2004 (1) TMI 22 - HC - Income Tax

Discretionary relief exercised u/s 273A - applications under section 273A for waiver or reduction in the interest and penalty levied delayed filing of return - The case set out by the petitioner was that after the death of his father he was over-burdened with other obligations as such he could not file the returns within the stipulated time - This fact has been completely ignored by the Commissioner, while considering the applications under section 273A of the Act. As against this, he has relied on extraneous circumstances which were never pleaded by the petitioner. Thus, the impugned orders suffer from non-application of mind on the part of the respondent/Commissioner. - While considering the application under section 273A, the non-payment of advance tax is an irrelevant consideration. It is not disputed that Petitioner has proved that he was and is entitled to have the discretionary relief exercised in his favour under section 273A We remand the proceedings to the Commissioner for quantification of the amount treating that the petitioner has proved his case, in both the capacities under section 273A

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Exercise of discretion under section 273A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
2. Voluntary disclosure of income and good faith.
3. Cooperation in assessment proceedings.
4. Payment or satisfactory arrangement for payment of tax or interest.
5. Non-payment of advance tax and delay in filing returns.

Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Exercise of Discretion under Section 273A:
The core issue is whether the Commissioner of Income-tax exercised his discretion in consonance with section 273A of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The petitioner contended that the discretion was not properly exercised, despite fulfilling all pre-conditions under section 273A. The court noted that the Commissioner must exercise discretion judicially and objectively, not arbitrarily or capriciously. The impugned orders were challenged for not adhering to the settled legal position.

2. Voluntary Disclosure of Income and Good Faith:
The petitioner voluntarily filed returns without any notice under section 139(2) or 148. The court emphasized that "voluntary" means "without compulsion" and "good faith" means an act done honestly, even if tainted with negligence or mistake. The returns were accepted under sections 143(1) and 143(3), indicating full and true disclosure of income in good faith. The court found that the petitioner met the criteria for voluntary disclosure and good faith.

3. Cooperation in Assessment Proceedings:
The court observed that the petitioner cooperated with the Income-tax Department, as the returns were accepted without any notice. There was no material to suggest non-cooperation. The court held that the petitioner complied with the requirement of cooperation in assessment proceedings.

4. Payment or Satisfactory Arrangement for Payment of Tax or Interest:
The petitioner paid the tax on the disclosed income. The court noted that the petitioner made satisfactory arrangements for the payment of tax or interest, fulfilling another condition under section 273A.

5. Non-payment of Advance Tax and Delay in Filing Returns:
The Commissioner considered the non-payment of advance tax and delay in filing returns as grounds for rejecting the petitioner's applications. However, the court held that these factors are extraneous to section 273A. The relevant factors are voluntary disclosure, good faith, cooperation, and payment of tax. The court found that the Commissioner relied on irrelevant considerations, leading to non-application of mind.

Conclusion:
The court quashed and set aside the impugned orders dated November 21, 1990, passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax, Pune. The proceedings were remanded to the Commissioner for quantification of the amount, treating that the petitioner proved his case under section 273A. The Commissioner was directed to decide the remanded proceedings by a reasoned order within eight weeks, following the principles of natural justice. The petition was allowed, and the rule was made absolute in terms of prayer clause (a), with no order as to costs.