9911796707
TMI Blog1953 (10) TMI 42X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e opened by the purchaser in favour of the British suppliers Messrs. Michael Settons' Sons and Hallwood Ltd., London. It appears that the plaintiff opened the letter of credit, the goods arrived in Bombay, and the suppliers were paid the price out of the letter of credit opened by the plaintiff. Dispute then arose between the plaintiff and the Customs authorities as to the duty that he had to pay. If these goods were of U. K. origin, the duty he would have to pay would be 18 per cent, and if they were of non-U. K. origin, then the duty he would have to pay would be 60 per cent. He was asked to pay and in fact he did pay at the rate of 60 per cent, the Customs authorities taking the view that the goods were of non-U. K. origin. The documents which constitute really the delivery under a O. I. P. contract was tendered to the plaintiff between 11 January, 1949, and January 17, 1949, and the plaintiff filed the present suit on 22 February, 1952, claiming the difference between the amount that he would have to pay on the basis of 18 per cent, duty and the 60 per cent, duty which in fact he paid. It is not disputed by the plaintiff that the article that governs this case is Article ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... fore, if we were to strictly construe Section 14 it is clear that the plaintiff would not be entitled to exclude the period taken up in arbitration proceedings. 3. But what is relied upon by Mr. Chandiramani is a decision of the Privy Council which has given an extended meaning to the expression "civil proceeding in a Court" used in S. 14, Limitation Act. The Privy Council case is reported in --'Ramdutt Ramkissen v. E.D. Sasson & Co.', AIR 1929 PC 103 (A). There the Judicial Committee was dealing with two arbitration proceedings. One arbitration proceeding had become abortive and the other arbitration proceeding on the same cause of action was undertaken, and the question that arose was whether in the second arbitration proceedings the time taken up in the first arbitration proceedings could be excluded, and the main question that the Judicial Committee had to decide was whether the Limitation Act itself applied to proceedings before an arbitrator, and the Privy Council held that if a claim was barred by limitation and if no suit could be filed on that claim it stood to reason that that same claim could not be litigated before a domestic forum, and therefore the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a suit to which the Limitation Act expressly applies & therefore there can be no question of applying Section 14 by analogy, and if Section 14 was strictly construed, as we have already pointed out, it cannot possibly cover a case of arbitration proceedings. 5. But Mr. Chandiramani relies on a decision of the Allahabad High Court in -- 'Firm Behari Lal Baij Nath Prasad v. Punjab Sugar Mills Co.. Ltd. , where on facts identical to those before us the Allahabad High Court held that Section 14, Limitation Act applied to arbitration proceedings. There Collister J. and Bajpai J. relied on the Privy Council decision and extended the application of Section 14 to a case which was not strictly before the Privy Council. With respect to the learned Judges, if they had said that they were extending the principle of Section 14 by analogy and they were giving it a wider interpretation than the Privy Council had given, we would have appreciated the argument. But in the judgment it appears that the learned Judges have taken the view that even on a strict construction the word "Court" used in Section 14 would cover a domestic forum, it is difficult to agree with that view. As alread ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ded, in computing the time prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, for the commencement of the proceedings (including arbitration) with respect to the difference referred." Therefore, we have now a statutory provision for exclusion of time taken up in arbitration, proceedings when a suit is filed, and the question arises of computing the period of limitation with regard to that suit, and the time that has got to be excluded is only that time which is taken up as provided in Section 37(5). There must be an order of the Court setting aside an award or there must be an order of the Court declaring that the arbitration agreement shall cease to have effect, and the period between the commencement of the arbitration and the date of this order is the period that has got to be excluded. It is therefore no longer open to the Court to rely on Section 14, Limitation Act as applying by analogy to arbitration proceedings. If the Legislature intended that Section 14 should apply and. that all the time taken up in arbitration proceedings should be excluded, then there was no reason to enact Section 37(5). The very fact that Section 37(5) has been enacted clearly shows that the whole ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
