1968 (7) TMI 55 - HC - VAT and Sales Tax

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the Sales Tax Officer.
2. Interpretation of Section 19(4) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959.
3. Determination of whether the petitioner-firm is a successor to the Commercial Sales Agency (C.S.A.) and liable for its tax dues.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Jurisdiction of the Sales Tax Officer:
The petitioner, New Saurashtra Vanaspati Company, challenged the jurisdiction of the Sales Tax Officer, arguing that the impugned order was "completely without jurisdiction" and "patently erroneous in law." The petitioner contended that the Sales Tax Officer's order was based on a misconception of law and violated Section 19(4) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. The court agreed, finding that the taxing authority had proceeded on a "complete misconception of law" and that the order was "clearly without jurisdiction and ultra vires section 19(4)."

2. Interpretation of Section 19(4) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959:
Section 19(4) states that if a dealer liable to pay tax transfers or otherwise disposes of his business, the dealer and the successor shall be jointly and severally liable to pay the tax due. The court emphasized that two conditions must be satisfied for Section 19(4) to apply:
- The dealer liable to pay tax must have been succeeded in the business by another person.
- Such succession must be in consequence of a transfer, disposal, or change in the ownership of the business by the dealer.

The court found that these conditions were not met in this case. The C.S.A. had surrendered its leasehold interest back to the lessor-company, which then leased the factory to the petitioner-firm. There was no transfer, disposal, or change in ownership of the business from C.S.A. to the petitioner-firm.

3. Determination of whether the petitioner-firm is a successor to the Commercial Sales Agency (C.S.A.) and liable for its tax dues:
The court found that the petitioner-firm could not be considered a successor to C.S.A. The C.S.A. had surrendered its leasehold interest to the lessor-company on 15th April 1964, and the factory remained idle until it was leased to the petitioner-firm on 2nd November 1964. The court noted a "complete hiatus" during this period, meaning there was no continuity of business. The petitioner-firm's business was a result of a new lease from the lessor-company, not a transfer from C.S.A.

The court also rejected the argument that the purchase of stock and machinery from C.S.A. by the petitioner-firm constituted a transfer of business. The court stated that merely purchasing items from a public tender does not equate to succeeding to the business of running the factory.

Conclusion:
The court concluded that the taxing authority's order was "patently erroneous" and "without jurisdiction." The petition was allowed, and a writ of certiorari was issued to quash the impugned order and the consequent notice of demand. A writ of mandamus was also issued, restraining the respondent from enforcing the said order and notice against the petitioner-firm. The rule was made absolute with costs, and the petition was allowed.