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TMI Blog2019 (9) TMI 1717X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... compensation of Rs. 207,75,63,348/- (Rupees two hundred and seven crore, seventy five lakh, sixty three thousand, three hundred and forty-eight only) at the rate of Rs. 8,624/- per square feet has been awarded in lieu of Rs. 4,620/- per square feet awarded by the SLAO. Determination has also been made under Section 26(c) and additional compensation of 75% of the total compensation under Section 27 and 100% solatium under Section 30 of 2013 Act has been awarded. Further, interest on the amount calculated at the rate of 12% under Section 69(2) of 2013 Act and interest at the rate of 9% per annum on the excess amount from the date of taking over of possession of the acquired property i.e., from 16/01/2014 for the first year and interest at the rate of 16% per annum for the subsequent years till deposit of entire compensation amount under Sections 72 and 80 of 2013 Act have also been awarded. 2. Being aggrieved by the enhancement of compensation made by the reference court, this appeal has been preferred. There is a delay of 75 days in filing the appeal. Hence, IA No. 1 of 2019 has been filed seeking condonation of delay. Statement of objections has been filed by the respondent enclo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... savings clause under Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act is not applicable to Section 74(1) of 2013 Act and the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act are not applicable. This is because, Section 74(1) of 2013 Act, which is a special law, excludes the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act. In this regard, several judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and other Courts were cited to contend that the application filed by the appellant under Section 5 of the Limitation Act be dismissed as the said Act is not applicable to Section 74(1) of 2013 Act, which shall be discussed later. 6. Per contra, learned High Court Government Pleader preferred that though 2013 Act is a special enactment, Section 74(1) of the said Act does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act. 7. In the circumstances, at the outset, we have to decide, as to, whether, the delay in filing the appeal by the appellant ought to be condoned or not. 8. While considering this question, we have construed this appeal to have been filed under Section 74(1) of 2013 Act though in the memorandum of appeal it is stated as Section 54(1 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... de of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Explanation.--The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section." x x x "29. Savings.--(1) Nothing in this Act shall affect section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872). (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. (3) Save as otherwise ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... pplicant has been prosecuting in good faith his application for such leave shall be excluded, and the court may, on payment of the court fees prescribed for such suit or appeal, treat the suit or appeal as having the same force and effect as if the court fees had been paid in the first instance. 14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction.--(1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from de ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... son being aggrieved by an award passed by the reference Court. Right to file an appeal: 13. It is a settled position of law that the right to file an appeal is a statutory right or a creature of the statute and no other right to file an appeal can be recognized de hors a statute. A right of appeal is a creature of statute and no appeal can be filed unless it is clearly expressed in terms of a statute. Further, the right of appeal is a substantive right and not merely a matter of procedure. It is a vested right which can be exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced. Though it exists from the date the lis commences, such right is governed by the law prevailing on the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails on the date of its decision or on the date of the filing of the appeal, vide Garikapati Veeraya vs. N. Subbaiah Chaudhry, [AIR 1957 SC 540] (Garikapati Veeraya). 14. In Anant Mills Company Limited vs. State of Gujarat, [AIR 1975 SC 1234 : (1975) 2 SCC 175] (Anant Mills Company), it has been held that though the right of appeal is a creature of a statute, there is no reason why the legislature while granting the right cannot impo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time." 18. In State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Pradeep Kumar, [(2000) 7 SCC 372] (Pradeep Kumar), on the question of a belated appeal being unaccompanied b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the submission of the learned senior counsel and learned counsel for the respondent is that beyond the period of one hundred and twenty days (120 days) from the date of the award no appeal is maintainable and cannot be entertained by the High Court. 20. As already noted, in the instant case, the application has been filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act by the appellant herein seeking condonation of delay of seventy-five days (75 days) in filing the appeal. In this regard, learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act to contend that even if the appeal has been filed beyond the extended period of sixty days i.e., beyond one hundred and twenty days from the date of the award, the High Court has the power to condone the delay in filing the appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and that under Section 29 of the Limitation Act, Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act are not excluded from being applied to Section 74 of 2013 Act and thus, Section 29 of the Limitation Act has to be considered. Hence, the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is maintainable and may be considered and allowed. 21. Sub-sec ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the Limitation Act. Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act essentially deal with computation of period of limitation under certain circumstances and in substance excludes time from the prescribed period of limitation. It is not necessary to go into the details of those sections at this stage, except to highlight the fact that Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law and in the instant case to appeals. 23. Hence, the question in the instant case is, whether Section 74(1) of 2013 Act, which is a special law prescribing a different period of limitation than as prescribed under the schedule to the Limitation Act, in terms of Section 3 of the Limitation Act excludes the application of Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act and particularly Section 5 thereof? In other words, if on a reading and interpretation of Section 74(1) of 2013 Act it is held that Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act are expressly excluded, then there cannot be any extension of time or condonation of delay as sought for by the appellant under Section 5 of the Limitation Ac ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tation Act, 1963 was made and the question was whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act was applicable. It was observed that even if the Limitation Act was applicable to election petitions under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, whether Section 5 thereof particularly was excluded from application in the case of an election petition. It was contended in the said case that the words 'expressly excluded' would mean that there must be an "express reference" made in a special or local law to the specific provision of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. But, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that what has to be seen is whether the scheme of the special law and the nature of remedy provided therein are such that the Legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. If, on an examination of the relevant provisions, it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act and particularly Section 5 thereof, are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the special law. That in a case where the special law does ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n within a further period of thirty days, "but not thereafter". Interpreting the expression "but not thereafter" used in the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 34, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the said phrase would amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and would, therefore, bar the application of Section 5 of the Act. It was held that the expression "but not thereafter" clearly meant that an application to set aside the award beyond the extended period under the provision to Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act was sufficient indication of the exclusion. In the circumstances, after going through the history and scheme of the Arbitration Act, it was held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act was not applicable to an application challenging an award under Section 34 of the said Act beyond the extended period and the question was answered in the negative. 29. Nasiruddin vs. Sita Ram Agarwal, [(2003) 2 SCC 577] (Nasiruddin), has also been cited by the respondent. In the said case, the controversy was as regards the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the matter of default in deposit of rent under Section 1 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f Sections 5 to Section 42 of the Limitation Act to the provisions of the said Act. 31. Singh Enterprises vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur, [(2008) 3 SCC 70] (Singh Enterprises) considered the expression "sufficient cause" and elucidated on the same. The said expression is found in Section 5 of the Limitation Act and also other special statutes which prescribe a specific period of limitation and thereafter, a further grace period within which an appeal or any other proceedings could be filed. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that sufficient cause therein means adequate or enough. There cannot be any straight jacket formula for accepting or rejecting the explanation offered for condoning the delay caused in taking steps. It was also observed that when a statute prescribes a particular period of limitation, the Court cannot direct condonation of delay beyond that specific period; in such an event, the specific provision providing for limitation would be rendered otiose. 32. Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise, Noida vs. Punjab Fibres Limited, Noida, [(2008) 3 SCC 73] (Punjab Fibres Limited) also considered the question whether the High Court has power to con ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... said case, His Lordship, Raveendran J. gave a separate but concurring opinion. His Lordship referred to Section 43 of the Arbitration Act to hold that Section 43 makes an express reference to the Limitation Act both in the Court and in arbitration. That there is also no express exclusion by an application of the provision of the Limitation Act to the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. But, there are some specific departures from the general provisions of Limitation Act, such as, the proviso to section 34(3) and sub-sections (2) to (4) of Section 43 of the Act. His Lordship observed that where the schedule to the Limitation Act prescribes a period of limitation for appeals or applications to any court, and the special or local law provides for filing of appeals and applications to the Court, but does not prescribe any period of limitation in regard to such appeals or applications, the period of limitation prescribed in the Schedule to the Limitation Act will apply to such appeals or applications and consequently the provisions of sections 4 to 24 will also apply. But, where the special or local law prescribes for any appeal or application, a period of limitation different from t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on Act and Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it was observed that they both vest a discretion in a court to extend the prescribed period of limitation if the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within the prescribed period. Section 5 of Limitation Act does not place any outer limit in regard to the period of extension, whereas the proviso to sub-section 3 of section 34 of the Arbitration Act places a limit on the period of extension of the period of limitation. It differs in regard to period of extension and it has the effect of excluding section 5 alone of the Limitation Act. Hence, it was held that having regard to Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, Section 14 of the Act would be applicable to an application under Section 34(1) of Arbitration Act. Even when there is cause to apply Section 14, the limitation period continues to be three months and not more, but in computing the limitation period of three months for the application under section 34(1) of the Arbitration Act, the time during which the applicant was prosecuting such application before the wrong court is excluded, provided the proceeding in the wrong court was pro ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eyond the prescribed period of 180 days. After referring to the scheme of the Central Excise Act (special law) and the nature of remedy provided therein, it was held that the said enactment was a complete Code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. It is observed there that if, on an examination of the relevant provisions, it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. It was further observed that even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the court to examine whether and to what extent, the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation. In other words, the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act has to be judged not from the terms of the Limitation Act but by the provisions of the special enactment (Central Excise Act in the said case) relating to filing of reference application to the High Court. After conside ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... may file an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal, to him, on any one or more of the grounds specified in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908). The proviso states that the Supreme Court may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days. 39. At this stage itself, it may be stated that the proviso to Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act is similar to the proviso to Section 125 of the Electricity Act. But, the main Section under Section 125 of the said Act prescribes a limitation of sixty days from the date of the communication of the decision or order by the appellate tribunal to an aggrieved party. Under Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act, the limitation period prescribed is sixty days from the date of the award and not from the date of the communication of the award. After considering Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act in light of Section 125 of the Electricity Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the scheme of Electricity Act a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... clear that the said decision ultimately affects the rights of the owner of the property and in that sense, like all decisions which affect persons, it is essentially fair and just that the said decision should be communicated to the said party. The knowledge of the party affected by such a decision, either actual or constructive, is an essential element which must be satisfied before the decision can be brought into force. Thus considered the making of the award cannot consist merely in the physical act of writing the award or signing it or even filing it in the office of the Collector; it must involve the communication of the said award to the party concerned either actually or constructively. If the award is pronounced in the presence of the party whose rights are affected by it, it can be said to be made when pronounced. If the date for the pronouncement of the award is communicated to the party and it is accordingly pronounced on the date previously announced the award is said to be communicated to the said party even if the said party is not actually present on the date of its pronouncement. Similarly if without notice of the date of its pronouncement an award is pronounced a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... iven case, the date of putting the order in communication under certain circumstances may be taken to be the date of the communication of the order or the date of the order but ordinarily and generally speaking, the order would be effective against the person affected by it only when it comes to his knowledge either directly or constructively, otherwise not. On the facts stated in the judgment of the High Court, it is clear that the respondent had no means to know about the order of the Taxation Officer rejecting his prayer until and unless he received his letter on October 29, 1964. Within the meaning of Section 15 of the U.P. Motor Vehicle Taxation Act that was the date of the order which gave the starting point for preferring an appeal within 30 days of that date." 42. Similarly, in Muthiah Chettiar vs. CIT, [AIR 1951 Mad 204] (Muthiah Chettiar), it was observed that "if a person is given a right to resort to the remedy to get rid of an adverse order within a prescribed time, limitation should not be computed from a date earlier than that on which the party aggrieved actually knew of the order or had an opportunity of knowing the order & therefore, must be presumed to have had ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... peal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days. In the said case, the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act also came up for consideration. It was held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act could not be invoked or otherwise, it would tantamount to amendment of the legislative mandate by which the special period of limitation has been prescribed. But, the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act was not excluded. Hence, it could be available where an aggrieved party may have prosecuted with due diligence a remedy before a wrong forum, but on facts, the benefit of Section 14 was not made available to the appellant therein. 46. In M.P. Steel Corporation vs. C.C.E., [(2015) 7 SCC 58] (M.P. Steel Corporation), it was held that Section 14 of the Limitation Act contains a principle based on advancing the cause of justice, it would certainly apply to exclude time taken in prosecuting proceedings which are bona fide and with due diligence pursued, which ultimately end without a decision on the merits of the case. The same has been applied to the provisions of Arbitration Act which also contains a provision similar to Section ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e the delay in filing the appeal under Section 25(1) of the SICA, 1985 beyond the period prescribed thereunder and Section 5 of the Limitation Act was excluded from its applicability beyond sixty days enacted in the said provision. It was further held that the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, cannot permit or direct an infraction by the authorities created by a statute and that an adjudicatory or appellate authority cannot be directed to breach the provision of limitation prescribed under Section 25(1) of SICA, 1985. 49. In Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited vs. Gujarat Energy Transmission Corporation Limited and Others, [(2017) 5 SCC 42] (ONGC Limited), while considering Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held, when there is a statutory command by the legislation as regards the limitation there is the postulate that delay can be condoned for a further period not exceeding sixty days, needless to say, it is based on certain underlined, fundamental, general issues of public policy. That when there is a special adjudicatory forum meant for expeditious decision on the grievance of a person, t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e question that arose was the applicability of Section 17 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay caused on account of alleged fraud played on the objector (party challenging the award), beyond the period prescribed under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act. In the said case, there was a delay in filing the suit and an application under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act was filed. The trial court had dismissed the said suit/application stating that it was filed beyond the limitation period stipulated under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. But the High Court had remanded the matter by stating that the trial court had not considered the applicability or otherwise of Section 17 of the Limitation Act which deals with the effect of fraud or mistake on the period of limitation. Aggrieved by the remand order, the appellants therein had approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the exclusion of Section 17 was necessarily implied on a reading of the scheme and object of the Arbitration Act. Firstly, the purpose of the Arbitration Act was to provide for a speedy dispute resolution process. Secondly, extending Section 17 of the Limitation Ac ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e Hon'ble Supreme Court while distinguishing Partap Singh vs. Directorate of Enforcement, [(1985) 2 SCC 72], which dealt with Section 37(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 and Mangu Ram vs. MCD [(1976) 1 SCC 392], and by following other decisions such as in the case of Popular Construction Company, ONGC Limited and Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board, held that Section 421(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 does not merely contain the initial period of 45 days being for filing an appeal, but also goes on to state that another period of 45 days, being a grace period, given by the Legislature cannot be exceeded, provided sufficient cause is made out within the aforesaid grace period to entertain the appeal. That the grace period of 45 days, being a special in-built kind of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, has been incorporated. It is under a special statute namely, Companies Act, 2013, which means that beyond the second period of 45 days, there can be no further condonation of delay. Emphasis was laid on the expression "not exceeding 45 days" in the proviso to Section 421(3) of the Companies Act, 2013, to state that it would have the same effect as the expression "but no ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... l noted that the appellant therein had sought condonation of delay of 314 days in filing the appeal and further delay of 44 days in re-filing the appeal. It was held that the appellant had proved sufficient cause for the delay in filing and re-filing the appeal and condoned the same. Further, this judgment is contrary to the judgment of the Kerala High Court where the delay of 164 days in filing the appeal was not condoned and the appeal was dismissed as not maintainable. 56. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Abdul Ghafoor and Another v. State of Bihar, [(2011) 14 SCC 465] (Abdul Ghafoor), observed that the law of limitation indeed must get due respect and observance by all courts. But in cases of conviction and imposition of sentence of imprisonment, the court must show far greater indulgence and flexibility in applying the law of limitation than in any other kind of case. 57. In Simplex Infrastructure Limited vs. Union of India [(2019) 2 SCC 455] (Simplex Infrastructure Limited) also it has been held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no application to a suit/application filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. But Section 14 of the Limitation Act applies to Section ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ding acquisition of property under the eminent domain doctrine. Entry No. 42 of List-III of the VII Schedule deals with "acquisitioning and requisitioning of property". The doctrine of eminent domain means that the person has a inherent or natural right to property irrespective of any Constitutional guarantee but the State has the power to over-ride the said natural right by compulsorily acquiring such property in exercise of its sovereign power of eminent domain provided the acquisition is made for a public purpose and the State pays the compensation to the expropriated owner. [Source: "Commentary on the Constitution of India" by Dr. Durga Das Basu, 8th Edition, Volume 8, 2011, Art. 300A] Payment of compensation must be just, fair and reasonable and not a mirage and under the 2013 Act, the object and recognition is a right to fair compensation. 61. Thus, the right of a land-loser to seek a just and fair compensation as recognized under Article 300A of the Constitution by filing an appeal to the High Court must be considered in the light of the appellate remedy being circumscribed by the law of limitation. As already noted, it is a settled position that a right of appeal is a subs ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e aforesaid objects, the 2013 Act has been enforced with effect from 01/01/2014, wherein several time-lines have been prescribed under various Sections in order to mitigate the difficulties of a land-loser and also, at the same time, be conscious of the requirement of land for developmental purposes whether infrastructural or other such purposes, including socio-economic purposes, which are public purposes. Chapter II of the said Act deals with determination of social impact and public purpose. It is in two parts: part-A deals with preliminary investigation for determination of social impact and public purpose, while part-B deals with appraisal of social impact assessment report by an expert group. The second proviso to Section 4 states that the appropriate Government shall ensure the completion of the Social Impact Assessment study within a period of six months from the date of its commencement. The said assessment must be made by the appropriate Government by issuance of a notification for commencement of consultation and the social Impact Assessment study. 63. Under Section 7 of the Act, the appropriate Government shall ensure that the Social Impact Assessment report is evaluat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ce a land is notified under sub-section (1) of section 11, any person interested in such land may within sixty days from the date of the publication of the preliminary notification, object to-- (a) the area and suitability of the land proposed to be acquired; (b) justification offered for public purpose; (c) the findings of the Social Impact Assessment report; after the objection are heard, the Government shall take a decision on the same. 66. Further, Section 16 of the Act pertains to the preparation of Rehabilitation and Resettlement Scheme by the Administrator. The Draft Scheme must include a time limit for implementing the said scheme. When the appropriate Government is satisfied that any particular land is need for public purpose, a declaration should be made to that effect. Such a declaration must be made within a period of twelve months from the date of publication of preliminary notification under Section 11. If no such declaration is made within the said twelve months, then such notification issued under Section 11(1) shall be deemed to have been rescinded. The appropriate Government has the power to extend the period of twelve months if in its opinion circumstances exist ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... compensation as well as rehabilitation and resettlement entitlements are paid or tendered to the entitled persons within a period of three months for the compensation and a period of six months for the monetary part of rehabilitation and resettlement entitlements listed in the Second Schedule commencing from the date of the award made under section 30. However, the components of the Rehabilitation and Resettlement Package in the Second and Third Schedules that relate to infrastructural entitlements shall be provided within a period of eighteen months from the date of the award. In the case of acquisition of land for irrigation or hydel project, being a public purpose, the rehabilitation and resettlement shall be completed six months prior to submergence of the lands acquired. 71. Under section 64(1), any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Authority, the Collector shall, within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of application, make a reference to the appropriate Authority and if the Collector fails to make such reference within ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... significant to note that any appeal filed under Section 74(1) of the Act to the High Court must be heard expeditiously and an endeavor must be made to dispose of such appeal within six months date of which it was presented to the High Court. Object and purpose of Limitation Act: 74. As a preface to the matter under discussion, paragraphs 12 and 13 of Basavaraj vs. Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81] (Basavaraj) could be cited as under: "12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been hel ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... was observed by a Constitution Bench of this Court that, if there is any hardship, it is for the legislature to amend the law, and that the Court cannot be called upon, to discard the cardinal rule of interpretation for the purpose of mitigating such hardship. If the language of an Act is sufficiently clear, the Court has to give effect to it, however, inequitable or unjust the result may be. The words, 'dura lex sed lex' which mean "the law is hard but it is the law." may be used to sum up the situation. Therefore, even if a statutory provision causes hardship to some people, it is not for the Court to amend the law. A legal enactment must be interpreted in its plain and literal sense, as that is the first principle of interpretation. 25. In Mysore State Electricity Board v. Bangalore Woolen, Cotton & Silk Mills Ltd. & Ors., AIR 1963 SC 1128 a Constitution Bench of this Court held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 26. In Martin Burn Ltd. v. The Corporation of Calcutta, AIR 1966 SC 529, this Court, while dealing with the same issue observed as under:- "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o have said or done was. The Courts have to administer the law as they find it, and it is not permissible for the Court to twist the clear language of the enactment, in order to avoid any real, or imaginary hardship which such literal interpretation may cause. 29. In view of the above, it becomes crystal clear that, under the garb of interpreting the provision, the Court does not have the power to add or subtract even a single word, as it would not amount to interpretation, but legislation." 76. At this stage, it is necessary to delineate on the object and purpose of the Limitation Act, 1963. The said Act consolidates and amends the law of limitation of suits, appeals and applications and for purposes connected therewith. The law of limitation is an adjective law containing procedural rules and do not create any right in favour of any person, but simply prescribes that the remedy can be exercised only up to a certain period and not beyond. The Limitation Act therefore does not confer any substantive right nor define any right or cause of action. The law of limitation is based on delay and laches. It is well known that the Limitation Act only bars the remedy without extinguishing ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... visions of Section 4 of the Limitation Act. Section 4 does not extend or enlarge the period of limitation, but such a provision has been made having regard to the practicality of the matter. 80. Section 5 of the Limitation Act deals with extension of prescribed period in certain cases. The moot point in the instant case is, whether having regard to Section 74 of 2013 Act, whether Section 5 of the Act is excluded. Section 5 states that an appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the Court that he has sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. By way of explanation, it is stated that the fact that an appellant or applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section. Section 5 of the Limitation Act may be contrasted with Section 74 of the 2013 Act. 81. Under Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act it is stated that a person aggrieved may ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ting the period of limitation for, inter alia, an appeal, the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded. Sub-section (2) of Section 12 states that in computing the period of limitation inter alia, for an appeal or an application for leave to appeal, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, award or order appealed from shall be excluded. Sub-section (3) states that where a decree or order is appealed from or where an application is made for leave to appeal from a decree or order, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment shall be excluded. Sub-section (4) states that in computing the period of limitation for an application to set aside an award, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded. Under the explanation it is stated that in computing the period under this section, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or an order, any time taken by the court to prepare the decree or order before an application for a copy thereof is made shall not be excluded. 84. Section 14 deals with exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in Court with ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... High Court. 85. Even though the High Court may be one for the State, but as far as State of Karnataka is concerned, there are three Benches and territorial jurisdiction are assigned to the Principal Bench at Bengaluru and the Benches at Dharwad and Kalaburagi and hence, time spent in prosecution of an appeal before a Bench not having competency to deal with the appeal and being transferred to another Bench or being returned to be re-filed before the appropriate Bench or if the appeal being withdrawn before a particular Bench to be re-filed before the competent Bench, before the Bench not having competency to deal with the matter would have to be inevitably excluded in a case when the appeal is represented or re-filed before the competent Bench. Thus, under Section 14 of the Limitation Act seeking exclusion of time spent in prosecuting the appeal before a Court or Bench not having the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the same would apply. Similarly, having regard to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the High Court and District Court time spent in an appeal bona fide prosecuted before the District Court when it had to be prosecuted before the High Court has to be excluded while consider ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Limitation Act which are applicable to appeals would apply to Section 74 of the 2013 Act having regard to Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. While on a consideration of the scheme of the 2013 Act, in light of the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is held that Section 5 of the Act does not apply, it is necessary to consider as to whether Sections 4 and 12 to 14 would apply. Thus, the interpretation is to be placed on the expression "within sixty days from the date of the Award" in Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act. Does it mean that the said period of sixty days must be calculated in a mechanical or pedantic manner or in a practical way? If Section 12 of the Limitation Act is considered, it is noted that in computing the period of limitation for any appeal, the day from which such period is to be reckoned has to be excluded i.e., date of the award in the instant case. In other words, the day on which the judgment i.e., the Award in the instant case, was made or drawn has to be excluded. This is also having regard to Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1899. The time taken for preparing the certified copy of the Award sought to be appealed against, has to be excluded. If ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... computing the period of limitation for filing an appeal under Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act, the time spent in prosecuting bona fide with due diligence an appeal before an appellate court not being the competent court in good faith has to be excluded. In fact, Section 14 of the Limitation Act has been made applicable to Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act in the cases of Popular Construction Limited, Consolidated Engineering Enterprises, Ketan, Western Builders, Simplex Infrastructure Limited and such other cases where provisions similar to Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act have been considered. 92. Thus, there can be no exception to the period of limitation to file an appeal to the High Court and the 60 days has to be computed after application of Sections 12, 13 and 14 of the Limitation Act. In other words, while applying the period of limitation prescribed under Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act in the matter of filing an appeal to the High Court against the judgment and Award of the reference court, while considering as to whether the appeal filed is within the period of 60 days, the exclusion of time as envisaged under Sections 12, 13 and 14 must be made applicable. In our view, suc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... date of the award. If the limitation period of sixty days is calculated mechanically, then the period of sixty days from 27/11/2018 would end on 26/01/2019. The said date being a holiday (Republic Day) and 27/01/2019 being Sunday, the appeal had to be filed on or before 25/01/2019 in terms of Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act de hors Section 4 of the Limitation Act. But, the expression used is "within sixty days from the date of the Award". It does not mean, fifty-nine days, it means sixty days. That means, on the sixtieth day also, from the date of the award, the appeal could be filed after excluding the day of making of the award. But, if the sixtieth day happens to be a holiday, as in the instant case which was 26/01/2019 (Republic Day), then the appeal could be filed on next working day i.e., on 28/01/2019 (27/01/2019 being Sunday) under sub-section (1) of Section 74 of the 2013 Act, if Section 4 of the Limitation Act is applied. Hence, the said period of 60 days cannot be considered mechanically, but by also applying Section 4 of the Limitation Act as the same applies to Section 74(1) of 2013 Act. 94. Similarly, application of Section 12 of the Limitation Act would have to be co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he appeal within sixty days from the date of the award after excluding the day on which the Award was made and the time taken for preparation of the certified copy. In the instant case, the date on which certified copy of the award was applied for, was within the period of sixty days and it was also ready within the said period and the appellant was also to appear within the period of sixty days and it was also ready within the said period and the appellant was also to appear within the period of sixty days. But it is not written in the certified copy of the impugned award as to when the appellant appeared and when the certified copy was actually delivered to the appellant in the absence of any noting of the same in the certified copy. In the absence of there being any date indicated in the certified copy produced by the appellant herein as to when the certified copy was actually delivered to the appellant, the question is whether the benefit of the same must be given to the appellant herein. We do not think so. The appellant could have collected the certified copy on 10/12/2018 or any date subsequent thereto so as to file the appeal on or before 28/01/2019 or even within the furth ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... port of the application seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal in order to ascertain the real reason for the delay in not filing the appeal in time and as per Section 74(1) of 2013 Act. The relevant portion of it reads as under: "4. I submit that pursuant to the order, the present Appeal is filed on the grounds which are urged in the Appeal. It is further submitted that the opinion of the District Government Pleader was required in the process and upon the opinion of the Law Department as well as the Office of the Special Land Acquisition Officer, had discuss the case and it was direction of the Government that the Appeal to be filed has the award passed is illegal, arbitrary and extensive. Hence, the correspondence between one office to other office have consumed hence bonafide delay. 5. I submit that after the order of the Trial Judge an opinion was sought from the Government Pleader, Office of the District Government Pleader, Bengaluru and there was delay in obtaining certified copy of the judgment, further more the Law Officer had also requested the certified copy of the evidence and cross-examination of the case below, again the District Government Pleader had a ..... 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