2005 (4) TMI 321 - SC - Central Excise

Application for condonation of delay - Held that - Appeal allowed. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. Judiciary is not respected on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal.

Issues Involved:
1. Condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
2. Grant of leave to appeal under Section 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
3. Consideration of sufficient cause for delay.
4. Impact of procedural delays and bureaucratic inefficiencies on the condonation of delay.
5. Judicial discretion in condoning delay and ensuring substantial justice.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Condonation of Delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963:
The primary issue was whether the delay of 57 days in filing the application for leave to appeal should be condoned. The State of Nagaland argued that the delay was due to the loss of the file and the subsequent bureaucratic process to trace and reconstruct it. The High Court refused to condone the delay, emphasizing that it is the litigant's duty to file an appeal within the limitation period and that mere instructions to file an appeal without follow-up did not constitute sufficient cause.

2. Grant of Leave to Appeal under Section 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:
The application for leave to appeal was consequentially rejected due to the refusal to condone the delay. The appeal pertained to a judgment of acquittal passed by the Additional Deputy Commissioner (Judicial), Dimapur, Nagaland, where police officers were involved in a shooting incident resulting in deaths and injuries.

3. Consideration of Sufficient Cause for Delay:
The Supreme Court highlighted that the concept of "sufficient cause" should be interpreted liberally to ensure substantial justice. The Court referenced several precedents, including N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy and Collector Land Acquisition v. Katiji, emphasizing that the sufficiency of cause depends on the circumstances and should be considered with a pragmatic approach. The Court noted that procedural delays and bureaucratic inefficiencies are common in governmental functioning and should be taken into account when assessing sufficient cause.

4. Impact of Procedural Delays and Bureaucratic Inefficiencies on the Condonation of Delay:
The judgment acknowledged that government decisions are often slow due to procedural red-tape and that this should be considered when evaluating delays. The Court emphasized that public interest could suffer if appeals by the government are dismissed due to such delays. It was noted that the government, unlike private litigants, operates through an impersonal machinery, and a certain amount of latitude is permissible.

5. Judicial Discretion in Condoning Delay and Ensuring Substantial Justice:
The Supreme Court reiterated that judicial discretion should favor substantial justice over technicalities. The Court cited various cases to support the view that delays should be condoned if they are not due to gross negligence or lack of bona fides. The Court emphasized that the judiciary's role is to remove injustice rather than to legalize it on technical grounds.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court concluded that the delay of 57 days in filing the application for leave to appeal deserved condonation. The order of the High Court refusing to condone the delay was set aside. The Supreme Court directed the High Court to grant leave to appeal and dispose of the appeal on merits, clarifying that no opinion was expressed on the merits of the appeal itself. The appeal was allowed, ensuring that the matter would be adjudicated based on its substantive merits rather than being dismissed on procedural grounds.

← Previous Next →