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TMI Blog1919 (2) TMI 2X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... egin to run, before the minor's acquisition of the cause of action. Appellant's contention is that he is entitled to the full extension of time, which the minor would have had, if the cause of action had remained his property or, in the alternative, to three years from the date, when his own ownership began. 2. This alternative contention can be dealt with shortly. It cannot be justified by any provision of the Limitation Act; for Section 6(3) is, as will be shown, the only one extending time for a person other than the one disabled and it is inapplicable to appellant, a transferee during the latter's lifetime. In fact, the argument in this form must rest solely on the tentative reasoning of Wilson, J., in Rudra Kant Surma Si ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... onstruction proposed by appellant, that, one person being referred to as disabled, two, that person or in the alternative his transferee, are referred to later in the clause as eligible for indulgence; and in my opinion the possibility of such construction is further negatived by the specification in Clause (3) of one person, for whose benefit the right to indulgence inheres in a qualified form, the legal representative, to the exclusion of the transferees from the disabled person during his lifetime. Next, Section 8 can, it is argued, be regarded as extending time in favour not only of the minor or idiot concerned, but also of the person indirectly disabled from suing, the transferee. But this interpretation of the reference to the person ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tention has been supported here, as it commended itself to Wilson, J., and might perhaps have commended itself in Subramanya Pandya Chokka Talavar v. Siva Subramanya Pillai 17 M.P 316 : 4 M.L.J. 152 : 6 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 219, of a decision had been necessary, on grounds of Convenience or in order to avoid anomaly. It is a sufficient answer that inconvenience and anomaly are almost inevitable, where the general law is overridden by personal privilege and natural expectations founded on the former are disappointed. It may be added that, where, as in England, the law is as appellant contends that it should be construed here, anomaly and inconvenience are nonetheless to be apprehended. Darby and Bosanquet, Statutes of Limitation, 2nd Edition, pa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to have been suggested that the prohibitory order issued during the attachment would come within the meaning of Section 15. That dictum cannot be regarded as good law in the face of Beti Maharani v. Collector of Etawah 17 A.M 198 : 22 I.A. 31 : 6 Sar. P.C.J. 551 : 8 Ind. Dec.(N.S.) 452. Therefore the first contention fails. 10. As regards the applicability of Section 14, it is enough to say that the attachment proceedings are not based on the same cause of action as the suit to recover money on the book debt. Another contention was that there was an acknowledgment which saved the limitation. Exhibit B, which is relied on as containing the acknowledgment, does not acknowledge a subsisting liability. The deponent distinctly says. I have d ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ber of cases. In Bombay in the earlier cases ending with Mahadev v. Babi 26 B.P 730 : 4 Bom. L.R. 513, the same view was taken. But in Arjun Ramji v. Ramabai 37 Ind. Cas. 221 : 40 B.P 564 : 18 Bom. L.R. 579 the learned Chief Justice and Justice Heaton were apparently, inclined to reconsider the question. In the case before them it was the personal representative, not an assignee, that brought the suit. There is no direct decision in Madras. In Subramanya Pandya Chokra Talavar v. Siva Subramanya Pillai 17 A.P 198 : 22 I.A. 31 : 6 Sar. P.C.J. 551 : 8 Ind. Dec.(N.S.) 452 doubt seems to have been thrown upon Rudra Kant Surma Sircar v. Nobo Kishore Surma Biswas 9 C.P 663 : 12 C.L.R. 269 : 4 Ind. Dec.(N.S.) 1091. But there is co decision of the q ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Clause (3) says that, where the disability continues up to the death of such a person, his legal representative may institute the suit. The special provision in favour of legal representatives, and the provision that such a representative can institute the suit after the death of the parson who was under disability, make it clear that an assignee was not within the contemplation of the Legislature and that suits by such assignees during the lifetime of the disabled person should not have the benefit of the extended period. Clause (4) makes a similar provision in favour of the legal representative when there have been successive disabilities. It seems to me that on the principle expressio unius personae vel rei, est exclusio alterius, Secti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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