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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 28 Records
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1953 (10) TMI 48 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rned Official Liquidator that in this case, there with a change in the constitution of the Managing Agents and inasmuch as the change had not been recognised under. Section 87-BB, the Managing Agents ceased to function, and that therefore they became wholly incompetent to borrow any loan on behalf of the company. There is no evidence now placed before me as to the time or nature of the change in the constitution of the managing agency; and even otherwise, that may not make much difference, because the same result should flow, from the fact that prior to the present loans, a provisional liquidator was appointed. However, it is unnecessary to consider this question further; and it will be left open to the Official Liquidator to examine it in case the Andhra Bank chooses to prefer a claim as an ordinary creditor. 5. The application falls and is dismissed with costs of Official Liquidator and the contesting creditor, Messrs. Soundararajan & Co. Counsel's fee, ₹ 250.
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1953 (10) TMI 47 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... which the parties belong there was any such well-recognised practice or belief. The defendants in the written statement make no assertion about it. But on the other hand, the plaintiff in paragraph 12 of his plaint asserts that the - "Institution of samadhi and ceremonies connected with it are not usual in the community to which the parties belong". 14. Indeed it may be assumed that such a practice is not likely to grow up amongst Hindus where cremation and not burial of the dead is the normal practice, except probably as regards sannyasis and in certain dissident communities. We see no reason to think that the Madras decisions are erroneous in holding that perpetual dedication of property for worship at a tomb is not valid amongst Hindus. 15. We accordingly affirm the judgment of the High Court and dismiss the appeal but in the circumstances without costs. 16. Appeal dismissed 17. Agent for the appellant S. Subramanian 18. Agent for the respondent M. S. K. Aiyangar
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1953 (10) TMI 46 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... -4-1952 is admitted to be a mistake. The reference must accordingly be quashed as regards bonus for 1949-50. 18. The last point urged is that the Government had no Jurisdiction under Act 14 of 1947 to amend a reference made under Section 10, of the Act and that' accordingly the Memorandum No. 59079 dated 25-6-1952 amending the reference made on 24-3-1952 is without Jurisdiction. The objection is one of form and is without substance. It would have been open to the Government to make under Section 10 an Independent reference concerning any matter not covered by the previous reference. That it took the form of an amendment to the existing references & not an additional reference is a mere technicality which does not merit any interference in these proceedings. 19. In the result, there will be an order quashing the reference so far as bonus for 1949-50 is concerned. Save as aforesaid, the petition will be dismissed with costs, of the workers' advocate fee ₹ 250.
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1953 (10) TMI 45 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... mselves and refused to give the plaintiff his legitimate share. The High Court has held that this claim of the plaintiff must fail. All that he purchased at the execution sale was the undivided interest of the coparceners in the joint property. He did not acquire titled to any defined share in the property and was not entitled to joint possession from the date of his purchase. He could work out his rights only by a suit for partition and his right to possession would date from the period when a specific allotment was made in his favour. In our opinion, this is the right view to take and Mr. Daphtary, who appeared in support of the appeals, could not satisfy us that in law his client was entitled to joint possession on and from the date of his purchase. The result is that these appeals are dismissed with costs. 13. Appeal No. 53 allowed. 14. Appeal Nos. 54 and 55 dismissed. 15. Agent for the appellant Rajinder Narain. 16. Agent for the respondent Nos. 1 & 2 P. G. Aggarwal.
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1953 (10) TMI 44 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
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... ... ..... assets of the partnership of the amounts found due and payable to them. In this view it is not necessary to record any finding on issue 3 because if the defendants get all the amounts invested by them in full there can be no further claim as co-owner over the properties purchased with these amounts. Such a claim is also not properly within the scope of the present suit. 15. In the result the decree of the lower court dismissing the suit is set aside and a preliminary decree is passed referring the matter to the Official Referee for ascertaining the amounts due and pay able to the defendants on account of the amounts advanced by them under Exs. P. 1 and D. 7. Oh payment of the amount, so found due the plaintiff will be granted a declaration that the partnership under Ex. P. 2 is void. The defendants will have a charge on the partnership assets for the amounts found payable to them. The costs of both parties here and in the court below will be provided for in the final decree.
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1953 (10) TMI 43 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is intended to modify rights in estates; the Act is not against the provisions of Article 19(f) because it imposes nothing more than reasonable restrictions upon the rights of individuals and these restrictions are in the interests of general public; the classification between displaced and non-displaced persons is also a reasonable classification; and none of the provisions of the Act are against the letter or spirit of the Constitution. I would therefore hold that the Act is 'intra vires' the Constitution and the petitions of the landlords are liable to be dismissed. I would accordingly dismiss them but in the circumstances of the case make no orders as to costs. Falshaw, J. 16. I have had the advantage of perusing the judgment of my learned brother Khosla J. and I agree with his views and cannot usefully add anything thereto. I accordingly agree that the petitions should be dismissed. Soni, J. 17. I agree with my learned brother Khosla J. and have nothing to add.
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1953 (10) TMI 42 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... have excluded all time taken up in good faith before an arbitrator just as the time taken up in prosecuting a suit or an appeal in good faith is excluded. But obviously the Legislature did not intend that parties should waste time in infructuous proceedings before arbitrators. The Legislature has clearly indicated that limitation having once begun to run, no time could be excluded merely because parties chose to go before an arbitrator without getting an award or without coming to Court to get the necessary order indicated In Section 37(5). 8. In our opinion, therefore, In view of Section 37(5), Arbitration Act it is clear that the plaintiff is not entitled to exclude any time taken up in arbitration proceeding's. The result, therefore, is that the suit is barred by limitation and the learned Judge was right in dismissing it. The rest of the judgment is not material to the report.) The result is that the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs. 9. Appeal dismissed.
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1953 (10) TMI 41 - COCHIN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Act, 1950, is also devoid of legal sanction behind it and accordingly it is also declared to be void. It follows therefore that the acts found to have been committed by the revision petitioner in contravention(sic) of Sections 7 and 17 of the Paddy (Acquisition and Movement) Control Order cannot amount to commission of offences under law for which he could be convicted and sentenced. 7. In the result we result both these revision petitions and hold that the conviction entered and the sentence passed against the petitioner-accused in C. C. No. 11/1950 and C. C. No. 12/1950 on the file of the Special First Class Magistrate's Court at Cranganore, are unsustainable in law. The conviction and sentences are quashed and the petitioner is acquitted of the offences charged against him in these two cases. The fine, if already realised from him in these cases, will be refunded to him. The value of the paddy recovered from him and forfeited to the State will also be refunded to him.
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1953 (10) TMI 40 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , but on the contrary renders the law itself uncertain by giving rise to two conflicting orders claiming apparently equal obedience from the Registrar. In such an event the Registrar who is empowered under Section 7 of the Act to cancel the certificate of recognition of a union would not know whether he should or should not make a further enquiry into the question of cancellation of the certificate granted to the petitioner. The Registrar cannot comply with either the order of this Court or that of the Appellate Tribunal without at the same time flouting the other. In view of Section 30(3) of the Act, if the submission of the petitioner be correct, the Registrar would be liable to be committed for contempt whether he disobeys one order or the other. It is not right for this Court to pass an order, which whether obeyed or flouted, places a public authority in inevitable jeopardy. The petition is dismissed with a certificate for appeal under Article 132(1) of the Constitution.
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1953 (10) TMI 39 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s democratic right to individual freedom, Meaning thereby a claim to socially irresponsible control over a huge industrial concern and over the lives of tens of thousands of human beings whom it happens to employ, He is talking in a dying language" 10. The industrial tribunals under the industrial disputes act, 1947, Are charged with a difficult and delicate task and in the interests of industrial peace they should be allowed to discharge their duties without delay or interference. Any employer who feels the urge to move this court will do well to note that article 226 of the constitution is no charter for the preservation of antique concepts of contractual rights in the field of labour relations against the impact of awards which are liberal or legislation which is progressive. we allow the appeal with costs, Advocate's fee rs. 200/ -. The appellant will also have his costs in o. P. No. 15 of 1952 from the petitioner therein, Advocate's fee rs. 200/ -. allowed.
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1953 (10) TMI 38 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ing a lump sum, undoubtedly that would, have been a capital expenditure; or even if instead of paying a lump sum it had paid the amount fixed for the goodwill by certain instalments, each instalment would have been in the nature of a capital expenditure. But in this case, as the partnership did not acquire anything in the nature of a permanent asset, the payment to Bai Tarabai is not a capital but a revenue expenditure." 3. In our opinion, the present case falls under the former category as the terms of the agreement embodied in the letter clearly establish that what was acquired by the assessee was not merely the user of the name but the goodwill itself in consideration of paying the amount in three instalments. The expenditure, therefore, has been rightly held to be capital expenditure and the question referred to us must therefore be answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. As the assessee has failed, he must pay the costs of the respondent, ₹ 250.
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1953 (10) TMI 37 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... it is sufficient that those who took an active part in the proceedings under section II are impleaded. It is not necessary to implead each and every creditor who either did pot appear or put forward a written statement under section 10 or took no active part in the proceedings under section 11(2). In the view that we have taken it is not necessary to decide the question whether the High Court was right in not exercising its powers under Order XLI, rule 20, in impleading the creditors as respondents to the appeal. For the reasons given above we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and remand the case to that court for hearing the appeal in accordance with law on its merits. If the High Court thinks fit that the presence of any creditors would help the court in arriving at a true decision of the matter it in its discretion may give notice to the creditors of the date of hearing, We leave the parties to bear their own costs of this appeal. Appeal allowed.
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1953 (10) TMI 36 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... le solely to religious or charitable purpose. Our answer to the fourth and fifth questions is that the income derived from industrial and commercial concerns is the income from property held under trust wholly for religious or charitable purposes and is exempt from income-tax under Section 4(3)(i) of the Indian Income-tax Act and it is, therefore, not necessary to apply to such income Section 4(3)(ia) of the Act. Our answer to the third question is in the affirmative. Our answer to question No. 6 is that the income derived from industrial and commercial undertakings of the Sabha is exempt from income-tax under Section 4(3)(i) of the Act and the rest of the question, therefore, does not arise. Section 4(3)(ia), however, we may point out, gives exemption to a different type of income which does not come under Section 4(3)(i) of the Act. The assessee is entitled to its costs which we assess at ₹ 200 in each case, i.e., ₹ 1,200 in all. Reference answered accordingly.
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1953 (10) TMI 35 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... brothers and given to his son-in-law and the legatee was directed to hand them over to the third son whenever he would feel confident that the latter had reformed himself properly. In our opinion, on reading the will as a whole the conclusion becomes clear that the testator intended the legatees to take the properties in absolute right as their own selfacquisition without being fettered in any way by the rights of their sons and grandsons. In other words, he did not intend that the property should be taken by the sons as ancestral property. The result is that the appeal is allowed, the judgments and decrees of both the courts below are set aside and the plaintiff’s suit is dismissed. Having regard to the fact that the question involved in this case is one of considerable importance upon which there was considerable difference of judicial opinion that the plaintiff himself is a pauper, we direct that each party shall bear his own costs in all the courts. Appeal allowed.
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1953 (10) TMI 34 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the ruling relied on by Mr. Ramanarasu will not apply to the facts of this case. Mr. E. Venkatesan, for the learned Government Pleader, frankly admit- ted that he could not distinguish the facts of this case from the facts in that case. He also conceded that the above ruling, relied on by Mr. Ramanarasu, would apply, as it has not been overruled. In that view, it is unnecessary to consider the contentions of Mr. Ramanarasu regarding the saving of limitation even under Section 18 of the General Sales Tax Act. The judgment and decree of the lower Court are set aside, and the suit is remanded to it for fresh hearing and disposal on issues 1, 2, 4 and 5, issue 3 being found in the negative and in favour of the plaintiffs. In the circumstances, the costs of this appeal will follow, abide and be provided for by the lower Court when disposing of the suit afresh. The Court fee paid by the appellants will be refunded to them. Suit remanded. (1) 1953 4 S.T.C. 202 (1953) 2 M.L.J. 181.
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1953 (10) TMI 33 - HIGH COURT OF MADHYA BHARAT
Winding up - Power of registrar to strike defunct company off register ... ... ... ... ..... Vic., c. 19, section 7, but by accident the notice could not be delivered and was returned. In April, 1887, he struck the name of the company off the register. Nothing appeared to have been done by the company between 1883 and 1888, but on the petition by the liquidator to have the name restored, and on production of evidence that some debts were still unpaid as also some calls, the court directed the company s name to be restored to the registers In re Carpenter s Patent Davit Boat Lowering and Detaching Gear Co. On consideration of the authorities cited above and on the grounds indicated by me above, I think it just to order restoration of the name of the company to the register of companies. I, therefore, direct the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies, Gwalior, to restore the name of the company in question to the register of companies in exercise of powers under section 247(6). The petitioner will be entitled to costs of this petition. Counsel s fee to be taxed at Rs. 25.
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1953 (10) TMI 32 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Winding up – Power of court to assess damages against delinquent, directors, etc. ... ... ... ... ..... scribed under section 236 prevails over the period prescribed by the Limitation Act for similar suits. The decision proceeded on the assumption that the period prescribed in section 236 is a period of limitation, and the learned Judge was not called upon to discuss the question, whether the requirements of section 236 constituted a condition precedent on the analogy of the Provincial Insolvency Act which was interpreted in the decision in Chenchuramana v. Arunachala. To a similar effect is the decision in Official Liquidators of the Benaras Bank Ltd. v. Sri Prakasha. We, therefore, think that the petitioner is entitled also to rely on section 10 of the General Clauses Act, and that the application is not barred under section 235 even from this point of view. The result is, the appeal must be allowed, the order of the learned District Judge set aside and the application remanded to the lower court for disposal according to law. Costs of these proceedings will abide the result.
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1953 (10) TMI 31 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Winding up – Avoidance of transfer, etc., after commencement of ... ... ... ... ..... ded by the learned official liquidator that the this case, there was a change in the constitution of the managing agent, and inasmuch as the change had not been recognised under section 87-BB, the managing agents ceased to function, and that therefore they became wholly incompetent to borrow any loan on behalf of the company. There is no evidence now placed before me as to the time or nature of the change in the constitution of the managing agency and even otherwise, that may not make much difference, because the same result should flow from the fact that prior to the present loans, a provisional liquidator was appointed. However, it is unnecessary to consider this question further and it will be left open to the official liquidator to examine it in case the andhra Bank chooses to prefer a claim as an ordinary creditor. The application fails and is dismissed with costs of the official liquidator and the contesting creditor, Messrs. Soundararajan and Co. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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1953 (10) TMI 30 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB
Winding up – Application for ... ... ... ... ..... e relief it is in my opinion only proper that relief should be afforded to him. As I have already said, I cannot see any legal bar to his maintaining the present petition in this court in spite of the previous application which is still pending in the Lahore High Court. It may be quite true that if that application is decided by the Lahore High Court the decision may in certain circumstances have the same effect as a decision of this court, but that cannot at present affect the maintainability of the new petition. My conclusion therefore is that the appellant s petition is maintainable notwithstanding the previous petition pending in the Lahore High Court and that the learned single Judge was not right in holding the contrary. I would therefore allow this appeal and set aside the order of the learned single Judge dismissing the application. In the circumstances of the case, however, I would leave the parties to bear their own costs in this appeal. Bhandari C.J. mdash I agree.
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1953 (10) TMI 9 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the first three items are receipts from business carried on by the company?
Whether those three items are receipts by a trade or professional or similar association performing specific services for its members for remuneration definitely related to those services?
Held that:- All the items of receipts from members referred to in the questions were received by the company from business with its members within the meaning of Section 10(1) and that none of them was received by the company as a trade, professional or similar association within the meaning of Section 10(6). In our judgment the High Court should have answered question No. 1 in the affirmative and question No. 2 in the negative. The appeal is allowed
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