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TMI Blog1974 (9) TMI 135X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on 62(A)(c) of the Motor Vehicles Act as amended by the Tamil Nadu Amendment Act 16 of 1971, because he already had more than ten permits. Out of the remaining seven applicants, the highest scorer, according to the marking system adopted by the Regional Transport Authority of the region, was one Palaniappa Gounder who obtained nine marks. But, Gounder was by-passed in favour of the appellant who secured 8.69 marks because Gounder had already been granted a permit on October 8, 1971. Three appeals, including one by Gounder, were then preferred to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal against the Regional Transport Authority's resolution. Only the appeal of P.V.K Transports, described as the second appellant , succeeded, although this party was awarded only 7.42 marks as against 8.69 of the appellant before us. The break up of the marks allotted, in accordance with Rule 155(A) of the Tamil Nadu Motor Vehicle Rules, was given as follows: Residence BO Workshop Experience Sector Viable Unit Total Second Appellant 2 . . 2 2 0.42 1 7.42 Respondent 2 . . 2 1.63 0.06 3 8.69 3. It appears, from the order of the State Transport Tribunal that the parties did not dispute the corre ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ection 115 of the Civil Procedure Code which was made applicable to decisions of the Tribunal by the Tamil Nadu Motor Vehicle Amendment Act 16 of 1971. It held that there was no error of jurisdiction or material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction since the Tribunal had based its decision on relevant considerations. Against this decision the appellant was granted special leave to appeal to this Court. 5. Civil Appeal No. 2254 of 1969 arises out of twenty-one applications which came up for consideration before the Regional Transport Authority, South Arcot, Cuddalore, for grant of a stage carriage permit for the route from Porto-Novo to Puliyangudi. The RTA rejected five applications on the ground that they were from new entrants who had no previous experience of this business. One was rejected on the ground that it was from a dissolved company. Another was rejected because the applicant was dead. Six were eliminated because of bad entries on their permits during the preceding year. Five were rejected on the ground that they had either no workshops or not sufficiently equipped workshops. Out of the three remaining applicants, one was considered inferior in merit in compar ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... at the same meeting of the Regional Transport Authority. That would be a relevant question. It pointed out: The first respondent altogether got three permits at the hands of the Tribunal. Whether he having got a permit before the Regional Transport Authority it would be consistent with public interest to grant further permits at the stage of appeals was undoubtedly a matter relevant to the consideration and that having not been decided by the Tribunal, its order is vitiated. 8. The Civil Appeal No. 2254 of 1969 has come up before this Court after certification of the case by the Madras High Court under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution as fit one for an appeal to this Court. 9. Civil Appeals Nos. 1481-83 of 1970 have resulted from 42 applications made for the grant of a permit to ply on the route Chidambaram to Tirukoilur via, Vedalur, Kadampuliyur, Panruti, and some other places, by the Regional Transport Authority, South Arcot. It appears that, after the elimination of a number of applications on various grounds of disqualification, the RTA embarked, ultimately, on a comparison of the relative merits of three applicants: 1. M/s Prabhu Transports (P) Ltd.; ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... pellants owns more route buses than what the appellant had. A learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court, after examining the orders of the State Tribunal in the light of all the facts of cases of the claimants as set out by the Tribunal itself, concluded and ordered: There has in reality been no selection, considering the claims of the applicants together. A comparative assessment with reference to relevant and material facts is lacking and the ratio of the decisions relating to the relevancy of recent grants not understood. In the circumstances, the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal cannot be sustained. It is, therefore, quashed. The Tribunal has now to take up the matter and consider the claims of the aggrieved applicants, the petitioners in the writ petitions and the first respondent, afresh, in the light of the observations contained herein. 12. The matter was then taken before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in these appeals. The Division Bench quoted the following passage from the judgment of the learned Single Judge setting out the main grievance of the petitioners in the High Court: Counsel pointed out that in the instant case, it is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to the appellant. In the above circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with the order of the learned Judge in the writ petition in these writ appeals which are dismissed in limine. 13. Against the Division Bench judgment and order we have three Appeals Nos. 1481-83 of 1970 before us by grant of special leave. 14. Three questions which fall for consideration upon the facts set out above are: (1) Is possession by/or recent grant of another permit to an applicant for a stage carriage permit, either by itself, or, in conjunction with other facts and circumstances, a relevant consideration in either refusing or granting a permit to an applicant? (2) If it is, in any particular set of circumstances, a relevant consideration, what is the weight to be attached to it in the assessment of the comparative merits of rival claims? (3) Does the High Court's judgment or order in any of the cases dealt with by it call for interference by us in any respect in exercise of our powers under Article 136 of the Constitution? 15. The questions posed above must, we think, be answered having regard to the provisions of Section 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act and such relevant and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... competent to lay down by way of general guidance certain fundamental principles, which will be according to them in the interests of the public generally. The heading will cover any ground which might not have been expressly mentioned in Section 47. It is neither possible nor is it desirable to restrict the discretion of the Regional Transport Authority to grant or refuse a stage carriage permit on considerations of public interest. It went on to express (at p. 266): Even otherwise we do not think that the scope of the section is limited to the factors to be taken into consideration while granting stage carriage permit mentioned in Section 47. It is not correct to say that Section 47 of the Act forms a complete code or that the factors mentioned therein are exhaustive. In our view that is clear from the words shall have regard to in Section 47. The requirement of the section is that the matter specified in the section may be taken into consideration. In other words, the primary duty of the Regional Transport Authority is to take into consideration the matters specified but it does not follow that the hands of the Regional Transport Authority are tied to the consideration ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... that even matters not specified in Section 47 of the Act can be taken into account, we think that the view is unobjectionable. Even where powers to be exercised by authorities, which are organs of the State, are not clearly defined, the Constitutional guarantees contained in Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution would certainly limit the scope and regulate the exercise of such powers. 21. This Court recently, in Maharafhtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Mangrulpir Jt. Motor Service (P) Ltd.4 after setting out the provisions of section 47 of the Act, observed about the manner in which the Regional Transport Authority has to function (see p. 570) (SCC p. 229, para 19): It is a statutory body. It is to exercise statutory powers in the public interest. Such public interest would have to be considered with regard to particular matters enumerated in Section 47 of the Act and the particulars of an application are to be judged with reference to Sections 46 and 47 in particular of the Act. 22. More recently, in Patiala Bus (Sirhind) Pvt. Ltd. v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal Punjab 1974 2 SCC 245, 249 this Court said with regard to the provisions of section 47 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... it under Section 47. A fact which, in certain circumstances, is relevant for a decision on what the public interest demands may become irrelevant where it is not connected with such public interest. Indeed, every class of consideration specified in Section 47(1) of the Act seems correlated to the interests of the public generally. It appears that section 47(1)(a) gives the dominant purpose and Section 47(1)(b) to (f) are only its sub-categories or illustrations. If any matter taken into consideration is not shown to be correlated to the dominant purpose or, the relationship or the effect of a particular fact, which has operated in favour of a grant is such as to show that it is opposed, on the face of it, to public interest, the grant will be bad. The power to grant permits under Section 47 of the Act is limited to the purposes for which it is meant to be exercised. Considerations which are relevant for applying Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution could not be foreign to the scope of section 47(1)(a) which is fairly wide.3 24. Where the power to grant permits shows that its exercise is meant to be judged on the touchstone of the interests of the public generally, the te ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... or the possession of other permits is neither a qualification nor a disqualification divorced from other circumstances which could indicate how such a fact is related to the interests of the public generally. It is only if there are other facts establishing the corelationship and indicate its advantages or disadvantages to the public generally that it will become a relevant circumstance. But, in cases where everything else is absolutely equal as between two applicants, which will rarely be the case, it could be said that an application of principle of equality of opportunity, which could be covered by Article 14, may enable a person who is not a fresh grantee to obtain a preference. Such a consideration, as we have indicated above could not be said to be outside the broad view of the interest of the public generally which we are taking so as to include within its purview application of tests underlying provisions giving Fundamental Rights to citizens under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. 26. We think that the Madras High Court while rejecting the application for a certificate of fitness of the case for appeal to this Court in cases which form the subject-matter of Civil ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... m which Section 47(1)(e) was omitted. But, the ordinances were repealed by the Tamil Nadu Acts 10 and 16 of 1971 so that the provisions of Section 47(1)(e) of the Act in their application to Madras were intact at the time of the grant. The contention was, therefore, unsound. 31. It was then contended, in Civil Appeal No. 1402 of 1974, that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal had held two extraneous or irrelevant circumstances to be decisive. These were: that the respondent grantee before it was a recent grantee and that he held three permits altogether whereas the second appellant before it, to which the permit was granted by it, held only one permit. It was urged that these considerations were applied mechanically without showing their corelationship at all with the interests of the public generally as though the Appellate Tribunal was entrusted with the task of distributing favours and had to do this equitably on grounds which, however, laudable, are extraneous to the purposes of Section 47 of the Act. Furthermore, it was pointed out that, at the relevant time, certain rules had been validly framed by the State Government under Section 133(1) of the Act the effect of which ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he High Court should, therefore, have interfered even in the exercise of its power under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code which has been made applicable to such cases. 33. In Civil Appeal No. 2254 of 1969, a preliminary objection was taken to the grant of a certificate of fitness of the case under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution in such a case when there was no final order passed by the High Court. Reliance was placed upon Raman Raman (Private) Ltd., Kumbakonan v. Sri Rama Vilas Service Ltd. Kumbakonam CA No. 995 of 1965, decided on May 3, 1968 where this Court said: We are of the view that the High Court was in error in granting the certificate when nothing was decided by their judgment. The order was not final. The order of the High Court did not determine the rights and obligations of the parties: it merely set aside the order of the Appellate Tribunal and directed the Tribunal to deal with and dispose of the question according to law. The appeal is liable to fail on that limited ground alone. No satisfactory answer has been given to the preliminary objection. But, as we could, if the case deserved it, grant special leave to appeal, even at this stage, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hich the case is confined. 35. In Civil Appeals Nos. 1481-83 of 1970, we find that the High Court has given good enough grounds to justify reconsideration of the claims by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. The High Court seems to us to have rightly hinted that, where the results of exercise of power to grant permit shows that permits are, without sufficient grounds for a discrimination or preference based on an appraisement of merits or requirements of public interest, being invariably granted to one particular party the powers are not fairly or impartially exercised. Quasi-judicial powers have to be exercised fairly, reasonably, and impartially. Capricious or dishonest preferences on purely personal grounds are necessarily excluded here. We have no doubt that the Tribunal will reconsider claims in conformity with needs of public interest as they exist at the time of reconsideration by the Tribunal. We do not think that these cases justify interference by this Court in exercise of its power under Article 136 of the Constitution. 36. The result is: We allow Civil Appeal No. 1402 of 1974 and set aside the order and judgment of the High Court as well as of the State Appell ..... 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