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TMI Blog1999 (5) TMI 628X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mands for a colour television and ₹ 50,000 in cash. It is also alleged that at the instigation of in-laws accused Nos. 2 to 6, accused No. 1 (her husband) administered certain medicine with a view to abort her pregnancy. After preliminary investigation, on 18th October, 1989, a charge sheet was filed against A1 to A6 under Sections 498(A), 406, 420, 315 I.P.C. and Sections 3 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The case was committed to the Sessions Court, Nagercoil and was numbered as Sessions Case No. 10 of 1989. Accused Nos. 3 to 6 filed an application under Section 227 of the Criminal Procedure Code for their discharge. That application was allowed by holding that they had not demanded dowry and there is no material to show that medicine for abortion was administered at their instigation. Against that order, complainant filed Criminal R.C. No. 442 of 1990 before the High Court of Madras. By Order dated 9th July, 1993, the High Court allowed the Revision case filed by the complainant and set aside the order of discharge. In pursuance of the said Order, on 13th June, 1996, learned Sessions Judge framed charges against accused Nos. A3 to A6 also. 4. Against that Order dated ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... holding that there were sufficient grounds on record to establish prima facie case against the accused for framing the charges and Additional Sessions Judge exceeded his jurisdiction in law as well as totally overlooked the material facts available on record by discharging the appellants. Despite the aforesaid order and by suppressing the same, appellants filed petition under Section 482 before the High Court for quashing the charges framed against them. In such circumstances, Court has imposed the costs to be paid to the wife of accused No. 1 to prevent abuse of the process of the Court and to secure the ends of justice. 7. The question is whether the Court had such jurisdiction? For deciding it, we would first refer to the relevant sections of the Criminal Procedure Code upon which reliance is placed by the learned Counsel for the appellants which empowers the Court to impose costs. Section 148(3) provides that when any costs have been incurred by any party to a proceeding under Section 145, Section 146 or Section 147, the Magistrate passing a decision may direct by whom such costs shall be paid, whether by such party or by any other party to the proceeding, and whether in wh ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... any other section nor is curtailed by any provisions which empower the court to award costs. No doubt, this jurisdiction is of exceptional nature and is to be exercised in exceptional cases for achieving the purposes stated in the section. Secondly, costs could be either for the purpose of meeting the expenses of the litigation as it can be exemplary to prevent the abuse of the process of the court or to secure ends of justice or giving effect to any order passed under the Code. 9. Learned Counsel for the appellants relied upon the decision of this Court in State of Orissa v. Ram Chander Aggarwal Etc. 1979 CriLJ 33 and submitted that inherent powers of the High Court could not be exercised for awarding costs when Criminal Procedure Code provides for awarding of costs in limited cases. In the aforesaid case, Court was dealing with the contention whether the High Court could review its Judgment and Order despite the specific bar under Section 369 of the Criminal Procedure Code except to correct a clerical error. The Court held that in view of Section 369 Cr. P.C. which prohibits all courts when it has signed its judgment to alter or review the same except to correct a clerical er ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of any matter covered by the specific provisions of the Code; it cannot also be invoked if its exercise would be inconsistent with any of the specific provisions of the Code; if the matter in question is not covered by any specific provisions of the Code, power would come into operation. The Court pertinently observed no legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that can possibly arise and it is an established principle that the Court should have inherent powers, apart from the express provision of law, which are necessary to their existence for the proper discharge of the duties imposed upon them by law. 11. Next, we would refer to the decision in Dr. Raghubir Sharan v. The State of Bihar, 1964 CriLJ 1 wherein this Court considered the power of the High Court to expunge remarks made against a medical practitioner who submitted his opinion on the health of the accused pending the proceedings before magistrate. While considering the scope of inherent powers under Section 561 (A) of the Code, the Court succinctly analysed the jurisdiction which could be exercised by the High Court in the following words: When we speak of inherent powers of the Hi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... urt are deliberately not defined by Section 561-A for good reason. It is obviously not possible to attempt to define the variety of circumstances which will call for their exercise. No doubt, this section confers no new power but it does recognize the general power to do that which is necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. But then, the statute does not say that the inherent power recognized is only such as has been exercised in the past either. What it says is that the High Courts always had such inherent power and that this power has not been taken away. Whenever in a criminal matter a question arises for consideration whether in particular circumstances the High Court has power to make a particular kind of order in the absence of express provision in the Code or other statute the test to be applied would be whether it is necessary to do so to give effect to an order under the Code or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. (Emphasis added) 12. From the aforesaid decisions, it is apparent that if there is an e ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Court or to do justice in a matter and in such circumstances, costs can be exemplary. It is true that this jurisdiction is to be exercised sparingly for the aforesaid purposes in most appropriate cases and is not limitless but is to be exercised judiciously. 13. Now, we would refer to the decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellants to contend that costs cannot be awarded while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Reliance is placed on the decision of Lasu Janu Pawar and Ors. v. Emperor (1948) AIR Bom 169, wherein the Court has held that - where a complaint and the proceedings resulting therefrom are quashed by the High Court as being both frivolous and vexatious, it has no power to award costs against the complainant. For that purpose, Court referred to sections under the Code which specifically confer jurisdiction/power in certain types of cases, to award costs or compensation and held that it negatives the existence of any general power or jurisdiction so to do in other cases unless such general power or jurisdiction is to result from Section 561(A) of the Code. The Court thereafter held that all that section do is to p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , extend the powers which had been granted to it by the statute. 14. In concurring judgment, Courts trotter J, observed that Courts of Equity in England always asserted their possession of such jurisdiction and constantly used it as is pointed out in various judgments that it can award costs. The learned Judge also referred to the decision of House of Lords in Guardians of West ham Union (supra) and observed that in the said case, it was undoubtedly laid down that as and by virtue of its position as the highest Court in the land and not by any devolution of powers from the Courts of Equity it held jurisdiction to deal with the costs. However, the learned Judge thereafter observed: But I think that the main reason why it is not possible for this Court to adopt that line of reasoning and take upon itself the awarding of costs in criminal cases is this: Revision is not an inherent power of this or any other Court: the whole machinery of revision is a creature of statute and has to be found within the four walls of the CrPC and, so far as criminal cases are concerned, I do not see how we can posit an inherent power in ourselves to supplement that purely statutory machinery by ass ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , the Court had inherent jurisdiction to order him to pay the costs of wrongly putting the court in motion, and there was nothing in the Act to show that the Legislature intended the Court not to have such jurisdiction. In case of a fruitless and unjustifiable application made to the Court, the Court should have its ordinary power of saying that such an application should be dismissed with costs. 17. In the case of the Guardians of West Ham Union v. The Church Wardens and Overseas and Guardians of the Poor of the Parish of St. Mathew, Bethnal Green (1896) Lr 477, the House of Lords held as under: The truth is, as it seems to me, that the House of Lords, as the highest Court of appeal, has and necessarily must have an inherent jurisdiction as regards costs. That this inherent jurisdiction is the sole authority for the action of the House of Lords in dealing with the costs of appeals is, I think, shown very plainly by the latest alteration which this House has made in its practice with regard to that matter. For a very long period it was the practice of the House of Lords never to give costs against a party coming to defend and sustain a decree in his favour : Mackersy V. Ram ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... pplication of the maxim here would lead to inconsistency and injustice, and would make Section 14(1) of the Act of 1920 uncertain and capricious in its operation. 20. The aforesaid maxim was referred to by this Court in the case of Asstt. Collector, Central Excise v. National Tobacco Co., 1978 (2) ELT 416 (SC) , the Court in that case considered the question whether there was or was not an implied power to hold an inquiry in the circumstances of the case in view of the provisions of the Section 4 of the Central Excise Act read with Rule 10(A) of the Central Excise Rules and referred to the aforesaid passage the maxim is often a valuable servant, but a dangerous master ...' and held that the rule is subservient to the basic principle that Courts must endeavour to ascertain the legislative intent and purpose, and then adopt a rule of construction which effectuates rather than one that may defeat these. Moreover, the rule of prohibition by necessary implication could be applied only where a specified procedure is laid down for the performance of a duty. In the case of Parbhani Transport Co-op Society Ltd. v. R.T.A. Aurangabad, [1960] 3 SCR 177, this Court observed that maxim ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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