2007 (10) TMI 551 - SC - Indian Laws

Whether presumption stood rebutted or not? Held that - It is now trite that if two views are possible the appellant court shall not reverse a judgment of acquittal only because another view is possible to be taken. The appellate court s jurisdiction to interfere is limited. The High Court furthermore has not met the reasons of the learned Trial Judge. It proceeded on the premise that the appellant had not been able to discharge his burden of proof in terms of Section 139 of the Act without posing unto itself a further question as to how the said burden of proof can be discharged. It furthermore did not take into consideration the legal principle that the standard of proof upon a prosecution and upon an accused is different. For the reasons aforementioned the impugned judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. Appeal allowed.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Reversal of judgment of acquittal.
2. Alleged advancement of money and issuance of a dishonored cheque.
3. Complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
4. Defense of the appellant regarding blank cheques.
5. Evaluation of evidence by the Trial Judge.
6. High Court's reversal of the Trial Judge's findings.
7. Burden of proof under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
8. Standard of proof in criminal cases.
9. Appellate court's jurisdiction in reversing judgments of acquittal.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Reversal of judgment of acquittal:
The Supreme Court noted that the High Court reversed the judgment of acquittal passed by the Trial Judge, which had favored the appellant. The Trial Judge had acquitted the appellant based on various findings that questioned the credibility of the complainant's claims and the authenticity of the cheque in question.

2. Alleged advancement of money and issuance of a dishonored cheque:
The respondent claimed to have advanced Rs. 3,16,000/- to the appellant, who issued a cheque that was dishonored due to insufficient funds and later due to payment being stopped by the drawer. This led to the filing of a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

3. Complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act:
The complaint was filed based on the dishonored cheque, alleging that the appellant had failed to remit the amount despite assurances. The complainant provided evidence of advancing various sums on specific dates.

4. Defense of the appellant regarding blank cheques:
The appellant argued that the cheque was issued blank for business purposes related to his brother's transport services and was later misappropriated by the complainant. The appellant supported his defense by examining the Bank Manager.

5. Evaluation of evidence by the Trial Judge:
The Trial Judge's analysis included several key points:
- The complainant lacked financial capacity to advance such a large sum.
- The complainant did not produce the diary recording the transactions, leading to an adverse inference.
- No commercial or business transaction was proven between the parties.
- Discrepancies in the dates and sequence of cheque issuance raised doubts about the genuineness of the cheque.
- The complainant's inconsistent statements about borrowing money from others further weakened his case.
- The appellant was deemed to have discharged his burden of proof.

6. High Court's reversal of the Trial Judge's findings:
The High Court reversed the acquittal, emphasizing that the appellant had not examined himself to discharge the burden of proof under Section 139 of the Act. The High Court disagreed with the Trial Judge's adverse inference from the non-production of the diary and the lack of interest on the advanced sums.

7. Burden of proof under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act:
The Supreme Court highlighted that presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 are rebuttable. The accused does not need to step into the witness box to discharge the burden of proof. The standard of proof for the accused is mere preponderance of probability, unlike the prosecution's burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

8. Standard of proof in criminal cases:
The Supreme Court reiterated that the standard of proof for the prosecution is beyond reasonable doubt, while for the accused, it is preponderance of probability. The Trial Judge had considered the entire evidence and circumstances, finding the complainant's claims unconvincing.

9. Appellate court's jurisdiction in reversing judgments of acquittal:
The Supreme Court emphasized that an appellate court should not reverse a judgment of acquittal if two views are possible. The High Court failed to address the reasons given by the Trial Judge and did not consider the different standards of proof for the prosecution and the accused.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court found that the Trial Judge's judgment was neither perverse nor legally infirm. The High Court's emphasis on the appellant's failure to testify was misplaced, as the burden of proof could be discharged through other means. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and allowed the appeal, reinstating the acquittal.