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TMI Blog2019 (9) TMI 1484X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... whood, minority or period of disability are deemed to cultivate the land personally through their tenants-the Explanation-I to Section 2(6) makes this clear - in the vast majority of cases, the landlord is divested of his title on a fixed date i.e. 1st April, 1957. It is only in exceptional cases where the landlord is a widow, minor or a person subjected to disability that this right of the tenant is postponed. What is important to note is that it is to the knowledge of both landlord and tenant that the tenant becomes the owner statutorily on a fixed date i.e. 1st April, 1957. Even otherwise, on postponed dates that are mentioned Under Section 32, the tenant shall be deemed to have purchased the land on such postponed date under the first proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 32 when an application for possession made by the landlord Under Section 29 is finally rejected-a date that is to the knowledge of both landlord and tenant. Given the fact that the object of the 1956 Amendment, which is an agrarian reform legislation, and is to give the tiller of the soil statutory title to land which such tiller cultivates; and, given the fact that the literal interpretation of Section 32-F(1 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nton Fali Nariman, R. Subhash Reddy and Surya Kant, JJ. For Appellant: Aniruddha Joshi and Shubhangi Tuli, Advs. For Respondents: Ajit S. Bhasme, Sr. Adv., Pankaj Kumar Mishra, Shashank Mangle, A. Bhasme and Nishant Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar, Advs. Overruled/Reversed: Appa Narsappa Magdum (D) Thr. Lrs. vs. Akubai Ganapati Nimbalkar and Ors. JUDGMENT Rohinton Fali Nariman, 1. This case has been referred to a Three Judge Bench by a detailed judgment of a Division Bench of this Court reported as Vasant Ganpat Padave v. Anant Mahadev Sawant (2019) 2 SCC 788. The relevant facts that are necessary for determination of the controversy before us are set out in paragraphs 3 to 5 of the referral order as follows: 3. One Balwant Sawant was landlord of Survey No. 92/2, corresponding to new Survey No. 31 Hissa No. 2/10, admeasuring about 0.01.3 H.R. at Village Padavewadi, Taluka District Ratnagiri. Balwant Sawant died on 10-5-1950 leaving behind Smt. Indirabai Balwant Sawant, his widow as his legal heir and representative. Smt. Indirabai Balwant Sawant, widow became the owner of the said property. Her name was mutated in the revenue records. The Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ice having been issued within the time as prescribed, the Appellants have lost right of purchase. 5. The Appellants, aggrieved by the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, filed a revision application before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. There were other revisions filed by several other tenants who were aggrieved by the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal by a common order dated 20-4-2013 dismissed the revisions and confirmed the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal held that applicants were under legal obligation to give intimation expressing their desire to purchase within time stipulated Under Section 32-F, which having not been given, no right of purchase is available to applicants. Aggrieved against the judgment of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, writ petitions were filed by the Appellants and several other similarly situated tenants. All the writ petitions were dismissed by common judgment dated 1-8-2014 [Arjun Hari Kamble v. Anant Mahadev Sawant, 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 4931] of the High Court, against which judgment, these appeals have been filed. 2. After setting out various provisions of the Maharashtra T ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... am Maruti Chavan v. Maruti Narayan Chavan, (2008) 9 SCC 358], clearly supports the submission of the learned Counsel for the Respondents that the Appellants having not exercised their right to purchase Under Section 32-F(1) read with Section 32-F(1-A) within the time prescribed, the right of purchase of the tenant is lost. But there is one aspect of the matter which needs to be noted and has not been considered in the above judgments rendered by two-Judge Benches of this Court which we shall notice hereinafter. The Division Bench then laid emphasis upon the Statement of Objects and Reasons to the 1969 Amendment of the 1948 Act and opined: 37. Amendment in Section 32-F(1)(a) added by Act 49 of 1969 expressly covered a case of landlord who was minor and has attained majority. Intimation by a minor landlord who has attained majority has been made a statutory obligation of the landlord so that tenant may exercise his right of purchase. The other two categories which are a widow or a person subject to mental or physical disability have not been expressly included in the amendment incorporated by Act 49 of 1969. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the amendment given in 1969 as well ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... xercise their right. The amendments by Act 15 of 1957 was agrarian reform making tillers of the soil the owners of the land which was done to achieve the object of making all tillers of the soil as owners of the land. While interpreting the provisions of Section 32-F(1-A) as well as Section 31(3), the purpose and object of the 1948 Act, amendments made therein from time to time cannot be lost sight off. 39. When Section 32-F of the 1948 Act gives right to purchase to a tenant whose landlord was suffering from a disability on Tillers' Day, the exercise of right to purchase by such tenant has to be interpreted in a manner so as to make the exercise of right meaningful and effective. The abovesaid right cannot be defeated on the ground that it was not exercised within the period prescribed when the tenant is unaware as to when the period has begun. 40. The period prescribed for exercising the right to purchase is not a period of limitation but a reasonable period prescribed for the exercise of a right. The knowledge of cessation of disability of landlord by the tenant can only be commencement of the period prescribed. 41. When a statute gives a right to a tenant, statute needs to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sme, learned Senior Advocate for the Respondent. Shri Joshi painstakingly took us through various provisions of the 1948 Act and was at pains to point out that it was a social welfare legislation enacted in furtherance of an Agrarian Reform Programme and was, therefore, covered by Article 31A of the Constitution of India. He laid great emphasis, in particular, upon the Amendment Acts of 1956 and 1969. By the first mentioned Amendment Act, the statutory scheme was to divest an absentee landlord of his title and vest title directly in the cultivating tenant of agricultural land. The landlord was given only a limited right to ask for resumption of his land provided certain very stringent conditions were met, provided that such application was made on or before Tillers' Day i.e. 1st April, 1957. He argued that in the case of three categories of persons, namely, widows, minors and persons suffering from a disability, the right of the cultivating tenant to become owner was only postponed, and Section 32-F must be read narrowly so as not to interfere with the statutory right of purchase of the cultivating tenant. The 1969 Amendment made this clear, but was limited only to one of the t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lso argued that in any event, if Section 32-F were to be construed literally, it would violate Article 14 as it would discriminate between cultivating tenants who are similarly situate, namely, tenants whose statutory right to become owners has been postponed on account of the landlord's disability. Whereas in the case of minors, the landlord is bound to intimate the tenant of the date on which such minor attains majority, so that he may exercise his statutory right in a meaningful way, there is no such obligation on a widow's successors to inform the tenant of the death of the widow, resulting in persons who are similarly situate being deprived of their statutory right for no fault of theirs, and contrary to the Object sought to be achieved by the 1956 Amendment. 4. On the other hand, Shri Ajit Bhasme, took us through various provisions of the Act and argued that the rent by a cultivating tenant needs to be paid at least annually by 31st May every year, which would enable the cultivating tenant to know that his landlady widow has died, as otherwise rent paid to a dead person cannot be credited to such person's account. He also made an emotional appeal to the Court that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tes lawfully any land belonging to another person shall be deemed to be a tenant if such land is not cultivated personally by the owner or a member of his family or by a servant on wages payable in cash or kind or by a mortgagee in possession. Under Section 4-B tenancies cannot be terminated merely on the ground that the period fixed by an agreement has expired. Section 31 is important and is set out hereinbelow: 31. Landlord's right to terminate tenancy for personal cultivation and non-agricultural purpose.-- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 14 and 30 but subject to Sections 31-A to 31-D (both inclusive), a landlord (not being a landlord within the meaning of Chapter III-AA) may, after giving notice and making an application for possession as provided in Sub-section (2), terminate the tenancy of any land (except a permanent tenancy), if the landlord bona fide requires the land for any of the following purposes: (a) for cultivating personally, or (b) for any non-agricultural purpose. (2) The notice required to be given Under Sub-section (1) shall be in writing, shall state the purpose for which the landlord requires the land and shall be served on the tenant o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of this Section and the provisions of the next succeeding sections, be deemed to have purchased from his landlord, free of all encumbrances subsisting thereon on the said day, the land held by him as tenant, if,- (a) Such tenant is a permanent tenant thereof and cultivates land personally; (b) Such tenant is not a permanent tenant but cultivates the land leased personally; and (i) the landlord has not given notice of termination of his tenancy Under Section 31; or (ii) notice has been given Under Section 31, but the landlord has not applied to the Mamlatdar on or before the 31st day of March, 1957 Under Section 29 for obtaining possession of the land; or (iii) the landlord has not terminated this tenancy on any of the grounds specified in Section 14, or has so terminated the tenancy but has not applied to the Mamlatdar on or before the 31st day of March, 1957 Under Section 29 for obtaining possession of the land: Provided that if an application made by the landlord Under Section 29 for obtaining possession of the land has been rejected by the Mamlatdar or by the Collector in appeal or in revision by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal under the provisions of this Act, the tenant shall ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nt; and thereafter, the provisions of this Section and Section 32-A to 32-R(both inclusive) shall, in so far as they may be applicable, apply thereto, subject to the modification that the tenant shall be deemed to have purchased the land on the date on which the land is restored to him. Provided that, the tenant shall be entitled to restoration of the land under this Sub-section only if he undertakes to cultivate the land personally and of so much thereof as together with the other land held by him as owner or tenant shall not exceed the ceiling area. Explanation-In this Sub-section, successor-in-interest means a person who acquires the interest by testamentary disposition or devolution on death. Section 32-F is the Section that falls for construction in the present case and is set out in toto hereinbelow: 32-F. Right of tenant to purchase where landlord is minor, etc.-- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding sections,-- (a) where the landlord is a minor, or a widow, or a person subject to any mental or physical disability, the tenant shall have the right to purchase such land Under Section 32 within one year from the expiry of the period during which such landlord ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion in that behalf to the landlord and the Tribunal in the prescribed manner within the period specified in that Sub-section: Provided that, if a tenant holding land from a landlord (who was a minor and has attained majority before the commencement of the Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Laws (Amendment) Act, 1969) has not given intimation as required by this Sub-section but being in possession of the land on such commencement is desirous of exercising the right conferred upon him Under Sub-section (1), he may give such intimation within a period of two years from the commencement of that Act. (2) The provisions of Sections 32 to 32-E (both inclusive) and Sections 32-G to 32-R (both inclusive) shall, so far as may be applicable, apply to such purchase. 8. Section 32-G is also important, in that, it is only after notice to the tenant that the price of the land to be paid by the tenant to the erstwhile landlord is then determined. The relevant Sub-sections of this Section states as follows: 32G. Tribunal to issue notice and determine price of land to be paid by tenants.- (1) As soon as may be after the tillers' day the Tribunal shall publish or cause to be published a public notice ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nder Sections 32F, 32O, 33C or 43-1D the Tribunal may suo motu or on an application made on this behalf land in case other than those in which the purchase has become ineffective by reason of Section 32-G or 32M, after holding a formal inquiry direct that the land shall be disposed of in the manner provided in Sub-section (2). (2) Such direction shall provide- (a) that the former tenant be summarily evicted; (b) that the land shall, subject to the provisions of Section 15, be surrendered to the former landlord; (c) that if the entire land or any portion thereof cannot be surrendered in accordance with the provisions of Section 15, the entire land or such portion thereof, as the case may be, notwithstanding that it is a fragment, shall be disposed of by sale to any person in the following order of priority (hereinafter called the priority list ): (i) a co-operative farming society the members of which are agricultural labourers, landless persons or small holders or a combination of such persons; (ii) agricultural labourers; (iii) landless persons; (iv) small holders; (v) a co-operative farming society of agriculturists (other than small holders) who hold either as owner or tenant or ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is only by such a declaration by the Tribunal that the purchase becomes ineffective. If no such declaration is made by the Tribunal the purchase would stand as statutorily effected on the tiller's day and will continue to be operative, the only obligation on the tenant then being the payment of price in the mode determined by the Tribunal. If the tenant commits default in the payment of such price either in lump or by instalments as determined by the Tribunal, Section 32-M declares the purchase to be ineffective but in that event the land shall then be at the disposal of the Collector to be disposed of by him in the manner provided therein. Here also the purchase continues to be effective as from the tiller's day until such default is committed and there is no question of a conditional purchase or sale taking place between the landlord and tenant. The title to the land which was vested originally in the landlord passes to the tenant on the tiller's day or the alternative period prescribed in that behalf. This title is defeasible only in the event of the tenant failing to appear or making a statement that he is not willing to purchase the land or committing default in p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ment landlord-tenant relationship as understood in common law or Transfer of Property Act comes to an end. The link and chain is broken. The absent non-cultivating landlord ceases to have that ownership element of the land and the cultivating tenant, the tiller of the soil becomes the owner thereof. This is unquestionable. The landlord from the date of statutory sale is only entitled to receive the purchase price as determined by the Tribunal Under Section 32-G. In other words, the landlord ceases to be landlord and the tenant becomes the owner of the land and comes in direct contact with the State. Without any act of transfer inter vivos the title of the landlord is extinguished and is created simultaneously in the tenant making the tenant the deemed purchaser. It is an admitted position that on April 1, 1957 Tarachand was the landlord and Janardhan was the tenant. Tarachand landlord was under no disability as envisaged by Section 32-F. Therefore on April 1, 1957 Janardhan became deemed purchaser and Mr. Lalit could not controvert this position. 7. If Janardhan became the deemed purchaser on tillers' day, the relationship of landlord and tenant between Tarachand and Janardhan ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... landlord is a widow, minor or a person subjected to disability that this right of the tenant is postponed. What is important to note is that it is to the knowledge of both landlord and tenant that the tenant becomes the owner statutorily on a fixed date i.e. 1st April, 1957. Even otherwise, on postponed dates that are mentioned Under Section 32, the tenant shall be deemed to have purchased the land on such postponed date under the first proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 32 when an application for possession made by the landlord Under Section 29 is finally rejected-a date that is to the knowledge of both landlord and tenant. Also, under the circumstances prescribed Under Section 32(1A), again the tenant shall be deemed to have purchased the land on a date on which a final order is passed by the Tribunal in the circumstances mentioned in the said Sub-section. Again, Under Sub-section (1B), in the circumstances mentioned in the aforesaid Sub-section, land gets restored to the tenant upon which deemed purchase takes place. Statutorily, therefore, in all cases covered by Section 32, the landlord is divested of his title either on Tillers' Day or on a postponed date which is to t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e entitlement of terminating a tenancy under any one of these three categories is contained in Section 31(3). In any of these three cases, the moment the disability ceases i.e. that the land in question no longer belongs to a minor, as he has become major, or to a widow, as she has died or transferred her share with permission Under Section 63, or to a person whose mental or physical disability ceases, one year is granted for such persons to apply for resumption of the land on the ground that such persons wish to personally cultivate the said land, pursuant to which an application for possession of land Under Section 29 may then be made. In case this is done within the time prescribed, the tenant's right to purchase does not fructify. It is only when this is not done within the period of one year, as aforestated, that the postponed right of the tenant springs into being. 16. Prior to the Amendment Act of 1969, on a plain literal reading of Section 32-F(1)(a), it is true that a tenant had to exercise this right within a period of one year from the expiry of the one year spoken of in Section 31(3) of the Act. Literally speaking, therefore, even if the tenant does not know when th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... graph 2 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons, is carried out by the proviso to Sub-section (1A) inserted by the 1969 Amendment Act into Section 32-F. 19. Simultaneously, the same Amendment Act inserted into Sub-section (1)(a), the following: and for enabling the tenant to exercise the right of purchase, the landlord shall send an intimation to the tenant of the fact that he has attained majority, before the expiry of the period during which such landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy Under Section 31: The addition of these words into Section 32-F(1)(a) would show that the legislature, in keeping with the object sought to be achieved statutorily divesting the landlord of his title and handing over the land to the cultivating tenant, cannot possibly be achieved unless a special fact within the knowledge of the landlord alone is first intimated to the tenant, so that he may then, with knowledge that the minor landlord has now turned major, meaningfully exercise his right of purchase under the Act. 20. It seems to us that the vast majority of cases which came to the notice of the legislature were cases of landlords who were minor at the time of the 1956 Amendment Act and who ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... er has no land within the ceiling limit or some land which does not exhaust the ceiling limit. This anomaly indeed turns the entire scheme of agrarian reform on its head. We have thus to see whether the language of Section 32-F can be added to or subtracted from, in order that the absurdity aforementioned and the discrimination between persons who are similarly situate be obviated. The Golden Rule of Interpretation 22. In Grey v. Pearson (1857) LR 6 HL Cas 61, what is referred to as the Golden Rule of literal interpretation was stated as follows: ... I have been long and deeply impressed with the wisdom of the rule, now, I believe, universally adopted, at least in the Courts of Law in Westminster Hall, that in construing wills and indeed statutes, and all written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no farther. This is laid down by Mr. Justice Burton, in a very excellent opinion, which is to be foun ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a difficult one. By implying after the words customs of England the addition over property subject to those laws and customs, the enactment would become sensible and harmonious. The difficulty is, and their Lordships quite agree that it is a great difficulty, that a condition which is apparently and at first sight the correlative condition of the conditional words could or might exercise is expressed by the last nine words of the section. And the question is whether that expression excludes all other implications. If such a construction left a substantial operative effect to the enactment, it might be necessary to answer that question in the affirmative; but, as it destroys the expressed objects altogether unless the word resident be construed to mean domiciled, and in that case destroys the expressed objects so far as regards real property, their Lordships answer it in the negative. It is true that they cannot find a sensible meaning for the nine words in question. Very likely the draftsman, whose want of skill is shown by other expressions in the Ordinance, attributed to residence a legal effect which it does not possess. But he does not make the legislature say that the powers c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the existence of such petition. 25. In Ramaswamy Nadar v. State of Madras (1958) SCR 739, this Court found it necessary to supply words which were not found in Section 423(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This the Court did as follows: ...But this argument is wholly ineffective because in either view of the matter the court has to supply some words in answer to the question find him guilty of what? According to the Appellant, those additional words should be of such offence as has been charged and of which he had been acquitted , and according to the other view, of the offence disclosed . If, in construing the section, the court has to supply some words in order to make the meaning of the statute clear, it will naturally prefer the latter construction which is more in consonance with reason and justice. 26. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Azad Bharat Finance Co. and Anr. (1966) Supp. SCR 473, Section 11 of the Opium (Madhya Bharat Amendment) Act, 1955 was construed as being permissive and not obligatory as follows: ...It is well recognised that if a statute leads to absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ended for by the Assessee and which found favour with the High Court the answer was in the affirmative because Sub-section (2)(b), on its literal construction, was absolute. In our view such literal construction would lead to a manifestly absurd result, because in a given case, like the present one, where the Appellate Authority (Tribunal) has found (a) the Income Tax Officer's order to be clearly erroneous as being prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, and (b) the Commissioner's order unsustainable as being in violation of principles of natural justice, how should the Appellate Authority exercise its appellate powers? Obviously it could not withhold its hands and refuse to interfere with Commissioner's order altogether, for, that would amount to perpetuating the Commissioner's erroneous order, nor could it merely cancel or set aside the Commissioner's wrong order without doing anything about the Income Tax Officer's order, for, that would result in perpetuating the Income Tax Officer's order which had been found to be manifestly erroneous as being prejudicial to the revenue. But such result would flow from the view taken by the High Court which h ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rce of interpreting the meaning of any writing: be it a statute, a contract or anything else. But it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning. We must not adopt a strictly literal interpretation of Section 52 Sub-section (2) but we must construe its language having regard to the object and purpose which the legislature had in view in enacting that provision and in the context of the setting in which it occurs. We cannot ignore the context and the collocation of the provisions in which Section 52 Sub-section (2) appears, because, as pointed out by Judge Learned Hand in most felicitous language: ... the meaning of a sentence may be more than that of the separate words, as a melody is more than the notes, and no degree of particularity can ever obviate recourse to the setting in which all appear, and which all collectively create. Keeping these observations in mind we may now approach the construction of Section 52 Sub-section (2). 6. The primary objecti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ge if obedience to the law should attract the levy of tax on income which has neither arisen to the Assessee nor has been received by him. If we may take another illustration, let us consider a case where A sells his property to B with a stipulation that after some time which may be a couple of years or more, he shall re-sell the property to A for the same price. Could it be contended in such a case that when B transfers the property to A for the same price at which he originally purchased it, he should be liable to pay tax on the basis as if he has received the market value of the property as on the date of re-sale, if, in the meanwhile, the market price has shot up and exceeds the agreed price by more than 15 per cent? Many other similar situations can be contemplated where it would be absurd and unreasonable to apply Section 52 Sub-section (2) according to its strict literal construction. We must therefore eschew literalness in the interpretation of Section 52 Sub-section (2) and try to arrive at an interpretation which avoids this absurdity and mischief and makes the provision rational and sensible, unless of course, our hands are tied and we cannot find any escape from the tyr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the intention of the Legislature from the language used. It is necessary to remember that language is at best an imperfect instrument for the expression of human intention. It is well to remember the warning administered by Judge Learned Hand that one should not make a fortress out of dictionary but remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish and sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning. 47. We have noted the object of Section 16(3) of the Act which has to be read in conjunction with Section 24(2) in this case for the present purpose. If the purpose of a particular provision is easily discernible from the whole scheme of the Act which in this case is, to counteract the effect of the transfer of assets so far as computation of income of the Assessee is concerned then bearing that purpose in mind, we should find out the intention from the language used by the Legislature and if strict literal construction leads to an absurd result i.e. result not intended to be subserved by the object of the legislation found in the manner indicated before, and if another construction is possible apart from strict literal construction the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... x xxx xxx 19. ... The presumption canvassed to be raised that the true effect of the words if the offence had not been committed was to presume a situation in which the undertaking given by the Assessee had been carried out even though in fact the same had not been carried out. That would be an absurd result. In our opinion the use of the expression if simpliciter, was meant to indicate a condition, the condition being that at the time of assessing the penalty, that situation should be visualised wherein there was no scope of committing any offence. Such a situation could arise only if the tax liability fell Under Sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the Act. The scheme of Section 8 indicated that concessional rates contemplated by Sub-section (1) thereof would be available only with reference to those goods which are covered by the declarations in Form 'C'. The moment it is found that in respect of particular quantity of goods the undertaking given by the Assessee in Form 'C' declaration has not been carried out, the goods were presumed to be such in respect of which no undertaking was existing. Therefore such goods would be liable to normal tax contemplated Under Sub-s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... meedia Hardware Stores v. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar [(1988) 2 SCC 513, 524-25] where it was observed that the court construing a provision should not easily read into it words which have not been expressly enacted but having regard to the context in which a provision appears and the object of the statute in which the said provision is enacted the court should construe it in a harmonious way to make it meaningful. An attempt must always be made so to reconcile the relevant provisions as to advance the remedy intended by the statute. (See: Sirajul Haq Khan v. Sunni Central Board of Waqf [1959 SCR 1287, 1299 : AIR 1959 SC 198].) 20. The tenant of course is entitled to raise all relevant contentions as against the claim of the classified landlords. The fact that there is no reference to the word bona fide requirement in Sections 14-B to 14-D does not absolve the landlord from proving that his requirement is bona fide or the tenant from showing that it is not bona fide. In fact every claim for eviction against a tenant must be a bona fide one. There is also enough indication in support of this construction from the title of Section 25-B which states special procedure for the disposal of appli ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cular words, or by rejecting them altogether, on the ground that the legislature could not possibly have intended what its words signify, and that the modifications made are mere corrections of careless language and really give the true meaning. Where the main object and the intention of a statute are clear, it must not be reduced to a nullity by the draftman's unskillfulness or ignorance of the law, except in a case of necessity, or the absolute intractability of the language used. Lord Reid has said that he prefers to see a mistake on the part of the draftsman in doing his revision rather than a deliberate attempt to introduce an irrational rule: 'The canons of construction are not so rigid as to prevent a realistic solution.' We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court was right in taking the view it did on this aspect and we agree with it. 34. In Molar Mal v. Kay Iron Works (P) Ltd. (2000) 4 SCC 285, this Court construed a provision of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 by interpreting the proviso to Section 13(3) of the said Act by adding certain words as follows: 12. ...We agree with this contention of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... liament having enacted Section 28-A, as a beneficial provision, it would cause great injustice if a literal interpretation is given to the expression had not made an application to the Collector Under Section 18 in Section 28-A of the Act. The aforesaid expression would mean that if the landowner has made an application for reference Under Section 18 and that reference is entertained and answered. In other words, it may not be permissible for a landowner to make a reference and get it answered and then subsequently make another application when some other person gets the reference answered and obtains a higher amount. In fact in Pradeep Kumari case [ (1995) 2 SCC 736] the three learned Judges, while enumerating the conditions to be satisfied, whereafter an application Under Section 28-A can be moved, had categorically stated (SCC p. 743, para 10) the person moving the application did not make an application to the Collector Under Section 18 . The expression did not make an application , as observed by this Court, would mean, did not make an effective application which had been entertained by making the reference and the reference was answered. When an application Under Section 18 i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ons to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest; Based on this proposition, Shri Bhasme has argued that the legislature in the present case has recognised a certain degree of harm, namely, to tenants of minor landlords and may, therefore, confine itself to such cases where the need is deemed to be clearest. 39. Proposition (d) has been later clarified in the seminal judgment of this Court, In Re Special Courts Bill, 1978, (1979)1 SCC 380. A Constitution Bench of this Court in paragraph 72 of the aforesaid judgment, after referring to Ram Krishna Dalmia's case (supra) and other judgments, stated 13 propositions insofar as Article 14 is concerned. We are directly concerned with propositions (1), (3), (6) and (8) which are set out as follows: 72. As long back as in 1960, it was said by this Court in Kangsari Haldar that the propositions applicable to cases arising Under Article 14 have been repeated so many times during the past few years that they now sound almost platitudinous . What was considered to be platitudinous some 18 years ago has, in the natural course of events, become even more platitudinous today, especially in view of the avalanche of cases which hav ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nferring privileges or imposing liabilities upon persons arbitrarily selected out of a large number of other persons similarly situated in relation to the privileges sought to be conferred or the liabilities proposed to be imposed, it does not forbid classification for the purpose of legislation, provided such classification is not arbitrary in the sense abovementioned. To proposition (d) in Ram Krishna Dalmia's case (supra) an exception has been engrafted in proposition (6) contained hereinabove. The law may recognise degrees of harm, but in so doing the classification should never be arbitrary, artificial or evasive. This is repeated by way of a proviso to proposition (8) as well. We have referred to the Statement of the Objects and Reasons for the 1969 Amendment. Paragraph 2 thereof stated that a large number of cases involving minor landlords had come to the notice of the legislature, for which reason the amnesty scheme mentioned in Sub-section (1A) of Section 32-F was enacted. However, what was forgotten by the draftsman when the addition to Section 32-F(1)(a) was made was the fact that Section 32F(1)(a) referred to three categories of landlords and not only one. The words ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... attempt to discover some basis for classification may gradually and imperceptibly deprive the Article of its glorious content. He referred to the doctrine of classification as a subsidiary rule evolved by courts to give practical content to the said Article. 63. In the pre-1974 era, the judgments of this Court did refer to the rule of law or positive aspect of Article 14, the concomitant of which is that if an action is found to be arbitrary and, therefore, unreasonable, it would negate the equal protection of the law contained in Article 14 and would be struck down on this ground. 42. Hiralal P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora (2016) 10 SCC 165, is a case in point. In this judgment, this Court struck down a portion of Section 2(q) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. Section 2(q) of the said Act defined Respondent as meaning any adult male person who is, or has been in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person and against whom the aggrieved person has sought any relief. This Court having regard to the object sought to be achieved by the Act, struck down the expression adult male as follows: 39. A conspectus of these judgments also leads to the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eates the artificial classification leading to a discriminatory application of law. 44. Respectfully following the law laid down in these judgments, and in order to read Section 32-F(1)(a) in conformity with Article 14, we eliminate the words ..of the fact that he has attained majority.. so that the intimation that is to be made by the landlord has to be made to tenants of all the three categories of landlords covered by the provision. 45. It now remains to deal with some of the judgments of this Court on the interpretation of Section 32-F. In Anna Bhau Magdum v. Babasaheb Anandrao Desai (1995) 5 SCC 243, a minor landlord attained majority in 1965 i.e. before the 1969 Amendment Act came into force. After adverting to the amendments made in 1969, this Court held that for this reason the amendment did not apply to the facts of that case. It was also found, as a matter of fact, that despite knowing that the Respondent landlord would attain majority on 17.1.1965, the tenant gave no intimation as required by Sub-section (1A) to Section 32-F even within the amnesty period of two years granted by the said Sub-section. The only argument made on behalf of the tenant in that case was that si ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s that were cited were distinguished in paragraph 27 stating that they were all judgments in which Section 32-F(1A) would apply. The facts of this case again are far removed from the facts of the present case and the judgment has, therefore, no application to the law laid down in the present case. 48. The next judgment cited before us is Tukaram Maruti Chavan v. Maruti Narayan Chavan, (2008) 9 SCC 358. This judgment followed the law laid down in Appa Narsappa (supra) and on facts held that the Appellant tenant had complete knowledge of the death of the widow in that case, as a result of which the Appellant's contention that he was confused as to who was the true owner was turned down. To the extent that this judgment follows the law laid down in Appa Narsappa (supra), this judgment also does not lay down the law correctly and is overruled to this extent. 49. It now only remains to consider some of Shri Bhasme's other arguments. The argument made based on Section 14(1)(a) that since a tenant is bound to pay the rent every year before the 31st May thereof, the tenant is bound to know that the person to whom he is paying rent has since died and that, therefore, knowledge canno ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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