9911796707
TMI Blog1993 (2) TMI 111X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n order within that period also for the reasons set out in I.A. No. I and in the affidavit in support of the I.A., two weeks time is prayed for. The time shall stand extended by another two weeks from today. I.A. I is disposed of accordingly." 2. The contention of Shri Chander Kumar, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants is that on the expiry of three months from the date of receipt of the order dated 13-12-1990 passed in W. P. No. 21339 of 1989, the Collector ceased to have jurisdiction to adjudicate as he was granted time by this Court to adjudicate within three months from the date of receipt of the orders. Therefore, the Court had no jurisdiction to extend time for passing an order de novo; because on the expiry of three months a right was accrued to the appellants to seek refund of the amount of Rs. 28,52,556/- which was paid under protest before the order of adjudication was passed, and the same was set aside in the Writ Petition No. 21339 of 1989; that by reason of extension of time for passing the order, the right to seek refund of the said amount has been affected and it has rendered infructuous the Writ Petition No. 356 of 1993 filed by the appellants on 6-1-1 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... quashed. The matter is remanded to him to make a fresh order in accordance with law and after complying with the request made by the petitioner furnishing all the necessary extracts and other information referred to in the letter dated 25-7-1989 and suitably reply his letter. Since the petitioner has deposited the disputed duty even before ad- judication; the Collector is directed to make the de novo order within three months from the date of receipt of this order." 5. From the aforesaid order it is thus clear that the Collector was directed to adjudicate the matter within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the order because a sum of Rs. 28,00,000/- odd paid by the appellants earlier to the order of adjudication was with the Central Government. The Collector did not make adjudication within the time allowed by this Court. According to the respondents, the order of this Court was received on 7-1-1991. Thus the time granted by this Court expired on 7-4-1991. An application for extension of time was filed only on 24-1-1992. That application was considered and an order was passed, by this Court on 3rd November 1992 in the following terms: "In the circumstances ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the jurisdiction of this Court, this court will not be reviewing its earlier orders; it will only be enabling the authorities to exercise their jurisdiction. Such orders as observed by the Supreme Court are in essence procedural orders in terrorem to avoid dilatory tactics by me litigants and also to avoid delay on the part of the authorities, to complete the proceedings. They do not however completely estop the court from taking note of events and circumstances which happened within the time fixed. It is also relevant to notice that the, power to extend time from time to time vests in the court in order to do justice to the litigants, if sufficient cause is shown. (See Mahanth Ram Das v. Canga Das - AIR 1961 SC 882). At this stage, it may also be relevant to notice para-8 of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Shivdeo Singh and Others v. State of Punjab and Others [AIR 1963 SC 1909] which reads thus : "(8) The other contention of Mr. Gopal Singh pertains to the second order of Khosla, J., which, in effect, reviews his prior order. Learned counsel contends that Art. 226 of the Constitution does not confer any power on the High Court to review its own order and, therefore, the se ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t is granted is only the time for compliance with the direction issued in the earlier order, and such extension is necessary in order to do justice, as already pointed out above. Learned Counsel placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in P.N. Eswara Iyer Etc., v. The Registrar, Supreme Court of India [AlR 1980 S.C. 808] and contended that the review of Judgment is a serious step arid reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility; that a mere repetition, through different counsel, of old and overruled argument, a second trip over ineffectually covered ground or minor mistakes of inconsequential import are obviously insufficient; and that the very strict need for compliance with these factors is the rationale behind the insistence of counsel's certificate which should not be a routine affair or a habitual step. It is not possible to apply the aforesaid decision to the case on hand because, as we have already pointed out, it does not amount to review. The mere fact that the application was rejected on an earlier occasion will not in any way prevent the court to extend time on ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
