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TMI Blog2010 (3) TMI 1291X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hereinafter referred to as Resolution No. 106/1995) wherein it is resolved that the Secretary of the Bar Council will be paid the scale of pay of District Judge with admissible allowances applicable to the post from time to time, with effect from 01/01/1995. Narration of brief facts of the case will be beneficial in the context. The petitioner was appointed on the scale of pay of Rs. 800-25-900-30-1200. By Resolution No. 57/91 dt. 07/04/1991 (hereinafter referred to as Resolution No. 57/91) in the scale of pay was enhanced to Rs. 2640-85-2725-100-2925-125-3675-140-3815, with effect from 01/04/1990. This, according to the petitioner, is by way of equating the post of Secretary with that of the Subordinate Judge in the judicial service. The scale of pay of the Secretary was again re-fixed through Resolution No. 106/95, which is extracted as follows: Resolved that the Secretary be paid the scale of pay of District Judge of Rs. 5100-150-5700 with admissible DA, HRA, CCA applicable to the post from time to time, with effect from 01/01/1995. Thereafter State Government ordered hike in pay scale of Government servants, through GO (P) No. 3000798/Fin. dt. 25/11/1998, based on which Bar ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... A, on 01/09/2001. One of the members of the sub committee had specifically pointed out that the words 'from time to time' appearing in Resolution No. 106/95 qualifies only to the admissible DA, HRA and CCA applicable to the post, and not to the pay scale applicable to the post of District Judge. It is held that Resolution No. 106/95 can only be interpreted in the manner as, the pay scale will remain static till revised by the Bar Council. The Bar Council which met on 11/09/2004 and 09/10/2004 had approved the report of the sub committee and rejected claim of the petitioner. The decision was intimated to the petitioner through Ext. P4. A subsequent representation to review the decision was also declined through Ext. P5. It is against rejection of the claim that the writ petition is filed. 2. In the writ petition, the Bar Council contended that the benefit arising out of GO 231/01 will be applicable to the post of its Secretary, only if it is approved by the Bar Council and since a different pay scale was fixed for the successor in office of the petitioner, it is a clear indication that the Bar Council has not adopted pay revision as enumerated in GO No. 231/01. Hence it is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r counsel for the appellant the Bar Council and Sri. T.P. Kelu Nambiar, learned senior counsel for the respondent. Our attention was drawn by Sri. Ravindran to the relevant provisions of the Advocates Act, 1961 and the Bar Council of Kerala Rules, 1979. Section 15 of the Advocates Act deals with power of the Bar Council to make Rules. As per Section 15(2)(k) the Bar Council is entitled to formulate Rules providing qualifications and conditions of service of the Secretary, Accountant, and the other employees of the Bar Council. Chapter VII of the Bar Council of Kerala Rules, 1979 deals with the Service Rules. Rule (1) of Chapter VII reads as follows: (1). The Council shall have on its establishment a Secretary who may be full time or part time as the Council may decide. The Council may also appoint such staff as may be decided from time to time. Scale of pay for the staff shall be decided by the Council from time to time. Rules 3 to 6 of the Bar Council of Kerala Rules, 1979 deals with the qualifications, tenure of office, remuneration, duties and powers of the Secretary of the Bar Council. Rule 4 of the said Rule is extracted below: (4). Tenure of Office and Remuneration.--T ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... entitled for any revision of the pay scale, unless and until the Bar Council specifically decides such revision, is the contention. Therefore the learned senior counsel strongly assailed findings of the learned Single Judge to the extent of it holding that the petitioner is entitled for arrears based on revision of pay scale brought in through GO No. 231/01. It was strongly contended that the wordings of Resolution No. 106/95 cannot be interpreted in any manner as to having any effect of permanent fixation of the pay scale of the Secretary of the Bar Council as that of the District Judge, which will be subject to revision from time to time. On the other hand it is contended that equating of the pay scale of the District Judge by Resolution No. 106/95 was only intended for the purpose of fixing pay scale of the Secretary at that time. Or in other words it is adopted only as criteria to arrive at a particular scale of pay at that time. It was contended that the wording 'from time to time' will qualify only the allowances such as DA, HRA and CCA and will not qualify the 'pay scale' fixed through that resolution. It was also contended that even assuming, without admitti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... (1) KHC 20 : 2010 (1) KLT 161 : ILR 2010 (1) Ker. 13 it is held that the contention regarding discrimination can be raised, if only equals are treated unequally. The service conditions of employees of the Government and that of various Government companies, statutory Boards etc., are different. There cannot be any comparison of service benefits granted to the employees working under various employers for considering violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. Based on the above principle it was argued that the petitioner is not entitled for any benefit merely because Government have revised pay scale of the judicial officers. 8. Lastly, the learned senior counsel for the appellant argued that the writ petition itself is not maintainable, because the relief claimed pertains purely with respect to a personal benefit for which there is no statutory backing. It was contended that no infringement of fundamental rights of the petitioner nor any violation of statutory provision is alleged in the writ petition, and therefore invoking powers under Article 226 of the Constitution is not permissible on the factual matrix of the case. 9. Sri. T.P. Kelu Nambiar, learned senior counsel appear ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... takes specific resolution to adopt the same. Moreover we are of the opinion that contentions raised on behalf of the appellant are legal in nature based on provisions of the relevant statutes, can always be permitted to be raised in appellate jurisdiction. 12. With respect to the contention regarding maintainability of the writ petition, we are not impressed upon by arguments of Sri. P. Ravindran. Claim of the petitioner is based on Resolution No. 106/95. According to him by virtue of the said resolution the Bar Council had adopted pay scale as that of the District Judges, and it is liable for automatic revision from time to time. So the claim for revision is raised as a matter of right on the support of a resolution adopted as prescribed under the statute. So it could not be held that the claim in the writ petition is not based on any statutory rights. Hence we are inclined to examine merits of the case based on the disputed contentions regarding claim of the petitioner. 13. Having considered the rival submissions, we are of the view that crux of the dispute is the statutory entitlement of the petitioner for the benefit claimed by him. It is evident that the qualification, tenur ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... xt. P3 representation. Since the decision taken by the special committee has been approved and adopted by the Bar Council, we find no infirmity, illegality or error in the decision taken as evidenced from Ext. P4 and P5. Since the petitioner could not claim the benefits demanded as a matter of right, statutory or otherwise the Bar Council was perfectly justified in its domain of powers to decline such benefits. Hence we are unable to agree with the findings rendered by the learned Single Judge. 14. In the result the Writ Appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment is hereby set aside and the writ petition is dismissed. 15. After preparing the judgment, before its pronouncement we made enquiries with both the senior counsel in the case regarding possibility of a settlement of the issue. Considering the lengthy service rendered by the writ petitioner as Secretary of the Bar Council and with a view to put quietus to the dispute, we made a suggestion to both sides to settle the issue by paying 50% of the monetary benefits arising out of the claim in dispute. Sri. Gopikrishnan Nambiar, who was instructing the senior counsel on behalf of the writ petitioner had informed us that, the petit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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