1962 (11) TMI 51 - SC - VAT and Sales Tax

Whether the appellant is liable to pay excise duty on the cloth and yarn manufactured and produced by it in accordance with the provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act 1944 which provisions were extended to the territory of the State of Rajasthan on April 1 1950. Whether the same appellant if liable to pay income-tax in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Income tax Act 1922 from the date on which those provisions were extended to the territory of the State of Rajasthan? Held that - Appeal rejected. The question of frustration of the contract was canvassed and gone into. The courts found that the contract was frustrated. In view of the findings it is now unnecessary to consider that question.

Issues Involved:
1. Liability to pay excise duty under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.
2. Liability to pay income tax under the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922.
3. Validity and enforceability of the agreement dated April 17, 1941.
4. Whether the agreement constitutes law or is purely contractual.
5. Applicability of Article 295(1)(b) of the Constitution.
6. Claims under Articles 19 and 31 of the Constitution.
7. Whether the contract was frustrated by subsequent events.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Liability to Pay Excise Duty:
The appellant, Maharaja Shree Umaid Mills Ltd., contended that it was exempt from paying excise duty based on an agreement dated April 17, 1941, with the Ruler of Jodhpur. The Supreme Court held that the agreement did not constitute law and was purely contractual in nature. It was further noted that the agreement did not mention excise duty imposed by the Union of India, which came into existence after the constitutional developments of 1947-1950. The court concluded that the appellant was liable to pay excise duty as per the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, extended to Rajasthan by the Finance Act, 1950.

2. Liability to Pay Income Tax:
Similarly, the appellant claimed exemption from income tax based on the same agreement. The Supreme Court held that the agreement did not bind the Union of India, as it was not affirmed by the succeeding sovereigns, namely the United State of Rajasthan or the Part B State of Rajasthan. The court found that the appellant was liable to pay income tax under the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, extended to Rajasthan by the Finance Act, 1950.

3. Validity and Enforceability of the Agreement:
The agreement dated April 17, 1941, provided certain tax exemptions to the appellant. However, the Supreme Court held that the agreement was not binding on the respondents (Union of India and the State of Rajasthan) as it was not affirmed by the succeeding sovereigns. The court also noted that the agreement was acted upon provisionally and there was no conclusive evidence of its affirmation by the United State of Rajasthan or the Part B State of Rajasthan.

4. Whether the Agreement Constitutes Law or is Purely Contractual:
The appellant argued that the agreement was a "legislative contract" and had the force of law. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating that the agreement was purely contractual in nature and did not have the characteristics of law. The court emphasized that a contract is a compact between parties based on consent, whereas law is a binding rule of conduct deriving its sanction from the sovereign authority. The court concluded that the agreement did not constitute law and was not enforceable as such.

5. Applicability of Article 295(1)(b) of the Constitution:
The appellant contended that Article 295(1)(b) of the Constitution provided a constitutional guarantee for the rights and obligations arising from the agreement. The Supreme Court held that Article 295(1)(b) did not apply as the agreement was not affirmed by the succeeding sovereigns. The court also noted that the article did not fetter the power of the Union Legislature to make laws altering the terms and conditions of a contract or grant under which the liability of the Government of India arises.

6. Claims Under Articles 19 and 31 of the Constitution:
The appellant invoked Articles 19 and 31 of the Constitution, claiming that the agreement constituted a right to property and could not be deprived without due process. The Supreme Court rejected this claim, stating that the appellant had no enforceable right against the State Government of Rajasthan or the Union Government on January 26, 1950. Consequently, the appellant could not invoke Articles 19 or 31.

7. Whether the Contract was Frustrated by Subsequent Events:
The trial court and the High Court had found that the contract was frustrated by subsequent events. However, the Supreme Court did not find it necessary to address this issue in detail, given its findings on the other issues. The court concluded that the appeals were without merit and dismissed them with costs.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the appellant was liable to pay both excise duty and income tax as per the relevant laws extended to Rajasthan. The agreement dated April 17, 1941, was deemed purely contractual and not binding on the respondents. The court also held that Article 295(1)(b) did not provide a constitutional guarantee for the agreement, and the appellant could not invoke Articles 19 and 31 of the Constitution.

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