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TMI Blog1997 (2) TMI 593X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eir rank and title in the Court below. Nandlal D. Chhabria and three others-plaintiffs jointly filed a suit in the trial Court against the National Sports Club of India and its office bearers. 3. The plaintiffs' case in brief is as follows :- The plaintiffs are the life members of the first defendant Club National Sports Club of India since 1950. The Club is registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. Each of the plaintiffs have paid the required subscription of ₹ 1000/- for becoming Life Member of the first defendant Club as per the rules and regulations of the Club. The plaintiff are not liable to pay any other subscription being Life Members. Of course the plaintiffs are liable to pay charges for making use of facilities and amenities provided by the Club. It is alleged that in 1986, the Club issued a circular stating that the members are required to pay annual fee of Sports Development Fee of ₹ 60/- per year with effect from 1-1-1986 on the basis of resolution of the Executive Committee. Then the Club issued bills including this annual subscription of ₹ 60/- as sports development fee. The plaintiffs by writing a letter dated 18-6-1986 o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to restrain the defendants from terminating or taking any steps to terminate the Memberships of the plaintiffs, to restrain the defendants from denying the facilities and amenities provided by the Club to the plaintiffs and their family members and for cost. 4. The defendants filed a written statement contesting the suit on various grounds. It is stated that the suit is misconceived and not maintainable. All the members of the Club including the Life Members are bound to pay the sports development fee, which has been levied to expand the activities of the Club. It is denied that the Club has no powers to levy such fee. The Club has ample powers to levy such fee for developing the activities. The plaintiffs have an alternative remedy of filing an appeal against the Executive Committee and having not exhausted that remedy they cannot approach a Civil Court. The plaintiffs are defaulters since 1986. The plaintiffs have been given sufficient and reasonable time to make payments. Then ultimately, the Club has decided to take action against the defaulting members and hence, the letter dated 31-5-1995 was issued to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs had been given time to make payment ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hearing both the sides the learned trial Judge came to the conclusion that the first defendant Club has no powers to levy any amount in the nature of subscription on Life Members. It was further held that the levy of Sports Development Fee is in the nature of annual subscription and hence, the Life Members are not liable to pay the same. It rejected the appellants' contention that the suit is not maintainable under Order 1, Rule 8 C.P.C. As far as the prayer of declaratory relief is concerned, it held that the claim is barred by limitation. However, the learned trial Court held that there is no bar of limitation so far as the relief of injunction is concerned. Accordingly, the suit came to be decreed granting the relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from terminating the membership of the plaintiffs or interfering with their rights as Life Members of the Club. The suit was dismissed so far as declaratory relief was concerned. 7. Being aggrieved by the grant of decree for permanent injunction, the defendants have come up in appeal in First Appeal No. 1618/96. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the suit so far as the relief of declaratory is concerned, the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ntative capacity, but subsequently that prayer is given up and now the plaintiffs have claimed relief only for themselves. It may be the relief of declaration if granted may apply to other life members. But we are not concerned about it. The question is whether one single individual can file a suit to protect his right though he may be exposing a public cause. For example, if a public passage is affected, the person who has a right to pass through that passage may individually file a suit for declaration or injunction, regarding his right to use that passage. He is not bound to file a suit in a representative capacity to protect the interest of entire community. Order 1, Rule 8 C.P.C. nowhere says that one individual cannot file a suit in respect of a right which may happen to be a public right or a right affecting many persons. Order 1 Rule 8 C.P.C. simply says that one person may sue or defend on behalf of all in same interest, as rightly pointed by the learned trial Court, this is only an enabling right given to one individual that if he wants he can file a suit in a representative capacity with the leave of the Court. It does not say that no suit shall be maintainable in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ase where the previous suit had been filed by some persons regarding certain reliefs. In a subsequent suit, the same issue came up for consideration. The question was whether the decision in the previous suit is res-judicata in the subsequent suit. The Supreme Court pointed out that in the earlier suit, no permission had been taken under Order 1, Rule 8 C.P.C. and therefore it was not a representative suit in the eye of law and hence, the earlier decision does not operate as res-judicata in the subsequent suit. Instead of supporting arguments canvassed by Mr. Bulchandani, it supports my view that filing a representative suit under Order 1, Rule 8 C.P.C. is not compulsory and person can file suit individually. The Supreme Court did not say that the previous suit was not maintainable, but it only observed that the judgment in that suit will not be binding on the subsequent suit, since the earlier suit was not under Order 1, Rule 8 C.P.C. For example, after the disposal of this suit, some other life members may file another suit against the Club, then the question will be whether the decision in this suit will be res-judicata in the subsequent suit. Then, the above judgment of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y be fixed by the Executive Committee from time to time shall be eligible to become a Life Member subject to the Rules and Bye-Laws in force governing the admission of members. A Life Member shall be entitled to all rights of tending and voting at General Body meetings. A Life Member shall not be liable to pay any annual or local subscription except that those Life Members enrolled after 1-10-1997 will be liable to pay in terms of the resolution passed in the meeting of the Executive Committee held on 10-4-1997 as yearly subscription as may be fixed by the Executive Committee from time to time. A perusal of the above Rule shows that a Life Member who was enrolled prior to 1-10-1997 is not liable to pay any annual or local subscription. But even Life Members enrolled after 1-10-1997 are liable to pay whatever subscription is levied by the Executive Committee from time to time. When there is a blanket prohibition for enhancing the subscription for the Life Member under the rule enrolled prior to 1-10-1997, the regional committee cannot get over this prohibition by merely calling the subscription levied as developmental fee. By merely changing the label, the Club cannot do indi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... does not pay. Therefore, the charges and fees for services and amenities provided in Rule 27 always refer to services and amenities provided by the Club and consequently utilised by the member and not otherwise. In the present case, the resolution in question is vague and bald and does not mention any particular service or amenity provided for which additional amount of ₹ 60/- per year is levied. Further everybody who does not use the services cannot be made liable to make such payment under Rule 27. 13. In this connection I may refer to the law Lexicon, Vol. No. 1 1989 Edition, by T.P. Mukherjee, where referring to number of decisions at page 663 it is mentioned that fee is generally defined to be a charge for a special service rendered to individual. It is a sort of return or consideration for services rendered. Now let us come to Rule 22 on which the learned Counsel for the Club laid much emphasis. Rule 22 reads as follows:- Notwithstanding anything contained in Rules 6 and 7 Executive Committee at any time and from time to time may determine, increase, reduce, alter, modify or vary the fees and subscriptions for membership. The Executive Committee shall have po ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , vary or modify the fees and subscription. As rightly pointed out by the trial Court and which was pressed into service by the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs, this power given to the Executive Committee is to change the fees and subscription for membership , which is necessarily meant for becoming member of the Club, which necessarily applies to the new members, who want to joint the Club. One of the fundamental rule of Interpretation of Statutes is that the Court must try to harmonise all the provisions. One provision in the statute cannot be interpreted in such a way to take away the effect of another provision. If we apply the rule of harmonious construction, then, Rules 6 and 22 must be held to operate in different fields. The provision in Rule 6 applies to old life members and the provisions in Rule 22 will apply to new members. Otherwise, the entire Rule 6 will have to be deleted and will have to be ignored and Rule 22 must alone hold the field. That cannot be the intention of the Authors of the Rules and Regulations. They wanted to provide certain safety to the old members and they also wanted to give powers to the Executive Committee to increase the rates from time ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... airman and members of the managing committee. They are doing no doubt great service. In that way the plaintiffs should not have grudged to pay ₹ 60/- per year which is a nominal amount. The plaintiffs should not have dragged such a premier institution to Court for facing this litigation. However, when the parties come to Court, the Court will have to decide the case, on the basis of Rules Regulations. If once, it is shown that the Club cannot increase subscription of Life Members, who were enrolled prior to 1-10-1977, the Court is helpless and will have to declare that the said levy by the Club is untenable in law, however, laudable it may be. In fact, the Club has also demanded some contribution by the members for Earthquake victims of Latur and Marathon race for slum children at Delhi. The plaintiffs have even challenged those two payments. Whatever legal rights the plaintiffs may agitate, they should not have made an issue to pay ₹ 100/- for earthquake victims at Latur. The learned Counsel for the Club fairly conceded in the trial Court that the Club will not terminate the membership of the plaintiff for non payment of these two voluntary contributions. (Vide pa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ument of Mr. Bulchandani, the learned Counsel for the Club, is no doubt attractive and in the first flush of thought I found it to be acceptable. But on deeper scrutiny, I find that the argument cannot be accepted. Whenever, some right is denied or asserted, a party need not rush to the Court and file a suit, a party has to rush to Court only when his rights are interfered or when there is unequivocal and effective threat to one's right. Here though the Club issued a circular in 1986 nothing was done by the Club to take steps to levy the demand till 1995 or 1996. On its own showing the Club issued a circular in 1986 and there was protest reply by the plaintiffs and the Club kept quiet without taking any further action for demanding the amount or taking any action by treating the plaintiffs as defaulters. Then the Club issued one more reminder in 1989, and again the plaintiffs sent a reply denying the liability to pay such an illegal demand and again the matter rested there and the Club took no action to treat the plaintiffs as defaulters or deprive them of their rights as Members. If a mere letter is sent and no follow up action is taken, there was no necessity for the plaintif ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e first plaintiff has been orally informed that the identity card will not be issued to his daughter unless he clears and pays the arrears of sports development fee. It is therefore obvious that the defendant are acting in furtherance to their illegal resolutions. The plaintiffs say and submit that after the defendant will take step, to terminate the first plaintiff and/or the plaintiffs membership of the Club thereby causing grave and irreparable harm, loss and injury to plaintiffs reputation. The plaintiffs, therefore submit that it is in the interest of justice the defendants be restrained by permanent order and injunction of this Hon'ble Court from taking any steps to declare the plaintiffs as defaulters or to terminate their membership of the Club on the ground of non payment of contribution to the sports development fund, the funds for the victim of Later earthquake or the fund for conducting of Marathon race for slum dwellers children. The plaintiffs say and submit that the balance of convenience is in their favour and that grave and irreparable harm, loss injury will be caused to them if the reliefs prayed for herein, are not granted. From the perusal of the above a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... learned trial Judge framed two issues, one regarding limitation as issue No. 3-A, and one regarding plea under Order 1, Rule 8 C.P.C. as issue No. 3B. Then again further arguments were heard and judgment was passed. Nothing is recorded in the judgment of the trial Court that after framing these two additional issues, the parties were called upon to lead oral evidence. Strictly speaking, the learned trial Court could not have framed any issue regarding limitation since no such plea was in the Written Statement. The learned trial Court should have rejected that application filed under Order 14, Rule 5 of C.P.C. stating that no issue regarding limitation could be framed when no such plea is taken in the Written Statement regarding limitation. It is too late in the day for the Club to contend before this Court that plaintiffs have not adduced any evidence regarding limitation. Even otherwise, since, many of the allegations in para 11 of the plaint are not denied in the Written Statement, it must be taken that the allegations are deemed to have been admitted. Hence, we can safely hold that there is sufficient allegation in the plaint, which is not controverted in the Written Statement ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nkat Reddy v. Kamat Reddy Narayan Reddy s/o Kishta Reddy and another. The same principle of the above Privy Council decision was followed in this case. It was a suit filed by a Patel regarding his office and Watan lands. Though there was an order of Collector against him, it was held that the suit was within time under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, when it was filed within 6 years from the date when the plaintiff was deprived of emoluments of his office. In [1960]2SCR253 Mst. Rukhmabai v. Lala Laxminarayan and others, the above Privy Council decision was quoted with approval. Though there was successive denials of right, it was pointed out that the right to sue accrues when the defendant has clearly and unequivocally threatened to infringe the right asserted in the suit. The following observations are very relevant and applicable to the facts of the present case. Every threat by a party to such a right, however, ineffective and innocuous it may be, cannot be considered to be a clear and unequivocal threat so as to compel him file a suit. Whether a particular threat gives rise to a compulsory cause of action depends upon the question whether that threat effectively invad ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed in possession and therefore he can come to Court as and when there was actual interference with his possession. Similarly, even in the present case the Club issued the circulars of 1986 and 1989 demanding levy of sports development fee and consequences for non-payment, still no action was taken by the Club admittedly for 10 years from 1986 to 1996 and the plaintiff's rights as members were not interfered with, there was no necessity for the plaintiff to rush to the Court for filing the suit. The test is as to when exactly the plaintiffs rights to continue as members or their enjoyment of the privilege of rights as members was interfered with. I have already pointed out that the rejoinder letter of the Chairman dated 12-6-1995 and the subsequent denial of duplicate identity card to the first plaintiff's daughter and the oral assertion by the management to the first plaintiff that identity card will not be issued unless he pays the arrears, make out a cause of action for filing a suit. Even if 12-6-1995 is taken as first cause of action for filing the suit, under Article 58 of the Limitation Act, the suit is within time being filed within 3 years from 12-6-1995. I am no ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the coffee board, but never paid money to the fertilizer dealer as agreed between the parties. Subsequently, the Fertilizer dealer filed a suit against the plaintiff and plaintiff was forced to make payment directly to the dealer. Then plaintiff filed a suit against the defendant for getting that amount which he paid to the fertilizer dealer. The defendant raised a plea of limitation and his plea was that the plaintiff knew the defendant had not paid money to the Fertilizer dealer, but the plaintiff has not taken any action against the defendant by filing a suit within period of limitation, and therefore the suit was barred by limitation. The High Court found that that the plaintiff was aware that the defendant had not paid money to the Fertilizer dealer as per the agreement, but the plaintiff need not rush to the Court. It is only when the plaintiff was compelled to make payment to the fertilizer dealer, the plaintiff got the cause of action to file the suit. The High Court followed with approval an earlier decision of the Madras High Court in A.I.R. 1938 Mad 193, which I have referred earlier. In particular the learned Judge quoted the observations of the Madras decision as foll ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 1986 and 1989. It is only in 1995 they issued one more circular which was replied by the plaintiff and for which the Chairman sent a reply asserting that he would be constrained to take action if amount is not paid within 30 days. This, the plaintiffs thought was an effective threat to their rights. Then, I found that the first plaintiff's daughter was denied the identity card and this is an immediate cause of action for the plaintiffs to rush to the Court. Hence, in my view, the cause of action arose to the plaintiffs either in 1996 or latest by 1995 and not in 1986 or 1989 as contended on behalf of the Club. Even though the letters or circulars were issued in 1986 or 1989, they did not affect the plaintiff's right as members of the Club. As long as the plaintiff's can continue as members, without any infringement of their rights, they could ignore the 1986 letter or 1989 letter. They could come to Court only as and when, their right as member was interfered with or there was an effective threat to their rights. I therefore, hold that both for the purpose of declaration and for injunction, the suit is within time. The trial Court erred in holding that the suit for dec ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a moot point and the discussion is purely academic, since, I have come to the conclusion that the cause of action for the plaintiffs arose in 1995 or 1996 and suit was filed in 1996 is well within time and therefore, the theory of continuing wrong for the purpose of limitation need not be examined. For the above reasons, points Nos. 3 and 4 are answered in the negative. 26. In view of my findings on points Nos. 1 to 4, the plaintiff's appeal has to succeed and the Club's appeal has to fail. I have already pointed out the conducts of plaintiffs in challenging even the payment of ₹ 100/- for the earthquake victims, the plaintiffs should not have made it a legal right when we are concerned with the human problems. Even if the Club has no right to demand such amount, the plaintiffs should have been graceful in paying that amount instead of making an issue in a Court of law. As already stated the National Sports Club is a prestigious Institution of India and doing lot of good work in the field of sports. There is nothing to doubt the bona fides of the management in levying the sports development fee. They might have levied that fee with a larger interest to collect ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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