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TMI Blog2011 (11) TMI 850X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d to as 'Defendants') in the court of 1st Additional District Judge, Mandaleshwar (West) Madhya Pradesh for declaration that Defendants do not have right to use the mark "Manikchand" to sell masala, gutka, supari, supari mix or any other goods which is deceptively similar to the mark "Malikchand'; for perpetual injunction restraining the Defendants from dealing in or selling the above articles under the name/brand "Manikchand"; for rendition of the accounts of profits earned by the Defendants by selling the said goods and other consequential reliefs. 4. The case of the Plaintiff is this: Prabhudayal Choubey son of Ramprasad alias Malikchand started the business of supari, ayurvedic pan masala and ayurvedic medicines in the brand name "Malikchand" in the year 1959-60. He continued his business upto April 1986. Prabhudayal Choubey assigned his trade mark of supari and ayurvedic pan masala "Malikchand" to his son Ashok Sharma sometime in the month of April, 1986. Ashok Sharma continued his business of supari, ayurvedic pan masala and ayurvedic medicines etc. upto March 1992. Ashok Sharma assigned the trade mark "Malikchand ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ly framed the following eight issues: 1. Whether the Plaintiff has been running his business of Food, Pan Masala, Supari Mix by the name of Mailkchand from the year 1959-60 2. Whether the Defendants have been running the said business by the name of "Manikchand" trademark identical to trademark of Plaintiff i.e. "Malikchand" If yes then its effect 3. Whether the Defendants have been selling the goods having prepared of inferior quality by the name of Manikchand trademark identical to the trademark of Plaintiff "Malikchand" due to which credit of Plaintiff is being adversely affected If yes, then its effect 4. Whether Defendants have been running their business from the year 1960 having lawfully obtained the trademark "Manikchand" from the competent officer If yes, then its effect 5. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to get the accounts of the said amount which Defendants have earned unlawful profits having sold the pouch by the name of Manikchand trademark identical to the trademark of Plaintiff 6. (a) Whether Plaintiff valued the suit properly 6. (b) Whether the Plaintiff has paid the sufficient court fee 7. Whether the Plaintiff has ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o. 11) under Order XXX Rule 10 of the Code for dismissal of suit as the same was filed in the name of a proprietorship firm. On December 6, 2004, the Defendants moved an application (IA No. 14) for discovery and production of documents under Order XI Rules 12 and 14 of the Code. On January 5, 2005, the Defendants made an application (IA No. 20) under Order VI Rule 17 for the amendment of the written statement. On January 19, 2005, the Plaintiff filed an application (IA No. 21) for summoning of the witnesses and on January 20, 2005, the Plaintiff made an application for permission to file photocopies of the original documents and (I.A. No. 22) for leading secondary evidence. On January 24, 2005, the Plaintiff made an application for production of additional documents. The Defendants responded to these applications. On February 8, 2005, the Plaintiff made application (IA No. 26) under Section 152 of the Code. On February 15, 2005, the Defendants made three applications, namely, I.A. No. 27 for summoning documents under Order XVI Rules 1 and 6 of the Code; IA No. 28 for inspection of documents under Order XI Rule 14 read with Section 151 of the Code and IA No. 29 for production of doc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Officer assumed charge on August 28, 2006. Even thereafter the Defendants kept on making application after application. The trial court heard arguments on those applications and all these applications were dismissed. The trial court pronounced the judgment on March 7, 2007 whereby Plaintiff's suit was decreed as follows: 23. Consequently, finally having allowed the suit, decree has been issued that: (a) It has been declared that Defendants do not have any right to sell Supari, Pan Masala, Mixed Supari, Gutka sell by packing in pouch under the name and trade mark "Manikchand". (b) Defendants are hereby restrained by order of permanent injunction from selling the pouch of supari, pan masala and mix supari under the name Manikchand and should not copy the colour screen and design of "Manikchand" zarda pouch and should not advertise or publish their pouch of supari, pan masala, jarda under the trade mark "Manikchand". (c) Defendants are hereby directed to submit the accounts of the profits earned by them during the period from 15.3.2001 to 15.3.2005 by selling the supari, pan masala, gutka etc. under the "Manikchand" within two months in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ments of the parties. In support of his submission, he relied upon a decision of Madras High Court in the American Baptist Foreign Mission Society, by its Attorney Rev. W.L. Ferguson, Jaladi Ayyappaseti and Anr. and Gurram Seshiah and Anr. v. Amalanadhuni Pattabhiramayya and Ors. 48 Ind. Cas. 859. Mr. Shekhar Naphade also argued that Order XVIII Rule 15 of the Code has no application since the Defendants had appeared before the Trial Judge on March 17, 2005 itself after the matter was heard ex parte and reserved for the judgment thereafter and that entitled the Defendants to make oral arguments. 21. On the other hand, learned Senior Advocates for the Respondent heavily relied upon Order XVIII Rule 15 of the Code and submitted that the successor Judge has to proceed from the stage the predecessor Judge had left the case and, therefore, the successor Judge had jurisdiction to prepare and deliver the judgment on the basis of the record of the case and had no jurisdiction to fix the case again for arguments and set the clock back to the pre-judgment stage. Reliance, in this regard, was placed on a decision of this Court in Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar and Ors. (1964) 5 SCR 946. It wa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he Code is as follows: 15. Power to deal with evidence taken before another Judge.- (1) Where a Judge is prevented by death, transfer or other cause from concluding the trial of a suit, his successor may deal with any evidence or memorandum taken down or made under the foregoing rules as if such evidence or memorandum had been taken down or made by him or under his direction under the said rule and may proceed with the suit from the stage at which his predecessor left it. (2) The provisions of Sub-rule (1) shall, so far as they are applicable, be deemed to apply to evidence taken in a suit transferred under Section 24. 24. Order XX Rule 1 of the Code provides that the court, after the case has been heard, shall pronounce the judgment in an open court either at once or on some future date after fixing a day for that purpose of which due notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders. 25. The hearing of a suit begins on production of evidence by the parties and suit gets culminated on pronouncement of the judgment. Under Order XVIII Rule 1 of the Code, the Plaintiff has a right to begin unless the Defendant admits the facts alleged by the Plaintiff and contends that eithe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... be carved out while giving full play to Rule 15 of Order XVIII of the Code which amply empowers the successor Judge to proceed with the suit from the stage at which his predecessor left it. 26. In Gullapalli Nageswara Rao and Ors. (1959) Supp 1 SCR 319, this Court stated the principle that one who hears must decide the case. The Court said: The second objection is that while the Act and the Rules framed thereunder impose a duty on the State Government to give a personal hearing, the procedure prescribed by the Rules impose a duty on the Secretary to hear and the Chief Minister to decide. This divided responsibility is destructive of the concept of judicial hearing. Such a procedure defeats the object of personal hearing. Personal hearing enables the authority concerned to watch the demeanour of the witnesses and clear-up his doubts during the course of the arguments, and the party appearing to persuade the authority by reasoned argument to accept his point of view. If one person hears and another decides, then personal hearing becomes and empty formality. We therefore hold that the said procedure followed in this case also offends another basic principle of judicial procedure. 2 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he judgment did not actually hear oral arguments although written arguments were before him and, therefore, the judgment was a nullity and the matter needed to be remanded to the trial court. The facts in that case were these: the Sub-Judge who heard the case fixed the 10th of November, for arguments. On that date, an adjournment was sought by the counsel who appeared. The Sub-Judge did not allow adjournment but directed them to file written arguments, if they wished to do so. The written arguments were submitted. While the matter was reserved for the judgment, the Sub-Judge decided to inspect the spot but he could not carry out inspection as he was transferred. The successor Judge took over and he inspected the spot and delivered the judgment. While dealing with the argument, as noticed above, the Division Bench of the Lahore High Court referred to Order XVIII Rule 2 of the Code and noted that the said provision gave an option to the parties to argue their case when their evidence was conducted and it was for them to decide whether they would avail of this privilege. The High Court held that it was for a party to argue the case if they wished to do so and as they did not do so, th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ssor of Muhammad Shah who was not in the same advantageous position as he was, inasmuch as he had not heard the evidence. Even so they certainly had more than one opportunity when they appeared before Mr. Trickland. It was for them to argue the case if they wished to do so. They did not do so and the only construction which can be put upon the events is that they deliberately failed to avail themselves of such opportunity and left the case in his hands knowing that the written arguments were before him. 30. We are in agreement with the view of the Lahore High Court that Order XVIII Rule 2 of the Code gives an option to the parties to argue their case when the evidence is conducted and it is for them to decide whether they will avail themselves of this privilege and if they do not, they do so at their peril. Insofar as the case in hand is concerned, the right of the Defendants to cross-examine Plaintiff was closed on February 28, 2005. The matter was then fixed for March 17, 2005 for the remaining evidence of the Plaintiff. On that day, none appeared for the Defendants although the matter was called out twice. In that situation, the Judge ordered the suit to proceed ex parte agains ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t on merits of the case could not have been denied. Learned senior counsel submitted that proceeding ex parte under Order IX Rule 7 of the Code on March 17, 2005, did not take away the Defendants' right to participate further in the proceedings of the suit. In this regard, senior counsel relied upon a decision of the Bombay High Court in Radhabai Bhaskar Sakharam v. Anant Pandurang Pandit and Anr. AIR (1922) Bom 345 and a decision of Nagpur High Court in Kashirao Panduji v. Ramchandra Balaji AIR 1948 Nag 362. It was submitted that the judgment of the Nagpur High Court in Kashirao Panduji AIR 1948 Nag 362 was binding on the trial court as at the relevant time, Mandaleshwar was within the jurisdiction of the Nagpur High Court. 34. The contention, at the first blush, appears to be attractive but has no substance at all. In the first place, once the hearing of the suit is concluded; and the suit is closed for judgment, Order IX Rule 7 of the Code has no application at all. The very language of Order IX Rule 7 makes this clear. This provision pre-supposes the suit having been adjourned for hearing. The courts, time out of number, have said that adjournment for the purposes of prono ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ases of gross negligence and misconduct that a party should be deprived of the opportunity of having a satisfactory disposal of the case which evidently can only be done when both parties have full opportunity of placing their case and their evidence before the Court. 37. There is no quarrel to the legal position that if a party appears before the case is actually heard and if he has otherwise not disqualified himself from being heard, he has a right to be heard. There can also be no quarrel about the general observations made by the Nagpur High Court with regard to Order IX of the Code but each case has to be seen in its own facts. As regards the instant case, it has to be borne in mind that the High Court in its order dated May 11, 2004 while dismissing the Defendants' appeal directed the trial court to conclude the trial of the suit expeditiously and finally dispose of it, preferably within a period of six months from the date of receipt of the copy of the order which was passed on May 11, 2004. Unfortunately, the suit could not be disposed of by the trial court as directed by the High Court. This Court on February 25, 2005 while dismissing the Defendants' appeal arisin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... CC 800. 39. We have already noted above the proceedings of the trial court on February 28, 2005. The said proceedings do indicate that on that date the Defendants' counsel refused to cross-examine the three witnesses tendered in evidence by Plaintiff and told the trial court that he was not in position to do anything and the court may do whatever it wants to. Faced with this situation, the trial court closed the Defendants' right to cross-examine the Plaintiff's three witnesses. As regards remaining witnesses of the Plaintiff, the trial court kept the matter for March 17, 2005. On March 17, 2005, none appeared for the Defendants and the Plaintiff decided not to examine more witnesses. It was in this situation that the trial court ordered the suit to proceed ex parte. The trial court heard the arguments of the Plaintiff's advocate and reserved the judgment for pronouncement. Is the course adopted by the trial court impermissible in law We think not. In a situation like this where the Plaintiff has closed his evidence and the Defendants failed to appear, Order XVII Rule 2 of the Code was clearly attracted. The said provision is as follows: 2. Procedure if parties fa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n such adjourned date and satisfies the court by showing good cause for his non-appearance on the previous day or days he might have the earlier proceedings recalled - "set the clock back" and have the suit heard in his presence. On the other hand, he might fail in showing good cause. Even in such a case he is not penalised in the sense of being forbidden to take part in the further proceedings of the suit or whatever might still remain of the trial, only he cannot claim to be relegated to the position that he occupied at the commencement of the trial. Thus every contingency which is likely to happen in the trial vis-a-vis the non-appearance of the Defendant at the hearing of a suit has been provided for and O.IX, Rule 7 and O.IX, Rule 13 between them exhaust the whole gamut of situations that might arise during the course of the trial. If, thus, provision has been made for every contingency, it stands to reason that there is no scope for the invocation of the inherent powers of the Court to make an order necessary for the ends of justice. Mr. Pathak, however, strenuously contended that a case of the sort now on hand where a Defendant appeared after the conclusion of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... se are indicated in paragraph 4 of the Report. On May 13, 2002, the case was fixed for the evidence of the Plaintiff. On that day, the Presiding Officer was on leave and the case was adjourned to May 29, 2002 for the Plaintiff's evidence. On May 29, 2002, none appeared for the Defendants and the matter was adjourned to May 31, 2002 for final arguments and for orders after lunch. Finally, the suit was decreed by the trial court. The first appeal from the judgment and decree of the trial court was dismissed. The matter then reached this Court. It is true that it was argued before this Court that the course adopted by the trial court has no sanctity in law and even if the Defendants were not present, the order could have been passed at the most to set the Defendants ex parte and another date should have been fixed. It was also argued before this Court that the reason for non-appearance was due to the wrong noting of the date by the counsel appearing for the Defendants. In paragraph 8 of the decision, this Court stated thus: 8. We find that the High Court has disposed of the first appeal practically by a non-reasoned order. It did not even consider the plea of the Defendants as to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... court on various interlocutory applications. Confronted with this difficulty, learned senior counsel relied upon statement made at page 'I' of the synopsis, paragraph 21, wherein it is stated: The following issues were taken in the ground of appeal and argued but have not even been discussed by the Hon'ble High Court in its impugned judgment. .... (d) That the Petitioner had also assailed the dismissal of various applications filed by the Petitioner during the course of trial in view of the liberty granted by this Hon'ble Court but none of the grounds has been considered or discussed or even averred to in the impugned judgment. .... It is true that in the counter affidavit filed by the Respondent, nothing has been said about the above statement made in the synopsis. However, in our view, in case the contentions raised by the Appellants were not considered by the High Court, the proper course available to the Appellants was to bring to the notice of the High Court this aspect by filing a review application. Such course was never adopted. In view of this, we are not persuaded to permit the Appellants to challenge the orders passed by the trial court on the inter ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... XVIII Rule 4 of the Code provides for the mode of recording the evidence. The said provision reads as follows: 4. Recording of evidence.-(1) In every case, the examination-in-chief of a witness shall be on affidavit and copies thereof shall be supplied to the opposite party by the party who calls him for evidence: Provided that where documents are filed and the parties rely upon the documents, the proof and admissibility of such documents which are filed along with affidavit shall be subject to the orders of the Court. (2) The evidence (cross-examination and reexamination) of the witness in attendance, whose evidence (examination-in-chief) by affidavit has been furnished to the Court shall be taken either by the Court or by the Commissioner appointed by it: Provided that the Court may, while appointing a commission under this sub-rule, consider taking into account such relevant factors as it thinks fit: (3) The Court or the Commissioner, as the case may be, shall record evidence either in writing or mechanically in the presence of the Judge or of the Commissioner, as the case may be, and where such evidence is recorded by the Commissioner he shall return such evidence together ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d along with the affidavit shall be subject to the order of the court. In a case in which appeal is allowed, Rule 5 of Order XVIII provides that the evidence of each witness shall be taken down in writing by or in the presence and under the personal direction and superintendence of the Judge or from the dictation of the Judge directly on a typewriter or recorded mechanically in the presence of the Judge if the Judge so directs for reasons to be recorded in writing. 52. The above provisions, namely, Order XVIII Rule 4 and Order XVIII Rule 5 of the Code came up for consideration before this Court in the case of Ameer Trading Corpn. Ltd. (2004) 1 SCC 702. Before we refer to this judgment, it is appropriate that the judgment of the Bombay High Court in F.D.C. Limited AIR 2003 Bom 371 is noted. The Single Judge of that Court in F.D.C. Limited AIR 2003 Bom 371 held as under: 7. It is to be noted that the legislature being fully aware about the provision of law contained in Rule 5 which was already there even prior to the amendment to Rule 4, has amended the Rule 4 with effect from 1.7.2002 specifically providing thereunder that the examination in chief "in every case" shall b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... be recorded by following the procedure prescribed under Rule 5. In non appealable cases however, the affidavit in relation to examination in chief of a witness can be taken on record as forming part of the evidence by recording memorandum of production of such affidavit by taking resort to Rule 13 of Order XVIII. The cross-examination of such deponent in case of appealable cases, will have to be recorded by complying the provisions of Rule 5, whereas in case of non appealable cases the court would be empowered to exercise its power under Rule 13. 9 In fact Rule 4, either unamended or amended makes no difference between appealable or non appealable cases in the matter of method of recording of evidence. Such differentiation is to be found in Rule 5 and 13. The Rule 4, prior to the amendment, provided that when witness would appear before the court, his testimony would require to be recorded in the presence of and under the personal direction of the Judge which was required to be done in appealable cases as well as in non appealable cases. Only method of recording testimony in appealable cases that was to be in terms of Rule 5 whereas in other cases in terms of Rule 13. Now, in term ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ase" and says that the examination-in-chief of a witness shall be on affidavit and copies thereof shall be supplied to the opposite party by the party who calls him for evidence. 55. Now, we consider the decision of this Court in Ameer Trading Corpn. Ltd. (2004) 1 SCC 702. The interpretation of Order XVIII Rule 4 and Rule 5 of the Code fell for consideration in that case. In paragraph 15 of the Report, this Court stated, 'the examination of a witness would include evidence-in-chief, cross-examination or re-examination. Rule 4 of Order XVIII speaks of examination-in-chief. ....Such examination-in-chief of a witness in every case shall be on affidavit". The Court then stated in paragraph 17 that Rule 4 of Order XVIII, as amended with effect from July 1, 2002 specifically provides that the examination-in-chief in every case shall be on affidavit. It was noticed by this Court that Rule 5 of Order XVIII has been incorporated prior to the amendment in Rule 4. Noticing the difference between Rule 4 and Rule 5 of Order XVIII, the Court said that Rule 4 of Order XVIII did not make any distinction between appealable and non-appealable cases so far as mode of recording evidence ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 2003 Bom 371 and noticed the conflict in the two decisions. When this Court stated in paragraph 32, "we agree with the view of the Bombay High Court", the Court agreed with the view of the Bombay High Court that irrespective of whether the case is appealable or non-appealable the examination-in-chief has to be permitted in the form of affidavit. Paragraph 32 of the Report cannot be read to mean that paragraphs 7 and 8 of the decision of the Bombay High Court in F.D.C. Limited AIR 2003 Bom 371 were approved by this Court in entirety. This is for more than one reason. In the first place, this Court after quoting the view of Rajasthan High Court in the case of Laxman Das AIR 2003 Raj 74 in paragraph 30 and the view of Bombay High Court in the case of F.D.C. Limited AIR 2003 Bom 371 in paragraph 31, said, "we agree with the view of the Bombay High Court". This expression, thus, means that this Court has preferred the view of Bombay High Court concerning the interpretation of Rule 4 of Order XVIII of the Code over the view of the Rajasthan High Court. Second and equally important, after quoting paragraphs 7 and 8 of the decision of the Bombay High Court in F.D.C. Li ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ut despite the opportunity given to the Defendants, they chose not to cross-examine them and thereby the trial court closed the Defendants' right to cross-examine these witnesses. In view of this, it cannot be said that any prejudice has been caused to the Defendants if these three witnesses did not enter the witness box. 59. Learned senior counsel for the Appellants also submitted that the suit was not maintainable under Order XXX Rule 10 of the Code having been filed in the name of the proprietorship firm- M/s. M.S.S. Food Products. Relying upon a decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Bhagvan Manaji Marwadi and Ors. v. Hiraji Premaji Marwadi AIR 1932 Bom 516, it was urged that a proprietorship firm cannot sue in its name. 60. Rule 10 of Order XXX of the Code reads as follows: 10. Suit against person carrying on business in name other than his own.-Any person carrying on business in a name or style other than his own name, or a Hindu undivided family carrying on business under any name, may be sued in such name or style as if it were a firm name, and, in so far as the nature of such case permits, all rules under this Order shall apply accordingly. 61. The above ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ce pan masala/gutka are exigible to excise duty) having not been filed by the Plaintiff which was the best piece of evidence, the adverse inference ought to have been drawn against the Plaintiff that Plaintiff never manufactured pan masala/gutka under the brand "Malikchand" and the factum of manufacturing "Malikchand" pan masala and gutka having not been proved, there was no question of restraining the Defendants from using their brand "Manikchand" in the passing off action. In support of his contention that the party is bound to produce best evidence in his possession to prove his case, learned senior counsel placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v. Mahomed Haji Latif and Ors. AIR 1968 SC 1413 It was also argued that the Defendants are well-known registered brand having national as well as international presence for more than two decades; the turnover of the Defendants is more than rupees three hundred crores per annum and they have been incurring huge expenditure on sales, promotion and advertisement and that on account of continuous use of trade "Manikchand" from the year 1961 on a commercial scale, their ma ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... facts and circumstances of the case, on transfer of the predecessor Judge who heard the arguments, it was not incumbent upon the successor Judge to hear the arguments of the Defendants. The proceedings reveal that ultimately the matter was kept for pronouncement of judgment on March 7, 2007. On that day, the court disposed of various applications made by the Defendants and pronounced the judgment. The order sheet of March 7, 2007 does record that the Plaintiff's advocate expressed that he did not want to address any arguments. This statement is in the context of not advancing further arguments as on behalf of the Plaintiff, the arguments had already been advanced; the judgment was reserved and kept for pronouncement. The contention of the learned senior counsel is noted to be rejected. 67. Lastly, learned senior counsel relying on "doctrine of proportionality" submitted that even if it is held that the Defendants were in default in reaching the court late on March 17, 2005 and failed to cross-examine the Plaintiff's witnesses, the court could have at best imposed cost on the Defendants and given them an opportunity to lead evidence and contest the suit on merits ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... de. A party to the suit is not at liberty to proceed with the trial at its leisure and pleasure and has no right to determine when the evidence would be let in by it or the matter should be heard. The parties to a suit - whether Plaintiff or Defendant - must cooperate with the court in ensuring the effective work on the date of hearing for which the matter has been fixed. If they don't, they do so at their own peril.... 70. The doctrine of proportionality has been expanded in recent times and applied to the areas other than administrative law. However, in our view, its applicability to the adjudicatory process for determination of 'civil disputes' governed by the procedure prescribed in the Code is not at all necessary. The Code is comprehensive and exhaustive in respect of the matters provided therein. The parties must abide by the procedure prescribed in the Code and if they fail to do so, they have to suffer the consequences. As a matter of fact, the procedure provided in the Code for trial of the suits is extremely rational, reasonable and elaborate. Fair procedure is its hallmark. The courts of civil judicature also have to adhere to the procedure prescribed in th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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