1988 (7) TMI 333 - SC - Companies Law

Whether the first meeting of the corporation called for that day at 2.45 p.m. by the Municipal Commissioner respondent No. 9 who presided over the meeting was adjourned for the day or adjourned sine die and therefore had to be called on some subsequent date to be fixed by him and thus necessitated the giving of seven days clear notice as required by rule 1(h) Chapter II of the Rules framed under section 453 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act 1949? Held that - Appeal dismissed. On an overall view of the facts and circumstances no hesitation in upholding the finding that the first meeting of the Municipal Corporation fixed by the Municipal Commissioner for May 6 1988 was not adjourned for the day or adjourned sine di but had only been put off to a later hour i.e. the proceedings had only been suspended to be re-commenced when peace and order were restored.

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the first meeting of the corporation was adjourned for the day or sine die.
2. Necessity of giving seven days' clear notice for a subsequent meeting.
3. Validity of the elections held later on the same day.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Whether the first meeting of the corporation was adjourned for the day or sine die:
The primary issue was whether the meeting called by the Municipal Commissioner at 2.45 p.m. was adjourned for the day or sine die, necessitating a subsequent date and a seven-day notice as required by rule 1(h), Chapter II of the Rules under section 453 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949. The affidavits presented conflicting facts: the petitioner and his supporters claimed the meeting was adjourned for the day, while the Municipal Commissioner asserted it was merely suspended. The High Court, relying on the 'preponderance of probabilities,' concluded that the meeting was only postponed, not adjourned for the day or sine die. The Supreme Court found no compelling reason to overturn this inference.

2. Necessity of giving seven days' clear notice for a subsequent meeting:
The petitioner argued that the meeting should have been adjourned to a subsequent date with a fresh seven-day notice. The Municipal Commissioner, however, maintained that the meeting was suspended due to disorder and resumed later the same day. The Supreme Court noted that the relevant statutory provisions and rules did not necessitate a fresh notice for an adjourned meeting if it was merely postponed to a later hour on the same day. The court found that the Municipal Commissioner did not adjourn the meeting sine die but suspended it to restore order, thus negating the need for a new notice.

3. Validity of the elections held later on the same day:
The petitioner contended that the elections held later on the same day were improper and illegal. However, the court found that the Municipal Commissioner had announced the resumption of the meeting at 4.30 p.m. after order was restored. The High Court accepted the Municipal Commissioner's affidavit, which stated that the meeting was only suspended and resumed later the same day. The Supreme Court upheld this finding, affirming the validity of the elections of the Mayor, Deputy Mayor, and standing committee members conducted at 4.30 p.m.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the special leave petition, concluding that the first meeting of the Municipal Corporation was not adjourned for the day or sine die but merely suspended to be resumed later the same day. The elections held at 4.30 p.m. were valid, and no fresh notice was required. The court upheld the High Court's judgment, finding no reason to interfere with its conclusions based on the affidavits and the preponderance of probabilities.

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