1994 (2) TMI 272 - HC - VAT and Sales Tax

Summary

Issues:
Delay in filing revision petition and condonation of delay.

Analysis:
The judgment of the High Court of Madras dealt with the issue of whether the delay in filing revision petitions can be condoned based on the law in effect at the time the proceedings commenced or the law prevailing at the time of filing the revision petitions. The court considered conflicting views from previous cases. In State of Tamil Nadu v. Aristo Paints, it was held that there is a vested right in the assessee to seek condonation of delay as per the law existing at the commencement of the proceedings, not affected by subsequent amendments. However, in Ganesh v. State of Tamil Nadu, it was ruled that the amendment restricting the power to excuse delay in filing revision petitions is an express exclusion of the Limitation Act, making petitions filed beyond the prescribed period not maintainable.

The court referred to the Supreme Court decision in Vinod Gurudas Raikar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., which clarified that the right to file an application is vested, but condonation of delay is not a vested right and must be governed by the law in force at the time of the delay. The court emphasized that the law regarding condonation of delay is procedural and should be applied based on the prevailing law at the time of filing the case. The decision in Vinod Gurudas Raikar's case was affirmed in Union of India v. Harnam Singh, establishing that there is no vested right in the course of procedure.

The judgment highlighted that conflicting decisions by High Courts cannot override Supreme Court decisions, as per Article 141 of the Constitution. The court concluded that the law as to condonation of delay is procedural and must be determined by the law in force at the time of the delay. Therefore, the decision in Aristo Paints was declared no longer valid, while the decision in Ganesh aligned with the Supreme Court's stance. The court also clarified that the decision in Hoosein Kasam Dada's case did not address the issue at hand.

In the specific cases considered, the court dismissed petitions where the delay exceeded the prescribed limit, even under the amended law. However, petitions with delays within the limit were allowed, and the delay was condoned. The court rectified an error regarding the delay in two petitions, allowing them for condonation due to a delay of only 8 days, contrary to the initial decision based on oversight.

In summary, the judgment emphasized that the law on condonation of delay is procedural, not a vested right, and must be determined by the law in effect at the time of the delay. It clarified conflicting views, upheld the application of the prevailing law, and rectified errors in specific cases based on the correct assessment of delay periods.