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TMI Blog2017 (7) TMI 1343X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... trong enough to deter entry and rapid expansion of Uber - there are no significant costs preventing consumers from switching between different radio taxi apps. The radio taxi apps are offered for free and can be easily downloaded on smartphones and can coexist on the same handset. Thus, availing the services of one aggregator s network does not preclude the use of another. Once these apps are installed on a device, riders can switch from one app to another in no-time. In fact, both drivers and riders can have applications developed by multiple service providers and can multi-home . In most markets, every enterprise will have some degree of market power, by virtue of which they can affect consumers or competitors in its favour to some extent. The narrow interpretation of the concept of dominance offered by the Informant would mean that an entrant armed with a new idea, a superior product or technological solution that challenges the status quo in a market and shifts a large consumer base in its favour would have to be erroneously held dominant. To preclude possibilities of such anomalies in approach in assessing dominance, the Act lays down a holistic framework for assessing dominan ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... under Section 3 of the Act, not Section 4. Hence, the present argument of the Informant regarding the collective dominance of OP and Uber is rejected herewith - The in-depth analysis in the preceding paragraphs clearly demonstrates that, during the period under investigation, OP did not have the ability to act independently of its competitors or consumers in the market. In the absence of dominance of OP, examination of abuse or any analysis of pricing strategy by OP is neither warranted nor permitted under the provisions of the Act. The Commission does not fully disagree with the Informants that the low prices of OP are not because of cost efficiency, but because of the funding it has received from the private equity funds. But as discussed above, there is no evidence that the access to such funding was inequitable and that the market for financing was not competitive and had aberrations. Moreover, it was their penetrative pricing strategy that facilitated them to garner high market shares in short span of time as well as develop the networks to a size that could provide sufficient positive externalities to the participants of the network. The Commission is of the view that the evi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ch amounts to predatory pricing under Section 4(2)(a)(ii) of the Act. This conduct, as per the Informants, has affected other competitors in the market who cannot offer similar discounts/incentives to commuters/drivers. 5. At that stage, the Commission, based on the high market share of OP, was prima facie of the view that OP held a dominant position in the market for 'Radio Taxi services in the city of Bengaluru' and that it was abusing its dominant position. Vide order dated 24th April 2015, the Commission directed the Director General (DG) to conduct detailed investigation into the matter. Thereafter, as stated earlier, another information based on similar facts and allegations, in Case No. 74 of 2015, against OP was received by the Commission. The Commission, vide order dated 30th September 2015, clubbed this information with the earlier case which was being investigated by the DG and directed the DG to submit investigation report covering both the Informants. During the course of investigation, the DG sought information from the parties and other radio cab companies (third parties), including Uber India Pvt. Ltd. ('Uber'), operating in the geographic region of Bengaluru. 6 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... latform for taxi hiring by commuters and is thus different from radio taxi companies operating under asset-owned model, the DG opined that taxis operating under these different business models are functionally substitutable. 10. OP also submitted, before the DG, that in Bengaluru, the radio taxis running on OP's platform compete with equally other commercial modes of transport and accordingly, the relevant market should be defined broadly to capture all such alternative modes of transport as well as they pose an effective competitive constraint on OP's taxis. The DG, however, found no merit in this contention and observed that the key features of radio taxi, viz. point-to-point pick and drop facility, ease of booking, pre-booking facility, round the clock availability even at obscure places, predictability in terms of expected waiting and journey time, reliability in terms of GPS/GPRS tracking, ease of payment, quality vehicles, professional and well trained drivers, feedback facility etc. makes them, i.e. radio taxi services, different from other modes of transport. Highlighting the distinctions between radio taxis and all these other modes of transport, the DG delineated the re ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 2015-16 (till September 2015), the DG noticed that while OP's market share increased from marginally by 2% to 3%, Uber's share increased at a faster rate i.e. by about 20%-22%. 13. Further, based on the monthly data (June 2012- September 2015) for point to point services, the DG observed that whereas till August 2014, Meru (one of the Informants) maintained the lead position, while from September 2014 onwards, OP took the lead position amongst other radio taxi companies. It was further noted that from March 2015 onwards, Uber has maintained the second position. The DG also noted that from January to September 2015, Uber's trip size registered growth of nearly 1200%, while OP's growth has been about 63% during the same period. 14. The DG has opined that for a player to have a dominant position in the relevant market, it should be able to hold its market share for a reasonable period of time. In the present case, OP's market share has started declining as Uber entered the relevant market almost three years after OP's entry. 15. The DG also took into account the findings made by Raghavan Committee Report to observe that factors other than market share are relevant to assess whe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... om exercising market power in the relevant market. This was evident from the fact that similar strategy was followed by Uber and as a result, the gap in market share between OP and Uber narrowed down from 69% in January 2015 to 22% by September 2015. 19. The DG also noted that in a scenario where the cab drivers have an option of getting themselves registered onto another platform and customers have an option of booking taxis from another platform, it is difficult for an incumbent to exercise market power. Thus, neither the customers nor the drivers are locked up in any manner. The DG further stated that, in the present case, competitive constraints can also be exerted by the customers/commuters in the form of countervailing buyer power, as they have an option of booking taxis from other platforms like Uber. 20. It was further noted that the potential impact of expansion of the existing competitors or entry of potential competitors is also relevant while assessing the competitive constraints on an enterprise. The DG noted that the regulatory requirement in the present case did not constitute a barrier for a new entrant. Further, the key feature of the aggregator model is that t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the provisions of Section 4 of the Act. Replies/ objections/ submissions of the Parties to the Investigation Report Replies/ objections/ submissions of the Informants (FastTrack and Meru) 25. The Informants have filed separate responses to the investigation report and were represented by different counsels at the time of oral hearings. However, considering the similarity in their arguments, their responses are jointly summarized hereunder unless specified otherwise. The Informants have stated that though the evidence on record indicate contravention of the provisions of Section 4 of the Act by the OP, the conclusion in the investigation report has been stated otherwise. 26. The Informants have vehemently argued that the finding of the investigation report regarding (non) dominance of OP is solely based on the fact that Uber is present in the relevant market and is engaging in a similar conduct as OP. 27. The Informants have agreed with the delineation of the relevant market proposed by the DG. It is submitted that the radio taxi market forms a separate relevant market in itself and can be distinguished from other modes of transport. 28. The argument of OP that it is me ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and British Airways plc v. Commission (Case T-219/99) case, wherein it was noted that decline in the market share cannot be taken as an evidence that the entity is not dominant. 32. Besides OP's high market share, the Informants have also alleged high entry barriers in the relevant market. It is stated that radio taxi market is characterized by network effects which can act as an entry barrier. Since it would take considerable time for a new player to capture a good position and compete against an established player, the network effects result in high entry barriers for potential entrants. The Informants have placed reliance on international case laws where network effects were shown to be posing a significant barrier to entry viz, European Commission decision in Microsoft case (COMP/C-3/37.792) and District Court of New York's decision in MasterCard/Visa case. It is claimed that OP was the first player to build a strong network with the help of its predatory model by virtue of which, it tipped the market in its favour, which has given it a strong edge in the market over its competitors. 33. The Informants have submitted that OP was paying an incentive of ₹ 302 per trip i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ave submitted data which, as per them, shows that OP has been able to increase its market share only because of its predation strategy backed by multiple rounds of funding. The Informants have also placed reliance on the judgement passed by Competition Appellate Tribunal (COMPAT) in the case of Meru Travel Solutions Private Limited v. Competition Commission of India & Others, where the COMPAT overturned the order passed by CCI under Section 26(2) of the Act. It was noted in the said judgement that "the size of discounts and incentives show that there are either phenomenal efficiency improvements which are replacing existing business models with the new business models or there could be an anti-competitive stance to it. [....]". 37. With regard to the countervailing buyer power, another relevant factor to be considered under Section 19(4) of the Act, it is submitted that the large network of OP acts as a sufficient detriment of any countervailing buyer power. The essential requirement to prove that there is sufficient countervailing buyer power, it is necessary to show that buyers/consumers have the power to negotiate and to substantially affect the service provider by shifting to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... et. It has thus been submitted that a conclusion of simultaneous dominance of OP and Uber is not incompatible with the provisions of the Act. 41. The first Informant, Fast Track, has submitted that OP and Uber, through their below cost pricing, have pushed the Informant to a situation of virtual nonexistence. The second Informant, Meru, on the other hand, has claimed that established players like itself and Mega have lost market shares and are on the verge of elimination. Thus, DG's observation OP is not dominant as hat none of the players are ousted from the market has been challenged by the Informant, stating that elimination is not a necessary condition for ascertaining dominance and abuse. 42. The decision of the European Court of Justice in the case of AKZO Chemie has also been relied upon by the Informants to infer that any price below the average variable cost by means of which a dominant enterprise seeks to eliminate a competitor must be regarded as an abusive practice since there is no conceivable economic purpose for charging a price below average variable cost by an enterprise other than elimination of a competitor. Since OP has charged prices below average variable ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nd not an accurate representation of the service being provided by it. 48. OP claims to have created a software platform in the form of a mobile application i.e., a portal that can be download by commuters as well as licensed taxi drivers, on their respective mobile phones. Once the portal is downloaded, it allows the commuters to register themselves, along with allowing them a wide range of customisations such as, preferred payment method, preferred type of cab, etc. In the case of licensed drivers, the portal allows them to register themselves, after a thorough screening process involving a valid commercial driver's license, a Know Your Customer ('KYC') complaint bank account, a car with a taxi permit, a background check on the character of the driver, etc. It is claimed that OP does not employ drivers (they are self-employed) and does not own any cars. It is stated that the portal aggregates a wide range of choices for the commuters and driver and once the commuter makes his choice and the driver accepts the ride, the driver would provide the end-to-end service of picking up the commuter from the preferred pickup point and dropping the commuter to the preferred destination. At ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to the lacuna of legislation in India for such advanced technologies and such categorization is not a fair representation of the actual services provided by it. 53. OP further submitted that it is functioning in a two-sided market that brings together two different user groups providing network benefits to each other. The peculiarity of a two-sided market is that an intermediary is engaged in the activity of connecting two different and distinct ends of the supply chain, by charging a fee or consideration for such a connection. However, the intermediary is worthless and its utility is nullified if one end of the supply chain stops using the intermediary. Thus, the pricing structure must be balanced in a way to attract both sides of the platform. 54. OP further submitted that though the DG has correctly concluded that it is not dominant, the assessment based on market shares has not been represented accurately. OP disagreed with the market share calculated by the DG based on its active fleet size. OP submitted that on that parameter of total active fleet, its market shares is merely (≈1.97%) in the city of Bengaluru as opposed to wrongly computed figure of 60-61% by the DG ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... or OP (i.e. payment to the drivers, 80% to 95%) is lower than the pricing by 20% to 5%, therefore the pricing at all times, is more than the AVC. This argument of OP was based on the proposition that customer discounts, bonus and driver incentives are not variable costs. OP claimed customer discounts, bonus and driver incentive are budgeted fixed costs and that it's low Effective Net Take Rate ('ENTR') was not due to below cost pricing. As such, OP has not indulged in predatory pricing by pricing its services below AVC. OP also submitted that it has been subject to sufficient competitive constraint from Uber in the relevant market. 58. Based on these submissions, OP prayed that DG's finding of it not being dominant in the relevant market be upheld and the DG's finding with regard to nature of services offered by OP and its pricing be dismissed. Observations and Findings of the Commission 59. The Commission has examined the material available on record, including the information, investigation report, written submissions filed by the parties, and heard the oral submissions made by their respective learned counsels on 15th February 2017 and 1st March 2017. 60. The primary alleg ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a distinct relevant product market. 63. While defining the relevant product market under Section 2(t) of the Act, all those products or services which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of characteristics of the products or services, their prices and intended use, need to be included in the realm of relevant product market. The purpose of defining the market is to encompass all those products or services which are considered to be the effective substitutes for the product or service in question, by the consumers. It is observed that OP has, undoubtedly, replaced the ownership/asset based model in the radio taxi service business and is operating under the platform based model. It outsources the bookings to the drivers/vehicle owners who are attached to its platform, instead of providing the same by taxis owned by it. However, this fact alone cannot make it a distinct category of service provider when the basic nature of service provided by it is same as that provided by other players operating under the traditional business model. 64. In this regard, the Commission agrees with the contentions of the Informants that the services offered b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... GPS/company/company operated control room having facility to monitor the movements of the cabs. In view of the existence of regulatory framework in various States in India specifically stipulating the inclusion of aggregators under the category of radio taxis, it can be inferred that services provided by OP are that of radio taxis. Accordingly, the Commission finds no merit in the argument of OP that it is only a technology software service provider and not a radio taxi service provider. 66. Based on these reasons, the Commission is of the view that the relevant product market in the instant case is 'market for radio taxi services'. 67. With regard to the relevant geographic market, the Commission agrees with observations made by the DG that transport is classified as a state subject under the Constitution of India, therefore the regulatory conditions governing competition are homogeneous only across a particular city/State. Further, the consumers availing point-to-point radio taxi service in a city would not avail the radio taxis operating in another city/State. The point-to-point taxi service is a localized service that is offered with the intent of meeting the local travel d ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... per the investigation report, radio taxis got introduced in the city of Bengaluru in the year 2008 when Meru launched its services. Subsequently, the market saw the entry of new players like Mega Cabs, Easy Cabs and KSTDC. All these initial players were operating under an asset-owned model, wherein either they owned the vehicles or had third party owned vehicles exclusively attached to them. The mode of booking of taxis was via telephone calls to customer care or online through the respective website of the radio taxi operator. 73. The entry of OP into the relevant market, in the year 2011, marked a shift in two key dimensions of the radio taxi market in Bengaluru. First, the market witnessed the emergence of platform-based model, which connected the riders with driver-owned taxis, thus obviating the need for capital investment in acquiring and maintaining an exclusive fleet as required in the then prevalent asset-owned model. Second, it capitalized on the widespread use and adoption of internet and smartphone technology which facilitated the matchmaking between the drivers and commuters instantaneously in real time through a software application ('App') designed by OP and acces ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ant market throughout the period of investigation and is, thus, dominant. It is also submitted that a market share of more than 50% of an entity creates a presumption of dominance. 76. Market shares have been computed by the DG in terms of fleet size, active fleet size and number of trips, based on yearly and monthly data collected from the players active in the relevant market. The DG has evaluated the yearly market shares for the years 2012-13 to 2015-16 (till September 2015) and the monthly market shares from June 2012 to September 2015. 77. Before delving into the discussion on market shares based on the data collected by the DG, the Commission notes that Fast Track, Informant in Case No. 6 of 2015, has objected to the period of investigation being stretched to September 2015, when the information was filed by it in January 2015. It has been argued that the DG ought to have restricted the period of investigation up to January 2015. The Commission finds no merit in this objection. The proceedings before the Commission are in rem, not in personam. While proceedings in personam are done or directed with reference to a specific person, proceedings in rem are with reference to n ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in 2015-16. In terms of number of monthly trips, OP's share witnessed a rising trend from June 2012 (0-1%) to January 2015 (75- 76%) and, thereafter, a gradual decline. However, the Commission is of the view that market position/strength is a relative concept. Thus, to assess the strength of OP in terms of market share, its competitors' market shares in the relevant market must also be examined in order to arrive at a meaningful conclusion. 80. The data collected by the DG indicates that Meru was the market leader in 2012-13 and 2013-14 with an annual market share of 59-60% and 50- 51% respectively in terms of number of trips. However, it lost its market position in the subsequent years with its share coming down to a miniscule 6-7% in 2015-16. Likewise, Easy cabs, which was the second largest player in 2012-13, lost its share drastically to have only a negligible market presence in 2015-16. On the other hand, Uber, which entered the relevant market in 2013-14, expanded its network rapidly to account for nearly one third of the active fleet in the relevant market in 2015-16. In terms of annual number of trips, its share increased from 1- 2% in 2013-14 to 30-31% in 2015-16. 81. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... orders of the Commission in HT Media v. Super Cassettes and MCX-SX. 84. It is a widely accepted view that high and durable market share can be an important indicator for lack of competitive constraints and accordingly for dominance. However, that does not imply that uniform market share thresholds and a standard time-period to assess durability of market share can be applied in the same manner to all businesses/sectors. The variance across industries in terms of their inherent characteristics, such as nature of competition, technology and innovation dimensions, calls for a case-by-case assessment of market share and its implications for dominance with reference to the totality of the market dynamics and competitive strategies of firms. Thus, the Informants' proposition that market share of more than 50% leading to a presumption of dominance cannot be accepted, especially when the scheme of the Act does not specify any numerical threshold. Moreover, market share is but one of the indicators enshrined in Section 19(4) of the Act for assessing dominance, and the same cannot be seen in isolation to give a conclusive finding. Particularly, in case of new economy/hi-tech markets, high ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he alleged dominant entity. Rather, in some of these cases (e.g. Michelin, United Brands etc.), the dominant entities' market shares were multiple times those of its competitors. Further, the AstraZeneca's case relied upon by the Informants, the European Commission was faced with the situation where high market share, which was much higher than those of its competitors, was held by AstraZeneca for many years in a row. 87. In this regard, the Commission notes that Section 19(4) of the Act emphasizes on the size and importance of the competitors, rather than the market shares of competitors. As a matter of record, in the present case, OP does not have an edge over all its competitors in terms of the size and resources. Interestingly, the investigation revealed that that Uber Inc., which is the parent company for Uber had a total capital investment of about 15 to 20 times of OP's financial resources. 88. Based on the foregoing observations, the Commission is of the view that competitive constraints in the relevant market are to be assessed in a holistic manner, not solely on the basis of market shares of the alleged dominant entity. Market shares must be interpreted in the light o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sides of the market, i.e. the drivers and riders. 92. In the relevant market under scrutiny, there are certain countervailing market forces that reduce the ability of even a very large platform to insulate itself from competition. The Commission agrees with the Informants that in a two/multi-sided market, network effects have a role to play in determining the competition dynamics and relative position of strength held by market players. The transportation service networks are likely to exhibit indirect cross-side network effects because increase in the number of riders attracts drivers and increase in the number of taxis/drivers benefits the riders. However, whether the network effects would act as an entry barrier in the relevant market depends on various factors. 93. In the present case, both OP and Uber are found to be aggressively competing with each other to attract participants, i.e. drivers and riders, on both sides of their platforms, which is necessary for reducing search and matching frictions. Despite OP having the largest network, the network effect was not strong enough to deter entry and rapid expansion of Uber. 94. Further, there are no significant costs preven ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tential entrants in the relevant market. The Informant has relied upon certain case laws to argue that requirement of huge finances in this market, for funding discount/incentive schemes, act as a barrier to entry/expansion. In this regard, it is important to note that though a very high capital requirement may have been perceived as an entry barrier traditionally, in new economy sectors, the traditional concept of 'capital requirements' may not be applicable in totality. What is notable and of significance in this context is the existence of a level-playing field in access to finance. This is evidenced by the experience of technology start-ups across sectors in the country which could access funding from various sources such as venture capital, angel networks, private equity funds etc. Recently, network industries financed by capital markets have observed very intense competition in innovative activities in India. The key to success in this fiercely competitive environment is fast adaptation to changes and constant innovation in business models, technology, pricing models to shake the markets out of equilibrium, and render old ways of doing business uncompetitive, dislodging the e ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ractions amongst the players in the market. The Commission finds these arguments are bereft of the correct understanding of basic tenets of competition law. Competition is not an end in itself; it is a means towards a greater end which presumes that competition in or for the market inter alia leads to desirable outcomes for the consumers ensuring wide variety of quality products/services at best possible prices. Towards that end, as long as there is competition in and for the market satisfying these outcomes, regulatory intervention is not warranted to either protect the existing players or to increase the number of players in the market. Competition and competition law is not about counting the number of firms in a particular relevant market to determine whether or not that market is competitive. 99. Every market is unique with a unique number of players that are determined organically by competitive forces. There can be no sacrosanct number of firms that ensures the presence or absence of competition. There can be markets which may not be competitive even with large number of players and equally possibly there can be markets which can work perfectly well with fewer players, con ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r hand, OP was accounting for positive indexed margin from September 2013 to May 2014 followed by negative indexed margin since June 2014. 101. Two key observations can be safely made from this data: first, OP did not initiate the strategy of aggressive pricing strategy and its negative indexed margin since June 2014 seems more to be a reactive strategy to Uber's aggressive pricing. Second, the loss of Uber in the relevant market has remained substantially higher than OP's loss except for a brief period from December 2014 to January 2015. 102. Further, OP's response to the aggressive pricing strategy of Uber in the relevant market since June 2014 is indicative of the competitive constraint put by Uber to OP in the relevant market. Though the Commission has already rejected the Informant's (Fast-Track) objection with regard to the period of investigation being stretched beyond January 2015 earlier in the order, the instant observations show that even during the period up to January 2015, there were sufficient competitive constraints that affected the ability of OP to act independent of the market forces. 103. It can be inferred from the aforesaid observations that competition ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... very narrow sense to Section 27(b) without realizing that the literal interpretation of statutory provisions have to be dispensed with if they lead to absurd interpretation. Although rule of literal interpretation suggests that words used in a statute have to be construed as per their literal meaning, there are sufficient exceptions if the same leads to absurdity or meaning which is contrary to the other provisions of the Act. In any case the use of words 'parties' or 'enterprises' in Section 27(b) seems to be meant for parties entering into anti-competitive agreements and not for enterprise indulging in unilateral conduct. 108. The Commission observes that there are various provisions in the Act that signify the intent of the legislature that there cannot be more than one dominant enterprise in the relevant market at a particular point of time. 109. Provisions of Section 4 of the Act clearly stipulate that dominant position can be held by only one enterprise or one group. Section 4(2) states that "There shall be an abuse of dominant position, if an enterprise or a group-." The term 'a'/'an' used in section 4(2) evidently states the singular form, which shows that the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... pplied) 115. The aforesaid proposed amendment further reinforces the proposition that there is no scope in the present scheme of the Act, either expressly or by implication, to contemplate the presence of two independent entities as dominant at the same time in the relevant market. Had there been any scope for such interpretation, this amendment would not have been required. 116. Based on the foregoing discussions, it can be concluded that the Act does not allow for more than one dominant player under Section 4. Rather the existence of two strong players in the market is indicative of competition between them, unless they have agreed not to compete, which also can be only be looked into under Section 3 of the Act, not Section 4. Hence, the present argument of the Informant regarding the collective dominance of OP and Uber is rejected herewith. 117. The in-depth analysis in the preceding paragraphs clearly demonstrates that, during the period under investigation, OP did not have the ability to act independently of its competitors or consumers in the market. In the absence of dominance of OP, examination of abuse or any analysis of pricing strategy by OP is neither warranted no ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tegies adopted by the app based taxi operators. OP and Uber have, in a manner, revolutionized the taxi market by providing radio taxi services at abysmally low prices. 122. The Commission does not fully disagree with the Informants that the low prices of OP are not because of cost efficiency, but because of the funding it has received from the private equity funds. But as discussed above, there is no evidence that the access to such funding was inequitable and that the market for financing was not competitive and had aberrations. Moreover, it was their penetrative pricing strategy that facilitated them to garner high market shares in short span of time as well as develop the networks to a size that could provide sufficient positive externalities to the participants of the network. 123. At this stage, it is difficult to determine with certainty the long-term impact of this pricing strategy as the market is yet to mature. Without going into the legitimacy of OP's pricing strategy, suffice to say that besides statutory compulsion of non-intervention in the present case, as OP is not dominant in the relevant market, the Commission is hesitant to interfere in a market, which is yet ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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