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TMI Blog2020 (7) TMI 832X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... remand and therefore, the period of 60 days or 90 days starts running from the date of the order of the remand. The date of remand has not been excluded in those decisions. The applicant was arrested and remanded to custody on 26th February 2020. The applicant was in custody from the date of first remand for a period of 4 days in the month of February (since February consisted of 29 days this year), 31 days in March, 30 days in April. 90 days were completed on 25th May, 2020. Application for default bail was preferred on 26th May, 2020 being 91st day, at 10.35 a.m. The Court called for report from the office and IO on the 26th May, 2020. The note put up by Office Superintendent indicate that after filling the application charge-sheet is received and it is under scrutiny and registration. It is not clear from the order as to when the cognizance was taken. Be that as it may application was prior in point of time. Hence the right under Section 167(2) of the Code had accrued in favour of applicant. The applicant is entitled for bail in accordance with aforesaid provision. The applicant is directed to be released on bail, registered with Navghar Police Station, in accordance with ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... May, 2020 appearing on the application filed under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. made by the Office Superintendent mentions that the application is filed under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. After filing the application, the charge-sheet in the crime is received and it is under scrutiny and registration. (e) The application for default bail was opposed by the prosecution. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Thane, rejected the application for bail, on the ground that the period of 90 days has to be calculated, excluding the date of production. The period of 90 days was completed on 26th May, 2020 which is 90th day and hence Section 167(2) is not applicable in the present case. 4. Thus, the question which arises for consideration is whether the first date of remand is to be excluded while computing the period of 90 days. Undisputedly, the charge-sheet was presented after the applicant preferred an application for default bail. The charge-sheet was received on the same day and the endorsement of the superintendent appearing on the application (as apparent from the certified copy of the application annexed to this application) would indicate that after filing the application, the cha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ance with accepted principles of natural justice, efforts to avoid delay in investigation and trial which is harmful not only to individuals involved but also to society and procedure should not be complicated and ensure fair deal to poorer sections of the community Section 167 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was enacted. It provided forwarding arrested accused before Magistrate with copy of entries in the diary, when it appears after arrest and detention of accused, that investigation cannot be completed within twenty four hours fixed by Section 57 and there are grounds for believing that accusation or information is well founded. The Magistrate to whom accused person is forwarded from time to time, whether he has or has no jurisdiction to authorise detention of accused in such custody for not exceeding 15 days in the whole. The Magistrate was empowered to authorise detention of the accused, otherwise than in custody of police beyond fifteen days if satisfied that adequate grounds exists, but no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused in custody for a period exceeding 60 days and on expiry of said period, the accused shall be released on bail if he is prepared ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... as the case may be, the accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail, and every person released on bail under this sub-section shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the purposes of that Chapter;] (b) no Magistrate shall authorise detention of the accused in custody of the police under this section unless the accused is produced before him in person for the first time and subsequently every time till the accused remains in the custody of the police, but the Magistrate may extend further detention in judicial custody on production of the accused either in person or through the medium of electronic video linkage;] (c) no Magistrate of the second class, not specially empowered in this behalf by the High Court, shall authorise detention in the custody of the police. [Explanation I-For the avoidance of doubts, it is hereby declared that, notwithstanding the expiry of the period specified in paragraph (a), the accused shall be detained in custody so long as he does not furnish bail;] [Explanation II-If any question arises whether an accused person was produced before the Magistrate as required under ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ith his reasons for making it, to the Chief Judicial Magistrate. (5) If in any case triable by a Magistrate as a summons-case, the investigation is not concluded within a period of six months from the date on which the accused was arrested, the Magistrate shall make an order stopping further investigation into the offence unless the officer making the investigation satisfies the Magistrate that for special reasons and in the interests of justice the continuation of the investigation beyond the period of six months is necessary. (6) Where any order stopping further investigation an offence has been made under sub-section (5), the Sessions Judge may, if he is satisfied, on an application made to him or otherwise, that further investigation into the offence ought to be made, vacate the order made under sub-section (5) and direct further investigation to be made into the offence subject to such direction with regard to bail and other matters as he may be specify 7. On perusal of aforesaid provision, it may be seen that sub-Section (1) is the mandatory provision, governing what a police officer should do, when the person is arrested and detained in custody and when it appears ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e grant of bail under chapter XXXIII of Cr.P.C. The proviso inserted by Act No. 45 of 1978, comes into operation where the Magistrate thinks fit that further detention beyond the period of fifteen days is necessary and it lays down that, the Magistrate may authorise the detention of the accused person otherwise than in the custody of police beyond period of 15 days. The proviso to Section 167(2) clearly state that the total period of detention should not exceed Ninety days in cases where the investigation relates to serious offences mentioned therein and sixty days in other cases and if by that time charge-sheet is not filed on the expiry of said periods the accused shall be released on bail. 8. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that, the applicant is entitled for compulsive bail, under Section 167(2) of Cr. PC. Learned Additional Sessions Judge has committed an error in computing the period of 90 days, while adjudicating the application for bail. The applicant was remanded to custody on 26th February, 2020 and from the first day of remand, the period of 90 days was completed on 25th May, 2020 and hence, the applicant preferred an application for default bail on 91st d ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eld that the charge-sheet was filed on 90th day, hence the applicant is not entitled for bail under said provisions. The learned Judge relied upon the judgment in the case of State of MP Vs. Rustam Ors. (Supra) decision of Uday Mohanlal Acharya Vs. State of Maharashtra (Supra). The learned Judge held that, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision of Uday Acharya excludes the date either of production or the day on which charge-sheet has to be filed. 13. In Chhaganti Satyanarayan case (Supra) the Supreme Court has held that the total period of 90 days or 60 days can begin to run from the date of order of remand. Therefore, the first period of detention should be computed from the date of order of remand. In the aforesaid decision, the question which arose for consideration was whether the period of 60 days or 90 days contemplated under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. shall be calculated from the date of arrest or from the date of first remand. The Hon'ble Supreme Court after analysing the provision of Section 167, historical background of the said provision, the objective behind the proviso has held that construing proviso (a) either in conjunction with Sub-Section (2) of Se ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is paragraph , for a total period exceeding i.e. 90 days/60 days . Detention can be authorised by the Magistrate only from the time the order of remand is passed. The earlier period when the accused is in the custody of a police officer in exercise of his powers under Section 57 cannot constitute detention pursuant to an authorisation issued by the Magistrate. It, therefore, stands to reason that the total period of 90 days or 60 days can begin to run only from the date of order of remand. 21. Approaching the matter from another angle also we find it necessary to construe the proviso in the manner set out above. We have earlier referred to sub-section (2A) newly introduced by Act 45 of 1978 to Section 167. This sub-section has been introduced for pragmatic reasons. In order that the production of an accused, arrested under Section 57, before a Magistrate is not delayed on account of the non-availability of a Judicial Magistrate, the Legislature has deemed it necessary to confer powers of remand on such of those Executive Magistrates on whom the powers of a Judicial Magistrate have been conferred. The sub-section states that if an arrested person is produced before an Executive ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... oviso (a) either in conjunction with sub-section (2) of Section 167 or as an independent paragraph, we find that the total period of 90 days under clause (i) and the total period of 60 days under clause (ii) has to be calculated only from the date of remand and not from the date of arrest. 15. In another decision of the Apex Court in the CBI Vs. Anupam Kulkarni (1992)3 SCC page 141 it was observed that Section 167 is supplementary to Section 57. The investigation should be completed in the first instance within Twenty Four hours, if not the arrested person should brought by the police before a Magistrate as provided under Section 167. While doing so the police should also transmit a copy of entries in the diary relating to the case which is meant to effort to the Magistrate the necessary information upon which he can take the decision, whether the accused should be detained in custody further or not. Even at this stage, the Magistrate can release him on bail, if an application is made and if he is satisfied that there are no grounds to remand him to custody. If he is satisfied that further remand is necessary then he should act as provided under Section 167. It was further obser ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d of remand. The proviso to Section 167(2) clearly lays down that the total period of detention should not exceed ninety days in cases where the investigation relates to serious offences mentioned therein and sixty days in other cases and if by that time cognizance is not taken on the expiry of the said periods the accused shall be released on bail as mentioned therein. In Chaganti Satyanarayan's case it was held that It, therefore, stands to reason that the total period of 90 days or 60 days can begin to run from the date of order or remand. Therefore the first period of detention should be computed from the date of order or remand. Section 167(2A) which has been introduced for pragmatic reasons states than if an arrested person is produced before and Executive Magistrate for remand the said Magistrate may authorise the detention of the accused not exceeding seven days in aggregate. It further provides that the period of remand by the Executive Magistrate should also be taken into account for computing the period specified in the proviso i.e. aggregate periods of ninety days or sixty days. Since the Executive Magistrate is empowered to order detention only for seven days in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d transmit him to the nearest Judicial Magistrate along with the records. When the arrested accused is so transmitted the Judicial Magistrate, for the remaining period, that is to say excluding one week or the number of days of detention ordered by the Executive Magistrate, may authorise further detention within that period of first fifteen days to such custody either police or judicial. After the expiry of the first period of fifteen days the further remand during the period of investigation can only be in judicial custody. There cannot be any detention in the police custody after the expiry of first fifteen days even in a case where some more offences either serious or otherwise committed by him in the same transaction come to light at a later stage. But this bar does not apply if the same arrested accused is involved in a different case arising out of a different transaction. Even if he is in judicial custody in connection with the investigation of the earlier case he can formally be arrested regarding his involvement in the different case and associate him with the investigation of that other case and the Magistrate can act as provided under Section 167(2) and the proviso and c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t: (1) Central Bureau of Investigation, Special Investigation Cell-I, New Delhi vs. Anupam J. Kulkarni (1992) 3 SCC 141, para 9 placitum d-e, para 13 placitum c where it has been authoritatively laid down that: The period of 90 days or 60 days has to be computed from the date of detention as per the orders of the Magistrate and not from the date of arrest by the police . (2) State through State through CBI vs. Mohd. Ashraft Bhat and another (1996) 1 SCC 432, Para 5; (3) State of Maharashtra Vs. Bharati Chandmal Varma (Mrs) (2002) 2 SCC 121 Para 12; (4) State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Rustom and Others 1995 Supp. (3) SCC 221, Para 3. 53. Section 167(2) is one, dealing with the power of the learned Judicial Magistrate to remand an accused to custody. The 90 days limitation is as such one relating to the power of the learned Magistrate. In other words the learned Magistrate cannot remand an accused to custody for a period of more than 90 days in total. Accordingly 90 days would start running from the date of first remand. It is not in dispute in this case that the charge sheet is filed within 90 days from the first order of remand. Therefore, the appellant is not entitl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d the accused is entitled to be released on bail, if he is prepared to an furnishes the bail as directive by the Magistrate. 4. When an application for bail is filed by an accused for enforcement of his indefeasible right alleged to have been accrued in his favour on account of default on the part of the investigating agency in completion of the investigation within specified period, the Magistrate/Court must dispose of it forthwith, on being satisfied that in fact the accused has been in custody for the period of 90 days or 60 days as specified and no charge-sheet has been filed by the investigating agency Such prompt action on the part of the Magistrate/Court will not enable the prosecution to frustrate the object of the Act and the legislative mandates of an accused being released on bail on account of the default on the part of the investigating agency in completing the investigation within the period stipulated. 5. If the accused is unable to furnish the bail as directed by the Magistrate then on a conjoint reading of Explanation I and the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 167, the continued custody of the accused even beyond the specified period in para (a) will not ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the accused in custody should be released on bail. But at that stage, merits of the case are not to be examined. Not at all, in fact, the Magistrate has no power to remand a person beyond the stipulated period of 90/60 days. He must pass an order of bail and communicate the same to the accused to furnish the requisite bail bonds . 22. In Sanjay Dutt vs. State (1994) 5 SCC 410, the Constitution Bench considered the provisions of Section 167 of Cr. PC and Section 20 of TADA Act and it was held that the indefeasibly right accruing to the accused in such situation is enforceable only prior to filing of the challan and it does not survive or remain enforceable on the challan being filed, if already not availed of. In Uday Acharya case (Supra) it is held that, the expression 'if not availed of' used in above decision must be understood to mean when the accused files an application and is prepared to offer bail on being directed in the case of the Act. 23. In the case of Union of India Vs. Nirala Yadav, the Apex Court has considered several decisions including in the decision of the Constitution Bench in the case of Sanjay Dutt Vs. State (Supra), State of MP Vs. Rustam Oth ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t to be in a position to proceed with the matter. On expiry of period of 90 or 60 days as the case may be the accused shall released on bail, if he is prepared to and does furnish bail. It is clearly indicated, that the stage of investigation ought to be confined to 90 days or 60 days and thereafter, the issue related to custody of accused, ought to be dealt with by the Magistrate on the basis of investigation. 25. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ravi Prakash Singh @ Arvind Singh Vs. State of Bihar (Supra) the Supreme Court has observed that in State of MP Vs. Rustam and Others. The Court has laid down the law that while computing period of 90 days, the day on which the accused was remanded to judicial custody should be excluded and the day on which challan is filed in the Court should be included. 26. In Rambeer Shoken Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) (2018) 4 SCC 405 it was observed that prayer for extension of period for filing charge-sheet was moved by Additional Public Prosecutor before statutory period had lapsed, but the same remained pending, until charge-sheet was filed in Court. Until the said request was formally and expressly rejected by the com ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of right. 29. The Gujarat High Court in the case of Aalam Khan (Supra) considered the question of granting bail on account of default under Section 167(2) of the Code. The factual matrix indicate that the date of remand was not counted for the purpose of computing the period of 90 days by taking recourse to Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The Magistrate Court while rejecting the application had relied upon the decision on the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of MP Vs. Rustam Others. The question raised before the High Court is whether period of 90 days or 60 days begins to run from the date of order of remand or the first date of production of accused is to be excluded while computing the period. The Court relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Uday Mohanlal Acharya (Supra) and held that the accused gets an indefeasible right of bail if the charge-sheet is not filed within the period of limitation. The Court also relied upon decision in the case of Union of India through CBI Vs. Neerala Yadav (2014) 9 SCC 457. The Court also relied upon the decision in the case of Chaganti Satyanarayan (Supra) and observed that day of the product ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ng statutory bail under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. The decision in the case of Chaganti Satyanarayan was placed for consideration. The learned Judge perused the decision of Ravi Prakash Singh and observed that the Supreme Court in the said decision has considered the decision in Chaganti Satyanarayana and relied upon the decision in the case of State of MP Vs. Rustam Others, and hence the issue is no longer open for consideration and the petition was dismissed. 33. It is evident from various decisions referred to hereinabove that the Apex Court has examined the provision of Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. and has held that the detention of the accused is authorised on the date when he is in produced before the Court and remanded to custody. The period of 60 days/90 days would start running from the date of remand. The first decision delivered after in depth analysis of the right of bail construed under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. in the case of Chaganti Satyanarayana. Undisputedly the said decision was not placed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court while deciding the case of State of MP Vs. Rustam Others. From the ratio in CBI Vs. Anupam Kulkarni also it is crystal clear that the pe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to explain those contrary decisions by assuming, as far as possible, that they applied to different sets of circumstances. This in fact is a course which was recommended by our ancient Jurists- Srutirdwaidhe Smritirdwaidhe Sthalaveda Prakalapate -in case there are two contrary precepts of the Sruties or the Smritis, different cases are to be assumed for their application. As Jurist Jaimini said, contradictions or inconsistencies are not to be readily assumed as they very often be not real but only apparent resulting from the application of the very same principle to different sets of facts- Prayoge Hi Virodha Syat . But when such contrary decisions of co-ordinate Benches cannot be reconciled or explained in the manner as aforesaid, the question would arise as to which one the High Court is obliged to follow. One view is that in such a case the High Court has no option in the matter and it is not for the High Court to decide which one it would follow but it must follow the later one. According to this view, as in the case of two contrary orders issued by the same authority, the later would supersede the former and would bind the subordinate and as in the case of two contrary l ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... urist, Seervai, has also advocated a similar view in his Constitutional Law of India, which has also been quoted with approval by Sandhwalia, C.J. in Indo-Swiss Time (supra, at p. 220) and the learned Jurist has observed that judgments of the Supreme Court, which cannot stand together, present a serious problem to the High Courts and Subordinate Courts and that in such circumstances the correct thing is to follow that judgment which appears to the Court to state the law accurately or more accurately than the other conflicting judgment. It appears that the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in R. Rama Subbnarayalu v. Rengammal, would also support this view where it has been observed (at p. 452) that where the conflict is between two decisions pronounced by a Bench consisting of the same number of Judges, and the subordinate Court after a careful examination of the decisions came to the conclusion that both of them directly apply to the case before it, it will then be at liberty to follow that decision which seems to it more correct, whether such decision be the later or the earlier one . According to the Nagpur High Court also, as would appear from its Full Bench ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ormula in determining the binding nature of precedents of co-ordinate jurisdiction. The law as enunciated in that Special Bench decision, as quoted hereinabove, has our unqualified concurrence. 15. Our attention has been drawn by Mrs. Ranjana Desai to the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Ganga Saran v. Civil Judge where also a similar view has been taken by the three Judge Bench (at p. 118). With respect, this can be the only reasonable solution and the only way out, when we are confronted with contrary decisions of the Supreme Court emanating from co-equal Benches. Both being binding on us by reason of their authority, we cannot but have the unpleasant task of choosing that one which appears to have better authority of reasons. During the preparation of this judgment our attention has also been drawn to the Division Bench of this High Court in Manasing Surajsingh (1968) 70 Bom LR 654 at 669) where Tarkunde, J, speaking for the Bench, has also taken the same view after referring to, with approval, the following observations in Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Edition Page 153:- Where authorities of equal standing are irreconcilably in conflict, a lower co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e Apex Court in the last paragraph of the judgment in the case of State v. Milind Katware . 38. The full bench of Allahabad High Court in Ganga Saran Vs. Special Judge, Muzaffarnagar, AIR 1991 ALLAHABAD 114 had observed that in the event of conflict between two decisions of equal benches of the Supreme Court, the Court must follow the Judgment which appear to them to state law accurately and elaborately, more so, when latter decision of Supreme Court did not notice certain amendments and earlier decision of the Supreme Court. 39. Similar situation arose before a Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of M/s. Indo Swiss Time Limited, Dundahera Vs. Umrao, AIR 1981 Punjab and Haryana 213. The observation in this decision are as follows: Now the contention that the latest Judgment of a coordinate Bench is to be mechanically followed and must have preeminence irrespective of any other consideration does not comment itself to me. When Judgment of the superior Court are of co-equal Benches and therefore, of matching authority Then their weight inevitably must be considered by the rationale and the logic thereof and not by the mere fortuitous circumstances of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s no interdiction in the Maharashtra Act of 1999 against the applicability of Section 167(2) proviso of the Criminal Procedure Code and therefore the accused arrested for commission of an offence under Section 3 of the MPID Act is entitled to claim release on bail an expiry of total period specified in Section 167 if challan is not filed within that period. However, the High Court rejected the application on the ground that, during the pendency of application before High Court, charge-sheet was filed on 30.08.2000, and the enforceable right did not survive. The High Court relied upon Constitution Bench decision in the case of Sanjay Dutt as well as M. P Vs. Rustam and also held that the Full Bench decision of the Gujarat High Court in Babubhai Patel Vs. State of Gujarat 1982 Cr CJ 284 is contrary to decision of the Supreme Court in Rustam's case. The said order was challenged before Supreme Court. It requires mention that; the charge-sheet was filed on 31.08.2000 which was the date much beyond the period of 60 days envisaged under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. The Supreme Court held that under the proviso to Sub-Section (2) of Section 167, the Magistrate may authorise detention of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... State of Maharashtra referred to the decision of Ravi Prakash and held that it is not open to contend that date of remand on which accused is produced is to be excluded. Several decisions as referred to above were not placed for consideration before the Court. 44. The Sessions Court has excluded the date of production and remand. Apparently the exclusion is based on Section 9(1) of General Clauses Act. The said provision reads as under: (1) In any (Central Act) or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word from, and, for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word to . The Gujarat High Court has dealt with this issue by interpreting the said provision and observed that it can't be applied to Section 167 of Cr PC. It would be apt to quote the observation of Gujarat High Court in the decision of Alam Khan Jenjari (supra) reflected in paragraphs 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 reads as under: 19. Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 gives statutory recognition to the well-establish ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... anath Sharma-, AIR 2001 SC 36(1)]. 22. The application of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act has to be on the basis of the terminology used in the statutes or orders of the Court. In the instant case, no such terminology has been used. In fact, Section 167 of the Code does not provide any method for calculating the period of 90 days or 60 days, as the case may be. 23. After a person is arrested, the Police can keep him in custody for a limited period under Section 57 of the Code. Thereafter, the accused has to be produced before a Magistrate for remand under Section 167 of the Code. Where the Magistrate decides to grant the remand, the custody thereafter is under orders of the Magistrate. The custody under this Section cannot be granted for a period 'exceeding sixty days' or 'ninety days', as the case may be. A calendar day as a unit of time is the interval from one midnight to another. It is not correct to take into consideration the fractions of two days to make up one day. Thus, the day on which the custody is granted cannot be excluded . 45. Similarly, sometimes prosecution invoke Section 10 of General Clauses Act to exclude holiday if it falls on 60t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... there is limitation of 90 days and 60 days, as the case may be. This provision of the Code falls under Chapter XII of the Code relating to information to the police and their powers to investigate. It is thus clear that this is a power which is only exercisable during the course of investigation of a case. The power to commit an accused person to custody after investigation is over and after the charge sheet is presented before the Court, is derived from Section 309 Cr.P.C. Any further remand to judicial custody beyond 90 days and 60 days without the charge-sheet being presented before the Court will be without the authority of law. 11. Sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Code nowhere prescribes a period within which the police is required to present charge-sheet before the Court nor does it envisage the performance of an act by an accused person within a particular period before a Court or office. In fact, nowhere in the Code a period is prescribed for investigation to produce the charge-sheet before a Court of law. Since the Legislature in its wisdom has not prescribed a period within which the investigation has to present charge-sheet against an accused person before a Cour ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eriod, if it is done on the next day on which the Court or office is open. It has further ruled that to attract application of Section 10 of General Clauses Act all that is requisite is that there should be prescribed period and that period should expire on holiday. 46. Thus in the above decision Section 9 and 10 of General Clauses Act were examined qua its applicability to Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. It is most pertinent to note that the Supreme Court in Chaganti's case has categorically excluded the applicability of provisions of General Clauses Act or Limitation Act. Paragraph 32 of the said decision reads as under: 32. As the terms of proviso (a) with reference to the total periods of detention can be interpreted on plain language of the proviso itself we do not think it is necessary to invoke the provisions of the General Clauses Act or seek guidance from the Limitation Act to construe the terms of the proviso . 47. Thus in view of the above decisions, in Chaganti Satyanarayana, Anupam Kulkarni and Pragyna Singh Thakur the period stipulated under Section 167(2) Cr. PC cannot be excluded. There is no reason to exclude the date on which the arrested accused is produced ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... gh Thakur which considers ambit and scope of Section 167 of Cr.P.C. needs to be considered for deciding this application. The period envisaged under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. has to be calculated from first date of remand/order and the said day cannot be excluded. In the light above decisions and several precedents referred to above there cannot be exclusion of any period from authorised detention while computing the period of 60 days/90 days as the case may be by invoking provisions of General Clauses Act. 50. The applicant was arrested and remanded to custody on 26th February 2020. The applicant was in custody from the date of first remand for a period of 4 days in the month of February (since February consisted of 29 days this year), 31 days in March, 30 days in April. 90 days were completed on 25th May, 2020. Application for default bail was preferred on 26th May, 2020 being 91st day, at 10.35 a.m. The Court called for report from the office and IO on the 26th May, 2020. The note put up by Office Superintendent indicate that after filling the application charge-sheet is received and it is under scrutiny and registration. It is not clear from the order as to when the cognizance ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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