applicability of the proviso to Section 12(5) on the facts of this case. Unlike Section 4 of the Act which deals with deemed waiver of the right to object by conduct, the proviso to Section 12(5) will only apply if subsequent to disputes having arisen between the parties, the parties waive the applicability of sub-section (5) of Section 12 by an express agreement in writing. For this reason, the argument based on the analogy of Section 7 of the Act must also be rejected. Section 7 deals with arbitration agreements that must be in writing, and then explains that such agreements may be contained in documents which provide a record of such agreements. On the other hand, Section 12(5) refers to an express agreement in writing . The expression express agreement in writing refers to an agreement made in words as opposed to an agreement which is to be inferred by conduct. Here, Section 9 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 becomes important. It states: 9. Pr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... m has been filed by the respondent before the arbitrator. The moment the appellant came to know that Shri Khan s appointment itself would be invalid, it filed an application before the sole arbitrator for termination of his mandate. 21. The learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the appellant has relied upon All India Power Engineer Federation v. Sasan Power Ltd., (2017) 1 SCC 487, and referred to paragraph 21 thereof, which reads as follows: 21. Regard being had to the aforesaid decisions, it is clear that when waiver is spoken of in the realm of contract, Section 63 of the Contract Act, 1872 governs. But it is important to note that waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right, and that, therefore, unless there is a clear intention to relinquish a right that is fully known to a party, a party cannot be said to waive it. But the matter does not end here. It is also clear that if any element of public interest is involved and a waiver takes place by one of the parties to an agreement, such waiver will not be given effect to if it is contrary to such public interest. This is clear from a reading of the following authorities. This judgme ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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