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2005 (9) TMI 689

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..... 1966. After the death of Francis Severance the plaint schedule property devolved on appellants 1 to 3. Shri K.V. Mathew, the husband of the 2nd respondent and father of respondents 1 and 3 and the 4th respondent entered into an agreement of licence with appellants and Hilda Severance with respect to the plaint schedule property under which permission was granted to Mathew to construct a cinema theatre for a period of five years. The licence was renewed from time to time and on 11.2.1991 by Ext. A1 agreement, the licence, was renewed for a period of five years. In the meantime Hilda Severance also died. The condition in Ext. A1 agreement was that on the expiry of five years from 11.2.1991, the licensee had to surrender vacant possession of the plaint schedule property on demolishing the building and the structures thereon. Before the expiry of five years mentioned in Ext. A1 agreement, the licensee, Mathew died on 24.5.1994. After that Ext. A2 notice was sent to respondents which yielded no result. The suit was filed on 12.2.1996. 3. The trial court as well as the First Appellate Court found that on the death of Mathew the licence came to an end and thereafter the possession of .....

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..... s clearly untenable. Firstly while reversing the findings recorded by the trial court as affirmed by the first Appellate Court the mandatory requirement of formulating substantial question of law was not followed. Even otherwise the High Court did not take note of several Division Bench's judgments of the Kerala High Court which were binding on learned Single Judge. Though he referred to them, his views were clearly at variance with that of the Division Benches. The explanation offered by the plaintiff as to why the suit was filed on 12.2.1996 has been ignored without reason. No issue was framed by the trial Court about the maintainability or otherwise of the suit and even no evidence was led or plea raised before the trial Court or before the first appellate Court that the suit was not maintainable having been filed after a long, period. The claim of the defendants all through was that they were tenants and not trespassers. These vital aspects have been lost sight of by the High Court. 5. In response, learned counsel for the respondents-defendants submitted that the High Court's judgment does not warrant any interference. A finding of fact has been recorded that the .....

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..... ed as a trespasser. It would depend upon the facts of the particular case. But there may be cases where after termination or revocation of the licence the licensor does not take prompt action to evict licensee from the premises. In such an event the ex-licensee may be treated as a trespasser and the licensee will have to sue for recovery of possession. There can be no doubt that there is a need for the licensor to be vigilant. A licensee's occupation does not become hostile possession or the possession of a trespasser the moment the licence comes to an end. The licensor has to file the suit with promptitude and if it is shown that within reasonable time a suit for mandatory injunction has been filed with a prayer to direct the licensee to vacate the premises the suit will be maintainable. 8. It is to be noted that in the instant case the High Court has nowhere held that the explanation, as offered by the plaintiffs, was not acceptable. Without so holding, the High Court only took note of the period after which the suit was filed. The basic issue is whether the suit was filed within a reasonable time . 9. As observed in Veeravee Ammal v. Seeni Ammal AIR2001SC2920 , it is .....

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..... hem after the ceremony has been completed and the owner has demanded their return. AIR 1930 Oudh 395. The expression reasonable time means so much time as is necessary under the circumstances to do conveniently what the contract or duty requires should be done in a particular case . 11. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to take note of the view expressed by this Court in several cases. 12. In Firm Sriniwas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad and Ors. MANU/SC/0021/1951 : [1951]2SCR277 it was noted as follows : As regards the other point, however, we are of the opinion that the decision of the trial court was right and that the High Court took an undoubtedly rigid and technical view in reversing this part of the decree of the subordinate judge. It is true that it was no part of the plaintiff's case as made in the plaint that the sum of ₹ 80,000/- was advanced by way of loan to the defendant's second party. But it was certainly open to the plaintiff to make an alternative case to that effect and make a prayer in the alternative for a decree for money even if the allegations of the money being paid in pursuance of a contract of sale could not be establi .....

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..... the appeal was heard ex party in the absence of the respondent. 13. In Sant Lal Jain v. Avtar [1985]3SCR184 in paragraph 7 8 of the judgment it was observed as follows: 7. In the present case it has not been shown to us that the appellant had come to the court with the suit for mandatory injunction after any considerable delay which will disentitle him to the discretionary relief. Even if there was some delay, we think that in a case of this kind attempt should be made to avoid multiplicity of suits and the licensor should not be driven to file another round of suit with all the attendant delay, trouble and expense. The suit is in effect one for possession though couched in the form of a suit for mandatory injunction as what would be given to the plaintiff in case he succeeds in possession of the property to which he may be found to be entitled. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the appellant should not be denied relief merely because he had couched the plaint in the form of a suit for mandatory injunction. 8. The respondent was a licensee, and he must be deemed to be always a licensee. It is not open to him, during the subsistence of the licence or in the suit .....

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