2000 (11) TMI 1200 - HC - VAT and Sales Tax

Issues:
1. Direction to Union of India and NSIC to make payment of statutory dues/arrears of sales tax and other dues/arrears.
2. Direction to Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi to restore the certificate of registration under the provisions of the Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1975.

Analysis:
1. The petitioner, a proprietorship concern, filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking directions for the payment of statutory dues/arrears of sales tax and other dues/arrears by the Union of India and NSIC. The petitioner had faced ex parte adjudications by sales tax authorities due to the non-supply of certain statutory declaration forms by NSIC, resulting in huge demands. Despite communication attempts, no fruitful result was achieved. The petitioner contended that the claims made were not exaggerated and sought relief for the outstanding payments. However, the respondent argued that the claims were highly exaggerated and disputed the amounts mentioned in the petition. Additionally, it was argued that the petitioner had not appeared before the sales tax authorities, leading to ex parte adjudications, and that the dispute was essentially a money claim not warranting a writ petition. The respondent highlighted previous legal actions taken by the petitioner, including a dismissed suit and a withdrawn writ petition, questioning the petitioner's intentions in filing the current petition. The respondent contended that the petition should not be entertained due to factual disputes and the belated nature of the claims.

2. The petitioner relied on a Supreme Court decision to support the argument that delay, by itself, may not defeat a claim for relief, especially if the position of the party had not been altered irreversibly due to the delay. The petitioner emphasized the importance of the writ remedy in cases where interpretation of a contract does not involve complicated factual questions requiring elaborate investigation. The petitioner argued that the High Court could exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 in such matters, especially when the facts pleaded do not necessitate extensive fact-finding. However, the Court referenced a recent Supreme Court case to highlight that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 are discretionary and should primarily be invoked for fundamental or legal rights, not mere contractual rights arising from agreements. The Court emphasized the need for special circumstances to deviate from settled legal principles regarding the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226. The Court noted that a casual approach in applying the right to livelihood in contractual matters for the purpose of invoking Article 226 jurisdiction should be avoided.

3. Referring to legal precedents, the Court underscored that in cases where the contract between the State and the aggrieved party is purely contractual and non-statutory, no writ or order can be issued under Article 226 to compel authorities to remedy a breach of contract. The Court cited various judgments to support this principle and highlighted that in the absence of constitutional or statutory rights being involved, a writ proceeding would not lie to enforce contractual obligations. The Court concluded that the petitioner's reliance on specific paragraphs of a judgment was misplaced as they addressed different issues not applicable to the present case. Consequently, the petition was dismissed based on the absence of statutory rights and the nature of the claims made by the petitioner.

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