1970 (10) TMI 60 - HC - VAT and Sales Tax

Summary

Issues:
- Interpretation of limitation period for filing applications under section 22(1) of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948.
- Consideration of time spent in obtaining certified copies of orders in computing the limitation period.
- Conflict of decisions among various High Courts on the application of section 12(2) of the Indian Limitation Act.
- Application of section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act for condoning delay in filing applications.

Analysis:
The judgment pertains to sales tax cases under the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, involving the interpretation of the limitation period for filing applications under section 22(1) of the Act. The petitioner-firm had applied for the referral of questions of law to the High Court, but their applications were rejected by the Sales Tax Tribunal as being barred by time. The issue revolved around the time spent in obtaining certified copies of orders and its impact on the limitation period. The Financial Commissioner's orders were communicated to the petitioner's counsel after a delay, leading to a dispute over the calculation of the limitation period.

The Tribunal held that the time spent in obtaining certified copies could not be deducted from the limitation period, citing the Govindji case. However, the judgment highlighted a conflict of decisions among High Courts on this matter. It referenced the Lahore view favoring the inclusion of time spent in obtaining certified copies in computing the limitation period. Additionally, it discussed the applicability of section 12(2) of the Indian Limitation Act and the possibility of condoning the delay under section 5 of the Act.

The judgment emphasized that even if section 12(2) did not technically apply, the delay in filing the applications could have been condoned by extending the limitation period. It critiqued the Tribunal's decision for not considering various authorities and viewpoints on the issue. By citing a case related to the interpretation of "passing of an order," the judgment argued that the limitation period should start from when the petitioner obtained the copy of the order, not just from the date of dismissal intimation.

In conclusion, the High Court set aside the Tribunal's orders rejecting the applications as barred by time and directed a fresh consideration of the applications after hearing the parties. The judgment provided a detailed analysis of the conflicting views on the computation of limitation periods and emphasized the need for a comprehensive assessment based on legal principles and precedents.