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TMI Blog2022 (2) TMI 403X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dgment of this Court in Bhikamchand Jain. The point that requires to be considered is whether this Court has taken a different view in Sanjay Dutt [ 1994 (9) TMI 351 - SUPREME COURT ], Madar Sheikh (supra) and M. Ravindran [ 2020 (10) TMI 1105 - SUPREME COURT ]. In Sanjay Dutt, this Court held that the indefeasible right accruing to the accused is enforceable only prior to the filing of challan and it does not survive or remain enforceable, on the challan being filed. It was made clear that once the challan has been filed, the question of grant of bail has to be considered and decided only with reference to the merits of the case under the provisions relating to grant of bail to an accused after the filing of the challan - In Madar Sheikh [ 1996 (1) TMI 429 - SUPREME COURT ], which was relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and the Intervenor, the appellants therein were taken into custody on 16.01.1993. The charge-sheet was submitted on 30.08.1993. Though the appellants were entitled to be released in view of the charge-sheet not being filed within the statutory period prescribed under Section 20(4)(b) of the Terrorist and Disrupti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of Section 43 of the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008. Inspectors were appointed by the Director, SFIO to carry out the investigation. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were arrested pursuant to the approval granted by the Director, SFIO on 10.12.2018. On 20.12.2018, the High Court of Delhi directed interim release of Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in Writ Petition (Criminal) Nos. 3842 of 2018 and 3843 of 2018. The order of the High Court was set aside by this Court on 27.03.2019, following which Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 surrendered on 01.04.2019. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were remanded to 14 days judicial custody on 05.04.2019. On account of continuation of the investigation, the Special Court, Gurugram extended the judicial custody of Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to 16.05.2019. In the meanwhile, Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 filed regular bail applications for being released on bail before the High Court on 03.05.2019. The applications were directed to be listed on 21.05.2019 by the High Court. The High Court further directed the trial court to consider any application that may be filed by Respondent Nos.1 and 2 under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ( CrPC ), in the meanwhile. On 16 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e. He submitted that the judgment of the High Court is contrary to the law laid down by this Court in Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain v. State of Maharashtra Anr. (2013) 3 SCC 77. 5. It was argued on behalf of Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 that the High Court was justified in granting statutory bail to them as, admittedly, cognizance was not taken before the expiry of the 60-day period. Placing reliance on a judgment of this Court in Sanjay Dutt v. State (1994) 5 SCC 410, Mr. Chaudhri argued that the maximum period of detention that the accused can be remanded to under Section 167, CrPC is 60 days, beyond which detention can be extended only if the accused is unable to furnish bail. He submitted that this Court in Mohamed Iqbal Madar Sheikh Ors. v. State of Maharashtra (1996) 1 SCC 722 explained the judgment in Sanjay Dutt (supra) and held that the right under Section 167(2), CrPC cannot be exercised after the charge-sheet has been submitted and cognizance has been taken. It was further argued that an accused has a right to seek statutory bail under the proviso to Section 167(2) even after the chargesheet is filed, till the court takes cognizance. 6. An application for interventi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... th Sections 417, 418, 420, 406, 463, 467, 468, 471, 474 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ( IPC ). The undisputed facts are that the complaint under Section 439(2) of the Companies Act, 2013 was filed on 18.05.2019, which was before the expiry of the 60-day period from the date of the remand. The applications filed for statutory bail were dismissed by the Special Court on 22.05.2019, on the ground that the charge-sheet was filed before the expiry of 60 days. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 did not argue before the Special Court that they were entitled for statutory bail, even after filing of the charge-sheet before the expiry of the 60-day period, as cognizance had not been taken. The trial court disposed of the applications for statutory bail, on being so directed by an order dated 10.05.2019 passed by the High Court in regular bail applications filed by Respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The said regular bail applications were taken up for hearing by the High Court and by the impugned order, bail was granted to Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 on the ground that cognizance had not been taken by the court before the expiry of 60 days. However, while doing so, the High Court failed to consider the order dated 2 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... (c) no Magistrate of the second class, not specially empowered in this behalf by the High Court, shall authorise detention in the custody of the police. Explanation I.-For the avoidance of doubts, it is hereby declared that, notwithstanding the expiry of the period specified in paragraph (a), the accused shall be detained in custody so long as he does not furnish bail. Explanation II.- If any question arises whether an accused person was produced before the Magistrate as required under clause (b), the production of the accused person may be proved by his signature on the order authorising detention or by the order certified by the Magistrate as to production of the accused person through the medium of electronic video linkage, as the case may be. 9. The issue is squarely covered by a judgment of this Court in Bhikamchand Jain (supra), as contended by the Appellant. It is necessary to closely examine the judgment passed in Bhikamchand Jain (supra). The petitioner in the said case was arrested on 11.03.2012 on the allegation of misappropriation of amounts meant for development of slums in Jalgaon City. The petitioner therein was accused of committing offences ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ccused for purposes of remand during the trial in terms of Section 309, CrPC. This Court clarified that the two stages are different, with one following the other so as to maintain continuity of the custody of the accused with a court. 10. It is clear from the judgment of this Court in Bhikamchand Jain (supra) that filing of a charge-sheet is sufficient compliance with the provisions of Section 167, CrPC and that an accused cannot demand release on default bail under Section 167(2) on the ground that cognizance has not been taken before the expiry of 60 days. The accused continues to be in the custody of the Magistrate till such time cognizance is taken by the court trying the offence, which assumes custody of the accused for the purpose of remand after cognizance is taken. The conclusion of the High Court that the accused cannot be remanded beyond the period of 60 days under Section 167 and that further remand could only be at the post-cognizance stage, is not correct in view of the judgment of this Court in Bhikamchand Jain (supra). 11. The point that requires to be considered is whether this Court has taken a different view in Sanjay Dutt (supra), Madar Sheikh (supra) and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... arrested and remanded to judicial custody on 04.08.2018 for offences punishable under the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. On 01.02.2019, the appellant therein filed an application for bail under Section 167(2) on the ground that investigation was not complete and charge-sheet had not been filed within the statutory period. The trial court granted bail under Section 167(2), which was set aside by the High Court of Madras by judgment dated 21.11.2019. Challenging the said judgment of the High Court, the appellant approached this Court. The crucial fact in the said case is that the appellant therein filed an application on 01.02.2019 at 10.30 a.m. before the trial court and on the same day at 4.25 p.m., an additional complaint was filed against the appellant, on the basis of which dismissal of the bail application was sought. This Court restored the order of the trial court while setting aside the judgment of the High Court, by holding that the accused is deemed to have availed of or enforced his right to be released on default bail, once application for bail has been filed under Section 167(2) on expiry of the stipulated time period. Taking into account the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion 167. Therefore, there is no requirement for referring this case to a larger bench. 15. A close scrutiny of the judgments in Sanjay Dutt (supra), Madar Sheikh (supra) and M. Ravindran (supra) would show that there is nothing contrary to what has been decided in Bhikamchand Jain (supra). In all the above judgments which are relied upon by either side, this Court had categorically laid down that the indefeasible right of an accused to seek statutory bail under Section 167(2), CrPC arises only if the charge-sheet has not been filed before the expiry of the statutory period. Reference to cognizance in Madar Sheikh (supra) is in view of the fact situation where the application was filed after the charge-sheet was submitted and cognizance had been taken by the trial court. Such reference cannot be construed as this Court introducing an additional requirement of cognizance having to be taken within the period prescribed under proviso (a) to Section 167(2), CrPC, failing which the accused would be entitled to default bail, even after filing of the charge-sheet within the statutory period. It is not necessary to repeat that in both Madar Sheikh (supra) and M. Ravindran (supra), this C ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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