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TMI Blog1954 (5) TMI 39X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 3 of 1949 in the District Court of South Malabar for setting aside an order modifying a scheme settled under Section 57 of Act II of 1927 (hereinafter referred to as the old Act) Subsection 7 of Section 57 of the old Act conferred the right of suit on the trustee or any person having interest to institute a suit to set aside or modify a scheme within six months of the date of publication, Pending the suit, Act II of 1927, was repealed and re-enacted as the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act 19 of 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the new Act). After the new Act came into force the District Judge felt that his jurisdiction to try and dispose of suits or applications commenced under the old Act and pending before him at that time, had ceased and in that view directed the return of the plaint to the party for the purposes mentioned above. Hence this appeal. 3. The question that falls for determination is whether this view of the District Judge is correct, in other words, whether the new Act has taken away the right of the parties to continue the proceedings in the District Court. All suits, applications and other proceedings arising under the old Act wer ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... would have been instituted in the Madras City Civil Court if this Act had been in force at the time when such suits or applications were instituted shall be continued in and disposed of by, the High Court. (k) any remedy by way of application, suit, or appeal which is provided by this Act shall be available in respect of proceedings under the said Act pending at the commencement of this Act as if the proceedings in respect of which the remedy is sought had been instituted under this Act. 4. It is contended on behalf of the respondent commissioner that a combined reading of these provisions with Section 6(6) of the new Act has divested the District Courts of their jurisdiction to dispose of suits or applications pending at the commencement of the new Act. The explanation is specially called in aid in support of this submission. It is argued that the explanation enables the High Court to retain the pending suits and dispose of them and the absence of analogous provision so far as the District Court is concerned indicates that the District Courts cannot do so. We do not think that the omission to enact a provision similar to the explanation in regard to mof ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the new Act. 6. A similar provision of law under the old Act fell to be interpreted in -- 'Chengayya v. Kotayya', AIR 1933 Mad 57 (A). Under Act 1 of 1925 an aggrieved party could apply to a court for setting aside or modifying a scheme settled for the management of a temple by the Hindu Religious Endowments Board. Pending that application, Act II of 1927 was passed under which schemes of administration settled by courts must be deemed to be schemes settled under the Act and could be modified or cancelled by a suit and not otherwise, instead of by application as provided in Section S 3(4) of the earlier Act. Section 7 of Act II of 1927 enacted: 7(i); All action taken and all things done including the constitution of the Board of Commissioners for the Hindu Religious Endowments, the notifications issued and orders made under and in pursuance of the said Act shall be deemed to have been validly taken, done, issued or made. (ii) All proceedings taken under the said Act may be continued under this Act in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. (iii) Any remedy by way of application, suit or appeal which is provided by ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ld be continued unaffected by any provision of the new Act. 8. We are now left with the change in the definition of court . The point for consideration is whether a mere alteration of the forum without anything more could defeat the right which a party had according to the pre-existing law. It is now well settled that a party has a vested right to have a suit tried in a forum in which it was commenced. Such a right is a substantive one and is not in the realm of procedural law, The following classical passage 'in -- The Colonial Sugar Refining Co.' Ltd. v. living', 1905 AC 369 (B), illustrates this principle: To deprive a suitor in a pending action of an appeal to a superior tribunal which belonged to him as of right is a very different thing from regulating procedure. In principle their Lordships see no difference between abolishing an appeal altogether and transferring the appeal to a new tribunal. In either case there is an interference with existing rights contrary to the. well-known general principle that statutes are not to be held to act retrospectively unless a clear intention to that effect is manifested. What is laid down in that pass ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of Section 6(6) and Section 103 of the new Act. We have already observed that Section 103 has not got that effect. The only circumstance namely the change in the definition of court is not so strong as to imply that the existing jurisdiction of the District; Courts has been ousted. 12. The judgment of Bhagwati J. in -- 'C. P. Bannerjee v. B. Section Irani AIR1949Bom182 (E) has a bearing on the present enquiry. What happened there was, a suit was instituted for the recovery of a sum of Rs, 1000 on the original side of the Bombay High Court. Subsequently the Bombay Legislature enacted Bombay Act 44 of 1948 called the Presidency Small Cause Courts (Bombay Amendment) Act which deleted the election which was given to the plaintiff to institute in the High Court suits whereof the amount or value of the subject matter exceeded ₹ 1000. The result of the enactment was that the original jurisdiction which had been vested in the Bombay High Court under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent to receive, try and determine suits whereof the amount or value of the subject matter exceeded ₹ 1000 at the election of the plaintiff was taken away from that court; The question ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uitor under the law as it stood at the time of the commencement of the proceedings. We must therefore hold with respect to the learned Judge that the view taken by Ramaswami J. is opposed to the accepted canons of construction of statutes and to the long line of decisions. We are constrained to hold that the priniple of law enunciated in C. R, P. No. 1362 of 1952 (Mad) (F) is not correct. 14. We now come to -- Kunhambu Nair v. Vadakka Veetil Ambu, AIR1953Mad214 (G). The facts there are these: A petition was filed in tha District Court of South Kanara under Section 84(2), Hindu Religious Endowments Act II of 1927 to set aside an order of the Hindu Religious Endowments Board that a particular temple was a private temple. During the pendency of this petition, the new Act (Act 19 of 1951) was passed under which as already pointed out, a court was defined as Sub Court wherever it existed. Soon after the passing of this Act an order was made by the District Judge holding that the petition stood transferred to the appropriate court or authority and that it should be deemed to be pending before the court or authority by virtue of Section 103(j) and (k) of the new Act. In a pe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ficient to observe that the Subordinate Judge will regard it as a transferred suit and dispose of it accordingly. 16. C. M. A. No. 568 of 1952: This is against a 'similar order passed By the same District Court and will be governed by the order we have just pronounced. 17. C. R. P. Nos. 594 and 915 of 1952: C.R.P. No. 594 of 1952 is against the order of the Subordinate Judge returning a petition filed under Section 53-A (4) of the old Act for setting aside the order dated 7-12-1950 passed by the Hindu Religious Endowments Board removing the petitioner from the office of the trustee, the basis of the order being that on the coming into force of the new Act that court had ceased to have jurisdiction to entertain the petition. We have also remarked that on a correct interpretation of the provisions of the statute the court's jurisdiction has not been ousted with regard to the pending proceedings. The result is this civil revision petition is allowed. 18. This order applies to G. R. P. No. 915 of 1952 in which as mentioned above reference was made by Ramaswami J. to a Bench and the order under revision is set aside. We must observe that in this case the le ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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