2006 (6) TMI 312 - AT - Central Excise

Summary

Issues:
Determination of duty payable on goods cleared from the factory premises after dyeing.

Analysis:
The case involved the manufacturing of nylon undyed texturised yarn and polyester undyed yarn, which were later dyed within the factory premises before being cleared for sale. The dispute arose regarding the duty payable on the dyed yarn cleared from the factory. The appellant contended that duty should be paid based on the cost of the dyed yarn, considering dyeing as a process incidental to manufacturing. The respondent, however, argued that duty should be calculated on the price at which the dyed yarn was sold, emphasizing that the goods were ultimately cleared as dyed yarn. The Commissioner (Appeal) had set aside the duty amount confirmed by the Asstt. Commissioner for the relevant period, stating that dyeing was not considered a manufacturing process during that time.

The Appellate Tribunal, after considering the arguments, referred to Section 2(f) where the process of dyeing was categorized as incidental and ancillary to the manufacture of the final product, which in this case was the dyed yarn. The Tribunal also highlighted a Board Circular mentioning that processes like dyeing are part of the finishing process for yarn before reaching the marketable stage. The Tribunal relied on a previous Supreme Court judgment that emphasized duty payment on goods as cleared from the factory without dividing the manufacturing process. The Supreme Court's decision in the case of Union of India v. J.G. Glass Industry was cited, where duty was payable on the value of printed bottles if printing was done within the same factory premises. The Tribunal concluded that since dyeing was conducted within the same premises, duty was liable on the dyed yarn, including the cost of dyeing.

Therefore, the Tribunal allowed the appeal of the revenue and set aside the order of the Commissioner (Appeal) regarding the duty payable on the dyed yarn cleared from the factory premises. The judgment was pronounced on 12-6-2006.