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TMI Blog1981 (4) TMI 86X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... er certain questions of law said to be arising out of the order of the Tribunal) to the High Court. Sub-s. (1) of s. 60 of the Act requires an application for reference to be submitted, to the Tribunal within sixty days of the date upon which a copy of the order of the Tribunal is served on the applicant. The last day for presenting the reference application before the Tribunal in all these cases was on December 16, 1976. The applications were sent by registered post from Trivandrum on December 14, 1976, but were received in the office of the Tribunal only on December 20, 1976. The Tribunal dismissed the reference applications on the ground that the applications are not presented within the time allowed by sub-s. (1) of S. 60 of the Act and the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to condone the delay in presenting the applications for reference. The order of the Tribunal dismissing the applications for reference in each of these cases is produced as annex. " A " in these original petitions. It is on dismissal of the applications for reference that these original petitions have been filed by the Commr. of Agrl. I.T., before this court under sub-s. (4) of S. 60 of the Act to direct the Appe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... peal sent by registered post under sub-regulation (1) shall be deemed to have been presented to the Secretary on the day on which it is received in the office of the tribunal. (3) Every principal application by an assessee shall specify the Kerala State as the respondent. (4) When such an application is filed by the Commissioner or other officer he shall describe Kerala State as the applicant. Regulation 28(2) is as follows: 28. Application for reference under sub-section (1) of section 60 of the Act.-... (2) Regulations 20, 21, 26, 29 and 30 shall apply, mutatis mutandis to an application under sub-section (1) of section 60. " Regulation 20 provides for the presentation of every memorandum of appeal, application and other documents in person or to be sent by registered post to the Secretary of the Tribunal. Clause (2) of regulation 20 specifically states that a memorandum of appeal sent by registered post shall be deemed to have been presented to the Secretary on the date on which it is received in the office of the Tribunal. The contention of the learned Advocate-General that cl. (2) of regln. 20 applies only to memorandum of appeal sent by registered post and n ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... special or local law." The contention is that the provisions contained in ss. 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act shall apply also in respect of the period of limitation prescribed by any local or special law in so far as these provisions are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. Section 5 of the Limitation Act is as follows: " Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Explanation.-The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period-may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section." If, therefore, the applicant is able to make out that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the application within the period fixed by the Act, the Tribunal, it is contended, has jurisdiction to condone the delay and entertain the application. Strong reliance is placed on ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the judicial Committee was followed by this court in the case of Additional Collector of Customs v. Best and Co., AIR 1966 SC 1713." The Supreme Court accordingly held that S. 12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, applies in respect of a revision under S. 10 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act and the time taken for obtaining a copy of the appellate order which is the subject of revision will be excluded in computing the period of limitation for revision. The learned Advocate-General has referred to the decision of a Division Bench of this court in K. K. Ibrahimkutty v. State of Kerala-T.R.C. Nos. 35 to 38 of 1976. There the question was whether the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal had jurisdiction to excuse the delay in filing. a memorandum of cross-objections. In that case, this court held that the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal has, under S. 39 of the Sales Tax Act, the jurisdiction to condone the delay, and the Tribunal was wrong in dismissing the memorandum of cross-objections on the ground that the application to excuse delay was not maintainable. In para. 2 of the judgment, Gopalan Nambiyar C.J., stated as follows: 2. Counsel for the revision petitioner cited to us the decision of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... so to appeals, applications, etc., to tribunals other than courts, In Commr. of Sales Tax v. Parson Tools and Plants [1975] 35 STC 413 (SC), the question was whether s.'14(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, can be invoked for excluding the time spent in prosecuting an application under r. 68(6) of the U. P. Sales Tax Rules in computing the period of limitation for filing a revision under the Act. After quoting S. 14(2) of the Limitation Act, the Supreme Court held at p. 416 as follows: " It will be seen that this sub-section will apply only if (1) both the prior and subsequent proceedings are civil proceedings prosecuted by the same party ; (2) the prior proceedings had been prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith; (3) the failure of the prior proceedings was due to a defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature ; (4) both the proceedings are proceedings in a court. Mr. Karkhanis, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, does not dispute the view taken by the High Court that the proceedings in question under the Sales Tax Act could be deemed as 'civil proceedings'. The learned counsel, however, contends that the authorities, irrespective ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... osal of revenue matters adversely affects the steady inflow of revenues and the financial stability of the State. Section 10 is therefore designed to ensure speedy and final determination of fiscal matters within a reasonably certain time schedule. Section 5 of the Limitation Act empowers the court to condone delay, if the court is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within the period of limitation. Section 14 empowers the court to exclude the time spent in bona fide prosecuting another civil proceeding in another court which from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, was unable to entertain the same. Both these provisions empower the court to extend the period of limitation in the circumstances mentioned therein. Sections 5 and 14 can be relied on for extension of time in respect of a proceeding in court and not before a Tribunal or other authority, under any local or special law. Section 12 of the Limitation Act on the other hand relates to the computation of the period of limitation and does not restrict its scope and applicability to proceedings in court alone. On its terms, the provisions of s. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the contingency when the prescribed period for any application expires on holiday and the only contingency contemplated is 'when the court is closed'. Again under section 5 it is only a court which is enabled to admit an application after the prescribed period has expired if the court is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the application. It seems to us that the scheme of the Indian Limitation Act is that it only deals with applications to courts, and that the Labour Court is not court within the Indian Limitation Act 1963." In Jokkim Fernandez v. Amina Kunhi Umma [1973] KLT 138; AIR 1974 Ker 162, a Full Bench of this court has held that s. 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to proceedings before the appellate authority under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. Referring to the contention that s. 5 applies by virtue of the provisions of s. 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, the majority judgment of the Full Bench stated as follows (p. 166 of AIR 1974 Ker): " I am afraid the above contention must fail. It has been ruled that the Limitation Act, 1963, applies only to courts and prescribes periods of limitations in respect of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hile, in the new Act of 1963, the long title is " An Act to consolidate and amend the law for the Limitation of suits and other proceedings and for purposes connected therewith In the long title, thus, the words " other proceedings " have been added; but we do not think that this addition necessarily implies that the Limitation Act is intended to govern proceedings before any authority, whether executive or quasi-judicial, when, earlier, the old Act was intended to govern proceedings before civil courts only. It is also true that the preamble which existed in the old Limitation Act of 1908 has been omitted in the new Act of 1963. The omission of the preamble does not, however, indicate that there was any intention of the legislature to change the purposes for which the Limitation Act has been enforced. The Bombay High Court also attached importance to the circumstance that the scope of the new Limitation Act has been enlarged by changing the definition of " applicant " in s. 2(a) of the new Act so as to include even a petitioner and the word " Application " so as to include a petition. The question still remains whether this alteration can be held to be intended to cover petitions ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Limitation Act applies only to courts and that consequently s. 5 had no application to an appellate authority under the Act, as it is not a court but only a Persona designata. [1973] KLT 138 has itself been followed in S. Ganapathi v. N. Kumaraswami, AIR 1975 Mad 383, for the same purpose. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, therefore, creates no problem. " Section 69 of the Agricultural Income-tax Act (Kerala Act 22 of 1950) is as follows : " 69. Computation of period of limitation.-In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any appeal under this Act or for any application under section 60, the date on which the order complained of was made and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of such order shall be excluded. " Section 69 of the Act indicates that the provisions of ss. 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act are not attracted to proceedings under the Act, and that the Act is intended to be a self-contained code in the matter of prescribing the periods of limitation for proceedings under the Act. The special provision in S. 69 of the Act would be unnecessary if S. 29(2) were to attract section 12 of the Limitation Act. There was no similar provision in the U. P. Sales ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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