9911796707
TMI Blog2018 (9) TMI 1923X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... een called for, it is seen that, in fact, the contention raised by the petitioners presently with regard to Chapter XXA having been made inapplicable to any transfer of immovable property made after September 30, 1986, has been duly dealt with in that judgment, noticing Section 269RR of the Act, eventually therefore holding that since the property was acquired well prior to 1986 and the acquisition having become final by way of dismissal of the appeal and the writ petition filed against such acquisition, the amendment made, w.e.f. September 30, 1986, would not affect such proceedings of acquisition. Hence, simply because the judgment in Mathews' case was not brought to the notice of the Court in those proceedings, that would not change the fact that the petitioners contended right to the property was ousted in that civil suit, which obviously cannot been reopened by this Court. Consequently, the property having been acquired in terms of Section 269F(6) of the Act, from Manak Chand Khanna in the year 1978, in my opinion the learned Additional District Judge has correctly held in the impugned order that it would only be the legal heirs of Manak Chand Khanna, who would be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... g in person), as also to counsel for the respondent Income Tax Department. 3. Manak Chand Khanna already having been died in the meanwhile on 29.09.1980, his wife and legal representative, Prem Wati Khanna, thereafter filed a writ petition before this Court. (Again, the details of the petition are not given in the impugned order and are also not known to the petitioners or the counsel appearing for the respondents, but again, the factum of dismissal of that writ petition on 11.03.1983 is not doubted in any manner). Hence, as per the respondents and as stated in the impugned order, Manak Chand Khanna ceased to be the owner of the property, which stood duly acquired and vested in the Central Government from the date of the order of acquisition, i.e. 17.02.1978. 4. Consequently, a notice to surrender and deliver possession of the property was served upon Prem Wati Khanna, who however did not surrender it willingly, upon which an order was passed on 08.02.1989 by the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Acquisition Range, Amritsar, under Section 269-I(2) of the Act, after which the property came to be taken into the pos ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ng over actual physical possession of the property. The said application was allowed on 28.10.2013 with the CPWD impleaded as a party to the proceedings before the learned Additional District Judge, the said department having duly appeared before that Court, initially stating there that as per instructions issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes, the CPWD was appointed as competent authority for taking over and managing the immovable properties acquired by the Government under Chapter XXA of the Act. 8. Having noticed the aforesaid facts, the learned Additional District Judge, vide the impugned order, came to the conclusion that the property in question actually stood acquired vide an order dated 17.02.1978, in terms of Section 269-F (6) of the Act, with that order having become final upto this Court on 11.03.1983 (with the dismissal of the petition filed against the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal), and therefore the property stood fully vested in the Central Government, which vide an order dated 08.02.1989, had also taken possession thereof. Hence, the sale deed of the year 1991, by which the present petitioners ar ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nexure P-9). He further submitted that possession of the suit property also has not been taken by the Income Tax Department. 11. He next submitted that Chapter XXA having been repealed/deleted from the Income Tax Act in the year 1986, with the suit property not having vested in the Income Tax Department, it would be deemed to be a pending proceeding even in 1986, and consequently, the property would still be vesting in the original owner, i.e. Manak Chand Khanna and his LRs, from whom petitioner no.1 and his partner purchased it by way of a registered sale deed in the year 1991. Upon a query by this Court as to how, even if this contention was to be accepted at its face value, this Court would review an order of a coordinate Bench passed in RSA-1538-2005, twelve years ago, holding petitioner no.1 and his partner not entitled to the suit property, he referred to a judgment of the Supreme Court in M.Mathew Thomas and others Vs. Commissioners of Income Tax (Civil Appeal No.1566 of 1993), to submit that the property never having vested in the Income Tax Department, no compensation infact was to be paid by the Depart ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... year 1991. 14. Having considered the aforesaid arguments as also the entire case history, as regards the petitioners' contention that in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court in M.Mathew Thomas , the property never having vested in the Income Tax Department no compensation could be paid by that Department and hence it would continue to be owned by them (petitioners), that argument has to be rejected firstly in view of the fact that the petitioners' suit seeking a declaration that they are owners-in-possession of the suit property and that the respondent department be injuncted from interfering in their possession thereof, has been dismissed, with, to again repeat, the said judgement dated September 16, 2008, passed in RSA No.1538 of 2005, having become final, very obviously this Court cannot sit upon that judgment to hold to the contrary. The case file of the said appeal having been called for, it is seen that, in fact, the contention raised by the petitioners presently with regard to Chapter XXA having been made inapplicable to any transfer of immovable property made after September 30, 1986, has been duly dealt with ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nto that issue, the suit earlier filed by the petitioners being one seeking a declaration that they are owners in possession of the suit property, which suit, to yet again repeat, was dismissed. Hence, if the petitioners are still in occupation of the suit property as they claim, without making any comment on the correctness of that contention (or otherwise), it needs to be stated here that such occupation is obviously illegal, with the property vesting in the respondents and in fact an order for taking possession having been passed in the year 1989, as already noticed. 18. As regards the argument of the petitioners, to the effect that it was the Central Public Works Department (CPWD) and not the Department of Income Tax which was 'competent' to pay compensation and therefore the compensation actually having been deposited by the Income Tax Department, it would be considered to be by an incompetent authority and hence deemed to be not received or receivable, and on that account the property would deemed to be vesting in the petitioners even now, that also is an argument to be wholly rejected; firstly for the reason that whether it is one department of the U ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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