TMI Blog1990 (9) TMI 13X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f the Income-tax Act, 1961, punishable under section 276DD of the same Act. Since various deposits are involved, several prosecutions have been launched. The prosecution case is that, on several dates, the petitioners had received in cash various deposits as evidenced by cash book entries which amounted to contravention of the provisions of the Income-tax Act aforestated. In all these petitions filed under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code to call for the records and to quash the pending prosecutions as not maintainable and an abuse of the process of the court, Mr. V. Ramachandran, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respective petitioners, urged a single contention before me. While urging this contention, he submitted that, in the grounds raised in the petition, the constitutional validity of section 269SS of the Act had been questioned, but that ground has now become infructuous in view of the dismissal by this court of several writ petitions challenging the validity of that provision. The single ground urged is that, with effect from April 1, 1989, section 271D had been introduced in the Income-tax Act while omitting section 276DD with effect from the same date. Se ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... initiated even in 1985 when section 276DD was in the statute book. Acceptance of the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner would result in a rather strange position. The petitioners will not be liable to pay penalty under section 271D of the Act, since it was introduced only on April 1, 1989, and prior to that date when that law was not in the statute book, they cannot be proceeded against. If a prosecution also cannot be launched under the then existing section 276DD of the Act, the resultant position would be that there can be neither a prosecution nor a penalty proceeding against these petitioners though violation of section 269S has been alleged and the respondent was prepared to substantiate his case by oral and documentary evidence. This certainly could not have been the intention of the Legislature. In the decision reported in T. Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe, AIR 1983 SC 150, the apex court was considering the offence committed by the accused therein under section 16(1)(a) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, on August 16, 1975, when the Act stood amended in its application to the State of West Bengal by the West Bengal Amendment Act of 1973. Such offences ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... gh, AIR 1955 SC 84, wherein, while considering sections 4, 7 and I 1 of the East Punjab Refugees (Registration of Land Claims) Act (12 of 1948) and the validity of the prosecution under the Act, the Supreme Court stated as hereunder (at page 88 of AIR 1955 SC) : " Whenever there is a repeal of an enactment, the consequences laid down in section 6 of the General Clauses Act will follow, unless, as the section itself says, a different intention appears. In the case of a simple repeal, there is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion. But when the repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject, the court would undoubtedly have to look to the provisions of the new Act, but only for the purpose of determining whether they indicate different intention. The line of enquiry would be, not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities, but whether it Manifests an intention to destroy them (underlining is mine). The court cannot, therefore, subscribe to the broad proposition that section 6 of the General Clauses Act is ruled out when there is repeal of an enactment followed by a fresh legislation. Section 6 would be applicable in such cases ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... On this interpretation, the complaint made for the offence under rule 132A(4) of the D.I.Rs., after April 1, 1965, when the rule was omitted, has to be held invalid. " The principle stated by the apex court is the same in several other cases cited before me, and they do not have to be referred to, for it only increases the volume, especially when there is no change in the principle. In R. V. M., T. V. D. and Co. v. CIT [1963] 50 ITR 23 (Mad), while considering the change of law - Repeal of Ordinance by later Act - and whether the Ordinance ceased to have effect oven with regard to the period before it was repealed, it was stated as hereunder (at page 28) : " It is not necessary to refer to the several provisions of the General Clauses Act which really nullify the above argument. It will be sufficient to refer to section 6 of the General Clauses Act, which clearly provides that where any Central Act repeals any enactment previously made, then unless a different intention appears, such repeal shall not affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed. The Ordinance effected a change in the law effective from April 1, 1949, and before the Ordinance lapsed, an Act of th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uses Act, the repeal of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, by the 1961 Act, does not affect legal proceedings instituted and continued in respect of any matter pending under the 1922 Act at the time of repeal unless a contrary intention can be gathered from the new statute. Parliament did not intend section 297(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, to be completely exhaustive and in regard to such matters as are not expressly saved by section 297(2) of the 1961 Act, the provisions of section 6(e), General Clauses Act, will apply. Under section 6(e), General Clauses Act, a legal proceeding in respect of an offence committed under the 1922 Act may be instituted even after the repeal of the 1922 Act by the 1961 Act, and punishment imposed as if the repealing Act had not been passed. " A conspectus of the case-law certainly shows that the prosecution initiated against the petitioners can definitely survive. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act which deals with the effect of repeal reads " where this Act or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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