1996 (1) TMI 381 - SC - Indian Laws

Title of land - Held that - Appeal allowed. The respondent who lost possession as a result of an order being passed in restitution application and was dispossessed pursuant to the order in the restitution application cannot maintain a suit based on his title since he had no title to the land. The High Court therefore was not right in upholding the decree of the trial court. The trial court found that the Tarwad had obtained possession pursuant to the restitution application. It however went on to hold that the respondent had established his title and could recover the property. These findings cannot be sustained in view of what we have said above. The decree of the trial court is set aside and the suit of the respondent is dismissed with costs.

Summary

Issues Involved:

1. Validity of ex-party decree and subsequent restitution.
2. Rights of the decree-holder auction purchaser versus a bona fide purchaser.
3. Applicability of the doctrine of restitution.
4. Legal status of a lessee under a decree-holder auction purchaser.
5. Protection under Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1964.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Validity of Ex-Party Decree and Subsequent Restitution:

The property in dispute originally belonged to Padanattil Chengottu Kunnath Tarwad. An ex-party decree was passed in favor of Mohammed Haji for recovery of possession and arrears of rent. This decree was executed, and the property was sold in a court auction to Mohammed Haji. However, the ex-party decree was later set aside by the High Court, leading to restitution proceedings initiated by the first defendant and Karnavan of the Tarwad. The properties, including the suit property, were re-delivered to the Tarwad as evidenced by Exh. 82 dated 5.4.1966. The trial court confirmed the re-delivery, but the respondent, P.K. Abdulla, contested this, leading to a series of appeals.

2. Rights of the Decree-Holder Auction Purchaser versus a Bona Fide Purchaser:

The court distinguished between properties purchased by decree-holders and those purchased by bona fide third-party purchasers at court auctions. If a decree-holder purchases property at a court auction and the decree is later set aside, the decree-holder is obligated to return the property. Conversely, bona fide third-party purchasers are protected, as they are not parties to the original decree and their purchase is considered valid. This principle ensures that court auctions fetch proper prices and protect honest purchasers.

3. Applicability of the Doctrine of Restitution:

The doctrine of restitution mandates that when a decree is reversed, the party who benefited from the erroneous decree must restore the other party to their original position. This principle was reinforced by the Supreme Court in the case of Binayak Swain v. Ramesh Chandra Panigrahi, where the court held that the judgment-debtor is entitled to restitution even if a subsequent decree is passed in favor of the decree-holder.

4. Legal Status of a Lessee under a Decree-Holder Auction Purchaser:

The respondent contended that as a lessee from the decree-holder auction purchaser, his lease was protected. However, the court held that the protection afforded to bona fide purchasers does not extend to lessees or assignees of decree-holder auction purchasers. The title of such lessees is defeasible and liable to be defeated if the decree is set aside. This view contrasts with the decisions of the Patna, Madras, and Kerala High Courts, which have extended protection to such lessees. The Supreme Court clarified that the assignee from a decree-holder auction purchaser cannot be equated with a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.

5. Protection under Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1964:

The respondent claimed protection under Section 43 of the Malabar Tenancy Act and Section 7 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1964. Section 43 protects tenants even if the landlord's rights are extinguished. However, this protection applies only to tenants of landlords with valid title. The court held that the respondent, knowing the defeasibility of his lessor's title, could not claim protection under these sections. Section 7B, introduced later, was not applicable at the time of eviction in 1966.

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the decree of the trial court and dismissing the respondent's suit with costs. The court held that the respondent, who lost possession due to restitution proceedings, could not maintain a suit based on title as he had no valid title to the land. The trial court's findings that the respondent had established his title and could recover the property were unsustainable.