9911796707
TMI Blog2021 (2) TMI 505X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rticle 136 of the Constitution and has reiterated that while entertaining an appeal by way of special leave, there shall not ordinarily be an attempt to re-appreciate the evidence on record unless the decision(s) under challenge are shown to have committed a manifest error of law or procedure or the conclusion reached is ex-facie perverse. On a plain reading of its judgment that the trial Court completely overlooked the provisions and failed to appreciate the statutory presumption drawn under Section 118 and Section 139 of NIA. The Statute mandates that once the signature(s) of an accused on the cheque/negotiable instrument are established, then these reverse onus clauses become operative. In such a situation, the obligation shifts upon the accused to discharge the presumption imposed upon him - Once the 2nd Appellant had admitted his signatures on the cheque and the Deed, the trial Court ought to have presumed that the cheque was issued as consideration for a legally enforceable debt. The trial Court fell in error when it called upon the Complainant Respondent to explain the circumstances under which the appellants were liable to pay. Such approach of the trial Court was dire ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ntly, Appellant No.2 has been sentenced to undergo three months Simple Imprisonment and a fine of ₹ 5,000/. Facts 3. The instant proceedings have originated out of a complaint preferred by P. Balasubramanian (Complainant Respondent) against the appellants. The respondent is the proprietor of a garment company named and styled as Growell International , which along with Appellant No.1 was engaged in a business arrangement, whereby they agreed to jointly export garments to France. Certain issues arose regarding delays in shipment and payment from the buyer, due to which, the appellants had to pay the respondent a sum of ₹ 11.20 lakhs. To that end, Appellant No.2 issued a cheque on behalf of Appellant No. 1 bearing no.897993 dated 07.11.2000 in favour of the respondent and also executed a Deed of Undertaking on the same day wherein Appellant No.2 personally undertook to pay the respondent in lieu of the initial expenditure incurred by the latter. The respondent presented the said cheque to the bank on 29.12.2000 for collection but it was returned with an endorsement that there were insufficient funds in the account of appellants. In wake of the cheque being dis ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... fore vide impugned judgment allowed the criminal appeal and convicted both the appellants under Section 138 of NIA. Appellant No. 2 was awarded a sentence of three months simple imprisonment with a fine of ₹ 5,000/( or 20 days simple imprisonment in lieu thereof). Additionally, Appellant No.1 was directed to pay a fine of ₹ 5,000/, in default of which, Appellant No. 2 would undergo another one month simple imprisonment. 8. The aggrieved appellants are now before this Court. It may be mentioned at the outset that when the SLP came up for hearing on 12.03.2018, their learned Counsel agreed to deposit the entire amount in dispute and in deference thereto, the appellants have on 11.04.2018 deposited a sum of ₹ 11.20 lakhs with the Registry of this Court. CONTENTIONS 9. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, nonetheless, desired to argue the case on merits and contended that there was no legally enforceable liability on the date of issuance of the cheque and that blank stamp papers signed by Appellant No.2 were misused by the respondent to forge the Deed of Undertaking dated 07.11.2000. Placing reliance on Murugesan v. State Through Inspector of Polic ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... perverse finding of fact. State of UP v. Banne, (2009) 4 SCC 271, 27; Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450, 70. 13. On a similar analogy, the powers of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution also do not encompass the reappreciation of entirety of record merely on the premise that the High Court has convicted the appellants for the first time in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. This Court in Ram Jag v. State of UP (1974) 4 SCC 201, 14, Rohtas v. State of Haryana (2019) 10 SCC 554, 12 and Raveen Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh 2020 SCC Online SC 869, 14, evolved its own limitations on the exercise of powers under Article 136 of the Constitution and has reiterated that while entertaining an appeal by way of special leave, there shall not ordinarily be an attempt to re-appreciate the evidence on record unless the decision(s) under challenge are shown to have committed a manifest error of law or procedure or the conclusion reached is ex-facie perverse. 14. Adverting to the case in hand, we find on a plain reading of its judgment that the trial Court completely overlooked the provisions and failed to appreciate the statutory presumption drawn under Se ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of accused. 17. The appellants have banked upon the evidence of DW1 to dispute the existence of any recoverable debt. However, his deposition merely highlights that the respondent had an overextended credit facility with the bank and his failure to update his account led to debt recovery proceedings. Such evidence does not disprove the appellants liability and has a little bearing on the merits of the respondent s complaint. Similarly, the appellants mere bald denial regarding genuineness of the Deed of Undertaking dated 07.11.2000, despite admitting the signatures of Appellant No. 2 thereupon, does not cast any doubt on the genuineness of the said document. 18. Even if we take the arguments raised by the appellants at face value that only a blank cheque and signed blank stamp papers were given to the respondent, yet the statutory presumption cannot be obliterated. It is useful to cite Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar (2019) 4 SCC 197, 36, where this court held that: Even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and handed over by the accused, which is towards some payment, would attract presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in the absence of any cog ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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