1964 (7) TMI 26 - HC - VAT and Sales Tax

Summary

Issues:
Challenge to refusal of appeal by second respondent based on proof of payment of admitted tax.

Analysis:
The petitioner, an assessee assessed to sales tax for the year 1961-62, filed a writ application challenging the order of assessment (exhibit P-1) and the subsequent refusal to entertain the appeal by the second respondent (exhibit P-2). The petitioner had paid a portion of the tax before the appeal and the remaining amount as directed by the court. The second respondent refused to entertain the appeal citing the non-submission of satisfactory proof of payment of the admitted tax. The petitioner argued that the appeal should be considered preferred on the date of the last payment towards the admitted tax. The court noted that the mere presentation of an appeal petition without necessary documents does not constitute preferring an appeal under section 14(1) of the General Sales Tax Act, 1125. The court emphasized the importance of proof of payment of tax and the distinction between preferring an appeal and its admission.

The court analyzed the relevant provisions of section 14 of the Act and rule 29 of the General Sales Tax Rules, emphasizing the requirement of proof of payment of tax for entertaining an appeal. It was clarified that the appeal can be considered preferred only when proof of payment of tax is furnished, either within the prescribed period or thereafter. The court highlighted that the question of admitting an appeal arises if proof of payment is submitted after the prescribed period, invoking the first proviso to section 14(1) regarding sufficient cause for the delay in preferring the appeal. The petitioner's inability to pay the tax within 30 days led to a writ application and subsequent court orders granting time for payment and stay of tax collection.

The court disagreed with the second respondent's decision to reject the appeal solely based on the lack of proof of payment, even though the payments were made. It directed the petitioner to submit a petition to the second respondent explaining the grounds for excusing the delay in preferring the appeal. The court set aside the order refusing the appeal and instructed the second respondent to consider the petition on its merits and make an appropriate decision under the first proviso to section 14(1) of the Act. The court highlighted the importance of considering whether there was sufficient cause for the delay in preferring the appeal, as supported by previous judicial observations.