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1984 (3) TMI 348 - SC - Indian LawsWhether the notice Ex. A-8 given by the plaintiffs father Seth Lachman Dass Gupta before his death under s.80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 would enure for the benefit of the plaintiffs. Whether the notice gives sufficient information as to the nature of the claim such as would enable the recipient to avert the litigation? Held that - Appeal allowed. The present suit would be directly covered by sub-s.(3) of s.80 so introduced if the suit had been brought after February 1, 1977. Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, s.97 of the Amendment Act provides that the amendment shall not apply to pending suit and the suits pending on February 1, 1977 have to be dealt as if such amendment had not been made. Nevertheless the Courts must have due regard to the change in law brought about by sub- s.(3) of s.80 of the Code introduced by the Amendment Act w.e.f. February 1, 1977.
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 2. Compliance with the requirements of Section 80 regarding the identity of the plaintiff. 3. Interpretation of Section 80 in light of legislative changes and judicial precedents. Detailed Analysis: 1. Validity of the Notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 The primary issue in this appeal is whether the notice (Ex. A-8) given by the plaintiffs' father, Seth Lachman Dass Gupta, under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, before his death, would enure for the benefit of the plaintiffs. Section 80 mandates a two-month notice period before instituting a suit against the government or a public officer, specifying the cause of action, the name, description, and place of residence of the plaintiff, and the relief claimed. 2. Compliance with the Requirements of Section 80 Regarding the Identity of the Plaintiff The notice Ex. A-8 was issued by Seth Lachman Dass Gupta, and after his death, his sons filed the suit based on the same notice. The High Court held that the notice did not comply with Section 80 as it did not include the names of the plaintiffs, thereby invalidating the notice. The Supreme Court, however, emphasized that the notice must substantially fulfill its purpose of informing the government of the nature of the claim to avert litigation. The Court noted that the military authorities had already rejected the claim, indicating that they were aware of the nature of the suit. 3. Interpretation of Section 80 in Light of Legislative Changes and Judicial Precedents The Supreme Court discussed the strict compliance required by Section 80 as established in previous cases like Bhagchand Dagadusa v. Secretary of State for India and Vallayan Chettiar v. The Government of the Province of Madras. The Court noted that while earlier judgments required strict compliance, subsequent decisions like Dhian Singh Sobha Singh v. Union of India adopted a rule of substantial compliance, especially regarding the cause of action and relief claimed. The Court also referred to legislative changes brought by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, which introduced sub-sections (2) and (3) to Section 80, allowing for substantial compliance and immediate relief in urgent cases. Although these changes were not applicable to the present case due to the pending status of the suit, the Court acknowledged the legislative intent to adopt a more pragmatic approach. Conclusion The Supreme Court concluded that the notice Ex. A-8 substantially fulfilled its purpose and that insisting on a fresh notice would result in injustice, particularly given the potential expiry of the limitation period. The Court held that Section 80 should be interpreted to advance the cause of justice rather than defeat it through technicalities. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the judgment of the Allahabad High Court was set aside, and the decree of the Civil Judge, Agra, was restored with costs throughout. The plaintiffs were also awarded further interest on the decretal amount at 6% per annum from the date of the decree until realization.
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