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TMI Blog1968 (4) TMI 89X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rder under which they might be compelled to declare the paddy in their possession or control and to sell it to the Government, as unconstitutional. By consent of parties, this O. P. was heard by the learned Judge, along with 720 others that challenged the above-said Orders as also the Kerala Paddy (Maximum Prices) Order, 1965, and the Kerala Rice (Maximum Prices) Order, 1965 -- hereinafter 'the Maximum Prices Orders' -- on "the question of the constitutional validity of the Orders" as a "preliminary point" and by a judgment common for ail the 721 O. Ps. the learned Judge has held: "The expression 'cultivator' has been denned as 'one who actually cultivates any land with paddy.' On the definition, it seems to signify one who actually puts his hand to the plough, and the plough to the soil. It seems also immaterial that the land he cultivates is one in which he has himself no proprietary or beneficial interest. If this be the meaning to be attributed to the term 'cultivator' the working ot the Levy Order would be reduced to an absurdity. It would mean that even a servant or labourer of an owner of land is to be regarded as a c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a person required to sell an essential commodity in compliance with an Order made with reference to Section 3 (2) (f) of the Act. It is only one of the factors to be taken into account. ......... Turning to the provisions of the Levy Order, the controlled price is the sole determinant of the price to be paid. To that extent the Levy Order seems to have travelled beyond the provisions of the parent Act, viz., the Essential Commodities Act, in respect of the provision as to payment of price for the rice or paddy acquired. ...... In the result I hold that the definition of the term 'cultivator' in the Levy Order is vague and does not lay down even the broad principles for a satisfactory administration of the provisions of the Order and is productive of arbitrariness. As the definition is the very crux of the Order and is inextricably woven throughout the texture of the Order the entire Order is liable to be struck down under Article 14 of the Constitution. I am further of the view that, in any event ...... the proviso to Clause 7 of the Order in so far as it places a ceiling on the market value of the price to be paid to the paddy acquired is violative of Article 31 (2) of t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... actory v. Shri Dhar, AIR 1960 All 692 (FB) where the question was whether an order of a Single Judge dismissing an appeal against an order granting a temporary injunction in a suit can be appealed against before a Division Eenqh. The learned Judge said: "All kinds of decisions are, however, given in a suit or proceeding from the date of its institution to the date of its termination. It is obvious that it could not have been the intention to include all these decisions in the term 'judgment' and make them appelable irrespective of their nature or importance. If a decision amounts to a decree as denned in the C P. C., it would certainly amount to a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent." But, Mootham. C. J., with whom Dayal, J., agreed, has observed in the abovesaid case, AIR 1960 All 692 (FB): "Now the order the nature of which we have to determine is an order which finally determines the right of a party to a specific temporary relief. It stems from a suit and its purpose is to make the judgment, if obtained, fully effective. It is neither an order which merely regulates procedure nor an order made on an application which is merely a step towa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... urt upheld the will and sent back the case for decision of other issues. The Privy Council held an appeal from that order of remand entertainable because the cardinal point in the case was about the will and that had been decided by the High Court leaving only certain subordinate enquiries to be made thereafter. 6. In Kasi v. Ramanathan Chettiar, 1947 Mad WN 723 the question was whether an appeal would lie against an order directing a fresh report by a commissioner on the accounts of a partnership, when that order contained an adjudication on the substantive rights of the parties with regard to several matters In controversy in the suit. Patanjali Sastri J., (as he was then), with concurrence of Tyagarajan, J., observed: "Even under the old Code which did not expressly provide for the passing of a 'preliminary decree' in any suit, their Lordships of the Judicial Committee stressed the expediency of passing such decrees so as to make it possible to prefer an immediate appeal to settle that part of a case on which the decision of the other parts depended. They observed in Muhammad Abdul Majid v. Muhammad Abdul Aziz, (1897) ILR 19 All 155 at p. 164 (PC): 'The learn ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... oint in the case (namely, the constitutional validity of the impugned Orders) on which the (reliefs sought in the O. Ps. depend largely is a preliminary judgment within the meaning of the C. P. C. and is appeal-able as such under Section 5 (i) of the High Court Act. 8. As arguments on the merits of Writ Appeal No. 30 of 1968 proceeded. Mr. Velayudhan Nair, Mr. Suryanarayana Iyer and Mr. Easwara Iyer (who have already entered appearance in response to the general notice referred to above) stated that they have, on behalf of petitioners in five of the 721 O. Ps. disposed of by the judgment under appeal, filed Writ Appeals Nos. 76 to 80 challenging the validity of the Maximum Prices Orders and of the entirety of the Declaration Order as also the findings of the learned Judge against points urged by them against the Levy Order, and requested that those appeals may be heard along with the Writ Appeal No. 30 of 1968 in the present hearing itself. As the learned Advocate General took notice of those appeals and agreed to their being heard now, it was so ordered by us on March 8, 1968 and the hearing continued as on all these writ appeals together. I. The Kerala Rice and Paddy (Procuremen ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t appear to be correct, If I engage a servant or employ a labourer to plough my land or to BOW seeds thereon, the common man would mention me to have cultivated the land, and not the servant or the labourer who did the manual work more or less as a machine and for my sake. When one does an act through the hand of another, one is in law and in fact doing it oneself really. The expression "actually" in the definition does not appear to cause any confusion. The dictionary meaning of the word "actually" is "really" "in actual fact"; and of the word "actual" is "real, 'existing in fact". If facts are assessed in proper perspective there can be little doubt that, when I engage a servant or a labourer to do a work for me, the work is mine, and mine only. Further, culti vation is not mere putting of the plough to the soil. As has been observed in Commissioner of Income-tax West Bengal v. Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy, AIK 1957 SC 768 at p. 788 "cultivation of land in the strict sense of the term means tilling of the land, sowing the seeds, planting and similar operations on the land" like manuring and watering. If I purchase ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mployment or (ii) terms of employment or conditions of labour of any person; these necessarily import a limitation in the sense that a person in respect of whom the employer-employee relation never existed or can never possibly exist cannot be the subject-matter of a dispute between employers and workmen. Secondly, the definition clause must be read in the context of the subject-matter and scheme of the Act, and consistently with the objects and other provisions of the Act. ... Having regard to the scheme and objects of the Act, and its other provisions, the expression 'any person' in Section 2 (k) of the Act must be ... one in whose employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour the workmen as a class have a direct or substantial interest." In Kanwar Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1956 SC 871 the Supreme Court held: "In the context in which it occurs in Section 418 (1) (of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act) the meaning which can reasonably be attached to the word 'abandoned' is 'let loose' in the sense of being 'left unattended' and certainly not 'ownerless'." The ratio of these decisions is r ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nia Iyer exhorted us to condemn the definition of a cultivator in the Levy Order "as it cuts across the known norms of land-holding and of interests in landed property and is therefore arbitrary and invalid" and explained it by pointing out that the cultivator of a land may be the owner, a co-owner, a tenant, a sub-tenant, an agent, or a servant, but there is no provision in the Levy Order to oblige the officer who makes a demand for the levy to make any enquiry as to the interest of the cultivator in the paddy raised by him. I see little force in this contention. Whatever might have been the position before September 4, 1967 -- which need not be canvassed here as the paddy raised then, whether procured by the Government or left with the cultivator, must have been disposed of long ago and therefore cannot now be made the subject of an effective writ or direction (cf. K. N. Guruswamy v. State of Mysore, AIR 1954 SG 592 Last Para) -- after the introduction of Clause 3C in the Levy Order there can be little chance for error in naming the cultivator for purposes of the levy. That clause obliges every cultivator, who IB liable for a levy, to inform in writing, 7 days before ha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... -C, of his cultivation to the VIIlage Officer and then to harvest it. The procedure prescribed in Clause 3-C leaves little room for any mistake in fixing the cultivator for purposes of lew even if the definition be assumed to be vague. I do not find anv inequity, much less arbitrariness, in the definition of a cultivator or in the procedure laid down in the Levy Order for procuring the levy paddy from the cultivator. 13. The learned Judge has held that "Clause 7 of the Levy Order, in so far as it imposes a ceiling on the price to be paid, fails to specify the principles on which compensation for the paddy taken b to be assessed, and thereby violates Article 31 (2) of the Constitution." Clause 7 requires the Government or its officer or nominee puichasing paddy to pay its price "at the prevailing market rate but not exceeding the maximum price specified by the Government for the lime being under" the concerned Maximum Prices Order Mr. K. V Survanaravana Iyer cited State of Weal Bengal v. Mrs. Bela Banerjee, AIR 1854 SC 170, State of Madras v. D. Namasivava, AIR 1965 SC 190, Vajravelu Mudaliar v. Special Deputy Collector for Land Acquisition, West Madras, AIR 196 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ual to or less than the maximum price. Any sale at a price above it will not be lawful and therefore cannot afford a standard for "just equivalent" for the commodity. The word 'just' in 'just equivalent' seems to repel consideration of any illegal transaction as its standard. If dealings with racketeers or other anti-social elements in black market are to rule the price of paddy procured for equitable distribution, the object of the Act and the Levy Order -- 'for securing availability at fair prices' -- is certain to be defeated. They cannot afford a standard for governmental action or judicial considerations. The contention that the Government is empowered by the Maximum Prices Orders to sell the foodgrains to the consumers at prices above the maxima fixed under them is not correct as the said Orders have only allowed the Government to fix separate maximum prices for the rice and paddy procured and sold by the Government "after taking into consideration expenses on account of transport, storage and other Incidental charges." I do not find anything unfair or illegal therein. The provision in the Levy Order for payment of price to the cult ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Section 3 (2) (f) "(an order made) for requiring any person ...... to sell". I would therefore accept Mr. Ha-rindranath's distinction and hold that Section 3 (3B) governs the Instant Levy Order. 15. Mr. V. R. Krishna Iyer urged that the cultivator is entitled to the current market price of the foodgrains procured from him by the Government. He cited the observation in AIR 1967 SC 637. "Under Article 31 (2) of the Constitution, no property shall be compulsorily acquired except under a law which provides for compensation for the property acquired and either fixes the amount of compensation or specifies the principles on which and the manner in which compensation is to be determined and given." and urged that Section 3 (3B) of the Act, when it said "there shall be paid to that person such price for the foodgrains ...... as may be specified in that order" imperatively insists on the first of the alternatives, namely fixation of the amount ofcompensation itself in the Order, but the State Government has ignored those commands of the Act in the impugned Order professedly made under the Act itself. In other words, the contention is that, in not specifyi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... v. Carlton Bank Ltd.. (1893) 1 QB 82, Lord Esher M. R. (with concurrence of the other two learned Judges of the Court of Appeal) held an entry in a bill of sale "Study -- 1800 volumes of books as per the Catalogue" to be "a specific description of the books" within the meaning of Section 4 of the Bills of Sale Act, 1882, that required the chattels assigned under a bill of sale to be "specifically described" in a schedule annexed to it. Likewise, in Carpenter v, Deen, (1889) 23 QBD 566, Fry, L. J. observed: "In considering the meaning of the words 'specifically described', we should look at the scope and object of the section. They are in my opinion plain. I think they are ...... to render the identification as easy as possible, and to render any dispute as to the intention of the parties as rare as possible, ...... That is to be done as far as possible; by which I mean, as far as is reasonably possible -- so far as a careful man of business trying to carry the object of the Act into execution could and would do without going into unreasonable particulars." The Bengal Foodgrains (Disposal and Acquisition) Order, 1947, directed that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... or for consideration in specifying the price to be paid for the grains procured. The "price prevailing" must necessarily relate to the current time, and not to any future and that is the alternative that the Levy Order has adopted when it provided that the cultivator shall be paid "at the prevailing market rate but not exceeding the maximum price." As has already been said, when both the controlled price and the prevailing or likely-to-prevail price are directed to be taken into consideration, the latter can only be envisaged as one below the controlled price and not exceeding it. As it is conceded that the cultivators have, since the date of promulgation of the instant Levy Order; been paid the maximum price fixed by the Government, they cannot have any legitimate grievance in this regard. The contention fails. 18. Thus, the grounds on which the learned Judge has struck down the Levy Order or its Clause 7 do not appear to me substantial. 19. Mr. K. Velayudhan Nair's attempt was to sustain the declaration of Invalidity of the Levy Order on certain grounds that have been repelled by the learned Judge. He contended that the promulgation of the Order is beyon ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 1967 the Levy Order lost its validity cannot also be accepted. The distinction between a supersession and a repeal is pointed out in Nand Kishore v. Emperor, AIR 1945 Oudh 214 thus: "...... It was argued that the Notification of 26th August, 1943, having been superseded it should be deemed never to have existed at all. ...... It is true that, as stated by Tindal, C. J.. in (1830) 6 Bine 576, the effect of repelling a statute is to obliterate it as completely from the records of the Parliament as if it had never been passed; and it must be considered as a law that never existed except for the purpose of those actions which were commenced, prosecuted and concluded whilst it was an existing law. ...... The effect of an Act or Order which is superseded is not to obliterate it altogether. An Act or order is said to be superseded where a later enactment or order effects the same purposes as an earlier one by repetition of its terms or otherwise. ...... The order of 1943, for the breach of which the petitioner was prosecuted was never repealed, or in other words it was never obliterated altogether. On the other hand it continued to exist till Government decided to effect the same pu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nd re-enactment of a statute appear pertinent here: "One mav pause here to remember that regulations framed under an Act are ot the very greatest importance. Such regulations are framed for the successful operation of the Act. Without proper regulations, a statute will often be worse than useless. When an Act is repealed, but re-enacted, it is almost inevitable that there will be some time lag between the re-enacted statute coming into force, and regulations being framed under the re-enacted statute. However efficient the rule-making authority may be it is impossible to avoid some hiatus between the coming into force of the re-enacted statute and the simultaneous repeal of the old Act and the making of regulations. Often, the time lag would be considerable. It is conceivable that any legislature ...... could have intended ...... that ...... the re-enacted statute, for some time at least, will be in many respects, a dead letter? The answer must be in the negative." (Chief Inspector of Mines v. Karam Chand Thapar, AIR 1961 SC 838). "When the appeal Is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject we would undoubtedly have to look to the provisions of the new Act, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ection 'as soon as may be' to mean 'within a reasonable time' as counsel would have it, would make the duration of the law uncertain and therefore cannot be accepted. As indicated by the Supreme Court in Jesan Nath v. Jaswant Singh AIR 1954 SC 210: "It is one of the rules of construction that a provision like this is not mandatory unless non-compliance with It is made penal." In Jan Mohammad Noor Mohammad v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1966 SC 385, a direction in the Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act that rules made under It "shall be laid before each of the Houses of the Provincial Legislature at the session thereof next following" to held by the Supreme Court not to be mandatory: "It is true that the Legislature has prescribed that the rules shall be placed before the Houses of Legislature, but failure to place the rules before the Houses of Legislature does not affect the validity of the rules merely because they have not been placed before the Houses of the Legislature." Halsbury's Laws of England, (3rd Edn. Vol. 36, pages 486-7) also says: "Many statutes conferring legislative powers provide that instruments made In e ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to the subjective satisfaction of the Government charged with the duty of maintaining law and order. To make the exercise of these powers justiciable and subject to the judicial scrutiny will defeat the very purpose of the enactment. ...... No assumption ought to be made that the State Government or the authority will abuse its power. ... Further, even if the officer may conceivably abuse the power, what will be struck down is not the statute but the abuse of power." (Virendra v. The State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 896 at p. 901), Considering the object of the Levy Order, which is to secure "equitable distribution and availability at fair prices". of foodgrains for all at a time of countrywide food shortage, the determination of quantity to be procured from or to be allowed to be retained by a producer must necessarily be left to the State Government who is the best appraiser of the pressure of the time, the urgency of the situation and the maintenance of public morale. Even a monopoly procurement may be justified if circumstances require such a course I am not persuaded to hold that the defects attributed by counsel to Section 3 of the Act are substantial. 24. Mr. Ve ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Levy Order that directs procurement as eoon as paddy is harvested and before the requirements of the producer are ascertained and allowed for, and that therefore the Levy Order is ultra vires of Section 3 (2) (f) of the Act and void. I am unable to accept this contention. To (me, the expression 'stock' in Section 3 (2) (f) appears to mean a collection or store. When a crop of paddy is harvested, threshed and the harvesting workers' charges are paid, what the cultivator takes thereafter in his 'stock' of paddy within the meaning of Section 3 (2) (f) of the Act, and the Order made in relation thereto is therefore well within its purview. There is nothing in that sub-section to indicate that the stock means only a stock for sale. 26. Mr. Velayudhan Nair also contended that the Levy Order has gone beyond the parent Act, because Section 3 (2) (f) of the Essential Commodities Act contemplates compulsory purchase only from a "person holding in stock" and that a person can be said to hold a stock only if he has a store of goods beyond his requirements; but the Levy Order compels sale of paddy by every person who has cultivated more than two acres of land with ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d an overall access to the Government, the Commissioner or Director of Civil Supplies. Considering the enormousness of the range of operation of the Levy Order and the speed with which it has to be worked, ample justice has to be held met by the above provisions. As pointed out by the learned Judge the constitution of official staff to survey and inspect all paddy fields in the State to assess their actual yield would involve "an administrative machinery so stupendous and costly that the very object of the Order would be frustrated." It has to be kept in mind that Courts are not to sit tight on every governmental action. As observed by Holmes, J., in Bain Peanut Co, of Texas v. Pinson, (1930) 282 US 499 at p. 501 we have to remember that the machinery of government would not work if it were not allowed a little play in its joints. A judicial review of governmental action should not involve excessive timidity that would encourage arbitrariness in administration nor temerity that would paralyse the administration. Counsel's reliance on State of Andhra Pradesh v. Nalla Raja Reddy, AIR 1967 SC 1468 and on K. T. Moopil Nayar v. State of Kerala, AIR 1961 SC 552 which relat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the Levy Order is discriminatory in that it does not treat all cultivators in the same way and procure from them the same measure of paddy per acre of their cultivation. Article 14 of the Constitution does not prohibit reasonable classification and in my view the classification made under the Levy Orders is not unreasonable, All cultivators are given exemption from levy for the first 2 acres of cultivated land and all have to measure the same measure of paddy for every acre cultivated beyond 2 acres, the same measure though at a higher rate per every acre beyond 5 acres, and the same measure though at a still rate per acre above 10 acres. That the rates rise as the slabs rise cannot spelt any unreasonable discrimination within the meaning of Article 14 of the Constitution. The merit of equal protection of the laws does not lie in giving the same treatment to every member of the society, for all are not of the same condition; but in giving to those in want according to their needs and taking from those in plenty according to their stocks, I am in respectful agreement with the observations of Shearer. J., in Mohammad Anzar Hussain v. State of Bihar, AIR 1952 Pat 220 at p. 226: " ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the unfettered and uncanalised discretion of the Government, and is therefore repugnant to Article 14. It is true that that section does not itself indicate the grounds on which exemption could be Granted, but the preamble to the Ordinance sets out with sufficient clearness the policy of the Legislature; and as that governs Section 15 of the Ordinance, the decision of the Government thereunder cannot be said to be unguided." This has been cited with approval and followed in P. J. Irani v. State of Madras, AIR 1961 SC 1731 para 13. 32. Counsel contended also that the power to reduce levy on objections by cultivators under Clause 6 (2) of the Order is left unguided to the discretion of the Taluk Supply Officers and is therefore likely to be made an instrument of unhealthy patronage bv certain officers. The Court cannot presume that the administration of a particular law would be done "with an evil eye and unequal hand." The jurisdiction to decide is conferred on a responsible officer, and the subjection of his decision to the supervision (under Clause 11) of the Government and the Commissioner and Director of Civil Supplies is a sufficient safeguard against abuses by ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rs to revise any order of any officer, The complaint of arbitrariness therefor does not appear to be serious. 35. Counsel then contended that the 4th proviso to Clause 4 of the Declaration Order which allows only one month's ration to some stock-holders while six months' ration is allowed to others by the preceding provisos is unreasonably discriminatory. Section 3 (2) (f) empowers the Government to require by order "any person holding in stock any essential commodity to sell the whole or a specifed part of the stock" to the Government or its nominee for 'securing equitable distribution and availability at fair prices' for all. Though the power extends to the whole of the stock of paddy and rice in the possession or control of the stock-holder, the State Government has, in the impugned Order, made a concession to him to retain a part of it and has for that purpose classified the stock-holders according to their relation with the stock and their co-operation with the Government in the ad ministration of the Order. If the stock is of paddy produced in the stock-holder's lands and he has co-operated with the Government by filing his declaration aa requir ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of 1.5 quintals of paddy for every acre of land cultivated by him (the cultivator) with paddy" as arbitrary and unrelated to its purpose, viz., meeting the cultivation expenses. Harvest charges, the learned Advocate General states --and I agree with him -- do not come in the picture, as they are invariably given at the threshing ground and therefore do not form part of the stock in the possession of the producer. Mr. Velayudhan Nair also contended that the fixation of the same rate for the whole State, irrespective of the actual need in the locality, is arbitrary. His contention is that in certain areas, where paddy itself has to be measured as wages to workers, the requirement will be more, and in areas where labour is cheap and wagea are paid in cash, it would be far less than what is allowed by the Order. Except the vague allegations at the hearing, no data have been placed before this Court to find any arbitrariness in this matter. No data are given by, counsel to show that 1.5 quintals of paddy per aere would not suffice for the seed and other requirements like food to agricultural labourers at work which have to be met with the grain. Nor am I convinced that there is la ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nd thereby to discriminate largely, tacitly allowing some to sell their stock in open market for prices far above the controlled price and at the same time compelling others to sell their stock to the State at controlled rates, and that such an arbitrary discretion is inconsistent with the equality of protection of law envisaged by Article 14 of the Constitution. I am afraid that the apprehension expressed by counsel is far-fetched. The preamble and various provisions of the Order indi-cate clearlv the intent and purpose of the law and they afford sufficient guidance to the action of the officers administering the law. It is hardly legitimate to presume that the administration of law entrusted with the executive officers will be exercised 'with an evil eye and an unequal hand'. There is ample power conceded by our Constitution to the Courts to correct the vagaries of any erring individual officer, I see no force in the contention. 40. As the Kerala. Paddy and Rice (Declaration and Requisitioning of Stocks) Order, 1966, is not shown to have offended any provision in the Constitution, the attack on its constitutional validity has to fail. The Order is declared valid. III. T ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eral officers have misunderstood and misapplied the definition of a cultivator in the Levy Order and that has caused the filing of a multitude of writ petitions in this Court, tell the Government that it would ensure proper administration of the Order if its officers are instructed on the real import of that definition in the light of this Judgment I make no order as to costs here. Krishnamoorthy Iyer, J. 43. I agree with my learned brother Madha-van Nair, J. 44. The learned Single Judge has held that the definition of the term "cultivator" in the Kerala Rice and Paddy (Procurement by Levy) Order, 19G6, (hereinafter referred to as the Levy Order) is vague and does not lay down even the broad principles for a satisfactory administration of the provisions of the Levy Order and is productive of arbitrariness and is therefore violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and the last portion of Clause 7 of the Levy Order in so far as it places a ceiling on the market value of the price to be paid for the paddy acquired offends Article 31 (2) of the Constitution. The learned Judge took the view that since the definition of the term "cultivator" is so intimately conn ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d under Section 3 (1) and (2) (c) of the Act read with the Notification No. 203 (General) (14)743/64/Py.11 dated the 13th October, 1064 of the Government of India, Ministry of Food and Agriculture (Department of Food). Sections 3(1) and 3(2)(c) and (f) which are relevant are reproduced below; "3 Power to control production, supply distribution etc. of essential commodities. (1) If the Central Government is of opinion that it is necessary or expedient BO to do for maintaining or increasing supplies of anv essential commodity of for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices, or for securing any essential commodity for the Defence of India or the efficient conduct of military operations it may by order, provide for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by Sub-section (1). and order made thereunder may provide-- (a) .................................. (b) .................................... (c) for controlling the price at which any essential commodity may be bought or Bold; (d) .................................... ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... se. It is no doubt true that when in a statute words are defined, normally the said meaning should be attributed to those words occurring in the several provisions of the Act. But all statutory definitions have to be read subject to the Qualification expressed in the definition clauses which create them. In V. F. & G. Insurance Co. Ltd. v. M/s. Fraser & Ross, AIR 1960 SC 971 their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed: "It is well settled that all statutory definitions or abbreviations must be read subject to the qualification variously expressed in the definition clauses which created them and it may be that even where the definition is exhaustive Inasmuch as the word defined is said to mean a certain thing, it is possible for the word to have a somewhat different meaning in different sections of the Act depending upon the subject or the context. That is why all definitions in statutes generally begin with the qualifying words similar to the words used in the present case, namely, unless there is anything repugnant in the subiect or context." An interpretation clause cannot therefore be used to interpret any of the Sections in the Act if there is anything in the Sect ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... regarding the disposal of the crops. As to whether a particluar person is a cultivator having a right to conduct the harvest and dispose of the paddy is a matter to be decided with reference to the facts of each case and in my view even if there Is any ambiguity in the interpretation clause as to the meaning of the term "cultivator" no such ambiguity exists in regard to the meaning that has to be attributed to the term "cultivator" in clauses 3, 3C and 4 to 8 of the Levy Order. Clause 3 of the Levy Order compels the cultivator to sell paddy derived from lands cultivated by him in accordance with the scales specified by the Government. According to the Schedule fixed by the Notification dated 3-8-1966 it is seen that persons who have cultivated paddy in an area up to and including 2 acres in the aggregate are exempted from selling any paddy to the State. Similarly clause 3C provides for a cultivator holding more than two acres of land to furnish the Information regarding the harvest. It Is therefore Impossible to conceive that the term "cultivator" used In these provisions relates even to a tiller having no sort of control over the paddy to be sold to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nment and either no notification in respect of such food-grains, edible oilseeds or edible oils has been issued under sub-section (3A) or my such notification having been issued has ceased to remain in force by efflux of time, then notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3), there shall be paid to that person such price for the foodgrains, edible oilseeds or edible oil as may be specified in that order having regard to-- (i) the controlled price, if any fixed under this section or by or under any other law for the time being in force for such grade or variety of foodgrains, edible oilseeds or edible oils; and (ii) the price for such grade or variety of foodgrains, edible oilseeds or edible oils prevailing or likely to prevail during the post-harvest period in the area tc which that order applies. Explanation.-- For the purpose of this sub-section, "post-harvest period" in relation to any area means a period of four months beginning from the last day of the fortnight during which harvesting operations normally commence." 49. Section 3 (2) (f) of the Act enables the Central Government or its delegate to require any person holding in stock any essential c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... l commodities in respect of which these two provisions operate are not the same. Section 3 (3A) deals with foodstuff in any locality while Section 3 (3B) deals with any grade or variety of foodgrains, edible oilseeds or edible oils. If Section. 3 (3B) is intended to cover all the foodstuff mentioned in Section 3 (3A) the difference in the wording in the two provisions would not be there. The second reason is that Section 3 (3A) contemplates the regulation of the price at which the foodstuff shall be sold in any locality to any of the persons mentioned in Section 3 (2) (f) of the Act. On the other hand, Section 3 (3B) provides for sales either to the Central Government or a State Government to an officer or agent of such Government. Section 3 (3B) cannot apply to the case of sale to such other persons or class of persons who may be specified in the order issued under Section 3 (2) (f) of the Act. In the appeals before us, the direction issued is to sell the paddy to the State Government. I am therefore of the view that to the cases before us Section 3 (3B) will alone apply and not Section 3 (3) of the Act. The purpose of Section 3 (3B) of the Act is to enable the Central Government ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ht during which harvesting operations normally commence. 52. If so what has to be decided is only whether the latter portion of clause 7 amounts to a fixation of the compensation in accordance with the principles stated in Section 3 (3B). The Maximum Prices Orders of 1965 referred to in Clause 7 of the Levy Order are passed by the State Government under Section 3 (2) (c) of the Act fixing the maximum price at which paddy or rice can be bought or sold. The learned Single Judge has upheld the validity of the Maximum Prices Orders of 1965. An attempt was made before us on behalf of the respondents to challenge the Maximum Prices Order of 1965 on the ground of delegation outside permissible limits for the reason that the Act itself does not afford or formulate the guide lines for the fixation of the maximum price. The submission was that Section 3 (2) (c) of the Act is bad because of the conferment of an absolute and unbridled discretion, in the Central Government or its delegate in the matter of controlling prices. 1 do not think that I can countenance this contention. In the nature' of things it is impossible for any legislature to afford the guide lines in regard to the fixatio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... el would depend on a rational evaluation from time to time of all these varied factors the Legislature may well have thought that this problem should be left to be tackled by the delegate with enough freedom, the policy of the Legislature having been clearly indicated by Section 3 in that behalf. The object is equitable distribution of the commodity, and for achieving the object the delegate has to see that the said commodity is available in sufficient quantities to meet the demand from time to time at fair prices." In Harishankar Bagla's case, AIR 1954 SC 465, Clause 3 of the Cotton Textiles (Control of Movement) Order, 1948 issued by the Central Government under Sections 3 and 4 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 was challenged on the ground that Section 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 amounts to delegation of legislative power outside the permissible limits. In overruling the contention their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed: "...... the preamble and the body of the sections sufficiently formulate the legislative policy and the ambit and character of the Act is such that the details of that policy can only be wo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... er, it is difficult to accept the contention that it does not represent the just equivalent for the paddy or rice acquired or requisitioned. Whatever a producer or cultivator is able to get towards the price of rice or paddy over and above the maximum price, taking advantage of the scarcity of the foodgrains in the State can be only something more than the just equivalent for the article acquired. One of the methods to fix the fair price at which an article may be made available to the general public is to control the rate of profit at which a producer, wholesale dealer or a retail dealer will be entitled to sell the commodity. Without controlling the profit or the margin of profit it will not be possible to fix the price under Section 3 (2) (c) of the Act, for carrying out the object and purpose of the Act. 54. If it is found that the Maximum Prices Orders of 1965 are legally valid the further submission on behalf of the respondents was that the maximum prices fixed in 1965 are quite inadequate even for covering the cost of production, in view of the increase in the wages to be paid for the labourers, the cost of fertilisers etc. If the cultivators are compelled to give paddy eit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ide. But even then the initial burden is on the respondents to show that the payment of compensation on the basis of the maximum prices fixed in 1965 is inadequate. Materials supplied in the cases before us are absolutely insufficient to come to that conclusion. The inadequacy of the compensation resulting from imposing the prices fixed in the Maximum Prices Orders in the Levy Order and in the Requisitioning Order is not an infringement of Article 31 (2) of the Constitution. Thev may be violative of Section 3 (3) or Section 3 (3B) of the Act. The latter portion of Clause 7 of the Levy Order itself provides for the fixation of maximum price from time to time. We cannot shut our eyes to the variation of prices of all the articles Including essential Commodities In the market due to several accounts (economic?) factors. There cannot therefore be any permanent fixation of price under Section 3 (2) (c) of the Act In respect of any essential commodity. If it is establish-ed that the maximum prices fixed in 1965 are not adequate to represent the just equivalent of paddy acquired from the second crop of 1967, it affects only the adequacy of compensation. The law which prescribes the princi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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