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Issues Involved:
1. Whether a winding-up petition remains maintainable if the debt becomes barred by limitation at the hearing date. 2. Whether the petitioner company can amend the winding-up petition to include a new ground under section 433(f) of the Companies Act. Issue 1: Maintainability of Winding-Up Petition with Time-Barred Debt The primary issue was whether a winding-up petition, maintainable when filed due to a debt not barred by limitation, ceases to be maintainable if the debt becomes barred by limitation at the hearing. The court held that the debt or claim of the petitioners, on the basis of which a petition for winding up is presented and a winding-up order is sought, should not necessarily be a subsisting debt at the date of the hearing of the petition; it is enough that it subsisted at the date of the presentation of the petition. The court examined relevant provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, including sections 433(e), 434(1), 439(1), 441(2), and 447. It concluded that there was nothing in these provisions to suggest that the debt must continue to be recoverable at the date of the hearing. The court emphasized that the inability to pay debts under section 433(e) is determined at the date of the petition, not at the hearing. The court also referenced the case of Maharashtra Small Scale Industries Development Corporation v. Trawlers Pvt. Ltd., which supported the view that the relevant date for determining the debt's status is the date of the petition. The court rejected the appellant's argument that the debt must be recoverable at the hearing date, noting that such an interpretation would unfairly prejudice the creditor. The court also distinguished the case from insolvency proceedings under the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, where specific provisions require proof of debt at the hearing. Issue 2: Amendment of Petition to Include New Ground under Section 433(f) The second issue was whether the petitioner company could amend the winding-up petition to include a new ground under section 433(f) of the Companies Act, alleging that it was just and equitable to wind up the company. The court held that an amendment in pleadings should ordinarily be allowed to bring out the real dispute between the parties unless it deprives the other party of a right already acquired, such as limitation, or introduces a new cause of action. The court disagreed with the lower court's reliance on the decision in Associated Biscuit Co. P. Ltd. v. T. L. Nambiar, which was interpreted as a general rule against such amendments. The court clarified that section 433(f) provides the court with discretionary power to make a winding-up order on just and equitable grounds, considering all circumstances, including those arising after the petition's filing. The court found that the petitioner company sought the amendment based on facts that came to its knowledge after the petition's admission, which were not disputed. Therefore, the amendment was allowed, enabling the petitioner to plead new facts and raise a new ground for winding up under section 433(f). Conclusion: The appeal regarding the maintainability of the winding-up petition (Appeal No. 84 of 1983) was dismissed, affirming that the petition remains maintainable even if the debt becomes time-barred at the hearing. The appeal regarding the amendment of the petition (Appeal No. 135 of 1983) was allowed, permitting the petitioner to amend the petition to include a new ground under section 433(f).
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