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TMI Blog2020 (7) TMI 832X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 3 and 4 of MPID Act. The FIR was lodged on 26th February, 2020. (b) The applicant was produced before the Learned District and Additional Judge, Thane on the date of arrest itself i.e. 26th February, 2020. The learned Judge vide Order dated 26th February, 2020 remanded applicant to police custody till 4th March, 2020. (c) The applicant was thereafter remanded to custody from time to time. On 26th May, 2020 at about 10.35 a.m. the applicant filed an application for bail before the aforesaid Court under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. At the time when the said application was preferred the charge-sheet was not presented by the police. Hence, the applicant had contended before the aforesaid Court that the period of 90 days from the date of production/first remand of the applicant/accused, is over on 25th May, 2020 and hence, the application was preferred on 91st day from the date of first remand and Since, the charge-sheet is not filed, the applicant be released on bail as per Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. (d) From the documents on record, it is apparent that the learned Session Judge, called report from the office and the Investigating Officer. On the same day i.e. 26th May, 2020 the ch ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ection 344 of Cr.P.C., 1898 and file preliminary or incomplete report before the Magistrate to keep the accused in custody. The Law Commission in its 41st Report proposed to increase the time limit for completion of investigations to 60 days. The report indicated that the use of Section 344 for remand beyond statutory period fixed under Section 167 can lead to serious abuse, as an arrested person can in this manner be kept in custody indefinitely while the investigation can go on in a leisurely manner. It is therefore desirable, as was observed in the Fourteenth Report, that some time limit should be placed on the power of the police to obtain a remand while the investigation is still going on, and if the present time limit of 15 days is short, it would be better to fix a longer period rather than countenance a practice which violates the spirit of the legal safeguard. It was proposed to follow recommendation in the Fourteenth Report that maximum period under Section 167 should be fixed at 60 days. The recommendations of Law Commission were accepted. The considerations for acceptance were reflected in statement of objects and reasons dated 7.11.1970 for introducing new Code of Crim ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the case, and shall at the same time forward the accused to such Magistrate. (2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time, authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole; and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction: Provided that- (a) the Magistrate may authorise the detention of the accused person, otherwise than in the custody of the police, beyond the period of fifteen days; if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so, but no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody under this paragraph for a total period exceeding,- (i) ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years; (ii) sixty days, where the investigation relates to any other offence, and, on the expiry of the sai ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e may think fit for a term not exceeding seven days in the aggregate; and, on the expiry of the period of detention so authorised, the accused person shall be released on bail except where an order for further detention of the accused person has been made by a Magistrate competent to make such order; and, where an order for such further detention is made, the period during which the accused person was detained in custody under the orders made by an Executive Magistrate under this sub-section, shall be taken into account in computing the period specified in paragraph (a) of the proviso to sub-section (2): [Provided that before the expiry of the period aforesaid, the Executive Magistrate shall transmit to the nearest Judicial Magistrate the records of the case together with a copy of the entries in the diary relating to the case which was transmitted to him by the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation, as the case may be.] (3) A Magistrate authorising under this section detention in the custody of the police shall record his reasons for so doing. (4) Any Magistrate other than the Chief Judicial Magistrate making such order shall ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... fore a Magistrate is neither referable to nor in pursuance of an order of remand passed by a Magistrate. The powers of remand given to a Magistrate, become exercisable after an accused is produced before him in terms of Sub-Section (1) of Section 167. Sub-section (1) of Section 167 covers this procedure and also state that the police officer while forwarding the accused to the nearest Magistrate should also transmit a copy of entries in the diary relating to the case. The entries in the diary are meant to afford to the Magistrate the necessary information upon which he can take the decision whether the accused should be detained in the custody or not. The law enjoins upon the investigating agency to carry out the investigation, in a case where a person has been arrested and detained, with utmost urgency and complete the investigation promptly in prescribed period. The proviso to sub-section (2) fixes the outer limit within which investigation must be completed and in case the same is not completed within the prescribed period, the accused would acquire a right to be released on bail and if he is prepared to and does furnish bail, the Magistrate shall release him on bail and such re ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Court of Chhattisgarh. 10. Learned APP opposed the application. It is submitted that there is no error in the order passed by Sessions Court. The period of 90 days has to be calculated by excluding the first day of remand. It is further submitted that either one day has to be excluded i.e. day when the accused is remanded or the day when the charge-sheet is filed. In the present case, by excluding the date of remand, the 90th day would fall on 26th May, 2020 and on that day, the charge-sheet was filed and hence, the right under Section 167(2) of Cr. PC did not accrue in favour of the applicant. 11. Learned APP strongly relied upon the following decisions: (1) State of MP Vs. Rustam & Ors. (Supra). (2) Achpal alias Ramswaroop and Anr. Vs. State of Rajasthan. (3) Ravi Prakash Singh alias Arvind Singh Vs. State of Bihar AIR 2015 Supreme Court 1294. 12. Thus, from the factual matrix of this case, it can be seen that the application for bail under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. was preferred by the applicant prior to presentation of charge-sheet. The dispute is with regards to the calculation of the period of 90 days. The learned Sessions Judge has excluded the first date of remand ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in other cases. The words used in proviso (a) are "no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody". Under this paragraph for a total period exceeding 90 days/60 days. Detention can be authorised by Magistrate only from the time the order of remand is passed. The total period of 90 days or 60 days can begin to run only from the date of order of remand. The intention of the legislature can also be gathered by comparing proviso (a) of sub-section (5) of Section 167. The legislature has consciously referred to the date of arrest in Section 167(5) but had made no such reference in Section 167(2) of proviso (a) thereto. If it was the intention of the legislature that the period of remand of 15 days in the whole envisaged in Sub-section (2) or the total period of 90 days/60 days prescribed in proviso (a) should be calculated from date of arrest then legislature would have expressly said so as it had done under Section 167(5). 14. It would be relevant to quote paragraph 20, 21, 22, 23 and 25 of this decision which reads as follows: "20. The words used in proviso (a) are "no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody", "under t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nd depending upon whether the accused person is forwarded to a Judicial Magistrate or an Executive Magistrate for purposes of remand. 22. The intention of the Legislature can also be gathered by comparing proviso (a) of sub-section (5) of Section 167. Sub-section (5) of Section 167 is in the following terms: "If in any case triable by a Magistrate as a summons case, the investigation is not concluded within a period of six months from the date on which the accused was arrested, the Magistrate shall make an order stopping further investigation into the offence unless the officer making the investigation beyond the period of six months is necessary". 23. The Legislature has consciously referred to the date of arrest in Section 167 (5) but has made no such reference in Section 167(2) or proviso (a) thereto. If it was the intention of the Legislature that the period of remand of 15 days in the whole envisaged in sub-section (2) or the total period of 90 days/60 days prescribed in proviso (a) should be calculated from the date of arrest then the Legislature would have expressly said so as it had done under Section 167(5). 25. Thus in any view of the matter i.e. construing provis ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... w the question is whether it can be construed that the police custody if any should be within this period of first fifteen days and not later or alternatively in a case if such remand had not been obtained or the number of days of police custody in the first fifteen days are less whether the police can ask subsequently for police custody for full period of fifteen days not availed earlier or for the remaining days during the rest of the periods of ninety days or sixty days covered by the proviso. The decisions mentioned above do not deal with this question precisely except the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Dharam Pal's case. Taking the plain language into consideration particularly the words "otherwise than in the custody of the police beyond the period of fifteen days" in the proviso it has to be held that the custody after the expiry of the first fifteen days can only be judicial custody during the rest of the periods of ninety days or sixty days and that police custody if found necessary of fifteen days. To this extent the view taken in Dharam Pal's case is correct. 9. At this juncture we want to make another aspect clear namely the computation of period of reman ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... this provision can only be to judicial custody and there cannot be any controversy about the same., vide Natabar Parida and other v. State of Orissa, [1975] 2 SCC 220. 13. Whenever any person is arrested under Section 57 Cr.P.C. he should be produced before the nearest Magistrate within 24 hours as mentioned therein. Such Magistrate may or may not have jurisdiction to try the case. If Judicial Magistrate is not available, the police officer may transmit the arrested accused to the nearest Executive Magistrate on whom the judicial powers have been conferred. The Judicial Magistrate can in the first instance authorise the detention of the accused in such custody i.e. either police or judicial from time to time but the total period of detention cannot exceed fifteen day in the whole. Within this period of fifteen days there can be more than one order changing the nature of such custody either from police to judicial or vice-versa. If the arrested accused is produced before the Executive Magistrate he is empowered to authorise the detention in such custody either police or judicial only for a week, in the same manner namely by one or more orders but after one week he should transmit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t has not been able to establish that she was arrested on October 10, 2008, even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the appellant was arrested on October 10, 2008 as claimed by her and not on October 23, 2008 as stated by the prosecution, she is not entitled to grant of default bail because this Court finds that the charge sheet was filed within 90 days from the date of first order of remand. In other words, the relevant date of counting 90 days for filing charge sheet is the date of first order of the remand and not the date of arrest. This proposition has been clearly stated in the Chaganti Satyanarayana and Others vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (1986) 3 SCC 141. 52. If one looks at the said judgment one finds that the facts of the said case are set out in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the judgment. In paragraph 20 of the reported decision it has been clearly laid down as a proposition of law that 90 days will begin to run only from the date of order of remand. This is also evident if one reads last five lines of Para 24 of the reported decision. Chaganti Satyanarayana and Others (Supra) has been subsequently followed in the following four decisions of this Court: (1) Centra ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on Bench in Sanjay Dutt Vs. State. (1994) 5 SCC 410. In the case of Uday Acharya, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had arrived at the conclusions in paragraph 13 of the said decision which are as follows: "1. Under sub-section (2) of Section 167, a Magistrate before whom an accused is produced while the police is investigating into the offence can authorise detention of the accused in such custody as the Magistrate thinks fit for a term not exceeding 15 days on the whole. 2. Under the proviso to the aforesaid sub-section (2) of Section 167, the Magistrate may authorise detention of the accused otherwise than in the custody of police for total period not exceeding 90 days where the investigation relates to offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years, and 60 days where the investigation relates to any other offence. 3. On the expiry of the said period of 90 days or 60 days, as the case may be, an indefeasible right accrues in favour of the accused for being released on bail on account of default by the investigating agency in the completion of the investigation within the period prescribed and the accused is entitled to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 21. In Hitendra Thakur and Others v. State of Maharashtra and Others (1994) 4 SCC 602 it is observed that Section 57 of Cr.P.C. provides that a person arrested shall not be detained in custody by the police for a period longer than that which is reasonable but such period shall not exceed 24 hours exclusive of time necessary for journey from date of arrest to the Court of Magistrate in the absence of order under Section 167 of the Code. The object of Section 167 of the Code was that detention of accused should not be permitted in custody pending investigation for longer period. The proviso creates indefeasible right in an accused person on account of the default by the investigating agency in completion of investigation within maximum period prescribed or extended as the case may be seek order of release on bail. In Rajnikant Jivanlal Patel vs. Intelligence Officer, Narcotic Control Bureau, New Delhi it was held that " the right to bail under Section 167(2) proviso (a) thereto is absolute. It is a legislative command and not courts dissertion. If the investigating agency fails to file charge-sheet before the expiry of 90/60 days, as the case may, the accused in custody should be re ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r.P.C. After analysing Section 167 of Cr.P.C., its historical background, view expressed by Law Commission of India relating to Section 167(2) of the Code, it was observed that the letter of and spirit behind enactment of Section 167 of Code as it stands mandates that the investigation ought to be completed within the prescribed period. Ideally, the investigation, going by provisions of the Code ought to be completed within first Twenty Four hour itself. If it appears that the investigation cannot be completed within Twenty Four hours, the concerned officer to transmit the entries in the diary relating to the case, and at the same time to forward the accused to such Magistrate. Thereafter, it is for the Magistrate to consider whether the accused be remanded to custody or not. Sub-section (2) prescribed certain limitations on the exercise of power of the Magistrate and the proviso stipulates that the Magistrate cannot authorise detention of the accused in custody for total period exceeding 90 or 60 days as the case may be. The provision has a definite purpose in that, on the basis of the material relating to investigation, the Magistrate ought to be in a position to proceed with the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... settled rule of construction that the intention of the legislature must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. It is very plain when it says the "total period in custody for 60 days or 90 days as the case may be" it means that the accused cannot be allowed to remain in custody for more than 60 days or 90 days. The date of arrest under Section 57 cannot be included while computing the period of 60 days or 90 days. 28. In the case of Powell Ogechi decided by Division bench of Delhi High Court, bail was refused by the Sessions Court on the ground that the normal rule is to exclude the first day and include the last day and the Sessions Court also invoked the aid of Section 10 of General Clauses Act and stated that since the 90th day was Sunday there was nothing wrong in producing the charge-sheet on 91st day and the custody of the accused was justified as legal even after 90th day. The Division Bench further observed that under the provision of 167(2) of the Code an accused person against whom the charge-sheet is not presented before the Court within the period of 60 or 90 days is entitled to be offered bail as a matter of right. 29. The Gujarat High Court in the case ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n application was filed for default bail on completion of 60 days in custody, which was refused on the ground that subsequently, Section 467 of IPC was added in Charge-sheet. The Court relied upon the decision in the Chaganti Satyanarayan, CBI Vs. Anupam Kulkarni, Uday Mohanlal Acharya Vs. State of Maharashtra, Rakesh Kumar Paul Vs. State of Assam and held that computation of period of detention of the accused in custody under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. will start from the date of remand and period of detention in custody for the offence punishable under Section 467 of IPC shall be governed by sub-clause (ii) of Section 167(2) (a) of Cr.P.C. and would be of 60 days. 32. Similar issue had also arisen before this Court in Criminal Writ Petition No. 228 of 2017 in the case of Sheikh Nasir Sheikh Rahman Vs. State of Maharashtra decided by the learned single Judge of this Court vide Order dated 26th April, 2017. The issue is whether the date on which the accused is produced before the Court and remanded to Magisterial custody should be included or excluded in completing the period of 60 days or 90 days, the per-requisite for seeking statutory bail under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. The dec ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... under the provision of 141 of the Constitution of India is the law declared by the Supreme Court. If there is a clear enunciation or declaration of law the same will be binding even though such declaration not strictly necessary for the disposal of the case or the declaration of law is not followed by actual application thereof in the case in question. The Court also made observations about course to be followed by the High Court when confronted with contrary decision of the Supreme Court, emanating from the benches of co-equal strength. It would be relevant to reproduce paragraph 14 and 15 of the said decision which are as follows: "14. It has been pointed out by one of us, while speaking for a Special Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Bholanath v. Madanmohan on the question as to the course to be followed by the High Court when confronted with contrary decisions of the Supreme Court emanating from Benches of co-equal strength, as hereunder:- "..... When contrary decisions of the Supreme Court emanate from Benches of equal strength, the course to be adopted by the High Court is, firstly, to try to reconcile and to explain those contrary decisions by assuming, as far as possi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... High Court is not necessarily bound to follow the one which is later in point of time, but may follow the one which, in its view, is better in point of law. Sandhawalia, C.J. in the Full Bench decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Indo-Swiss Time Ltd. v. Umarao took this view with the concurrence of the other two learned Judges, though as to the actual decision, the other learned Judges differed from the learned Chief Justice. In the Karnataka Full Bench decision in Govinda Naik v. West Patent Press Co., the minority consisting of two of the learned Judges speaking through Jagannatha Shetty, J. also took the same view (supra, at p. 95) and in fact the same has been referred to with approval by Sandhawalia, C.J. in the Full Bench decision in Indo-Swiss Time (supra)." "This later view appears to us to be in perfect consonance with what our ancient Jurist Narada declared-Dharmashastra Virodhe Tu Yuktiyukta Vidhe Smrita-that is, when the Dharmashastras or Law Codes of equal authority conflict with one another, the one appearing to be reasonable, or more reasonable is to be preferred and followed. A modern Jurist, Seervai, has also advocated a similar view in his Constitutio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... constitute a larger Bench, it has, however, been observed that for otherwise the subordinate Courts are placed under the embarrassment of preferring one view to another, both equally binding on them. According to the Supreme Court, therefore, when confronted with two contrary decisions of equal authority, the subordinate Court is not necessarily obliged to follow the later, but would have to perform the embarrassing task "of preferring one view to another". ".... We are, however, inclined to think that no blanket proposition can be laid down either in favour of the earlier or the later decision and, as indicated hereinbefore, and as has also been indicated by the Supreme Court in Atma Ram (supra), the subordinate Court would have to prefer one to the other and not necessarily obliged, as a matter, of course, to follow either the former or the later in point of time, but must follow that one, which according to it, is better in point of law. As old may not always be the gold, the new is also not necessarily golden and ringing out the old and bringing in the new cannot always be an invariable straight-jacket formula in determining the binding nature of precedents of co-ordinate ju ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... w as succeeding ones would fall in the category of per in curium. 37. This Court in the case Jaydeo Mahadeo Parate vs. State of Maharashtra 2006 (2) Mh.L.J. 497 was confronted with two conflicting decisions of Apex Court. This Court in paragraph 24 of in the above decision observed as follows: "24. The Full Bench of this Court in the case of Kamleshwar Ishwardas Patel v. Union of India and Ors. reported in 1994 Mh.L.J. 1669 dealing with a question as to what course has to be followed by the High Court when confronted with contrary decisions of the Supreme Court emanating from Benches of coequal strength, has held that the High Court is not necessarily bound to follow the decision later in point of time, but must follow the one which in its view is better in point of law. For coming at such a conclusion, the Full Bench of this Court has relied on the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Atma Ram v. State of Punjab. We are of the considered view that the Division Bench in the case of Sanjay Punekar has correctly considered the observations of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the last paragraph of the judgment in the case of State v. Milind ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cordance with Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C., in the case of Uday Acharya Vs. State of Maharashtra would indicate that the accused therein had surrendered before Special Judge and was remanded to Judicial custody by Order dated 17.06.2000. The period of sixty days for filling charge-sheet was completed on 16.08.2000. The learned Judge inferred that the Supreme Court had calculated 60 days, excluding the date either of production or the day on which charge-sheet has to be filed. Hence, in the present case 90 days would complete on 26.05.2020. It is pertinent to note that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has not stated in the decision that the date of either production or the day on which charge-sheet has to be filed is to be excluded. The Supreme Court reproduced the facts reflected in the case with regards to date of remand and completion of 60 days. The application was filed on 17.08.2000. It is relevant to note that the application was rejected by Special Court on the ground that provisions of Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. have no application to case pertaining to MPID Act. The High Court held that there is no interdiction in the Maharashtra Act of 1999 against the applicability of Section 167( ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he surmise that either day of production or the day on which charge-sheet has to be filed has to be excluded. It was not the contention of the prosecution that there would be extension of day to file charge-sheet due to holiday. The Court has also not entered into such issue. In any case considering the several judicial pronouncement it can be seen that the theory of exclusion by invoking Section 9 and 10 of General Clauses Act would not arise in case of Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. 43. In Rustam's case it was held that the day on which accused remanded to judicial custody should be excluded. The decision in the case of Chaganti Satyanarayana was not placed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case. The decision in the case of Anupam Kulkarni was also not placed for consideration in Rustam case. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ravi Prakash Singh (Supra) referred the decision in Chaganti Satyanarayana. The decision in the case of Anupam Kulkarni and Pragyna Singh Thakur were not placed before the Court. The learned Special Judge of this Court in Sheikh Rahman Vs. State of Maharashtra referred to the decision of Ravi Prakash and held that it is not open to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word "from", and, for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any period of time, to use the word "to". The principle is that when a period is delimited by statute or rule, which has both a beginning and an end and the word "from" is used indicating the beginning, the opening days is to be excluded and if the last day is to be excluded the word "to" is to be used. In order to exclude the first day of the period, the crucial thing to be noted is whether the period of limitation is delimited by a series of days or by any fixed period. This is intended to obviate the difficulties or inconvenience that may be caused to some parties. For instance, if a policy of insurance has to be good for one day from the 1st January, it might be valid only for a few hours after its execution and the party or the beneficiary in the insurance policy would not get reasonable time to lay claim, unless the 1st January is excluded from the period of computation [See Tarun Prasad Chatterjee v. Dinanath Sharma-, AIR 2001 SC 36(1)]. 22. The application of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act has t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y to any act r proceeding to which the Indian Limitation Act, 1877 (XVI of 1877) applied." The Division Bench of Delhi High Court in Powell Ogechi case has observed that a plain reading of Section 10 of General Clauses Act would, therefore show that there should be a period prescribed for the performance of an act in a Court or office. It is only in such cases that if the last date of limitation prescribed expires on a holiday then Section 10 comes into play and make it permissible to do that act on the next day when the Court or office opens. Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, therefore, clearly pre-supposes that there must be in existence a positive act to be performed by person and for the performance of which there is existence a period prescribed by law It will have no application in any other situation. Further reasoning of the court appears in paragraph 10 and 11 which is as follows: "10. A bare reading of the aforesaid provision of the Code would go to show that this provision merely confers power on the Magistrate to commit to custody an accused person and there is limitation of 90 days and 60 days, as the case may be. This provision of the Code falls under Chapter ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... heet on 13.09.1982. The right is accrued the moment 90 days are over, whether 90th day falls on a holiday or not. The accused continued to be in custody and therefore, the provisions of Section 167(2) lays down that he can be in the custody only for a period of 90 days or 60 days, as the case may be. The absolute right cannot be allowed to be defeated by resorting to the provisions of Section 10 of General Clauses Act. Hence the said provision does not apply to the case. The Gujarat High Court in Alam Khan's case (Supra) also took similar view. Court relied on the Supreme Court decision in Harinder Singh Vs. Karnal Singh AIR 1957 SC 271 where the Hon'ble Supreme Court while interpreting Section 10 of the General Clauses Act ruled that the object of Section 10 is to enable a person to do what he could have done on a holiday, on the next working day. Where therefore period is prescribed for the performance of an act in a Court or office, and that period expires on a holiday, then according to the Section, the act should be considered to have been done within that period, if it is done on the next day on which the Court or office is open. It has further ruled that to attract a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... provide any method for calculating the period of 90 days or 60 days. 49. In Chaganti Satyanarayana and Others, CBI Vs. Anupam Kulkarni, Pragyna Singh Thakur Vs. State of Maharashtra, it is held that period enumerated in Section 167(2) proviso has to be calculated from date of production of accused for first remand. There is no exclusion of the first day of remand. In Chaganti Satyanarayana it is also held that it is not necessary to invoke provisions of General Clauses Act or Limitation Act. The Court in above decisions considered the ambit and scope of Section 167 of Cr.P.C. The decisions in State of M.P. Vs. Rustam and Ravi Prakash Singh Vs. State of Bihar take contrary view. Law relating to Section 167(2) is also analysed in several other decisions referred to hereinabove. In the light of law relating to precedents, as laid down in Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Kamleshkumar Patel Vs. Union of India and other related decisions discussed above the law laid down in aforesaid decisions in Chaganti Satyanarayana, Anupam Kulkarni and Pragyna Singh Thakur which considers ambit and scope of Section 167 of Cr.P.C. needs to be considered for deciding this application. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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